SOME PROBLEMS OF CONCEPT AND METHOD IN STUDYING THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF REPUBLICAN TURKEY

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I. INTRODUCTION

In introducing the *International Review of Social History*, that prestigious journal which is currently published by our host, the International Institute of Social History, Prof. Rüter defined the scope of the discipline as follows: "Social history is taken to mean the history of estates, classes, social groupings regardless of name, seen both as separate and mutually dependent units."

I find this statement a useful starting point for the theme of this paper, i.e. "problems of concept and method in studying the social history of republican Turkey" for the following reasons:

First of all, Rüter makes it clear that classes and social groupings (and "estates", if you will) are the main units of analysis of social history. It follows that much confusion will prevail in our research unless we agree upon rigorous definitions and clarifications of the strategic concepts "social class" and "social group". I will later try to show that such a clarification would greatly help to eliminate a number ambiguities in social history studies of 20th century Turkey, even among those structured around class-based approaches.

Such a clarification will directly lead to the question of whether (in Rüter's words) social classes and/or groups should be "seen as separate or mutually dependent units". Although Rüter's eclectic statement leaves this controversial issue open, I believe that a definite position-taking on the problem is required. I will try to argue that the degree, form and nature of "mutual dependency" should be seen as a major feature in distinguishing social *classes* from social *groups* and that this is one area of confusion which affects studies on 20th century Turkish society.

Rüter's reference to the "history of classes etc." leads immediately to a number of essential and methodological issues. If we commit ourselves to a class conception based on "mutual dependency", it follows that inter-class relations and struggles will naturally fall within the scope of social history. But does it exclude anthropological and sociological histories of social groups in "relative isolation" from others? Moreover, and more importantly, is a social history of interrelationships between social classes and the State a feasible task which can be distinguished clearly from political history? I will answer this last question in the affirmative

-a question which, however, immediately leads to the tricky concept of "the ruling class". My discussion will attempt to show that historical studies on Republican Turkey suffer from a number of misinterpretations on this particular problem.

Historical studies structured around class-based frameworks require an effective combination of theoretical abstraction with an appropriate set of empirical tools and material. I will try to demonstrate that such a combination has been an extremely difficult one for studies on 20th century Turkey and that the double risks of "theoricism vs. empiricism" have rarely been avoided.

These are the issues which I will take up in this paper. The paper is structured around three sections where the conceptual framework, the problem of "the ruling class" and methodological problems around "empiricism vs. theoricism" will be discussed respectively. Constraints of time and space preclude a full-scale survey of studies relevant for the social history of 20th century Turkey. However, a discussion in the abstract is hardly possible for our theme. I have therefore opted for a half-way solution and decided to use a single source when discussion around my points require concrete examples of history-writing. This is a recent workby Çaglar Keyder, a prominent social historian of Republican Turkey. His book' is possibly the most appropriate single text for a discussion around the theme of this paper since it incorporates almost all the controversial positions with which I take issue.

II. SOCIAL CLASSES AND SOCIAL GROUPS: IS THE TURKISH BUREAUCRACY A "SOCIAL CLASS"?

If we intend to use social classes and social groups as basic units of analysis, we require an internally consistent and theoretically sound conceptual framework around which our definitions can be structured. I consider the *materialist interpretation of history* as the most appropriate theoretical attempt towards providing such a framework.

A fundamental proposition of historical materialism is that a particular class structure emanates from and, hence, corresponds to particular relations of production. As for various relations of production in class societies, they are defined and distinguished by specific mechanisms of extracting the surplus product from direct producers. This

initial extraction of the surplus constitutes primary relations of production.

If we come back to the issue raised in the introductory section of this paper, once we commit ourselves to the foregoing formulation, it becomes clear that social classes cannot be conceived "in isolation". A *specific duality of social classes*, in Rüter's words "mutually dependent on each other"; but also directly confronting each other, is therefore produced through particular *mechanisms of surplus extraction*. In other words, each class can only be defined with respect to its dialectical opposite within a distinguishable and well-defined mode of extracting the surplus product. Working class vs. the bourgeoisie, serfs vs. lords, , the slave vs. the master are the well-known class dualities which emerge from capitalist, feudal and slave modes respectively. These examples do not exhaust the possible and actual historical variations based on e.g. semi-feudal, "Asiatic", petty-commodity producing modes. I will elaborate how some of these patterns are observed in 20th century Turkey further on.

When we come to the task of clarifying *social groups/strata* and distinguishing them from classes, the concept of the *redistribution of the surplus product* has to be introduced. In each social formation the initial extraction of the surplus is modified through market and non-market processes of redistribution i.e. *secondary relations of distribution*. Those who participate in this redistribution process in specified forms or distinguishable regularities constitute and hence define social groups/strata. A division into two broad groups are called for in this context: *Sub-groups of economically dominant classes* should be distinguished from *intermediate social strata*. In the former case in a capitalist economy, an *internal division of surplus value* takes place between industrial, financial and commercial capital and rentiers as sub-groups of the bourgeoisie. In the latter case -and taking a capitalist economy as an example once again- surplus transfer to the bureaucracy, to the self-employed professionals or (in the Turkish case) to the so-called "marginal groups" takes place through the intermediation of the market or of the state.

The foregoing propositions carry a number of implications for social history studies of 20th century Turkey. Among these, I will take a single issue for discussion on which divergent perceptions of social class

lead to serious conflicting interpretations and misunderstandings. This is the question of whether the Turkish bureaucracy of the Republican era should be considered a social class or not. Those social scientists (among whom Keyder is a representative) who answer this question in the affirmative constitute a school of thought which evidently conflicts with our understanding of the theoretical framework defining class structures in various social formations.

This line of thinking considers the Republican (and before that the Young Turk) bureaucracy as an almost direct and uninterrupted continuation of the Ottoman "state class" into the 20th century. It is well known that that particular class -although rarely under the same term- has been considered as one of the major classes of the Ottoman social formation by the theoreticians of the "Asiatic mode of production" school. We should immediately note that such a class formation fully fits in with the conceptual framework and with the definition of social class I presented earlier since in this mode a particular mechanism of extracting the surplus (i.e. through various mechanisms of taxation such as the tithe) produces a specific duality of social classes peculiar to this mechanism: The state class on the side of surplus extractors and the tax-paying peasantry on the side of direct producers... In my view the theoretical consistency of such a class structure is beyond dispute. However, when we come to the question of whether the historical-empirical reality of the Ottoman society corresponds to such a model, the answer becomes less straight-forward with every chance that the issue will remain unresolved: The rival schools of thought with respect to this question -i.e. the "Asiatic" vs. the "feudalist" schools- have been using more or less the same historical material, but keep arriving at totally conflicting conclusions. This is, typically, a case where commitment to a particular "model" has become an act of faith and historical reality and empirical material have become subordinate to model-building. I will come back to this last and methodological question with respect to the Republican era at the last section of this paper.

Even if we accept the empirical validity of the existence of a "state class" during the classical Ottoman society, it is the effective identification of this class with the Young Turk/Republican bureaucracy of the 20th century that creates a host of problems. The substantiation of such a position requires an extremely in-depth exposition and analysis of

the internal transformation of the Ottoman state class into its modern form and also an extremely pain-staking analysis of the social origins and compositions of the modern bureaucracy as well as the individual biographies of its purported leading members (e.g. the Young Turk and Kemalist political cadres). Such an analysis is hardly undertaken[3].

Moreover, there is another and more fundamental *theoretical* difficulty with this particular treatment of the republican bureaucracy as a class -a difficulty which does not exist for the classical Ottoman period. Nobody can dispute the fact that the twentieth century bureaucracy is a salaried group within a modernised state structure. As the state finances became less and less dependent upon the taxation imposed upon agriculture during this century, one can hardly speak of the bureaucracy as a *social class* directly extracting a surplus from the peasantry within primary relations of production. The severance of the distributional trade-offs between the bureaucracy and the peasantry becomes complete and definite with the abolition of the tithe in 1925. The only interpretation consistent with the foregoing conceptual framework can consider the republican bureaucracy only as an intermediate social group which earns its revenues from a state budget to which the peasantry's contribution becomes mainly limited to its shares in indirect taxation. The bureaucracy with no direct trade-offs with a particular class may, however, include an upper echelon whose positions within the state enables conditions of material advantage originating from the hand-outs of the dominant economic classes. This is, however, a different question to which I shall return further on.

A simplified scheme reflecting the class structure and social stratification of the Turkish society during the republican period should, in my view, be constructed around the three observable relations of production, i.e. capitalist, semi-feudal modes and petty commodity production. The social classes which these modes create are, respectively, the working class vs. the bourgeoisie; landless (or small) tenant-farmers vs. landlords and market-oriented peasantry vs. merchants/moneylenders. This last group, to be considered a class in its full right, should be in its pre-capitalist forms. Four sub-groups of the bourgeoisie (industrial/agrarian, financial and commercial capital and rentiers) and three intermediate social strata (self employed and/or educated professionals, the bureaucracy and the so-called "urban marginals") can be

proposed as constituting the social groups subservient and peripheral to and outside the basic class structure.

III. SOCIAL CLASSES AND THE STATE: THE REPUBLICAN BUREAUCRACY AS THE RULING CLASS

In trying to delineate the scope of social history through Rüter's statement quoted above, when we come to an elaboration of the phrase "the *history* of classes and social groupings" the question we have to tackle is, evidently, "what kind of history?" This question immediately leads to a number of others: If it is wrong to define social classes in isolation, does it follow that the history of classes can only consist of the history of class struggles? But in that case, long periods in the evolution of social formations when class struggles appear to be dormant and take place only in the regularities of the economic domain ought to be excluded from social history's agenda. Such an orientation may also lead to the exclusion of those social groups whose participation within class struggles are extremely complicated and ambiguous. It is clear that narrow-minded answers to these question would result in limiting the scope of social history into an extremely contracted area of exceptional periods and events. In rejecting such a narrow approach I would even prefer to go one step further and propose that a historical approach based on class terms cannot exclude covering interrrelationships between social classes/groups and *the state*. State/class linkages should, therefore, be considered another area of investigation of social history.

I will discuss a few questions on historical investigations of state/class relations both in general terms and with respect to studies on twentieth century Turkey. In this case as well, a narrow interpretation which focuses on state/class relations only during those exceptional (i.e. revolutionary or counter-revolutionary) periods when classes engage in struggle for *the conquest of state power* would be counter-productive. It is unjustifiable to exclude those long and normal periods in the evolution of class societies when the decisive question of "which class rules?" has been resolved, but interrelationships between sub-groups of the ruling bloc and the state, as well as those between the subordinate social groups and the political superstructure are in flux.[4]

Do we have any theoretical guidelines for such an investigation? I believe that the best orientation is provided by a well-known thesis of the

materialist interpretation of history that during those periods of the "normal" evolution of social formations, the economically dominant (i.e. the major surplus-extracting) class controls the state as well. The changing internal balance of forces in-between the sub-groups of the dominant class determines the form and content of political power and this becomes an area of intra-class conflict, bargaining and compromise. Cases of coalitions between economically dominant *classes* for the control of state power can also be observed although -by the nature of things- these are destined to be unstable and usually correspond to historically transitory phases. A refined version of the same thesis emphasises the *relative autonomy of the state at certain moments: The scope of this autonomy area -or the existence of a relatively large area of freedom independent of economically dominant classes- expands during periods of transition from one mode of production to the other. And it is during such transitory periods that this relative autonomy is occasionally mis-perceived by the observer, or even the social scientist, as if it is the state functionaries, the civil servants, in short the bureaucracy itself which was the ruling class.*

This misperception is widespread among the scholars of those countries with long traditions of strong states and of authoritarian rule and it is natural that we should observe the same interpretation among social scientists and historians of twentieth century Turkey. This interpretation is objectionable not only because of its treatment of the bureaucracy as a social class -which I have already criticised above- but also because it sees the administrators of state functions throughout centuries of Ottoman rule and throughout the republican period as a single ruling class maninly undifferentiated in time.

The typical Turkish version of this approach, particularly in its newly acquired "liberal left" version sees the whole history of 19th and 20th century Ottoman/Turkish societies as a "class struggle" between two classes: The bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. Although there are ups and downs in this struggle and phases of collaboration and coalitions, it is mainly seen as a struggle around the strategic question on who will be the ruling class. The conquest of the State power by the Young Turks and Kemalists in 1908 and 1920-1923 cannot be perceived as "historical ruptures", let aside as "revolutions" by this perspective, but rather as incidences of political conflicts between different factions of the

traditional ruling class and is to be distinguished from the major class conflict of the period -e.g. the bureaucracy/bourgeoisie conflict. Although advocates of this school see a gradual strengthening in the relative position of the bourgeoisie during the decades, the outcome is far from being resolved even as we approach the end of the century: Phases of progress of the bourgeoisie are followed almost without exception with periods of comebacks of the bureaucracy. The 1960, 1971 and 1980 military coups are interpreted as bureaucratic-military comebacks of this nature and the definite commitment of the post-1980 junta to the economic (and even the political and constitutional) program of the bourgeoisie is not explained. In slightly different phraseology, the Turkish history of the 20th century is seen as a continuous, pendulum-like and unresolved struggle between the State and Civil Society. The "left" and the working masses of the Turkish society are invited to join the active forces struggling for "civil society" the vanguard of which has always been the bourgeoisie. An undercurrent in this intellectual tradition represented ,among others, by Keyder carries the same story only up to 1950, the year of Democratic Party's victory over the Kemalist party after which the bourgeoisie is admitted to have moved into a more permanent position of strength[6].

The main flaw with this story of an all-powerful bureaucracy in its (classical and Western-styled) Ottoman, and then Young Turk, and finally Kemalist garbs but with no distinction in its social character and function as the only ruling class from the 14th (or 15th?) century up to the second half of the 20th century is its extreme simplicity: It moves over the six hundred years of history like a tank, levels all the hills and holes into a flat area and claims to explain everything. I have always doubted that those magic formulas which seem to explain everything but are actually devoid of substance. The theory of the bureaucracy as the (almost) perpetual ruling class suffers from a number of complications. The reluctance to define or delineate the bureaucracy with rigour and empirical clarity is one complication which I will discuss in the next section. Relations of the "bureaucracy" with the bourgeoisie is another complication which I will take up now.

When the theoretician or historian committed to the "Asiatic" mode of production models depicts the classical Ottoman "state class", he/she paints a picture in which this ruling class attempts to hinder as far as

possible the emergence of rival centres of economic power based on various forms of property and wealth and succeeds in this endeavour with respect to the Moslem population up to the end of the 20th century. But when the same theoretician (like Keyder) moves into the 20th century, particularly from 1914 onwards, he continues to tell the story of the same ruling class, albeit with a "reformist" facade, shifting to a strategy of nurturing and supporting the newly emerging Turkish bourgeoisie. This is not a one-way street: The higher echelons of the bureaucracy enrich themselves as a matter of policy and legitimately between 1914-1930 and illicitly during the 1930s and 1940s. As a result of this process, for example during the etatist period, "it becomes difficult to distinguish between the top ranks of the political class and industrial bourgeoisie,...merged into a coalition...[of a] ruling bloc,...with conflicts remaining [only] at the level of dividing the spoils."[6]

The question is well worth asking if these writers are speaking of the same social reality in referring to the Ottoman state class of the classical period with a definite bias against individual enrichment and to the Young Turk and Kemalist political cadres with intimate and mutually beneficial linkages with the bourgeoisie when they write sweepingly about the "bureaucracy as a ruling class" to analyse both phenomena. The reluctance to define and delineate operationally the strategic concept of "the bureaucracy" evidently is one major cause of the difficulties. However, and more importantly, it is evident that the analytical concept utilised here is not refined enough to capture the complex socio-economic phenomena occurring in the 20th century. In looking at the same phenomena of the state-bourgeoisie links, an alternative explanation based on the "embourgeoisiement" of the political cadres following the collapse of the empire -a period during which the autonomy of the state had considerably and inevitably broadened- and the gradual conquest of the state by a bloc of economically dominant classes finalised not in 1950, but in 1946 seems a much more productive one. Once we liberate ourselves from the in-built dogmas of the model, it immediately becomes clear that the myth of "the bureaucracy as the ruling class" during the 20th century (or the first half thereof) is a totally redundant one.

IV. EMPIRICISM VS. THEORICISM: SOME METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS:

Like most branches of social sciences, historical investigations confront the risk of falling into either one of the two methodological extremes: Empiricism vs. theoricism.

Empiricism as the widespread deviation in mainstream Turkish historians is characterised by an extreme down-to-earth approach based on detailed archive material and empirical investigation and by the rejection the usefulness of any societal theory or of conceptual framework on relatively high levels abstraction to explain the long-term (historical) movements of social systems. With respect to social history, empiricism does not reject the utilization of class-based concepts, but excludes any commitment to *any* theory of history (i.e. historical materialism) aiming to explain the long-term dynamics of class societies.

Theoricism in social history, on the other hand, is a more common disorder within the ranks of radical and/or Marxian-oriented social scientists and manifests itself in an excessive commitment to theoretical models coupled with selective use of empirical material in a sloppy way so as to support the pre-conceived theoretical scheme. It is, perhaps, not coincidental that in Turkey this tendency is mainly represented by non-historian social scientists whose direct contributions to our pool of historical findings are not extremely impressive and whose theoretical contributions are usually received with disparaging -and in many cases unjustified- indifference by professional historians.

A social scientist who, for example, defines his objectives in historical investigation as "focus[ing] on the relations among dominant classes and fractions and their attempts to attain, maintain and employ state power"[7] is almost automatically preparing a trap for himself unless he takes extreme care to protect his work from the methodological biases of theoricism. Such an agenda (e.g. for 20th century Turkey)induces the theoretician to narrate a story structured around a few actors -e.g. industrial and commercial bourgeoisies, the bureaucracy and -in second rate and passive roles- the working class and the peasantry. A pre-conceived scenario allocates well-defined roles to these actors. Such a story cannot be narrated unless it is assumed that each one of these actors -e.g. classes- possesses a unified and single will with respect to its economic and political interests and acts accordingly and consistently.

Such a story-telling makes extremely interesting and exciting reading. But the reader may occasionally remember that what he is studying is not fiction, but social science. A researcher who takes social classes or groups thereof and intermediate social strata as the units of analysis of social history should not commit himself to this fictional and abstract methodological bias. He is not justified to disregard the extreme diversity, conflicting internal interests, elements of false consciousness and the unavoidable unpredictability -which is always present in social processes since they involve human beings- within each class, group or stratum. In practical terms this means that the researcher must be satisfied with establishing only general tendencies and loose and broad regularities with respect to the actions and economic and political destinies of these social actors. And even these modest conclusions can only be obtained on the basis of extremely systematic use and cautious interpretation of historical and empirical material.

It must be admitted that many contributions to 20th century Turkish social history suffer from the theoricist's disorder. A typical case in point refers to the lack of any clear-cut definition of "the bureaucracy" in those studies in which this group is treated as the ruling class of republican Turkey. We do not know, for example in Keyder's book, if this "class" includes the totality of civil servants only or the educated professional self-employed, the intelligentsia in general as well. Or does the group include merely the political cadres, but only up to 1950 whatever their ideological orientations and social roots may be? After 1950 are we entitled to include only those political cadres with particular ideological orientations and political links (e.g. those belonging to the RPP or those serving the military governments) within the ranks of this "class"? And after 1980, for example, where are we supposed to place the mass of the civil servants who, by the dramatic erosion of their salaries, are gradually moving into the shanty-town areas of urban centres and are forced to the life-styles and consumption norms of the proletariat? Should we evict them from the ranks of the bureaucracy? Or, maybe, has the bureaucracy as a class disappeared altogether when it was removed from power (in 1950) or when the incomes of the group as whole deteriorated dramatically (post-1980)? These are the types of questions remaining unanswered in most contributions on republican bureaucracy.

As for the treatment of social classes/groups as actors in a pre-conceived scenario, a few examples may be in order: "The [19th century] bureaucracy...tended to favour a model of capitalist integration promising to uphold the claims of state functionaries as a surplus receiving class." "The bureaucracy [in the 1930s] reacted against incorporation into the capitalist system, and a class struggle ensued between it and the burgeoning bourgeoisie." "The poorer peasantry...preferred economic freedom in the form of market opportunity, although not as fervently as middle and rich peasants." "It was highly unlikely that [after 1960] any significant group within the bureaucracy...would advocate a prolonged regime...outside Western parliamentarism." "[The 1960 coup was] a marriage between bureaucratic hopes and the manufacturing bourgeoisie's demands." "Shanty towners reproduced...the anti-elite resentment they had carried with them." "[Following 1980] the bourgeoisie as a whole...made the choice for restricted democracy...[and] self-employed petty producers supported the new [post-1980] orientation."[8]

These statements, all from Keyder, are supported by extremely loose and unsystematic empirical evidence and reasoning. I am aware that once we move into the level of abstraction embodied in the foregoing statements, their empirical substantiation usually emerges as a formidable and, at times, impossible task. I am also convinced of the occasional necessity to work at this level of abstraction. However, an excessive tendency to disregard altogether the task to formulate, construct and systematise criteria or indicators based on economic, political, legal or ideological information to support such theoretical assertions can hardly be defended. Otherwise, it may be always possible to substitute one set of abstract statements for another and contradictory set without even bothering to change the empirical ground but merely make different theoretical interpetationson the basis of the same historical facts. There is, evidently, no limit to variations on these themes unless methodological discipline is introduced into the use empirical/historical information.

What kind of empirical guidelines can one propose to salvage social history of republican Turkey from the excessive theoricism afflicting some of our researchers? I believe that any historical investigation on the present century must make good use of the empirical material and findings emanating from various disciplines of social sciences and even from

unconventional sources.I will conclude this paper by suggesting a few ideas in this direction:

An essential element of social history investigations of republican Turkey should be seen as *quantitative indicators of primary and secondary relations of distribution*. The availability of this group of empirical inputs will eliminate all pretext for making speculative statements on changes in the relative economic positions of social classes/groups on the basis of which class positions are usually built. Wages/value added ratios and/or real wage, employment and labour productivity series are the relevant indicators of capitalist relations of production. For petty commodity production -with respect to the peasantry- changes either in the terms of trade for agriculture or in the commercial margins between prices paid by final users and prices received by farmers of agricultural (or agriculture-based) commodities represent changes in the rates of surplus extraction from the peasantry. Under certain types of market structures facing petty commodity production the former indicator can be assumed to represent surplus extraction by industrial capital and the latter that by merchant capital. For semi-feudal relations, land-rent per unit of agricultural output or real rents per unit of land, and changes thereof can be used. With respect to secondary relations of distribution, interest rates and share of interest payments (or of revenues) within gross profits (or within GDP); a refined breakdown of the structure of relative prices leading to estimates on commercial margins and profits in various sectors; and non-agricultural rents in real and relative terms reflect the internal sharing of the surplus. Trends in the share of civil service salaries within non-agricultural GDP, salaries in real termscan be used as indicators of distribution for "the bureaucracy" as an intermediate social stratum. For the calculation of some of these indicators, conventional statistics do provide the appropriate basis[9]. For others -e.g. those relating to semi-feudal rents, incomes accruing to self-employed professionals or to the "marginal population"- field work by different specialists can provide the necessary data.

In order to comprehend the incidence of economic and social policies emanating from the state, and to assess them from the viewpoint of class positions, the researcher should have a full grasp of the mechanisms through which these policies are decided upon and are implemented. This

goes beyond a mere overview of the formal channels and requires a full analysis of how particular groups penetrate and influence decision-making at the political level. Without such an investigation it becomes difficult either to reject or validate those speculative formulations on class/state inter-relationships some of which I have criticised above.

With respect to the "history of classes and of social groupings", particularly on the day-to-day struggles of various groups, there should be, in my view no taboos on the utilization of unconventional sources of gathering information and of empirical material. From sociological and anthropological field research to journalistic and even literary contributions, there exists an immense area of untapped information sources for the social historian once he/she is willing to move into an unorthodox style of work.

Finally, investigations on class ideologies in their immense variations and in flux have traditionally remained the most speculative area for the Turkish social investigators. The Turkish intellectual and political life of the present century is varied and rich enough to provide the raw materials for an analysis of ideological positions. What is missing is the lack of appropriate theoretical and methodological tools for linking individual or institutional viewpoints, positions and actions to particular social classes and groups, for distinguishing the various layers of ideology or for decomposing an apparently single doctrine into its different ideological components. Without a refined and extremely careful endeavour in this direction, any statement on "bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, official, dominant, working class, bureaucratic" ideologies become, at best, merely working hypotheses and, at worst, empty and speculative assertions devoid of any substance.

Let me end on a somewhat optimistic note concerning the future of social history of republican Turkey with a Turkish saying: "We have the sugar, the flour, the oil; but where is the pudding?" All the elements of a grand synthesis of Turkish social history for the 20th century exist, both at empirical and theoretical levels; but the expected output of high standards is yet to be produced. However there are signs that we will not wait too long before starting to enjoy the pudding.

NOTES

1. Ç.Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, Verso 1987, London. Keyder, as far as I know, is the only Turkish social scientist who has labelled his own work as "social history". See his *Toplumsal Tarih Çalismalari*, Dost 1984, Ankara.

2. In Keyder's words, in the Ottoman social formation, "functionaries constitute a state-class...based on the extraction of surplus (in the form of taxes) from an independent peasantry." (*State and Class in Turkey*, *op.cit.*, p.26.)

3. In Keyder's story, sometime in the 18th or 19th century, and out of the blue, emerges "a new 'modern' faction within the bureaucracy,...[with a] more secular conception of state power, [and]...a version of reformism." And this "bureaucracy tended to favour a model of capitalist integration promising to uphold the claims of state functionaries as a surplus receiving class." (*Ibid.*, pp.28,29) This is as far as Keyder goes in explaining the transformation of the classical Ottoman "state-class" into the Young Turk/Republican bureaucracy. The author may feel justified to paint a picture of an extremely smooth transformation just because he asserts that this is no new class formation, but indeed a perfect continuation of the same class into a modern era. However,I don't feel any social scientist is justified to eliminate his/her theoretical, analytical and empirical difficulties merely by simplifying assertions.

4. Histories of states or of inter-state relations in the narrow sense would naturally fall outside the scope of social history, to be covered by conventional (e.g. "political") history.

5. In Keyder's understanding, if there is a single revolutionary rupture in the evolution of Ottoman and Turkish societies, it is the electoral victory of Democratic Party in 1950 seen (in his words) as "a fundamental break in Turkish history...against a statist tradition several centuries old...[leading to] the bureaucracy's subordination to the bourgeoisie during the subsequent phase." (*Ibid.* pp.124,127.)

6. *Ibid.* pp.106-107.

7. *Ibid.* p.4.

8. *Ibid.* pp.29, 2, 127, 141, 145, 207, 225-226 respectively. These critical observations on the theoricist bias in Keyder's recent book should not be interpreted as a criticism of Keyder's previous contributions which had, for example, enriched our empirical knowledge and theoretical understanding of Turkey during the 1920s and and of Turkish agrarian structures.

9. See K.Boratav, *Die türkische Wirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert (1908-1980)*, Dagyeli 1987, Frankfurt and K.Boratav, *Türkiye Iktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985*, Gerçek 1988, Istanbul for time series covering the whole republican period of most of the above-mentioned indicators of distribution.