

## An Anatomy of the Great War

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Until 1941 the first World War was known as the Great War. It is my contention here that this was and is a misleading description; that - however 'great' in terms of their scale and consequences the events that took place between 1914 and 1918; however extensive, in terms of time and geographical area, the hostilities; however large the casualties and the number of states involved - it is misleading, however convenient it may be, to refer to them as The War. For the term 'the Great War' is really a collective term. What really happened in 1914 is that several wars broke out, and then went on, simultaneously.

### I

The first war to be dealt with is the first war to break out in 1914, the war declared by Austria-Hungary on Serbia on 28 July, and later joined by the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria on the Austro-Hungarian side and by Roumania and Greece on the Serbian side. This was the third Balkan War. The most nearly concrete piece of evidence for so describing it is the monument erected in 1919 in Belgrade to the Unknown Soldier. Set into the floor is the unaccompanied inscription '1912-1918'.

The Treaty of Bucharest of August 1913 followed the defeat of Bulgaria in June of that year by the forces of Greece, Serbia and Roumania. The defeat of Bulgaria followed that of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of Serbia and Bulgaria in October 1912. After the Treaty of Bucharest the situation was as follows: the Ottoman Empire, by virtue of its defeat, and Bulgaria, by virtue of hers, were both disaffected, revisionist, states. Both were in dispute with Greece - the Ottoman Empire over the Greeks' possession of the Aegean Islands, over Greek control of Crete and other areas, — and over Greek aspirations in Asia Minor - Bulgaria because she too wanted Macedonia for herself. In addition, Greece was in dispute with Austria-Hungary over southern Albania, which to the Greeks was northern Epirus, and which controlled the entrance to the Adriatic (in this dispute Italy was supporting her ally Austria-Hungary against Greece); there was almost complete incompatibility between Bulgaria

and Roumania; there was resentment in Roumania of Austria-Hungary, for sympathising with Bulgaria when the latter had attacked her, and for appearing to favour Bulgarian interests thereafter, and because 55% of the population of Transylvania was Roumanian, under Magyar rule within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In September 1913 Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire had drafted, but not signed or ratified, a military convention. They too however were in dispute with regard to the fate of certain national groups, and over the future of Thrace and Macedonia. Moreover the Bulgarians were afraid that the Ottoman Empire would immediately attack Greece, and leave them to face a Roumanian-Serbian combination which would go to the rescue of Greece, the latter having been in alliance with Serbia against Bulgaria since June 1913.

The Bulgarians' fear was not unfounded. For in March 1914 the Ottoman Empire announced that it would make good its claims to the islands disputed with Greece within three or four months, and began to take steps to achieve local naval superiority over Greece by attempting to purchase warships from Germany, France, Italy, and Argentina. These four Powers refused to sell. Great Britain, however, was already building two battlecruisers for the Ottoman Empire. The Greeks responded by buying from the United States of America two warships, Idaho and Mississippi, in June 1914. Since May 1914, moreover, the Greeks and the Turks had been committing atrocities against one another's nationals in Smyrna, in Thrace, in Crete and in Macedonia, under the guise of exchanging populations. On 12 June 1914 the Greeks delivered to the Porte an ultimatum, demanding an end to these persecutions, together with compensation for damages and a guarantee for the future of the lives and property of Greeks in Asia Minor. The Greek representative was told to break off diplomatic relations if the Ottoman Empire failed to give a favourable reply.

The point to be made is an obvious one. It is that between many of the smaller states in the Balkans there were disputes which looked as if they could be resolved only by resort to war, and that there was a very strong likelihood that any such war would involve all the Balkan states. If hostilities were not actually commenced by Austria-Hungary and/or the Ottoman Empire both these Powers would in all probability have joined in, with a view to recoving their recently lost positions in the Balkans.

This war, as already noted, was very nearly started by Greece in June 1914. On that occasion Emperor Wilhelm II of Germany remarked: 'We shall shortly see the third chapter of the Balkan Wars in which we shall all be involved'.<sup>1</sup> Had the Turks then been prepared it is doubtful that they would have given the favourable reply that they did give at that time. It is equally likely that the Ottoman Empire, having bought time in this way, would have issued some sort of ultimatum of their own within a few months.<sup>2</sup>

II

After the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy lost most in the first Balkan War, which had broken out in October 1912. As a result of this war, Serbia had doubled its territory, had many times multiplied the threat that its existence posed to the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and had placed itself in a position both to dominate the Adriatic and to exclude Austria-Hungary from Asia Minor, a destination the Monarchy still nurtured ideas of reaching, however slowly.<sup>3</sup> Since October 1912 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been unable to improve its position diplomatically. It had in fact, in the spring of 1914, lost its ally since 1885, Roumania, and failed to gain Bulgaria. From October 1913

successive Austrian Crown Councils had concluded that the Serbian threat must ultimately be removed by war. The assassination of the heir to the throne convinced the Austrians, if it did not, immediately, convince all of the Hungarians,<sup>4</sup> of the correctness of these conclusions, and furnished them at the same time with the best possible justification for the action contemplated for almost two years.

A resolution of its Serbian problem had been pressed upon the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by the German Empire since March 1913. Here we come to the second of the wars that broke out in July/August 1914 - the German-Russian war. From the outcome of the first Balkan War, which in the view of the German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg altered in favour of the Slavs and against the German Powers the balance of power in the Balkans, and, therefore, the balance of power in Europe,<sup>5</sup> the German hierarchy was of the opinion that such a war had to be fought, and that their only chance of winning it lay in fighting it before Russian military improvements and increases begun in 1912 would be completely effected, as would be the case by 1918. The Germans

had, as they saw it, some six years grace. In December 1912 they began to prepare the German public for such a war. They also commenced to lay the diplomatic framework. One element in this framework was the freeing of Austria-Hungary from concern about Serbia, so that the Austro-Hungarian war effort could be concentrated upon Russia. As the German Emperor put it in conversation with the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff at manoeuvres in Silesia between 17 and 19 September 1913: 'it would be better to see Serbia united with Austria than for Austria to have as its neighbour a south Slav state which would at all times stab it in the back'.<sup>6</sup><sup>7</sup>

The unity of Serbia with Austria-Hungary was a strand of German, and particularly of the Kaiser's, foreign policy that was assiduously pursued for the last eighteen months of peace between the Great Powers. This unity could be achieved, and the problem of Serbia solved, in one of two ways. If the carrot failed, there was always the stick.

In March 1913 the Kaiser minuted: 'I remain of the opinion that the combination of Serbia, Roumania and Greece under Austria's leadership is the natural and better one.' Even though the voices of a few Austrian politicians had earlier been raised in favour of certain Serbian plans in Albania, and even though at least one Serbian diplomat had indicated in November 1912 that if Serbia acquired with the good offices of Austria-Hungary an Adriatic port then even a Serbian-Austrian customs union might come about, how the Kaiser could propound such views was a mystery to the Ballhausplatz, and remained so. The following month, April 1913, in the Budget Commission of the Reichstag, War Minister von Heeringen pointed out that the enlarged Serbia would tie down Austro-Hungarian forces which would therefore be absent from the Galician front in a war against Russia. After speaking to Conrad in September 1913 the Kaiser took up the matter again with the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs Count Berchtold in October. He said:

'The war between east and west is in the long run inevitable, and if Austria was then exposed on its flank to the invasion of a respectable military power it could be fatal to the outcome of the great struggle. With Serbia there could be no other relationship for Austria than that of the dependence of the small power on the big one. Austria must attract Serbia

by providing - money, military training, trade preferences. In return for the protection which the Austrian army could offer Serbia against foreign intervention she would place her army at Austria's disposal. If Serbia refused to do this force must be used - if Francis Joseph makes a demand the Serbian government must comply and if it refuses to do so Belgrade will be shelled and occupied til Francis Joseph's will has been done - and you can be sure that I shall stand behind you ready to draw my sword whenever your action requires it.'

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The German Ambassador in Vienna reported the same conversation to Bethmann Hollweg in the following terms:

'The Emperor (Wilhelm II) remarked that Austria-Hungary must do everything to establish, if at all possible à l'aimable, an economic and political understanding with Serbia, but if that could not be achieved by peaceful means more energetic methods must be employed. Somehow or other Serbia must in all circumstances be made to join forces with Austria-Hungary, particularly in the military sphere; so that in case of a conflict with Russia Austria-Hungary will not have the Serbian army against it but on its side. He added that it could be assumed with certainty that for the next six years Russia would be incapable of taking military action.'

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The Kaiser further elaborated his policy in a conversation with the Austro-Hungarian Military Attaché in December 1913. Taking into account what Conrad, who of those present at the Austrian Crown Council of 3 October 1913 most nearly shared his views had told him in September to the effect that Serbia would shortly have twenty divisions at her disposal, he said:

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'The Serbs must be harnessed before the car of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy - in one way or another. The final decision in South East Europe may involve sooner or later a serious

armed conflict, and we Germans then stand with you and behind you, but it can in no case be a matter of indifference to us whether twenty divisions of your army are earmarked for operations against the southern Slavs, or not.'

In March 1914 Wilhelm II advised the former Austro-Hungarian Minister of Trade, Baernreither, at a meeting in Berlin which included Foreign Minister von Jagow, Colonial Minister Solf, and Zimmerman and Koerner of the German Foreign Office, 'to conclude a customs alliance with Serbia and in the end a military convention', and pleaded for a union of Rumania, Greece and Serbia which might also be joined by the Ottoman Empire. In June, in conversation with Franz Ferdinand, he maintained that it was vital for Austria-Hungary to take energetic steps against Serbia, arguing once more that Russia was by no means ready for war and that she would probably not oppose such an action.

German support and encouragement for Austro-Hungarian action against Serbia at the beginning of July 1914, then, may be seen as a continuation of a policy consistently pursued and pressed upon Austria-Hungary for at least the previous seventeen months. Under the influence of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand the Germans had merely, eventually, come to agree with the Dual Monarchy that the Serbs were irreconcilable, and would never be won over or round by the thoroughly inappropriate and misconceived peaceful means suggested in Germany's own interests by the Kaiser in particular - a spectacular manifestation on his part of an inability to see the trees for the wood.

Thus far, it has been established that there was an extreme likelihood of a third Balkan War breaking out at some point in 1914; and it has been maintained that this third Balkan War took the form of an attack by Austria-Hungary on Serbia, a move that from the German point of view was seen as clearing the decks, freeing Austria-Hungary's back, and improving the position of the German Powers for a war at some unspecified point before 1918 against Russia, the greatest of the slavonic Powers.

What happened in July 1914 was that the German calculation of June, that Russia

was not ready for war and would not oppose the action of Austria-Hungary, a calculation that was still being made in the third week of July, proved to be wrong. The German-Russian war, planned but not fixed for the future, was thereby brought forward, and followed by four days, instead of by four months, or four years, the Austro-Serbian war which was supposed to increase the chances in it of German success.

### III

A second war was brought forward in 1914. This was the third of the wars that broke out at this time - the German-English war. War against Great Britain had been contemplated by the German Empire since at least the turn of the century. As in the case of the war against Russia, no precise date had been fixed, but the idea is implicit in the reasons given by Admiral von Tirpitz to Wilhelm II for the adoption of a great naval policy. The possession of a great navy by Germany, so it was professed in certain quarters, would compel the British to make colonial concessions to the German Empire. As a result the latter would become a World Power, like Great Britain, Russia and France.

The German Chancellor von Bülow admitted in a memorandum of 29 March 1900 for the Bavarian representative Count von Lerchenfeld that the imperial government was basing its naval calculations upon a probable war with England. In 1903 Bethmann Hollweg, then Oberpräsident of Brandenburg, the highest administrative office in Prussia, described the Kaiser's intentions to Baron <sup>ess von</sup> Spitzemberg in this way: 'His basic and primary idea is to destroy England's position in the world to the advantage of Germany; therefore - it is the Kaiser's firm conviction - we need a navy and, to build it, a great deal of money..'. If the British refused to make the sort of accommodation that was envisaged, if they resisted German demands and insisted on continuing to occupy their position in the world, Germany would resort to force. Even if in the process she lost her own fleet, she would have the satisfaction or consolation of so reducing British naval power as to render the British Empire indefensible. So went German thinking (though 'thinking' is not at all the right word for this odd collection of attitudes), on a very long-term basis. For not until 1918-1920 would the Germans have enough naval power to risk a contest. By that time, however, events would have demonstrated whether the British were prepared to resist or to yield.

This German outlook was heavily conditioned by a situation in which the German Empire already dominated Europe. At the turn of the century Great Britain was isolated, on bad terms with France and worse terms with Russia, who was largely occupied with plans for expansion in the Far East and in Central Asia. The favourable position of Germany in Europe lasted, roughly, until 1912, by which time Russia had evidently recovered from her defeat by Japan in 1904-5 and the revolution that had followed. After visiting Russia in that year, Bethmann Hollweg could see no point in planting new trees on his estate in East Prussia, as the Russians would be there to enjoy them within a few years.<sup>20</sup> The favourable position of Germany in Europe ended, precisely, in October 1912. The recovery of Russia, and the 'Slav threat' given substance by the victories of the Balkan League over the Ottoman Empire in that month, presented the German Empire with an unexpected 'Russian' problem, the solution of which was to be found in a deviation from, or interruption of, Weltpolitik. Germany had to deal with the 'Slav threat', had to secure her own European position, which was suddenly less secure than it had been at any time since the mid-1890s, had to readjust in her favour the recently changed balance of power. Only when this had been accomplished could she concentrate on Weltpolitik, and take on, if necessary, the British Empire. Hence the necessity for the German-Russian war. Essentially, this was a nuisance, something to be got out of the way in order to return to the long-term business. It was not, as it was with Hitler's Third Reich, the main object of German policy.<sup>21</sup>

The obverse of the German-English war is, of course, the Anglo-German war. Although the decision for war against Germany of the British Foreign Secretary and of the British Foreign Office was largely geared to considerations of avoiding both isolation and an outright contest with Russia for supremacy in Central Asia;<sup>22</sup> and although the decision of the British Cabinet for war with Germany was largely geared to considerations concerning the future of the Liberal Party;<sup>23</sup> there were elements within the British body politic that regarded war with Germany as a preventive war on the part of Great Britain. In the face of German naval building, many within the British establishment did Tirpitz's calculations for themselves. They too forecast a war between England and Germany at some point in the future. Their estimates of this point tended to change as the German naval programme developed, and slowed down a



little, but the majority of these estimates predicted either 1913-14 or 1917-18. There was also a parallel with the idea held in some high German circles, that if a war came, or developed out of, a situation in which Austria-Hungary was already involved, then the Central Powers could operate as a unit in a way which might not be possible if the war developed out of any other situation or area. <sup>24</sup> In the circumstances of July-August 1914 Great Britain would have France and Russia as allies - this would not necessarily be the case in other cases, or at the time selected by Germany to act against Great Britain.

The elements within British political life which regarded war with Germany in a positive way broke the surface from time to time, especially during periods of tension between Britain and Germany. Most spectacular of all, perhaps, was the speech at Eastleigh on 2 February 1905 in which Arthur Lee, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, reminded his listeners that 'Thrice blest is he who hath his quarrel just, but four times he who gets his blow in fust'. <sup>25</sup> Later that same year Sir George Clarke, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, reminded the owner of The Times newspaper of articles in the Army and Navy Gazette advocating an attack upon Germany. <sup>26</sup> Right at the end of that year Colonel Repington, the influential military correspondent of The Times, told the French Military Attaché, Huguet, that if a Franco-German war broke out 'en ce qui nous concerne plus particulièrement, jamais l'Angleterre ne retrouvera une occasion aussi belle et elle en profitera certainement'. <sup>27</sup> In 1907 Lord Rosebery told J.A. Spender, editor of the Westminster Gazette, of Clemenceau's declaration that he would not be hurried into war with Germany by English Teutophobes. <sup>28</sup> In 1908 Algernon Law of the Foreign Office wrote to the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie:

'I should like to go for the Germans at once before they have built up a formidable navy, and put a stop once and for ever to their competition which is so serious to us.'

At the height of the naval building scare of 1909 Spenser Wilkinson, defence correspondent of the Morning Post, pounced upon a remark of Fabian Ware, the editor, concerning the time when Delcassé resigned as French Minister for Foreign Affairs in June 1905: 'You (Ware) now think we ought to have fought Germany then. You thought so if I remember right at the time'. <sup>30</sup> Wilkinson followed this up on 3 April 1909 with

another warning: 'You, as I understand, want to hasten a war with Germany while I hope it may be averted by proper attention to navy and army and by a sound foreign policy.'<sup>31</sup> In March 1911 F.S.Oliver wrote to Lord Milner: 'Nothing will save us except the sight of red blood running pretty freely; but whether British and German blood, or only British, I don't know - nor do I think it much matters...'<sup>32</sup> On the occasion of Secretary of State for War Haldane's visit to Berlin at the beginning of 1912 a Major Viburne wrote to a friend: 'Personally, I think there must be a war between this country and Germany sooner or later, and it had better come sooner...'<sup>33</sup> At the very same time, the possibility that the French might attack Germany first did not embarrass the British Ambassador to Paris in the slightest. Bertie told Grey this on 16 February, and repeated it to Lloyd George two days later.<sup>34</sup> When this possibility reached the ears of Reginald McKenna, the then incumbent of the Home Office and former First Lord of the Admiralty,<sup>35</sup> it did disturb him, as it had disturbed Grey. The impression that it made upon Lloyd George, however, may not be unconnected with the disposition he was shortly thereafter reported as manifesting in the direction of embracing compulsory military service. As H.A.Gwynne, Ware's successor as editor of the Morning Post, to whose ears this came, remarked to his proprietor: 'If it is true and if Lloyd George is sincere, it is the biggest thing going - the fulfilment of our dreams and the achievement of our efforts.'<sup>36</sup> At any rate, Lloyd George was reported, later in the year, as having spoken 'quite complacently about the rousing of the English national spirit for a war about the Balkans'.<sup>37</sup>

One can be sure that the Wares, the Olivers, and the Viburnes welcomed the Anglo-German war, when it came. Like Rupert Brooke, though not necessarily for the same reason, they were 'swimmers into cleanness leaping'. It is not known whether the later association of Ware with the Imperial War Graves Commission (he wrote a history of it, The Immortal Heritage, published in 1937) sobered him up.

#### IV

These were the wars of 1914-1918. They overlapped. They intermingled. Two of them came before their time. To them may be added the war begun by the Ottoman Empire against both Russia and Great Britain. This began in November 1914, and continued, on

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the British side, as a way to gain something, given the deadlock on the western front, and as a way of preventing what the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office foresaw in September 1913 - 'that Mesopotamia will be Teutonised & lost to G[reat] B[ritain]'. <sup>38</sup> The original wars - that of Austria-Hungary against Serbia, that of Germany against Russia, that of Germany and Great Britain against one another - all had elements of the defensive, the preventive, in them.

Is there any point, in view of the above 'Anatomy' of the 'Great War', in looking for the cause of the first World War, as such - a search which in the past has embraced the 'alliance system', 'militarism' and arms races, economic imperialism, the press, the balance of power - a search which, more often than not, has started not later than the 1890s and/or 1870, and which in some cases has been pushed back into the Dark Ages? <sup>39</sup> There still may be some point in succumbing to the temptation to produce for some great event - even if the latter is really a combination of several lesser events - some great cause or at least common factor. Certain areas remain relatively unexplored.

One of these has to do with the attitude of Russia, on which the Germans miscalculated, for it was this attitude which brought forward the German-Russian war and the Anglo-German war. Despite being pressed by the French from mid-1912 onwards to build strategic railways that would relieve the German pressure on France and reduce the necessity for the sort of concessions France had made in the course of the Agadir crisis of 1911 <sup>40</sup>, the Russians were not considering an attack upon the Central Powers. Even after the success of the Balkan League, which Russia had been unable to restrain from attacking the Ottoman Empire <sup>41</sup>, the policy of Sazonov, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was mainly concerned to maintain the status quo in this region. Nevertheless, from October 1912 onwards there was a distinct appreciation on the occasions when foreign policy was discussed in the councils of the Tsar, of two things. One of these things was the extent to which the occupation of the whole Straits area and complete dominance over the Balkans represented the ultimate goal of Russian policy. The other thing was the extent to which the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the schemes for compensation or for a sharing of influence <sup>put forward by</sup> Austria-Hungary, and the interest of Germany in exercising power at the Porte, **constituted** a threat to this 'historic striving' and to the application of the principle of 'the Balkans for the Balkan peoples'. The situation was compounded by the realisation, as a result of the closure and threat of closure of the <sup>Straits</sup> during the first two Balkan Wars, of the

true value to the Russian economy of the free and unrestricted use of this waterway. Not only were the Russians afraid of the establishment of a causeway of Teutonic influence from Berlin through Vienna to Constantinople and Asia Minor, leading to a complete domination of the peoples and potential of the Balkan region by the Central Powers and their allies; but they became adamant that they would fight, rather than see the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles fall under the control of a hostile power, great or small. Following a decision to this effect in January 1914, and the acquisition in February of German memoranda which stressed a German desire to control the Straits, even at the cost of European war, should the Ottoman Empire collapse, Sazonov told the British Ambassador in April that whilst Russia would never take aggressive action against an independent Ottoman Empire, she would have to act against an Ottoman Empire that became a dependency of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Although Austria-Hungary's policy in attacking Serbia in July 1914 was defensive - in that the Monarchy was attempting to break out of what she perceived as encirclement by Russia and states sympathetic to Russia - it was also aggressive, and the longer term the view taken of it the more aggressive it was. For not only was the Monarchy attempting to change the status quo, she was also intending to use the new status quo as a springboard from which to establish her own influence and exclude that of Russia from the whole area. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had vested interests in putting one clock back and then another forward. Whilst Russian policy was defensive - in that it was mainly geared to maintaining the status quo - it too was aggressive in the long term, in that she too was determined exclusively to enjoy and exploit the resources of the Balkan region and beyond.

What produced this clash of strategies was the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire in Europe in October 1912. Whilst the Ottoman Empire existed in Europe there was always an Eastern Question. Until it practically ceased to exist answers to this question could always be found. The Ottoman Empire was expelled from Europe by Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro. Their reasons for so doing are central to a full explanation of the wars of 1914. If one may redirect the question of the Thurbur Woman, who were the members of the Young Turkish Society of Union and

and what did they want? <sup>44</sup>

Progress, which in 1908 had deposed Sultan Abdul Hamid, / What was the origin and impact of the policies that they pursued towards the Balkan states, the intolerance of which policies, even after the Balkan Wars, was remarked upon by the Russian Government? <sup>45</sup>

Could it be said that these Turks, who by closing the Straits during their war against Russia did much to bring about arguably the single most significant event of 1914-1918 - the Russian Revolution - also contributed largely to the outbreak of the wars of July-August 1914? Was it not they who created the context in which the wars of 1914, the wars of the immediate and more distant future, merged into the Great War? Was it not they who caused to be posed a challenge to statesmanship which the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which could have acted more quickly, or in another way, and which the German Empire, which deliberately misinterpreted the Russian mobilisation as a casus foederis, were both unable, and unwilling, to meet? Was not the Young 'Turks' particular form of nationalism the trigger not only for the nationalism of the smaller states within the ambit of the Ottoman Empire, but for that of the Great Powers of Europe as well? The value of this Conference resides in the light that the contributors to it may shed upon the above questions, which represent the least explored area of all.

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİHİ

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footnotes

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19. cited in Fischer in Hunt and Freston op.cit. pp.106-7.
20. cited in Fischer War of Illusions p.224.
21. See N.Rich Hitler's War Aims vol.i (London 1973).
22. See K.M.Wilson Empire and Continent (London 1987) ch.9.
23. See K.M.Wilson The Policy of the Entente (Cambridge 1985) ch.8.
24. Bethmann Hollweg in September 1910, cited in Fischer War of Illusions p.86.
25. A.Clark (ed.) A Good Innings: the Private Papers of Viscount Lee of Fareham (London 1974) p.89.
26. G.S.Clarke to J.Walter 22 October 1905 The Times Archives.
27. Huguet to Etienne 30 December 1905 Documents Diplomatiques Francais (Paris 1929-62) 2nd Series viii no.300. Huguet repaid the compliment in a letter of 26 July 1914 to General Sir Henry Wilson in which, certain already that war would come, he looked forward to it, and described it as the best diversion for Britain from her internal problems. H.Wilson MSS 73/1/18.
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30. Wilkinson to Ware 30 March 1909 Glenesk-Bathurst MSS.
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45. Zotiades op.cit.p.296.

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