## Tosio Iwamura

# The Japanese Communist Movement

The Japanese Communists as well as the Comintern expected the Japanese Communist movement to develop more rapidly than the Korean and even than the Chinese Communist movement. Today everybody knows the gap between the reality and wishful thinking as regards the development of the Communist movement in prewar Japan.

The Communist movement in Japan took place in the 1920-1930s, although the Japanese people could harldy ever have their own nation-wide, independent, ideological mass organizations. Here neither Christian socialism nor social-democracy as mass movements had preceded the Communist movement. Anyhow, the latter suddenly made its first appearance and had some effect on the masses.

The development of the prewar Japanese Communist Party (*Nihon Kyosanio*; JCP) can be divided into three periods, turning twice: at the dissolution of the First Party in April 1924 and at the suppression in March 1928. Roughly speaking, the first and second period of tehe Japanese prewar Communist movement coincided with the late period of the Taisyo Democracy.<sup>2</sup>

During the First World War monopoly capitalism was firmly established in Japan too. Consequently the economic and social contradictions became more intensified. It inevitably led to a change of the Taisyo Democracy.

In August and September 1918 the nation-wide Rice Riots first showed that "in the second half of the Taisyo Democracy period the driving force came from the new middle class of the city. [...] this driving force was assisted by the working and tenant farmer classes. [...] Awakened to their political power at the time of the Rice Riots, the masses formed various organizations one after another from 1919 to 1922". In a sense the foundation of the JCP in 1921 was a bastard of the Taisyo Democracy.

Politically, the late Taisyo Democracy period saw the semi-absolutist-dualist monarchy go nearest to the parliamentary monarchy in prewar Japan; however, as our bastard also often did so, "the pioneer labour organizations in a position to lead the proletarian classes vainly dreamed of realizing a socialist system in a single bound, and were almost totally ignorant of the value of the struggle for political freedom".

One of the most authoritative Japanese historians on the Taisyo Democracy, Takayosi Matuo, has a good reason to indicate the following: "Had the JCP followed instructions from Moscow (see Draft Programme of the Communist Party of Japan, 1922) and participated in the universal suffrage movement, and had they succeeded in getting the liberal middle class to concentrate around them, the tide of Japanese democracy would have been able to press more heavily for the transformation of the old ruling structure."

Naturally we can not make any reference to this point of an argument, because the JCP couldn't readily get rid of such a barrier even afterwards. It disturbed the JCP in its own work, above all, in the third period, when the most broad strata of the people should have been gathered about itself against monarchy-fascism and war since the Great Depression of 1929. Now the above-mentioned widening gap became incurable.

Indeed the Japanese Communist movement also had always had the other tendency to close the gap, but this was too weak and too late. If we would like to discuss the history of the JCP in particular, taking into

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 1917-1923, 3 Vols (London, 1950-1953, p. 527; Tosio Iwamura, *Nihon zinmin sensen so zyosetu* [An Introduction to the History of the Japanese Popular Front] (Tokyo, 1971), pp. 252-263.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For the Taisyo Democracy see Takayosi Matuo, "The Development of Democracy in Japan", *The Developing Economies*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 1966). The name of the era "Taisyo" extends from 1911 to 1926, but it is possible that "Taisyo Democracy" covers a longer period.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 616, 628 (italicized by T.I.). See also Takayosi Matuo, *Taisyo demokurasi no gunzo* [A Group in the Taisyo Democracy] (Tokyo, 1990), pp. 3, 12-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Matuo, "The Development of Democracy in Japan", p. 636. See also Matuo, *Taisyo demokurasi no gunzo*, p. 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Matuo, "The Development of Democracy in Japan", pp. 632-633. See also Matuo, *Taisyo demokurasi* no gunzo, p. 17.

account its relations with the Comintern,6 we cannot lose sight of such a disputed point.

## 1. Birth and Rebirth of the First Party

The date of the founding of the Japanese Communist Party has been officially regarded as 15 July 1922. It has been believed as if then the Constituent Congress of the JCP had taken place in Tokyo. But, in my view, this is not only very questionable, but also the JCP may have been already founded in March 1921. This is a fairly important point of an argument, if we adequately take notice of the Comintern turn towards a united front policy, adopted by its Third Congress in July 1921.

Previously Nikolai Ivanovič Bucharin returned home from the United States by way of Tokyo, where he, in April 1917, visited a prominent Japanese socialist, Tosihiko Sakai, bearing a letter of introduction by Sen Katayama. In the middle of the following year, Sebald Rutgers also stayed in Yokohama and Tokyo for two

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Among the studies in European languages are: A. Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action 1919-1951 (Cambridge, Mass., 1952); Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement 1920-1966 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967); George M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, The Japanese Communist Party 1922-1945 (Stanford, 1969); Ivan Ivanovič Kovalenko, Očerki istorii kommunističeskogo dviženija v Japonii do vtoroj mirovoj vojny (Moscow, 1979). Except for the first, each of them contains a bibliography. See also Central Committee of the JCP, Fifty Years of the Japanese Communist Party, rev. and enlgd. ed. (Tokyo, 1980). As regards the available publications of documents in Japanese, the following books must be mentioned: Youti Murata (ed.), Kominterun sirvosyu [Collected Documents on the Comintern], 7 Vols (Tokyo, 1978-1985) and Sirvosyu Kominterun to nihon [Collected Documents: the Comintern and Japan], 3 Vols [Tokyo, 1986-1988). Both works are appreciated in Japan and abroad. Their bibliographies in European languages also are very useful. Concerning the collected microfilms of documents in Russian their contents are found in M.I. Luk'janova [et al.] (eds), Bibliografija Japonii, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1960). But they contain neither the non-Russian literatures nor the works written by nonrehabilitated purged opponents. Except for these, they exclude all newspaper articles. These faults can be partially made up for by the second above-mentioned work of Y. Murata. With respect to the bibliographies in Japanese, reliable is Hirotake Koyama, Nihon syakai undo-si kenkyu si ron [Historical Reviews of Studies of the History of the Japanese Social Movement), 2 Vols (Tokyo, 1976-1979). The author was one of the prominent specialists in the history of the JCP. He wrote many works, including Nihon marukususyugi si gaisetu [An Outline of the History of Japanese Marxism], enlgd, ed. (Tokyo, 1970). As to the list of the Japanese authorities' documents see Kei Komori, "Syaka undo siso kankei siryo saimoku [Items on the Materials concerning the Social Movement and Thought]" in Undosi Kenkyu [Journal of Movement History], No. 1-7 (February 1978 - February 1981). The author had served for a very long time as a clerk in charge of this sphere in the Institute for Social Science, Tokyo University, which has one of the most important archives on the Japanese social movement history. In addition, as the only specialized biographical dictionary famous is Syobei Siota [et al.] (eds), Nihon syaka, undo zinmei ziten [Biographical Dictionary of the Japanese Social Movement] (Tokyo, 1979). It contains many items on members and former members of the prewar JCP and its sympathizers but lacks biographies of foreigners, including Koreans who were active in Japan.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Jahrbuch für Politik, Wirtschaft und Arbeiterbewegung 1922-1923 (Hamburg, 1923), pp. 853-855. The, at first sight, very vivid memoirs of Kiyosi Takase on the so-called Constituent Congress of the JCP of 15 July 1922 are unreliable, referring only to the records of the weather at that time. In detail see Tosio Iwamura, "Otenki to rekisi: Nihon Kyosanto soritu sinwa [The Weather and the History: The Myth of the Foundation of the Japanese Communist Party]", Siso [Ideal], No. 715 (Jan. 1984). It is worth noticing that Takayosi Matuo also altered his own view on this point. In his article "The development of Democracy in Japan, p. 632, he wrote that "the JCP was organized in the summer of 1922", in his newest book Taisyo demokurasi no gunzo, p. 17, he says: "the JCP was founded in 1921".

months in similar circumstances, to acquaint himself with Sakai. During the First Comintern Congress in March 1919 Rutgers delivered the greetings and the resolution in favor of the Russian Revolution and against the Japanese intervention in Siberia as adopted by the executive of the Group of Socialists in Tokyo-Yokohama (Tokyo-Yokohama syakaisyugisya-dan zikko-iinkai). Vladimir Il'ič Lenin had vainly intended to have this Dutch act for a Japanese delegate in the Congress. There is much likelihood that his close friend Sen Katayama would still have sympathized with the Dutch radicals for some time. 10

At last, in July 1920 the Japanese Socialist League (Nihon Shakaisyugi Domei) was founded at Tokyo, being only a scratch team whose affiliated groups were mostly tiny and ideologically diverging, except in Osaka, isolated from mass labour organizations like the most powerful reformist trade union, the Japanese General Federation of Labour (Nihon Rodo Sodomei or Sodomei).

One of its anarchist leaders, Sakae Osugi, visited Shanghai to contact with a Comintern representative, Grigorij Naumovič Vojtinskij, in October 1920, but it was another leading socialist, Tosihiko Sakai, and his anarcho-syndicalist companions like Kanson Arahata, Hitosi Yamakawa and others who took the initiative of founding the JCP in Japan in March 1921. Attending the Third Comintern Congress with Unzo Taguti, who lived in the United States, Taro Yosihara first revealed the fouding in the session of 12 July, adding that he just received the Manifesto and the Rules of the JCP before a few days only. Being drafted by Hitosi Yamakawa and approved in the Inaugural Meeting of the JCP in March 1921, both the Manifesto and the Rules were published in the magazine Narody Dal' nego Vostoka (Irkutsk, No. 4, 15 September 1921).

But there was another current in the genesis of the JCP. Being ordered to depart from the United Kingdom by the Scotland Yard, a British Communist of Japanese origin, Sanzo Nosaka, returned home via several European countries in April 1922, bringing with him the newest Comintern policy. He had lived as a correspondent for the Sodomei in London from August 1919 to May 1921; there he joined the British Socialist Party in the early summer of 1920 and automatically took part in founding the British Communist Party in July 1920.

The German Communist Party (KPD) achieved something new at the Eleventh Congress of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschafs-Bund (ADGB) in June 1922 to win the broad masses of its members. In the autumn of 1921 Nosaka had visited the headquarters of both the ADGB and the KPD in Berlin, where he met Fritz Heckert to ask for help with regard to his own trip to Moscow. In the winter of 1921 Aleksandr Losovskij invited Nosaka to his office in Moscow to inform him about the new Profintern policy for national trade union unity in each country.<sup>11</sup>

As soon as he returned to Tokyo in the spring of 1922, Nosaka had the firm intention to bridge the gap between the tiny JCP and the developing reformist Sodomei.

Consequently Yamakawa, Arahata and other Japanese Communist leaders suddenly determined in the middle of July that they would finally break with Sakae Osugi and other anarchists to approach Suehiro Nisio and other Sodomei leaders. The conflict between anarchism and so-called Bolshevism came to a head on 30 September 1922, when anarchists were defeated at a convention in Osaka and began to loose influence since.<sup>12</sup>

Besides Sanzo Nosaka newcomers like Katumaro Akamatu and Kenzo Yamamoto in Tokyo or Sadatika Nabeyama and Kiyosi Koiwai in Osaka ought to have known their own role to exercise a great influence on the Sodomei.

In January 1922 the Far Eastern Peoples' Congress took place in Moscow. In its opening session, it was, in my opinion, an anarcho-syndicalist, Hajime Yosida (using Yozi Kato as a pseudonym), who addressed the participants as the representative of the Japanese delegation, though among the presidum members accompanying

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See Eitaro Kisimoto and Hirotake Koyama, *Katayama Sen* [Sen Katayama], 2 Vols (Tokyo, 1959-1960, Vol. 2, pp. 61, 101.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Murata, Siryosyu kominterun to nihon, Vol. 1, pp. 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Tosio Iwamura, Kominterun to Nihon Kuosanto no seiritu [Comintern and the Foundation of the Japanese Communist Party] (Tokyo, 1977), pp. 121-122.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See Sanzo Nosaka, Fusetu no ayumi [Meet Wind and Snow], 8 Vols (Tokyo, 1971-1989), Vol. 3, pp. 229-311.

<sup>12</sup> Iwamura, "Otenki to rekisi [...]".

him were Sen Katayama and Unzo Taguti, who had become Communists while living in the United States. At least until this Congress the honeymoon of anarchists and Communists was not over in Japan as well as in China and Korea, where even nationalists joined in it. The polysemous word "peoples" in the title of the congress had not faded yet.<sup>13</sup>

Indeed Grigorij Vojtinskij praised himself for the "tatsächliche Vereinigung" between Japanese anarchosyndicalists and Communists in the Congress, but he and other Comintern officials must soon have taken notice
that Japanese "people", namely the masses of the people, were left alone. In this respect July 1922 was exactly
the date of the rebirth of the JCP.

By the way, Sanzo Nosaka left Moscow before the Far Eastern Peoples' Congress, in contrast to Kyu'iti Tokuda, who all his life took a pride in his own attendance at the Congress. <sup>14</sup> The latter never appreciated the meaning of "rebirth" of the JCP, very unlike the former.

Among the newcomers to the JCP from the United States were, posides Sen Katayama and Unzo Taguti, several other prominent activists, e.g. Tunao Inomata, Suekiti Maniwa, Masayuki Nonaka and Mosaburo Suzuki. They had the significant experience there, in which a Latvian "captain" and future Comintern instructor to the JCP, Karlis Jansons, took the lead, though his name is -carelessly - hardly ever mentioned in any dictionary.<sup>15</sup>

Having in view Lenin's advice, he played a vital part in founding the legal Worker's Parties in America and in Canada in December 1921 and February 1922 as "die mit dem Kommunismus sympathisierende Partei". 16

Before he arrived in Tokyo in June 1925, the newcomers from the United States were authorized by him to make use of their experience for the Japanese social movement. Bringing forth the "Draft Programme of the Communist Party of Japan", the Fourth Comintern Congress instructed the JCP to adopt several immediate demands; e.g. "universal franchise" and "complete freedom of workers' parties" besides "abolition of the monarchy".' In this respect, besides S. Nosaka and his companions, the Inomtaite-Suzukiite faction played an indispensable role in the removal of the anarcho-syndicalist rests from their leaders Kanson Arahata and Hitori

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Tosio Iwamura, "Kyokuto Kinrosya Taikai kaikaisiki hatugensya no nazo [A Riddle of a Speaker in the Opening Session of the Far Eastern Toilers' Congress]", Siso, No. 295 (May 1979). The several Far Eastern languages lack a polysemous word which means both "masses of people" and "nation". Consequently, by each delegation of the Far Eastern countries, the term "people" should have taken in different senses and should have been rendered exactly into each appropriate word. For this point see Tosio Iwamura, "Kyokuto Kinrosya Taikai nihon daigiindan saitaku koryo [The Program adopted by the Japanese delegation in the Far Eastern Toilers' Congress]", Sirin [Journal of History], Vol. 62, No. 3 (May 1979), pp. 137-139.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See Nosaka, *Fusetu no ayumi*, Vol. 3, pp. 289-296; Kyu'iti Tokuda and Yosio Siga, Gokutyu zvuhati nen [18 Years in Jail] (Tokyo, 1947), p. 32.

biografija (Moscow, 1988). For biographis of Taguti and Suzuki see Masahiro Ogino, Tyosi naki syuen: Intanasyonarisuto Taguti Unzo [The End of the Life without Any Poem of Condolence: The Internationalist Unzo Taguti] (Tokyo, 1983); Tetuzo Suzuki, Suzuki Mosaburo: Syakaisyugi undo si no iti danmen [Mosaburo Suzuki: An Aspect of the History of the Socialist Movement], 2 Vols (Tokyo, 1982-). For the biography of Jansons see Valentine Šteinbergs, Čārlzs Skots no Latvijas [Charls Scot from Latvia] (Riga, 1985); Valentin Augustovič Štejnberg, Čarlz Skott, ego druz'ja i vragi. O Karle Jansone (Moscow, 1983). See also the Japanese revised edition of these biographies in the Ohara Syakai-mondai Kenkyusyo Zassi [Ohara Institute for Social Research Journal], Nos 374-392 (January 1990 - July 1991), translated and supplemented by Yoiti Murata. By the way, in the Soviet Union it was not revealed until recently that Jansons was a Comintern representative in Japan, and this was still the case in the Latvian periodical Komunists of 25 July, 1989; however, the Sovetskaya Latviya of 2 August, 1990, broke the taboo to reprint the comment of Murata from the above-mentioned journal.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Fridrich Igorevič Firsov, Lenin, Komintern i stanovlenie kommunističeskich partij (Moscow, 1985), pp. 258, 291-292.

#### 2. The Inheritance of the First Party and the Birth of the Front Organizations

Indeed, after the arrests of some eighty of its members and sympathizers on 5 June 1923 and the assassination of Sakae Osugi and other Japanese socialists as well as thousands of Korean immigrants under cover of the great Tokyo earthquake on 1 September 1923, the JCP ended its ephemeral early period with the decision to disband itself without any Comintern sanction in April 1924, though the Fourth Comintern Congress had officially recognized it as the Japan section of the Comintern in November 1922. Above all, the white terror under the Tokyo earthquake also shocked the Communists who had been detained in the Itigaya jail in Tokyo at that time. The following remark of one of them, Kiyosi Koiwai, is worth to be cited here: "'They say that the socialists agitate the Koreans to commit cruelties.' Such a rumour was talked about by general prisoners every day. [...] Before anything else, we suddenly realized that we socialists were too unpopular and not understood among the average people. They do not know at all what socialism is. Whenever will the Japanese proletariat be emancipated, if they go on this way? Socialism should wipe a past disgrace to be literally theirs."

But the First Japanese Communist Party left a heritage, e.g. the Selfguard-Aid Association (Bo'en-kai) and the Industrial Labour Research Bureau (Sangyo Rodo Tyosasyo or Sanro). On 20 April 1923 the former came into existence on the initiative of Mosaburo Suzuki, who, during his stay in the United States, had experienced the battle of the American Communists against the Palmer raids. On 1 March 1924 the latter was founded by Sanzo Nosaka after the example of the Labour Research Department in London, whose secretary was Nosaka's friend R.P. Arnot. Although the Ohara Institute for Social Research (Ohara Syakai-mondai Kenkyusyo or Ohara Syaken) had been founded on 9 February 1919 in Osaka, Nosaka intended a similar institute in Tokyo. By the way, both these institutes were in the possession of the prominent Comintern archives. Whereas the Ohara Syaken moved to Tokyo in 1937 and merged with Hosei University after the war, the Sanro was deprived of its archives by the authorities in May 1933, just before its closing.

Besides these there were other front organizations like the so-called "Left" and the Federation of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Tosio Iwamura, Kominterun to Nihon Kyosanto no seiritu [Comintern and the Foundation of the Japanese Communist Party] (Tokyo, 1977), chapters 2 and 3. For the passive attitude of the Japanese Communists toward the universal suffrage movement, see also Takayosi Matuo, Futusenkyo seido seiritu si no kenkyu [Studies of the History of the Establishment of the Universal Suffrage System] (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 248-254, 289-295, 301-305, 325-327.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For the diverse aspects of the JCP at the early period, the so-called First Communist Party, see also Giiti Inumaru, Nihon Kyosanto no soritu [The Foundation of the Japanese Communist Party] (Tokyo, 1982) and Masahisa Kawabata, Kominterun to nihon [Comintern and Japan] (Kyoto, 1982), even if both of them contain several assertions under dispute and Kawabata handles the more limited period before January 1922. For the mass assassination of Korean immigrants under cover of the Tokyo earthquake, see in English Michael Weiner, "Koreans in the Aftermath of the Kanto Earthquake of 1923", in Immigrants and Minorities, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 1983). In prewar Japan, taking the accused of a supposed offense to court for trial, the judicial authorities drew up three kinds of documents, i.e. the protocol of the explanation by the judicial police officer, one by the prosecutor, and the protocol of the preliminary examination by the judge. They are important materials for the studie of the history of the JCP, but not all of them are available now. For the First JCP, however, a part of them were printed in Takayosi Matuo (ed.), Zoku Gendaisi siryo [Documents of Modern History, second series], Vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1986). Those of some of the accused who were arrested in 1928-1929 were printed in this book and in Kentaro Yamabe (ed.), Gendaisi siryo [Documents of Modern History), Vol. 19-20 (Tokyo, 1967-1968), but most of them still have not been printed yet. For the five documents of the First JCP kept in the Hoover Institute, Stanford University, see Takayosi Matuo, "Soritu-ki Nihon Kyosanto si no tame no oboegaki [Materials concerning the Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1923: An Introduction and Commentary]", Kyoto Daigaku Bungaku-bu Kenkyu-kiyo [Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University], No. 19 (March 1979).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Kiyosi Koiwai, "Zisin tozi no gokutyu no kuki [The Atmosphere in Jail under the Earthquake]", Susume [Go Ahead], February 1924.

Students (Gakusei Rengokai or Gakuren), both of which had a more limited influence. Aiming at the JCP sympathizers in the trade unions, the former held its inaugural conference in Nosaka's home in the spring of 1923; Suehiro Nisio was one of the participants. Being founded on 7 November 1922, the latter originated the Student Social Science Federation (Gakusei Syakaikagaku Rengokai or Gakuren), which held its first congress in September 1924.

Only through these front organizations about a hundred members of the tiny First JCP could - without the strict discipline of democratic centralism - continuously have a considerable influence on broad strata of the democratic people, who successfully urged the Japanese troops to withdraw from the Soviet Far East by the fall of 1922 and went on demanding the establishment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. When the League of Comrades for Non-intervention in Russia (Tairo Hikansyo Dosi-kai) held its lecture meeting in July 1922, even the non-socialist Dietmen Seigo Nakano and Ryutaro Nagai took up a positive attitude to meet the requests of its Communist promoters.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, another secret inheritance prepaired the "rebirth" of the First JCP. When the Krestintern held its Constituent Congress in Moscow in October 1923, it was attended secretly by Sen Katayama and another Japanese activist, Tosio Onisi, who returned home in the next month to be a secretary of the reformist Japanese Peasants' Union (Nihon Nomin Kumiai or Nitino) and started a successfull collaboration with one of its secretaries Yu'iti Nisina.<sup>21</sup>

## 3. Attempts to Reconstruct the Party

The reconstruction of the JCP ranges from mid-1924 to late 1926. Its process reflected fairly truely the conflict between both factions in Moscow. Kazuo Fukumoto, Kyu'iti Tokuda, Masanosuke Watanabe and other leftists were connected with a Zinov'evist-Trotskyist, Grigorij Vojtinskij, whereas Kanson Arahata, Tunao Inomata, Hitosi Yamakawa and other rightists were in collusion with a Bucharinist, Karlis Jansons.

The first Japanese Communist whom met Jansons, the Comintern instructor to the JCP, immediately after his arrival on 8 June 1925 in his capacity as a Soviet embassy collaborator (sotrudnik posol'stva),<sup>22</sup> was a graduate from the KUTV, the former anarchist printer Sentaro Kita'ura. He soon introduced an Okinawa born barrister, Kyu'iti Tokuda, to the Latvian revolutionary. Very soon the two differed in opinion with one another, although they had in common that they did not come from good families, unlike most of the Japanese Communist leaders before the Second World War.

In late 1923 the former promoters of the Bo'enkai, Suekiti Aono and Mosaburo Suzuki - both of them escaped from prison after their arrest on 5 June 1923 - began to prepare a legal proletarian party. In June 1924 the Society for the Study of Politics (Seizi Kenkyukai or Seiken) was founded as a catalyst to involve various democratic individuals and mass organizations, including the Sodomei and Nitino in their project. Sen Katayama and Tunao Inomata sent their own reliable comrades Masayuki Nonaka (who used Masa'iti Hosi as a pseudonym) and Minoru Takano to its headquarters as secretaries.

But their plan did not succeed. Perhaps it is not too much to say that such a fault could not be attributed to them. To blame for it were the reformist leaders of the Sodomei, including the former Communist Katumaro Akamatu and the former sympathizer Suehiro Nisio on the one hand and the so-called "left" Communists on the

Wamura, Kominterun to Nihon Kyosan-to no seiritu, pp. 153-159, 170-196. See also Suzuki, Suzuki Mosaburo, Vol. 1, pp. 157-165; Nosaka, Fusetu no ayumi, Vol. 3, pp. 112-133, Vol. 5, pp. 56-68.

Tosio Iwamura, "Wakaki hi no Nisina Yu'iti to sono syuhen: Nitino soritu no sisosi teki igi" [Young Yu'iti Nisina and his Environments: The Thought-Historical Significance of the Foundation of the Nitino], part 2, Nihonsi Kenkyu [Journal of Japanese History], No. 147 (November 1974), pp. 33-42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> In the literature on the subject Karlis E. Jansons and Jacob D. Janson, a trade representative at the Soviet embassy in Tokyo, sometimes have been confounded, the latter having been taken for a Comintern agent. Even the former Soviet acting ambassador Grigorij S. Besedovskij committed such an error, overlooking an embassy collaborator in his memoirs *Den Klauen der Tscheka entronnen, Erinnerungen*, (Leipzig, 1930), pp. 26, 42, 44-46. As regards the studies in English, the same confusion was spread by Swearingen and Langer in their book *Red Flag in Japan*, p. 26. Even recently Germaine A. Hoston still clings this rumour in her work *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan* (Princeton, 1986), pp. 96, 309.

other hand.

Three Parties for the Defence of the Meiji Constitution (Goken-sampa) won the election of the Imperial Diet in May 1924. Their new cabinet signed a convention for the normalization of the relations with the USSR and very soon - in January 1925 - passed two laws in the Diet: the Peace Preservation Law and the Universal Manhood Suffrage Law. The Goken-sampa Cabinet of Mitubisi's son-in-law Taka'aki Kato successfully drove a wedge into the democratic camp, meeting a part of its demands both in Japan and abroad.

The Peace Preservation Law was certainly aimed at the JCP that was being re-established, intending to isolate it from the broad democratic strata. Grave fears of the JCP's influence had been felt already under the white terror in early September 1923, as mentioned above. The future of this law, however, was hardly foreseen at this moment. The law left room for loose interpretation, that became actual very soon in the process of formation of the monarchy-fascism. It prohibited any organization to change the "national polity (kokutai)" or the "system of private property", the former of which had an ambiguous sense. At last, even some liberals and religionists were regarded with suspicion.

Several weeks after the introduction of the Universal Manhood Suffrage Law, Grigorij Vojtinskij wrote in the *Bol'shevik* (No. 7, 15 April 1925) that a "relative stabilization" of the Japanese capitalism could not be found by "even the most right elements of the world communist movement". He stirred the Japanese "leftists" to join the battle against any schemes to convert a Worker's Party into a "parlamentskaija partija demokratii".

A Christian socialist, Toyohiko Kagawa, who was criticized by Vojtinskij by name in his article, called out to the delegates of the Fifth Congress of the Nitino in March 1926 against "syndicalism in France or Leninism in Russia", to find himself isolated and purged from the union. The radicalism of its youth division made Yu'iti Nisina too much optimistic, blinding him to the faults of the so-called Fukumotoism and consequently he now had a jump on even his comrade Tosio Onisi.

A considerable number of radical adherents of Kazuo Fukumoto occupied the full-time offices of the workers' and peasants' mass organizations. They recruited new graduates from the Society of Freshmen (Sinzin-kai) and other student societies, most of whom came from relatively good families and at the very best had the spirit of the "sisi". Before the Seiken was dissolved during the convention of April 1926, Mosaburo Suzuki and others had already left it out of discontentment with the leftists. But it was the Comintern turn to the left that bound Karlis Jansons to sit on his hands, who had been constant in his devotion to win Hitosi Yamakawa to the leadership of the reconstructed JCP and once had arbitrated between Kanson Arahata and Kyu'iti Tokuda to reject the latter in late 1925.24

Moreover, it was an unlucky circumstance for Jansons that in May 1925, just before his arrival in Tokyo, the left unions had left the Sodomei to set up the left Council of Japanese Labour Unions (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Hyogikaia or Hyogikai) against the real intention of the Profintern, that had invited Suehiro Nisio to Moscow in the previous summer, expecting too much of his initiative in advocating the founding of a united International, meaning the re-unification of the Amsterdam International and the Profintern, under neither of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> For the spirit of the sisi of the radicalists, see a review by Fumio Moriya of Henry DeWitt Smith, II, Japan's First Student Radicals (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), in: Undosi Kenkyu, No. 4 (August 1979). Using the word "kokusi" instead of "sisi", the reviewer censures the author for his indifference to the spirit of the "sisi" founded among most of the Japanese radical students, though this reference is not always to the matter in his book. The Japanese word "sisi" meant public-spirited, selfless, but elitist ex-samurai (warrior), even if in fact he wasn't a man of ex-warrior's birth. It is needless to say that such an attitude is common among young graduate-radicalists, who studied the Japanized Confucian spirit above all at a few selected senior high schools. The word "sisi" is derived from the Chinese "chihshih jejien" ("sisi zinzin" in the Japanese pronunciation; a person with lofty and benevolent principles even at the risk of his life) in the Confucian Anaects. Such a mentality was even scarcer among the radicalists of no good birth and no regular school career, like both Yu'iti Nisina and Masanosuke Watanabe. In addition, with regard to the graduates from the Founders' Federation (Kensetusya Domei) organized at Waseda University, among whom were Tosio Onisi and Sin'iti Miyai, the Japanese narodničestvo", the spirit of the "sisi" seems to have been one of the lacks in their personality. This seems to have led to their indifference to the Fukumotoism. For this point, see also Syo'iti Miyake [et al.] (eds) Kensetusya Domei no rekisi [History of the Founders' Federation] (Tokyo, 1979), pp. 346-356.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See Iwamura, Kominterun to Nihon Kyosanto no seiritu, pp. 196-267; Iwamura, "Wakaki hi no Nisina Yu'iti", part 2, pp. 43-49.

whom the Sodomei belonged.

Indeed, when a Riga-born Bucharinist, Ivan Ivanonič Lepse, and other Soviet trade-union delegates visited Japan under the scheme of Jansons in August 1925, even Suehiro Nisio welcomed them in Osaka.

But in the fourth session of the Central Council of the Profintern in March 1926 Aleksandr Losovskij blamed him for having broken his promise of a united International. In this session Leo Heller and Li Li-San also severely criticized the president of the Sodomei, Bunji Suzuki, for his intention of founding the "coloured labour International" together with an Indian reformist, S.M. Joshi, who met as labour delegates to the ILO in May 1925. Since the events of 30 May 1925, that proved the proletarian leadership in the Chinese national liberation movement, the Chinese Trade Union Federation had been attracting the Profintern officials, who now gave up their expectations of cooperation between Suzuki, Nisio and other Japanese reformists. In the abovementioned session Leo Heller deplored that the Japanese trade union movement was far more scattered and ideologically more unstable than the Chinese, Indeed, the Japanese leftists made too many sacrifices to get their own tiny unions, hardly taking any notice of the bulk of their sacrifices. Ultimately they had no idea of what a united labour union meant.<sup>25</sup>

#### 4. The Exposed Conflict between the Right and Left Factions: the Split of the Party

The year 1926 recorded a new height of the workers' and peasants' movement through the period of the so-called relative stabilization of Japanese capitalism (Table 1). But this relative stabilization did not show the fragility some extremists liked to see in it then and like to do so now. On the contrary, it can be said that in the 1920s the economic stagnation did not evenly cover all sectors, and besides in 1925-1926 the economy apparently revived except for the "traditional" sector, including agriculture, cottage industry, and factories employing at most a few scores of workers. Even in the villages, the middle semi-tenant peasants went on growing through the so-called chronic agricultural depression as small producers of commodities like silk raisers. 26

Soviet scholars already in 1934 mentioned a point worth remembering even now: "The Wakatsuki cabinet, which succeeded the Kato cabinet, was able to continue the policy of the latter owing to the partial industrial boom which took place in the year 1925-1926. It is significant that the Wakatsuki cabinet also endeavored (at least outwardly) not to compromise itself too much by openly supporting the feudal landlords in the class struggle which was steadily growing more acute in the rural districts."<sup>27</sup>

It is needless to say, that the more miserable strata like petty poor tenant peasants and employees of the medium and small enterprises should not be ignored, just like the broad mass of unskilled labour in the cotton spinning and the silk industry, most of whom were tender daughters of those.

Their basis was formed by the great number of immigrants from Korea and the Ryukyu (Okinawa) Islands in the industrial cities and by a numerous Hisabetu-Burakumins (a discriminated minority of Japanese descent) both in the country and in the cities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> See Tosio Iwamura, "Kominterun to Taiheiyo Rodo-kumiai Kaigi" [Comintern and the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference], in Toru Watanabe and Masamiti Asukai (eds), *Nihon syakaisyugi undo si ron* [Studies of the History of the Japanese Socialist Movement] (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 162-178. For the role of both Suzuki and Joshi in the plan of an Asiatic Labour Congress (Azia Rodo Kumiai Kaigi), George Oakley Totten gives a too simple explanation in accordance with Japanese semi-official sources in his work: *The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan* (New Haven and London, 1966), pp. 272, 274.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> See Hoston, Marxism in Prewar Japan, pp. 7-10, where the author, in opposition to the statistics mentioned by herself, insists on the common view that "on the whole, the 1920s marked a difficult period for the entire Japanese economy". Soviet scholars' views form a remarkable contrast to hers. For example see Anna B. Kozorovitskaja, Bor'ba za edinstvo rabočego klassa Japonii (Moscow, 1962), p. 61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> O. Tanin and E. Yohan, Militarism and Fascism in Japan (London, 1934), p. 109. Authors followed and revived Oleg U. Pletner, who insisted upon the same in his work: Agrarny vopros v Japonii (Leningrad, 1928), pp. 138-225, though this book was one-sidedly critizised by the prominent Communist scholar Eitaro Noro, and therefor it had been nearly ignored in Japan immediately after the publication of the Japanese edition in March 1931.

The skilled labour of the military and naval arsenals and the most important plutocratic (zaibatu's) heavy-industrial enterprises did not have any trade unions or supported the reformist ones. The left could have some influence at the most on an extremely limited part the of workers and peasants. But the All-Japan Proletarian Youth League (Zen-Nihon Musan Seinen Domei or APYL), led by the impromptu disciples of Fukumoto, attracted many young students and workers. They believed that if Japanese capitalism became bankrupt, it would be easy to defeat not only the right reformists but also the "right" Communists and their sympathizers.

The labour dispute of the Nihon-gakki Co. in Hamamatu City from late April through early August 1926 was distinguished by some manoeuvring ultra-leftists who belonged to the APYL but never worked for the factory. Immediately the dispute suffered defeat, over a thousand employees were rid of a trade union affiliated with the Hyogikai, and moreover, it did not disturb the president of the company to win the municipal elections on 3 September, which took place under the universal manhood suffrage laws for the first time all over the country.<sup>28</sup>

The leftists of the Communist Group determined to be through with Hitosi Yamakawa as an authority just afterwards, on 19 and 21 September 1926. Consequently Kazuo Fukumoto attacked him for underestimating the left in the November number of its organ Marukususyugi (Marxism). The sub-editor talked openly about discord with the chief editor, who had written only in the September number of the organ and at once obtained consent of his fellows, including Masanosuke Watanabe. This was accompanied by the reorganization of both the Worker-Peasant Party and the organ magazine Taisyu (Masses), which were started at once in March 1926.

By late 1926 some support for the Worker-Peasant Party came from the Hyogikai and the Nitino, except for its right half, that formed the All-Japan Peasants' Union (Zen Nihon Nomin Kumiai or Zen'nitino) in April 1927. The group of the Taisyu choose not to mediate between the Communists and the left social democrats, converting itself to a tiny sect of "right" Communists and their sympathizers.

Indeed the Japanese Zinov'evists-Trotskyists held the Party Congress on 4 December 1926 to reestablish the JCP officially and dismissed Sentaro Kita'ura as the chief editor of its organ *Musansya Simbun* (Proletarian News); a follower of Karlis Jansons succeeded him. But they were too ignorant of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI, which took place from 22 November to 16 December, to respond yieldingly to the Comintern call in the next early spring. Before his departure from Tokyo for Moscow in February 1927, Jansons stirred and financed the anti-Fukumotoists to organize an opposite faction, including of Kita'ura, but this, beyond expectation of Jansons and co., resulted in the founding of the so-called Worker-Peasant Faction (Ronoha) hostile to the JCP in the autumn of 1927.

Meanwhile, the Anti-Imperialist League held its first congress in Brussels from 10-15 February 1927 and the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference took place in Hank'ou from 20-27 May 1927. In the former Sen Katayama was one of the most active attendants, he emphasized that the League was the kind of non-partisan organization the Japanese left social-democrats supported. In the latter the Japanese delegation included not only Communists and pro-communists but also the anarcho-syndicalists.

In Moscow, Karlis Jansons, under the authority of Bucharin, played a vital role as the draftsman of the 1927 Theses, that denounced both factions of the JCP. Despite this Jansons was not able to fulfil his wish of re-uniting both.<sup>29</sup> Although the JCP, with a membership of 409, was not without sectionalism, it was nevertheless able to have some results in the rural districts in the prefectural elections in the autumn of 1927 and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> See Tosio Iwamura, 'Nihon-gakki sogi to Rodo Nomin-to saihensei katei, Nihonsi Kenkyu, No. 114 (September, 1970), pp. 3-20. For the APYE and the labour dispute of the Nihon-gakki Co. see also Isamu Saito, Nihon kyosansyugi seinen undo-si [A History of the Japanese Communist Youth Movement] (Tokyo, 1980), pp. 38-111; Samon Kimbara, Taisyo demokurasii no syakai teki keisei [The Social Formation of the Taisyo Democracy] (Tokyo, 1967), part 3, ch. 2; Sinsuke Oba, Hamamatu Nihon-gakki sogi no kenkyu [Studies of the Labour Dispute at the Nihon-gakki Co. in Hamamatu] (Tokyo, 1980). On 25 September 1926 the Soviet Embassy trade representative Y.D. Janson left Tokyo, but his resignation was misread by Besedovskij as if he had taken responsibility for his own instigation of the dispute at the Nihon-gakki Co., financing ten thousand dollars: Den Klauen der Tscheka entronnen, pp. 43-46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> See Iwamura, Kominterun to Nihon Kyosanto no seiritu, ch. 4; "Nihon-gakki sogi to Rodo Nomin-to saihensei katei", pp. 20-30 and "Kominterun to Taiheiyo Rodo-kumiai Kaigi", pp. 183-222. The 1927 Theses were published in full in the Comintern organs in early 1928, after its gist had already appeared in the issue of 19 August 1927 of the *Pravda*. The Comintern's turn to the left had probably affected its codification.

in the Diet election on 20 February 1928, both of which took place for the first time under the universal manhood suffrage laws.

The Worker-Peasant Party (Rono-to) won four seats in the Kagawa prefectural assembly and its president Ikuo Oyama and another candidate had good results in the same prefectural districts in the Diet election. In the Kagawa Prefecture the Nitino was proud of having won several elections earlier on and secretly sent two actives to the KUTV, one of whom was the only Japanese peasant that studied there. But even here it were just a few Communists and pro-communists under the command of Sin'iti Miyai that dominated the prefectural organizations of the Nitino, whose membership never was pro-communist. Instead, they were so "anti-communist" that some 12,000 members seceded from the Nitino immediately after the nationwide mass arrests of the Communists broke out on 15 March 1928, which marked the end of the second period of reconstructing the JCP.

In other prefectures also, the results of both those elections led some leaders of the Rono-to to believe that the rank and file of the Nitino never was so radical. A flexibility still lay hidden within the Rono-to. In fact, there were even rumours about a Left League "in the French style", including the Rono-to, after the general election.<sup>30</sup>

In addition, the authorities disbanded the Rono-to, the Hyogikai and the APYL as pro-communist on 10 April 1928. With the exception of Kagawa, the Nitino bore a heavy blow and reunited with the Zen'nitino on 27 May 1928. This might have been the only product of their united front tactics that the JCP brought home from Moscow. But within the Nitino as well quite many non-partisan leaders had been discontent with the so-called fraction of the Communists, whose arrests hastened the amalgamation of both peasant unions into the National Peasants' Union (Zenkoku Nomin Kumiai or Zen'no). Having Motoziro Sugiyama as its president, the new union denied any support for proletarian parties, admitting its members to enter any proletarian party.<sup>31</sup>

## 5. The Establishment of the Zenkyo and Other Pseudo-communist Parties

After the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1928, Syo'iti Itikawa and Sadaki Takahasi came home, where they were arrested in late April 1929. Though they then still believed in the 1927 Theses, a sign of clear effects of the Congress was their negative indication of any legal worker-peasant party, as Kenzo Yamamoto reported proudly in the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI in July 1929.<sup>32</sup>

Nevertheless, Ikuo Oyama, Hazime Kawakami, Kiyosi Koiwai and others established the new Worker-Peasant Party (Sin Rono-to) legally in November 1929, re-concentrating the legalist faction of the old Hyogikai, the left of the new Zen'no and other so-called legalist left forces under its influence. The Sin Rono-to could have played a positive role just like the Workers' Party in Bulgaria did in 1927-1934 and the workers' and peasants' faction in the Saeimas in Latvia in 1928-1933; both displayed legal activity under the leadership of their respective illegal Communist Party.

Indeed the JCP merely abided faithfully by the so-called Theses on the national-colonial question as adopted by the Sixth Comintern Congress. Although facing with similar situations, the two Comintern officials wrote utterly different prescriptions. Actually, the Sin Rono-to was based in Osaka, where, also, Kiyosi Koiwai and others were compelled to alter their opinion by the summer of 1930. But most of them joined neither the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Tosio Iwamura, "Futusenkyosei-ka no musan seito no kiban" [The Base of the Proletarian Parties under the Universal Suffrage System], Akira Fuziwara and Takayosi Matuo (eds), *Ronsyu gendaisi* [Collected Articles: Modern History] (Tokyo, 1976), pp. 245-254, and "Musan seito no seiritu" [Formations Of the Proletarian Parties], in: *Iwanami Koza: Nihon Rekisi* [Iwanami Lectures: The History Of Japan], Vol. 18 (Tokyo, 1975), pp. 310, 315-316, 319-332. For another view of the matter see Itaru Yokozeki, "1920 nendai kohan no Nitino, Rono-to" [The Nitino and the Rono-to in the Latter Half of the 1920s], *Rekisigaku Kenkyu* [Journal of Historical Studies], No. 479 (April 1980).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> See Nomin Kumiai-si Kanko-kai (ed.), *Nomin kumiai undo si* [History of the Peasant Union Movement] (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 429-445.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> See Syo'iti Itikawa, *Itikawa Syo'iti syu* [Collected Works], 3 Vols (Tokyo, 1985), Vol. 3, pp. 240-255; Senatorov, *Sen Katajama*, pp. 266-267.

JCP nor the National Council of the Japanese Labour Union (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Zenkoku Kyogikai or Zenkyo).33

The Zenkyo was founded in late 1928. But, declaring in favour of the the JCP and against any other legal proletarian party in a draft of one of its resolutions in April 1929, it rejected all legalist elements of the old Hyogikai, for which the Federation of Korean Labours in Japan (Zai Nihon Tyosen Rodo Sodomei or Roso) substituded. The affiliation of the Roso to the Hyogikai had already been accepted by a Japanese delegate, Goitiro Kokuryo (alias Genziro Nakano), during the Fourth Congress of the Profintern on 27 March 1928, and moreover, reconfirmed by Kenzo Yamamoto (alias Kenzo Yamagata) at the Second Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference in August 1929.

In May 1930, in the process of their amalgamation, a considerable number of Korean female spinners - about one-third of over five hundred women employees - striked against lower pay in the Kisiwada Boseki Co. in the southern suburbs of Osaka. Their direct action shocked Koiwai and others enough to be disturbed about the Sin Rono-to.

During the world-wide economic crisis of 1929-1933 the Korean immigrants suffered the most terrible persecution. The Zenkyo used most of its energy to substitute them for people from the broad mass of Japanese workers, most of whom were out of its reach. Far from that, it was composed of the so-called revolutionary opposition groups within the Japanese legalist left trade unions as well as of centralist unions like the National Labour Union Federation (Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Domei or Zenro), that was founded by the opponents of the more right-oriented Sodomei in June 1930. They were too tiny and weak to overwhelm the leaders.

Among the Japanese people, the Hisabetu-Burakumins resembled the Koreans in Japan in their extreme misery. Rejecting the need to defend their specific interests, the extremists advocated the rash disbandment of their organization, the National Levellers' Association (Zenkoku Suiheisya), during its Tenth Congress in December 1931, to merge it into both the Zenkyo and the below-mentioned Zen'no Zenkai. But they worked hard without any success and had to beat a retreat by bits the following year.<sup>34</sup>

The Zenkyo and other front organizations, including the Industrial Labour Research Bureau (Sanro) and the Japan section of the MOPR or the Red Aid (Sekisyoku Kyuenkai), did not just become pro-communist, but became pseudo-communist, being hardly indistinguishable from the JCP, except for their names. Above all, the Zenkyo rashly adopted the slogan of "the overthrow of the monarchy" by a narrow margin in the Central Committee of September 1932 to shut ways of dodging the wholesale application of the Peace Preservation Law, which led to its ruin by late 1934.<sup>35</sup>

Indeed, going sometimes to extremes, the Zenkyo succeeded in getting a considerable number of activists within some unions affiliated to the Japan General Alliance of Transport Workers (Nihon Kotu Rodo Soremmei or Koso), such as the Tokyo Transport Workers' Union (Tokyo Kotu Rodo Kumiai or Toko) and the Osaka Society for Self-Help of Municipal Transport Workers (Osaka Siden Zizyokai or Zizyokai). But there the Zenkyo's auxiliaries (Zenkyokei) often acted for the Zenkyo, although they, strictly seen, were another

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See Iwamura Tosio, *Nihon zinmin sensen si zyosetu*, ch. 2; Toru Watanabe [et al.] (eds), *Osaka syakai rodo undo si* [History of the Social Labour Movement in Osaka], 3 Vols (Osaka, 1986-1989), Vol. 2, pp. 1507-1522.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> See Toru Watanabe, "Zenkoku Suiheisya kaisyo ron to buraku iinkai" [The Campaign for the Dissolution of the National Levellers' Association and the Origin of the Village Committee Movement], Zinbun Gakuho [Journal of Humanistic Studies], No. 47 (March 1979); Z.Y. Khanin, Burakuminui: diskriminiruemoe men'šinstvo Japonii. Istoričeskii očerk 1900-1937 (Moscow, 1989), pp. 140-141, 150-154.

<sup>35</sup> See Toru Watanabe, Nihon rodo kumiai undo si [History of the Japanese Labour Union Movement], (Tokyo, 1954); Toru Watanabe (ed.), 1930 nendai nihon kyosansyugi undo si ron [Essays on the History of the Japanese Communist Movement in the 1930s] (Tokyo, 1981); Tosio Iwamura, Zainiti tyosenzin to nihon rodosya kaikyu [Koreans in Japan and the Japanese Working Class] (Tokyo, 1972), ch. 4-6; Kyongsik Pak, Zainiti tyosenzin undo si [The History of the Koreans in Japan] (Tokyo, 1979), ch. 4, and Ten'nosei kokka to zainiti tyosenzin [The Monarchical State and the Koreans in Japan] (Tokyo, 1976), pp. 122-130; Hirosi Nisikawa, "Zainiti tyosenzin kyosantoin dotyosya no zittai" [A Statistical Analysis of Korean communists in Japan, 1930-1934], Zinbun Gakuho, No. 50 (March, 1981). For both the closing of the Sanro and the dispute on the Kisiwada Boseki Co. see Nosaka, Fusetu no ayumi, Vol. 7, pp. 97-116; Tyantyong Kim, Tyosenzin zuoko no uta [Song of the Korean Women Workers] (Tokyo, 1982).

organisation. In early July 1932 the JCP was forced to approve this.36

Only the National Peasants' Union National Conference (Zen'no Zenkokukaigi-ha or Zen'no Zenkai) escaped from the same destiny as the Zenkyo and others by bringing back the old left Nitino in the spring of 1931. But from the beginning only a few of the legalist leaders joined the organization. Because it followed the old Nitino as a mass organization, where the middle semi-tenant peasants had carried weight, it was beyond the reach of a handful of illegalist graduates' powers, though they temporarily managed to take hold of its headquarters.

After the summer of 1933 the legalists endeavoured to overcome the left-wing deviation and soon made the affiliated prefectural federations return separately to the Zen'no, some of whose leaders like Hisao Kuroda and Tosio Onisi of the Rono-ha pulled the strings.<sup>37</sup>

It is not easy to estimate the influence of the Comintern and the Profintern upon these Japanese extremists. Having headed the Vladivostok Bureau of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat until 20 July 1930, Karlis Jansons bitterly blamed the Zenkyo for "'left' deviation from the general line of the Profintern" during its Fifth Congress in August 1930.<sup>38</sup> And furthermore, commenting on the breakaway of the Zen'no Zenkai from the Zen'no in the 1932 Theses, the Comintern officers without mercy condemned the JCP for "the extremely harmful confusion of the left peasant unions with the Communist Party".<sup>39</sup>

But only the Zenkyo Renovation League (Zenkyo Sassin Domei or Satudo) at best was found around the JCP. The so-called right deviationists like the Rono-ha were no longer within the Party. The "left" deviationists could therefore not be expected to be "self-critics" and they consequently always had the leadership of the JCP.<sup>40</sup>

## 6. Paradoxical Shifts of the Revolutionary Strategy and the Koza-ha

As Bucharin did so in the Comintern turn to the left, some former Bukharinists paradoxically bore a hand in abolishing the 1927 Theses and led the Japanese Communists to the left again. Among them Sen Katayama and Karlis Jansons were the best-known. Indeed they played an important part in overcoming the left adventurism

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> See Tutomu Hyodo, "Syowa kyoko-ka no sogi" [A Dispute under the World Economic Crisis], in Mikio Sumiya (ed.), *Nihon rosi kankei si ron* [Essays on the History of Japanese Labour-Management Relations] (Tokyo, 1977), pp. 142-147, 158-169; Akira Fuziwara [et al.] (eds), *Nihon minsyu no rekisi* [History of the Japanese People], 11 Vols (Tokyo, 1974-1976), Vol. 8, pp. 237-238, 247-248.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Kei'itiro Aoki, Nihon nomin kumiai undo si [A History of Japanese Peasant Union Movement], 6 Vols (Tokyo 1958-1962), Vol. 4, ch. 10-11; Nomin Kumiai-si Kanko-kai (ed.), Nomin kumiai undo si, pp. 572-616; Suzuki, Suzuki Mosaburo, Vol. 1, pp. 342-355. For the importance of the young middle semi-tenant peasants to the Zen'no Zenkai see the following case studies: Tosio Iwamura, "Senzi taisei-ka no nomin undo" [Peasants' Movement under the Wartime Regime], Tiikisi Kenkyu [Bulletin of the History of Amagasaki], No. 18 (March 1977), pp. 7-14; Yosihiro Sakane, Senkanki noti seisaku si kenkyu [Studies on the History of the Land Policy between the Two World Wars] (Fukuoka, 1990), pp. 101-137.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Pjatyj kongress Profinterna, stenografich. očet (Moscow, 1930), p. 320. See also Šteinbergs, Čarlzs Skots no Latvijas, pp. 287, 293-294, and Stejnberg, Čarlz Skott, ego druz' ja i vragi, pp. 234, 239-240.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> I.I. Kovalenko, *Očerki istorii kommunističeskogo dviženija v Japonii*, p. 246; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 42 (20 May 1932), p. 1309; *International Press Correspondence*, No 23 (26 May 1932), p. 471. In the English text "krest'janskie sojuzy" or "Bauern*verbände* is mistaken for "Peasant leagues". In the view of the author, the Russian original text was published for the first time in 1933, under false pretense of "translation from the German text".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> For the Satudo see Watanabe, Nihon rodo kumiai undo si, pp. 158-187. For the Rono-ha see Suzuki, Suzuki Mosaburo, Vol. 1, pp. 194-481; Yosiaki Yosimi, "Rono-ha no sosiki to undo" [Organization and Movement of the Worker-Peasant Faction], in: Ohara Syakai-mondai Kenkyusy, Hosei Daigaku (ed.), Rono-ha kikansi: Rono, Zensin [Organ of the Worker-Peasant Faction: the Worker-Peasant and the Advance], special vol. (Tokyo, 1982).

of the Zenkyo in the Fifth Profintern Congress, where they also spoke on the "fascistization of social-democracy" or the "social-fascists". Properly speaking, the "thesis on 'social-fascism' was not included in the documents of the Sixth Comintern Congress and, at last, it was thrust upon it after the removal of Bucharin from the leadership of the ECCI". 42

When the Japanese edition of the *Pan-Pacific Worker*, the organ of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, was started under the command of Karlis Jansons in Vladivostok in February 1930, a Japanese graduate of the KUTV, Zyokiti Kazama, became its editor. After attending the Fifth Profintern Congress, he came home and became the leader of the JCP in the early spring of 1931, to draw up the 1931 Draft Political Theses with the co-operation of Yosimiti Iwata and in accordance with the instructions given by Jansons, Georgi Safarov, Ya. Volk and other officials in Moscow.

In the Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the JCP in March 1931, the attendants - including a prominent Marxist scholar, Eitaro Noro - were unanimously in favour of the 1931 Draft Political Theses. The Central Committee sent an absentee, Sanzo Nosaka, to Moscow to report on it. Being on bail to treat his left eye, he left Japan without problems on 21 March 1931.

Still regarding the Japanese monarchy as the bourgeois state, the new Draft Theses denied the so-called two-stage revolutionary strategy of the 1927 Theses and strikingly showed the left deviation. With this weak suit, the new Draft Theses narrowly escaped from being anachronism liked the coming 1932 Theses proved to be. But a return to a two-stage revolutionary strategy must have been mistaken by some officers even in Moscow. For instance, a contributor cited the 1927 Theses in an item of the encyclopedia, that presumably was written in Moscow by late August 1932 at the latest.<sup>43</sup>

Otto W. Kuusinen submitted a sketch of the 1932 Theses to the session of the Presidium of the ECC1 on 2 March 1932. Though here he limited still the number of the "krupnoe pomeščiki" in Japan to 40,000 families with over ten cho (24.5 acres) in Japan, he had already misunderstood them as resembling the Russian ones. Such a mistake led the Comintern draftsmen of the 1932 Theses like Ya, Volk and others astray.

Being groundlessly based on identification of the Japanese monarchy with the Russian tsarism, their two-stage revolutionary strategy was distinguished at sudden disappearance of a prescription of the bourgeois state for the Japanese monarchy, common to Comintern precedent platformal documents on the JCP, the 1931 Draft Political Theses included.

Unluckily it overlapped with the preceding abandonment of the category of "absolutism" by a prominent Soviet historian, Michail Nikolaevič Pokrovskij, a category that he had advocated himself as "the commercial capital wearing the Monomach's Cap", according to an appropriate expression in his own article containing self-criticism in the *Bor'ba klassov* (No. 2, 1931). The leaders of the JCP and their followers like the Lecture faction (Koza-ha) did not understand at all what he criticized himself for, nor could they distinguish between the 1927 Theses and the 1932 Theses. They don't seem to have suspected the latter to be anachronistic.<sup>45</sup>

They were a group of Marxist intellectuals contributing to the seven-volume scholarly *Nihon sihonsyugi* hattatu-si koza (Lecture on the History of the Development of the Japanese Capitalism") which was published in Tokyo from May 1932 to August 1933. Though with a few exceptions, most of the contributors took the side of the Comintern and the JCP, being hostile to the Rono-ha.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Pjatyj kongress Profinterna, pp. 279, 320. See also Senatorov, Sen Katajama, pp. 269-270.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Fridrich Ivanovič Firsov, "N.I. Bucharin v Kominterne", in V.V. Žuravlev (ed.), Bukcarin: čelovek, politik, učenyi (Moscow, 1990), p. 190.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> "Kommunističeskaja partija Japonii", in *Bol'šaja sovetskaja enciklopedija* (Moscow, 1931), pp. 698-699. Though it is beyond his recollection, the author must have been Sanzo Nosaka, who used his pseudonym Okano for the first time after his arrival in Moscow by late April 1932. It is noteworthy that the quotations from the 1927 Theses contained the words "the struggle for the democratization of the Japanese State, the liquidation of the monarchy". On these words see below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Tosio Iwamura, "Groβgrundbesitzer no nazo" [A Riddle of the Groβgrundbesitzer], in Matuo, Zoku Gendaisi siryo, Vol. 2, Supplement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Tosio Iwamura, "Pokurofusuki sigaku to Koza-ha" [Pokrovskij's Historiography and the Lecture Faction], Siso, No. 689 (November 1981).

Nevertheless, after the fascist coup d'état attempted on 15 May 1932 they until mid-September 1932 vainly endeavoured to adapt the 1932 Theses to the newest political situation, in spite of the fact that the draftsmen of the Theses were unable to foretell the coup at all.

The Russian original text of the Theses was signed by Kuusinen, Safarov, Volk and Ludwig Mayer and dated 2 April 1932, at that time when this text was not yet adopted by the Presidium of the ECCI. It denounced the Japanese ruling classes and the social-democrats for the "manoeuvres consisting of the fact that the existing monarchist regime and the growing oppression of the reaction are cloaked behind the bugbear of the menacing fascism'.<sup>47</sup>

Keeping a one-stage revolutionary strategy, the executives of the JCP had intended to have visions of, so to speak, "the phase of the popular revolution against Fascism", but the new two-stage revolutionary strategy deprived them of such a possibility. Using the terms "the struggle for the democratization of the Japanese State, the liquidation of the monarchy", the 1927 Theses put up both slogans "Dissolution of parliament; Auflösung des Parlaments; Rospusk parlamenta" and "Universal suffrage for both sexes from the age of 18" together with "Abolition of the monarchy". But the 1932 Theses renounced these two slogans and even claimed "dispersal; Auflösung; razgon" of parliament itself. In other words, both Theses had diverse views on how to evaluate the results of the Taisyo Democracy. It is evident that the 1932 Theses made the Koz-ha also unjustly ignore them, as finally was pointed out twenty odd years after the Second World War.

Although a two-stage revolutionary strategy was reconfirmed also in the Conference of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in March 1930, Ruggero Grieco (alias Marco Garlandi), Comintern instructor to the PCE, had already excluded any "perspective of the democratic phase" and separated the "people's revolution" from it. 50 The conception of "la rivoluzione populare antifascista" once meant such a phase of the socialist

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> See the unpublished paper of the author: "32 nen teze to Koza-ha" [The 1932 Theses and the Lecture Faction]. For the controversy of the Koza-ha against the Rono-ha see also Sinkiti Nagaoka, Nihon sihonsyugi ronso no gunzo [A Group of Rival Leaders in the Controversy on Japanese Capitalism (Kyoto, 1984); Nelli Fedorovna Leščenko, "Revoljucija Mejdzi" v rabotach japonskich istorikov-marksistov (Moscow, 1984); Hoston, Marxism in Prewar Japan.

The words "bugbear of the menacing Fascism" ("jupel ugrojajučego fašizma") in the Russian original text of the 1932 Theses were changed for "alleged struggle against fascism" (mnimaja bor'ba protiv fašizma), when it was published in Moscow in 1933. The Russian text agrees with the words of "Schreckgespenst des drohenden Faschismus" and "bogey of a fascist menace" of the 1932 Theses in the German and English versions of the Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz and the International Press Correspondence. The original text of the Theses is well-preserved in the Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow. This fact was verified for the first time in July 1989 at the request of the author, who visited the Institute to make sure of its existence. The author could read its copy, which prof. Yoiti Murata didn't receive from the Institute till February 1991. Prof. Murata intends to publish the text before long together with several other documents of the JCP preserved in the Moscow Institute. The author very much appreciates the kindness of both the Institute and Prof. Murata. In the Moscow Archive the English original text of the Theses is kept aside also, bearing, according to the information the author got in the Institute, the signature of Sanzo Nosaka.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Both types of revolutionary strategie for countries of medium capitalist development in the Comintern Program of 1928 had a defect in "ignorance of a struggle for democracy", as Boris Lejbzon and Kirill Širinja point out about the Polish Communist Party in their book *Povorot v Politika Kominterna* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 162-163. But one of the 1932 Theses on the JCP was probably the most rigid internationally. By the way, to be exact, the word "Auflösung" in the German version of these Theses should be replaced by "Auseinandertreibung". On this point see Tosio Iwamura, "Teze no seibun" [The Original Texts of the Theses], *Nihonsi Kenkyu*, No. 237 (September 1982).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> See Matuo, "The Development of Democracy in Japan", p. 613.

<sup>50</sup> rs munističeskii Internacional, No. 13-14 (20 May 1330), pp. 102-105.

tato Operaio, No. 1 (October 1927), p. 99.

revolution to the Italian Communist Party, whereas the JCP as well as the PCE now had to accept the slogan of the "people's revolution" as merely a synonym for the Communist-led "bourgeois-democratic revolution".<sup>52</sup>

Indeed, after the autumn of 1932 the Koza-ha had been under restraint of anachronism of the 1932. Theses. But it was only a kind of isolation ward where some radical intellectuals were taken, a considerable number of whom were not Communists but merely sympathizers, though a Communist, Eitaro Noro, played a dominant part not to underestimate. Consequently right or wrong it hardly affected scarcely the popular movement itself.

## 7. The Collapse of the Party or an Attempt to Establish a People's Front

In spite of the warning of Karlis Jansons in the Fifth Profintern Congress, playing still with the "one separated and abstract slogan", the Japanese Communists went on to attach too much importance to the theoretical struggle. The JCP could not easily get out of the so-called "personalism through the medium of 'theory'" peculiar to the above-mentioned sisi-group. The "theory" was not induced from the "practice", but was deduced from the Comintern instruction. The "theory" of the Koza-ha was the model of such a "theory". Naturally such a "theory" was not useful for any "practice". As a former head of the Communist faction within the illegal headquarters of the Zen'no Zenkai, Isamu Miyauti writes in his memoirs that he felt "impotent and disheartened" as an organizer in northeastern Japan, where the agricultural depression was the most severe. Severe.

It is characteristic of the Japanese authorities to have been in full control of many a Communist, advising him that he should swear an oath of tenko (conversion) to avoid rigid enforcement of the Peace Preservation Law. Except for Eitaro Noro, who died in jail in February 1934,55 all contributors of the Koz-ha obeyed this advice. It was not so hard for a "bookish agitator" with the sisi spirit to pretend that he substituted the principles of the national polity (kokutai) for Marxist "theory". The emperor (ten'no) was gracious enough to replace Marx as a founder of a "theory" for such a convert.56

But we can find a new tendency toward the people's front also in the wave of mass conversions during the 1930s. It was in Osaka that a Communist, Sisasi Wada, a pro-communist, Kiyosi Koiwai, and others had prepared and developed this tendency, abandoning both enmity with the Rono-ha and the Communist-led "parallel unions" by the summer of 1933 to lead many subleaders of the centralist union Zenro to an approach the united social-democratic party, the Social Mass Party (Syakai Taisyu-to) founded in July 1932.

They successfully took the initiative of a coalition between the lower branches of both the Zenro and the right-oriented Sodomei in April 1935, and moreover, advanced a slogan of "For the defence of the Constitution" to unite all the forces against Fascism in December 1936. Being confirmed by Sanzo Nosaka - who was staying abroad at that time - the next May, this surely meant the withdrawal of the slogan of the 1932 Theses: "Down with monarchy (ten'no-sei)", but it did not necessarily indicates that this meant "for the defence of the monarchy", naming the dualist constitutional monarchy as one of forms of government. It was not until then that they distinguished these from the political regimes, i.e. whether democracy or Fascism, as Georgi

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> For another view which revaluates somehow the "people's revolution" of the 1932 Theses see Murata, Kominterun siryo syu, Vol. 5, p. 619. Edward H. Carr seems not to have noticed this matter in his book The Twilight of Comintern, 1930-1935 (London, 1982), pp. 315, 381.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Hiroaki Matuzawa, Nihon syakaisyugi no siso [Ideas of Japanese Socialism] (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 219-220.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Isamu Miyauti, 1930 nendai Nihon Kyosanto sisi [A Personal History of the Japanese Communist Party in the 1930s] (Tokyo, 1976), p. 134. Four years after his arrest in 1934 he admitted himself to have been only "a too bookish agitator" in his prison diary. For this see Isamu Myauti, Toyotama keimusvo nite [In Toyotama Prison] (Tokyo, 1980), p. 241.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> For the biography of Eitaro Noro see Tuyosi Matumoto, Noro Eitaro (Nagoya, 1983), and Noro Eitaro (Tokyo, 1985), though the author was partial.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> In English see Richard H. Mitchell, *Thought Control in Prewar Japan* (Ithaca and London, 1976), chapters 4-5; Hoston, *Marxism in Prewar Japan*, pp. 31-32, 184-185, 349.

Dimitrov did so for the first time during the Seventh Comintern Congress on 13 August 1935.<sup>57</sup> But the arrests of Sisasi Wada and many other Communists and sympathizers began in late November 1936. Also many activists of the Rono-ha were arrested between December 1937 and February 1938.

Though it was extremely difficult to oppose the upward tendency of chauvinism after the outbreak of the aggressive war against northeastern China in September 1931, some former Communists kept on working under false converts in the Hyogo prefectural branches of the subsidiary fascist Eastern Association (Toho-kai) during the Second World War. They were very skilful at keeping the lower organizations of the former Zen'no Zenkai. Being implicated in the case of 15 March 1928, its leader Ta'motu Nagao polled six per cent of the vote, i.e. 8622 votes, in the whole Second District in Hyogo Prefecture in the April 1942 Diet election. He gained 1381 votes in comparison to his own result in February 1936. Above all, he obtained thirty per cent of the vote, i.e. 3593 votes, in Mihara County, where he had already won his seat in the prefectural assembly's election with 24 per cent of the vote, i.e. 2839 votes, in September 1927. Being located at the southern end of Awazisima Island, the Mihara County still is a pure and simple rural district.

At last, in October 1943 Nagao and his comrades were arrested for the violation of the Peace Preservation Law. The authorities arrested the president of the Toho-kai, Seigo Nakano, and his companions because of anti-governmental activities, but distinguished the former from the latter.<sup>59</sup>

#### 8. Epilogue

The truth is that some Profintern officials like Karlis Jansons consistently were not only discontented with the 1932 Theses, but even, like Ya. Volk, altered their view of the Japanese monarchy by early 1936 at the latest, admitting that a semi-religious attitude towards the monarch never disturbed the unification of the broad democratic strata against Fascism.

Toiling at clearing the stumbling stone, Kh.T. Eidus (alias U. Khayama), one of Jansons' followers, cleared away all the rests of the 1932 Theses from the second edition of his book on the Japanese modern history printed in early 1938, at the latest, 60 when the Japanese monarcho-fascism had not only been already established, but also a small number of JCP members remained in jail in Japan and in Moscow.

Indeed, even Moscow was dangerous for them, and so it was for Jansons, who was shot by the Stalinist

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Georgi Dimitrov, Selected Works, 3 Vols (Sofia, 1972), Vol. 2, p. 101. See Tosio Iwamura, "Monarcho-fašizm i tezisui KPYa 1932 goda", lectured at the Institute of the History of the Latvian Communist Party under CC LKP on 20 July 1989. For the tendency to the Japanese Popular Front see Iwamura, Nihon zinmin sensen si zyosetu, pp. 168-188, 200-251; Giiti Inumaru, Nihon zinmin sensen undo si [A History of the Japanese Popular Front Movement] (Tokyo, 1978); Fuhito Kanda, Nihon no toitu sensen undo [A United Front Movement in Japan] (Tokyo, 1979), pp. 31-128.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> The 1932 Theses put up a slogan of "Against imperialist war, for the conversion of imperialist war into civil war". So rigidly it obeyed the Japanese Communists that they were behind social democrats and liberals as regards both a new Soviet new proposal for a Soviet-Japanese non-agression pact in late December 1931 and a call for the Shanghai Anti-war Conference held in late September 1933.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Iwamura, "Senzi taisei-ka no nomin undo", pp. 14-63. For a phenomenon similar to this about Sin'iti Miyai in the wartime Kagawa Prefecture see also Iwamura, "Futusenkyosei-ka no musan seito no kiban", pp. 256-275. By the way, describing Nagao as a Toho-kai Diet candidate in 1942, in his book *The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan*, p. 423, Totten writes that Nagao also "became national socialist". The author is too superficial to note even the fact that Nagao's election campaign was interfered the most fiercely by the police in the Hyogo Prefecture, as was the case with the very famous anti-fascist conservative Takao Saito in the Fifth District in the same Prefecture. The Japanese authorities were more realistic and more severe with Nagao and his "tovariši", most of whom joined in the reconstructions of the JCP and the Japan Farmers' Union (Nihon Nomin Kumiai or Nitino) soon after the Second World War. On this point see also the item "Tohokai" written by Tosio Iwamura in Toru Watanabe [et al.] (ed.), *Nihon Kingendai-si Ziten* [Dictionary of Japanese Modern History] (Tokyo, 1978), pp. 459-460.

<sup>60</sup> See Iwamura, "32 nen teze to Koza-ha".

barracks socialists on 8 April 1938. Sanzo Nosaka barely escaped to Yan'an in the spring of 1940, where he, in a representative capacity of the JCP, beforehand agreed to the dissolution of the Comintern in June 1943. He stayed in China during the war to re-educate the Japanese prisoners who were captured by the Chinese Red Army.

A small number of non-converts, including the leaders of the postwar JCP like Kenzi Miyamoto and Kyu-iti Tokuda, were set free by the American occupation force after the war. Most of them were eager adherents of the 1932 Theses, but had too few a knowledge of the drastic switch in Comintern policies to adapt themselves to the new complicated situation. The third and last period of development of the prewar JCP started with the suppression in March 1928, This so-called third period was the category worthy of the Communist movement, but not the capitalism in prewar Japan. As regards the JCP, it closed bit by bit, but not suddenly.<sup>61</sup>

Table 1
Number of labour strikes and tenant disputes in Japan, 1916-1929

Year Strikes		Disputes	Year	Strikes Disputes
1916	108 (8413)		1923	270 (36259) 1917 (134503)
1917	398 (57309)	85	1924	295 (48940) 1532 (110920)
1918	417 (66457)	256	1925	270 (32472) 2206 (134646)
1919	497 (63137)	326	1926	469 (63644) 2751 (151061)
1920	282 (36371)	408 (34605)	1927	346 (43669) 2052 (91336)
1921	246 (58225)	1680 (145898)	1928	332 (36872) 1866 (75136)
1922	250 (41503)	1578 (125750)	1929	494 (60993) 2434 (81998)62
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<sup>61</sup> A talented spy, Richard Sorge, had stayed in Tokyo after September 1933 to send the most useful intelligence to Moscow, but his party was something else than the JCP, though he himself was perhaps a Bucharinist. The third period may be divided into two, as Masamiti Asukai argued in his book Nihon poruretaria bungaku si ron (An Essay on the History of the Japanese Proletarian Literary Movement) (Tokyo, 1982), p. 26: "the fourth period, i.e., the period of collapse and conversion since the summer of 1933". Although this may be the case with the Federacio de Proletaj Kultur-Organizoj Japanaj (Nihon poruretaria bunka renmei or KOPF) and some front organizations affiliated to it, such a turning point can not be found so easily in the whole JCP at this time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Number of the participant labours and Peasants in brackets. Sources: According to Tosio Iwamura, "Nihon-gakki sogi to Rodo Nomin-to saihensei katei" [Dispute of the Nihon-gakki Co. and the Process of Reorganizing the Worker-Peasant Party], Nihonsi Kenkyu, No. 114 (September 1970), p. 1.

As regards the extent to which the development of the Japanese Communist movement was determined by Comintern policies or by other factors, the role of the Koreans in the leftest trade union, i. e. the National Council of Japanese Labour Union or Zenkyo might be the best example.

As my paper shows, the Korean immigrants were planning to amalgamate with the Zenkyo according to the policy of the Fourth Profintern congress under the great world depression. Though the Zenkyo adopted the slogan 'the overthrow of the monarchy' in September 1932 and consequently suffered from wholesale application of the Peace Preservation Law, even for the Korean activists the slogan implied merely the independence of their homeland.

In Korea also, the Peace Preservation Law was applied to the Korean Communists, but it involved possibility that they would acquire more confidence of the Korean people. In 1930 the Japanese authorities had to to hesitate to punish one of the top leaders of the Korean Communist Party Un-hyong Yo nicknamed 'Korean Lenin' for the crime of changing the 'national polity'. The KCP demanded the independence of Korea, and not the overwhelming of the Japanese monarchy. The Japanese colonial authorities had to recourse to the farfetched interpretation that the independence of Korea would trespass on the domain of the Japanese monarchy and therefore change the 'national polity'.

The same slogan 'Overwhelm the monarchy!' of the Zenkyo was taken differently by the Japanese and the Koreans. The Zenkyo absorbed the nationalistic energy of the latter rather than its class energy that was expected by the Comintern and the Japanese Communists. Moreover, their nationalistic energy was exhausted from substituting for the class energy of the Japanese workers. Apparently the Comintern policy dwelt on playing down the nationalistic factor of the Korean immigrants, but in fact took advantage of it. The seemingly spectacular rise of the Zenkyo badly depended on it. Indeed the Korean sections of its affiliated organisations were belatedly formed and even Korean edition of their organs issued, but it never led to such a 'national form of the labour movement', as Georgi Dimitrov mentioned in the Seventh Comintern Congress.

As my paper shows, one of the most famous labour disputes in an Osaka suburb that the Zenkyo led proved the power of Korean female spinners, but it became the turning point, since when the new Worker-Peasant Party—one of the front organisations was destined to be disbanded. The substitution in the Zenkyo was too expensive to the Japanese left also.

Richard Mitchell writes the following in his book: The Korean Minolity in Japan (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1967) p. 61, 'By 1933, more than half of the members of Zenkyo were Koreans, who had so firm a grip on the union and the party (JCP — I.T.) leadership that the Japanese communists found it impossible to act without their cooperation'. But the author is quite different to the nature of so-called 'cooperation'.

The so-called tenko (conversion) of the communist to the nationalist meant admiration of the 'national polity' to the Japanese, but it didn't always so to the Koreans, as Un-hyong Yo showed afterwards. On such an aspect of his life see Tok-sang Kang '1930 nendai no Yo Un-hyong (Un-hyong Yo in 1930s)' in Samtyolri, no 50 (Tokyo, Dec. 1988).

As is generally known, G. Dimitrov condemned some communists for their 'national nihilism' in the Seventh Comintern Congress. If we are nevertheless intent on finding merely the so-called national nihilism among one resolution and another of the Comintern and its sections, we shall miss the latent 'nathional feeling; национальные чувства; nationale Gefühle of the broad working masses'. Stalinists knew it well enough to expell the non-Russian 'deviationists', often labelling them the 'nathionalists', and persecute the инородим — non-Russian minorities in Soviet Union, sometimes forcing them whole to migrate, as 200 thousand Koreans along the river Ussuri in 1937-1938, against that merely the Japanese embassy in Moscow ironically filed a protest with the Soviet foreign commissariat.

Another one is the problem about the term "nomemux", i. e. "land-lord", "Gutsherr", though it isn't noticed even in Japan. This term is used as a synonym for the Japanese "jinusi" in most of the Comintern literatures on Japan. But the latter should be distinguished from the former at the linage.

The nomemux is a descendant of the \$\phieodan\$; feudal lord, but the Japanese jinusi isn't so. However most of the Comintern officers were ignorant of this fact. Neither E. S. Varga nor Ya. Volk knew about this. When K. Jansons reported on the JCP in Moscow in May 1927, he reasonably argued that "we can not use the slogan 'Confiscate and divide the land', because there are so few big landowners in Japan". But he didn't raise any objection to the slogan "Confiscation of the estates of the Mikado, landlords, governments and church" in the draft of the 1927 Theses of the JCP, which he received in July 1927. We can't make sure of his real intention now.

As is well known, the Marxists-Leninists used the term "big landown-er" in the meaning of the landowner descending from the feudal lord, that is as a synonym for the landlord. However the Japanese Communists misunderstood its meaning. They erroneously supposed that the slogan "Liquidierung des Großgrundbesitzes" of the German text of the 1932 Theses of the JCP had to be replaced with the slogan "Abolition of parasitic landownership" of its English text. They had no knowledge that both phrases were the same and misread as if the Großgrundbesitz were merely the big parasitic landownership. But it made them belive that the Comintern officers correctly grasped the Japanese jinusi.

The words landlord, Gutsbesitzer, nomemux, etc. have been mistaken to be the European words equivalent for jinusi up to now. Such a mistake disturbed the communication about the Comintern documents. There are no good European words for this Japanese word. They are the HOBBU NOMEMUX, new landlords and the like, if we insist. By the way, the Japanese word jinusi literally means the landowner, but it doesn't at all mean the owner of the nomemue, Gut and the other hereditary domains.

The Comintern Progaram of 1928 offered a definition of countries with "significant remnents of semi-feudal relations in agliculture". This definition embraced in fact two types of such countries, i. e. the first type of these where were the nonemuku and the second type of these where were not the nonemuku. If we can find "significant remnents of semi-feudal relations in agliculture" in both of the types, it means just existence of the small tenant-peasants. Japan also should have been classified as the second type, as V. Kolarov's objection was accepted on his own country in the Six Comintern Congress.