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The British desire to retain its influence in Turkey even after the Lausanne, and to draw Turkey into the dependency upon the British policy, as well as ~~to defer~~ <sup>to defer</sup> French influence in Turkey, are closely connected with Curzon's Turkish policy. . . .

After British success in Lausanne which led to a number of dynamic changes [in the international situation], the goal of the British policy in Turkey is the implantation of the British influence there, and the slow ~~suspension~~ <sup>suspension</sup> of French influence. . . . England also seeks control over the railways in Asia Minor. [Meantime] the Mosul question remains still unsettled.

France, on the other hand, is interested in the settlement of the question of Alexandretta, and of the Ottoman debt to France. Finally, there is the problem of the French schools in Turkey. . . .

As to the future relations between Turkey and Russia, and the policy regarding the Straits and the Black Sea, new ~~prospects~~ <sup>prospects</sup> are now opened in connection with the penetration of the "western orientation" and the disappearance of the last remnants of Pan-Islamic ideology in Turkey.

The Young Turk revolution in 1908 was already a purely nationalist one; in its political and religious ~~concepts~~ <sup>concepts</sup> it was permeated with the western ideology, and in the Itilaf circles even with the franco massonic ideas. The end of the era of Abdul Hamid is actually the end of the Pan-Islamic ideology in Turkey; it was followed by the Pan-Turkic nationalist policy which is connected with the regime of Talaat Pasha during the war. This policy found its exceptionally clear expression in the activity of Jemal Pasha when he was the Viceregent in Syria. Finally, one should mention the penetration of the British influence into



the Arab~~ic~~ regions of the Ottoman empire during the war. All the above led to the breaking up of the ethnically Turkish and non-Turkish sectors of the empire. The agreement which was reached easily at Lausanne in regard to the loss of the southern provinces of the empire, and the Turkish persistent efforts to retain the Turkish sectors of this empire, particularly Thrace -- point out at the purely national, or rather racial orientation which finds its expression in Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism, and which directs Turkish interests exclusively ~~to the~~ eastward, to the Caucasus, Turkestan, and so forth. The friendly relations between Russia and Turkey which existed in the period of the Turkish war of liberation had somewhat smoothed over these tendencies, but in the future, when Russia's friendship is no longer needed, these tendencies might find further and strong development as the result of the Turkish ideological and political racial orientation. At present Turkey is in a state of absolute exhaustion. . . This condition, and the necessity of a stubborn and heavy effort directed at the inner reconstruction of the country, will take a considerable number of years. Therefore, it provides a <sup>certain</sup> limitation in the Turkish foreign policy, but nonetheless this policy has definite eastward expansionist tendencies. The final stamping out of the Pan-Islamic institutions of the Caliphate... <sup>lays</sup> ~~gives~~ only an additional ~~empha~~ emphasis on the purely Pan-Turkic ideology. . . .

The complete modernization of Turkey which ~~found~~ such a dramatical expression in the suppression of Caliphate, and which bears a historical significance, represents to a certain extent ~~the~~ the final stage of the Russo-Turkish relations of the period of the war of liberation. ~~However~~ However, there remain other domains which make possible the ~~continuation~~ continuation of Russo-Turkish friendship. However, it would be instructive to recall Lord Curzon's statement in the British Parliament that "at Lausanne we have achieved more than we had expected; not only did we acquire the right of free <sup>through</sup> passage of the Straits, but even the right -with certain limits - of the entry by our warships of (over)



Black Sea." [ In other words Turkey was leaning more to the West than Soviet Russia would have wished ] .

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