

Page 1: At the end of the first paragraph, instead of the fullstop insert a comma and continue: "which did not last longer than two years at the first two instances and will not -hopefully- at the third either."

Page 3: Delete lines 3 and 4, + the first two words of the 5th line. Start with three points and "whether ..."

Page 5: At line 4, after "many members" add: "-worker or otherwise-".

At line 7, before closing the paranthesis add (2) for the footnote:

² The Turkish Socialist Party (the old Ottoman SP was dubbed Turkish SP during its resurrection at February 1919) of Hüseyin Hilmi, organised successful strikes at Tanning Factories, Dockyards and Tramways in spring 1920. The party became powerfull especially among transport workers. There are rumors to the effect that Hilmi was secretly supported by the British Occupation Forces against the French companies who held concessions for operating most of İstanbul's transportation lines. It is even suggested in Tim Harington Looks Back (London: John Murray, 1940), that the French may have been responsible for Hilmi's mysterious murder soon afterwards.

Line 18: change (2) into (3).

Page 6: At line 9, after "Turkey." add (4) for the footnote:

⁴ For this conference see G.D.H.Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, vol. IV, part I, p. 46 ff. For the Turkish participation see G.S.Harris, Origins of Communism in Turkey, pp. 31-32.

The Turkish delegates were Nisim Mazliyah, a Jewish lawyer, ranking high at the Union and Progress Party; Dr. Âkil Muhtar, a Turkish MD and academician; and Prof. Hüseyinzade Ali, a Pan-Turanist Azerbaidjani. A Soviet source gives the following information about the socialist party they supposedly represented: A bourgeois-police "Socialist Party" was organised by the Union and Progress. Capitalists, lawyers and even generals became members. They wanted to participate into the International Socialist Congress in Stockholm at 1917, under the name of the TSP. Talât Paşa, the grand vizier order^{ed} the Security director the preparation of a special seal on the party's name. A.Şnurov, Türkiye'de Kapitalist-leşme ve Sınıf Kavgaları (Transition to Capitalism and Class Struggles in Turkey - Turkish translation), p. 41. This attempt is also corroborated in a contemporary Armenian source which relates the joint decision of the Dashnak and Hinchak parties to combat against its danger. See Fethi Tevetoğlu, Türkiye'de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler (Socialist and Communist Activities in Turkey), p. 53.

At line 18, substitute "from adopting" instead of "to adopt".

At line 23, substitute "exploit" instead of "utilize from".

Page 7, line 9, add "'s" to "Enver Paşa"

Page 9, line 14: change (3) into (5).

Page 11, delete lines 15-25.

Page 12, delete lines 8-14. At the last line start deleting from "Schools," till the 12th line at page 13.

Page 14, at line 6, add (6) after "a mystery." And make into a footnote 6, the three lines starting from "I, for one," to the end of that paragraph.

Page 19, starting from "Still, Aydınlık" at the end of line 6, delete lines 7-11.

At line 24, after "attitude" add "exemplified by the recent Terakkiperver (progressivist) opposition,".

Page 20, at the last but one line, after "Islam" add (7) for the footnote:

⁷ Hüseyin Hilmi's attitude towards Islam is typical for many other Ottoman socialists also. In an article he has written in İştirak (March 6, 1326 = 19, 1910), we read that socialism started with Christ and its principles endorsed by many a divine verse in Kor'an as well a multitude of Hadiths are transformed into a practical shape through the institution of zekât in Islam. Conversely, some Moslems writing in the same journal have tried to utilize from socialism depicting it as a requirement of their religion.

Native Anatolian leftist movements during the War of Liberation, also reconciled themselves with Islam (many of which derived from the Unionist Pan-Islamism anyway). When the alliance with Bolsheviks was claimed to be an act of infidelity, it was reciprocated by the official left arguing that Bolshevism was much closer to Islam than the European debauchery. Socialism was taken to be identical with Islam.

Page 22, line 8 change (4) into (8). Line 21 change (5) into (9).

Page 23, line 4 change (6) into (10). Line 15 change (7) into (11).

Page 24, line 5 change (8) into (12).

Page 27, at the third line from bottom, after "Turkish;" add (13) for the footnote:

¹³ This has to be qualified in several ways. First of all the titles chosen for translation were the less sophisticated and more provocative ones. Those books dealing with serious philosophical problems or difficult economic analyses were prone to be overlooked, because they demanded a deeper culture. How could they be understood apart from their historical context to which the novices of socialism had no desire to be initiated? Then, few of the translators were really capable to cope with their texts. They made many mistakes due to their being inexperienced non-professionals. Furthermore, some consciously took liberties with the books they translated and "corrected" them according to their lines, without bothering to indicate the modifications they made.

Also, many translators for fear of juridical persecution automatically substituted "socialism" wherever "communism" was mentioned, thus often created confusion between these concepts. So far, about the rendering of Marxist classics into Turkish. As for the actual consumption of the translated works, another grim observation is due. They were bought and placed on book-shelves in private homes, but seldom read, let alone be fully grasped. They were venerated like holy books. In their stead, vulgarizations such as George Politzer's texts for the Workers' University in France before the Second World War were being read by students and staff members alike. Later on, especially in Maoist circles memorizing techniques spread. The result was the replacement of Marxian analysis with slogans and quotations cited more often than not appropriately.

Page 28, line 6, add "'s" after Atatürk.

End of line 10, add ⁽¹⁴⁾ for the footnote:

¹⁴ Comtean positivism was surely atheistic, but the Religion of Humanity attempted to be created by its founder on the organizational model of the Catholic Church, had retained all the features of a usual creed. The New Ottomans and the Young Turks of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were fascinated by positivism through Freemasonry. They believed that it was very progressive and they did not discern its basic similarity with the religion they blamed for preventing the advancement into modernity. In fact, positivism was much more conservative than it looked.

End of line 12, add ⁽¹⁵⁾ for the footnote:

¹⁵ I do not regard Marxism to be inherently dogmatic as positivism is; but it can be rendered into a dogmatism as many other liberitarian ideologies have been. Marxism in fact has been transformed into a "state religion" in those countries where communist parties are in power. Marxist parties in other countries who follow their lead are often torn between loyalty to them and to the theory itself. Only where a Marxist party is strong enough to challenge the leadership of an external center, the full potential of Marxism to keep abreast with all kinds of current problems can be observed.

As for the quasi-religious characteristics of the many recent Turkish socialist currents, these can perhaps be attributed (besides the easiness of continuing in a mentality) to the relative novelty of Marxism in this country. During the outlawed years of the TCP, its intellectual vitality had dried out. The short span of free socialist activity at the mid forties did not suffice to go deeper than the mere surface. At the sixties when Marxism was discovered anew, the appeal of ready paths was too strong to resist for many enthusiasts who wanted quick panaceas.

Line 12, after "Turkey" add (?) for the footnote:

17 A recent application of this theory to Turkish history (largely drawing from Prof. Küçükömer's 1969 book, Düzenin Yabancılaşması: Batılama [Alienation of the Order: West(ern)ization]) is to be in Ali Gevgilili's Yükseliş ve Düşüş (Rise and Fall - İstanbul, 1981), pp. 4-6.

The six hundred years-old Turkish Ottoman sovereignty differs in various respects from oriental societies as well as from classical western societies. Ottoman society was founded on the support of the Anatolian peasant's reaction who was striving to stay free against the Byzantine Empire, then in the process of transition to a feudal order. The founders of the Ottoman system offered to the Anatolian population a solution drawn from oriental and Islamic traditions: Land would not be the subject of personal property.

The Ottoman Sultan, i.e., the public authority who represented a tolerant version of oriental despotism was the sole owner of the whole arable land. For individuals only usage benefits (usis fructi) existed. This became a very important historical factor allowing the large peasant masses to behave more freely in comparison to western feudalism, both during the Ottoman and the Turkish Republican periods. Ottoman central authority undertook to realize the organization of the land. Establishment and functioning of the order was above all a question of resources. Therefore, another dominant social force was bound to appear who would appropriate the value created from the land and render the state bureaucracy into a very important instrument. This stratum composed of civilian or military state functionaries was different from the western civilian bureaucracy at the disposal of the economic system. In contradistinction to the western civilian bureaucracy, the Ottoman state bureaucracy had a very peculiar social status, able to exert control on the whole economy. Sometimes it acted as if it was a ruling class enjoying extensive powers possessing all means of production though it did not.

The Ottoman economic system which was situated at the junction of the East-west land trade routes and had reaped at its early period important shares from the world commerce, due to new international geographical discoveries, began to shake at its most vulnerable foundations. Eastern trade started over the Oceans afar from the Ottoman lands. As a result, the Turkish economy became progressively deprived of the external surplus value gained through mediation in foreign trade. This epoch also represented the reaching of the Ottoman expansion in Middle East, North Africa and Mid-Europe to its ultimate frontiers. Foodstuff required by millions of people living in the vast Ottoman realm, could no longer be provided by the agriculture under public

ownership because of the diminishing results tendency in production.

This phase and its aftermath in the Ottoman society is a period both of stagnation and fall, and of social and economic anarchy. Western Europe wished to make Turkey gradually a market and a depot of raw materials. Internally too, the first funds which began to accumulate through rising contraband trade desired to transform themselves into an agricultural and commercial capital. The historical state structure became once again an impediment to development. The dominant forces of the system prevented the evolution of capitalistic production relation for fear of losing their active status, yet they failed to bring about better solutions instead of the developments they stopped.

Lately the intellectual fashion concerning Asiatic Mode of Production is being replaced or complemented with another fad of Center-Periphery analysis of the World System, in other words, basically, the Wittfogelian revision of Marxism with the Wallersteinian. But the practical implications of this newer trend on the left are far from being clear.

Page 30, at line 15, before "But" add ⁽¹⁸⁾ for the footnote:

18 The TWP polled at these elections 3 % of the total votes (276,000 out of 9,300,000). At the partial senate elections of 1966 (21 provinces) it polled 3,2 % (79,000 out of 2,472,000) and of 1968 (22 provinces) 4,7 % (143,700 out of 3,067,000). This continuously rising ratios declined to 2,7 % (242,600 votes out of 9,086,000) at the 1969 general elections and the proportional representation with the national remainder having been changed, this resulted in electing only 2 of the 450 members of the Assembly.

at line 22, after "1968." add ⁽¹⁹⁾ for the footnote:

19 Aybar who formulated a new Humanitarian Socialism (on Caraudy's line) against the intervention of Warsaw Pact countries, managed to keep his presidency of the TWP for yet another year and resigned on November 15, 1969 after the electoral failure of his party.

Page 31, after the first 4 lines add the following paragraph:

Two common features can be observed in the credos of all these groups. The first is the priority given to the anti-imperialist struggle and the second, the belief in the imminency of a revolution. Considerations about economic development and planned industrialisation which were dominant during the earlier sixties, ^{now} seemed to be postponed to the realization of the revolution. Anti-imperialism was essentially anti-Americanism. The Cyprus conflict (where USA was suspected to favor the Greeks) made this stand increasingly popular among university students. The shared feeling of urgency related to a revolution wrongly expected to arrive soon, gave rise to an unhealthy radicalisation in almost all groups. They were divided, however,

as to the nature of the coming revolution. Was it going to be a socialist revolution as TWP supporters held or a national-democratic one as many youth organizations such as the Dev Genç thought. The latter who were much more fiery than the easier going TWP membership formulated a slogan of "fully independent and really democratic Turkey" reflecting their anti-imperialism and national-democratic revolution creed. Mihri Belli's followers who styled themselves "proletarian revolutionaries" (proletarian perhaps ideologically, but not sociologically; in fact the sharper a group appeared to be the more probable was their members being of upper-class origins) were prominent in this block for a while; then they were ready for more violent actions. Proliferation of groupings continued. superceded by those who were

At the end of line 12, change (10) into (20).

Please correct the old footnote number accordingly.

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Whether a certain theory is suitable to a given social structure, is not an empty or a purely verbal question. During the last decade, interesting developments have taken place which have confused us greatly. This experience did neither corroborate or negate the suitability of Marxism to Turkish conditions. Some features of the socialist program spread to non-leftist circles. But the Left itself split into many fractions. Most important of all, a movement that was militarily based, aiming at making a short-cut to power and cherishing a set of seemingly leftist demands, but also drawing on Kemalist support and utilizing Kemalist methods, created a pretext for a counter-reaction. It was sensed that there were some participation in this movement from the Left itself. (Following the 1971 military intervention, the major inciters of this attempt were purged from the army ranks and some were condemned at the ensuing Martial Law Command courts.)

as I raised in my book,

Today, our leftist movements evaluating the experiences of other socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China and applying the results of these evaluations to Turkey's conditions, constitute irreconcilable fractions which consider one another as the arch enemy. This splintering of the Left forces in the last twenty years is a novel development in Turkey. Throughout the 1945-1960 period, inspite of the formal disappearance of the Comintern, the tiny Turkish left was still kept in a central line. Whereas at the 1960s and 1970s, with the increasing of interest in Marxism, a proliferation of approaches came about. The result was a freer than ever atmosphere in the Left and assimilation of many European neo-Marxist tendencies on the one hand and an undisciplined dispersion of groups on the other.

What the situation will be on the Left after the present ban on politics is lifted, the limits of expression and action then to be permitted to Marxism, how and if the leftists will participate in a movement for the restoration of democracy in Turkey, are all interrelated and yet to be seen.

questions, the answers of which are