

Herbert S. Dinerstein, Soviet Foreign Policy in the Near  
and Middle East 1917-1923

A thesis submitted to the Department of History at ~~Har~~  
Harvard University in Partial Fulfillment of the ~~XXXX~~  
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
1943, 372 p.

Contains:

1. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk and the Caucasus.
2. The End of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk
3. The Allies and Transcaucasia
- ✓ 4. The Comintern and Russia's Near Eastern Policy
5. Soviet conquest of the Caucasus and the Turks  
over

6. Russia and Persia
7. Russia and Afghanistan
8. The Lausanne Conference.

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p.169 Whether or not the Bolsheviks relegated the Comintern to second place at its very inception, at its second meeting it was converted into an auxiliary of Russian foreign policy. The leading subject at the second meeting of the Comintern was the revolt of the peoples of the East. No attempt was made to conceal in whose interests this policy was primarily framed. Lenin, before he presented his theses on the nationalities question explained.../see Lenin's speech in Vtoroi Kongress...second paragraph p.99/ also paragraph 5 of the resolution on the national question, p.492/

p.171 Lenin revealed in his introduction to the theses on the national and colonial questions that there had been considerable debate in the committee on the following question: Is it correct to assert that the capitalist stage of development is inevitable for those backward countries.... Lenin answered the question he had himself posed in the negative....

p.172 Quelch's objection....By his rude reply to Quelch's remarks, Radek showed that the internationalist conscience of the Bolsheviks was still tender...He then touched on the essence of the issue...."and if our hard work in the East, our class agitation with the goal of creating soviet organizations in Turkestan and the Caucasus and the extension of our first feelers into Persia and Turkey are viewed in England as steps of the Soviet Republic directed toward the preparation of difficulties for the English - then this is a complete misunderstanding of the foreign policy of the Soviet Government. It is the fulfillment of the program of Comintern, it is the fulfillment of the duty of Soviet Russia as part of the International. We do not view eastern agitation as an auxiliary means in the struggle with European capitalism; we view it as the fulfillment of the duty to which the permanent interests of the European proletariat bind us!" / see Vtoroi Kongress...pp. 115

/see Lenin's speech on the change of attitude expressed in the terms of "bourgeois democratic movements" and bourgeois revolutionary movements", pp.99-100/

p.175 In the seventh theses of the supplementary theses did Roy reveal his ~~disagreement~~ difference with Lenin. / see this paragraph in Vtoroi Kongress, pp.498/....

p.176 ...Sultan Zade, with the Persian situation in mind, felt that the revolution in the West was a necessary preliminary to the revolution in the East. Nor was Sultan Zade free from doubts on the score of cooperation with the bourgeoisie. He said: see Vtoroi Kongress p.120

Steps were taken to ~~supplement~~ implement the program for revolution in the East. In Sept. 1920 - / the Baku Congress/....

p.177 The Bolshevik leaders framed their Eastern policy with an eye to Russia's political benefit, although they had not lost their interest in world revolution per se. For instance M.Pavlovich-Weltman elaborates the following thesis in a book written in 1920:

The war against Soviet Russia is the war against the revolutionary East, and vice versa the war against the East is the war against Soviet Russia.

....Supporting Wrangel and having a base of support in the Crimea, England and France have the opportunity at any moment of making a landing on the rear of the Red Anatolian Army, in the rear of Kemal's troops and preventing any union of Turkey and Soviet Russia through the Black Sea. On the other hand, as long as Asia Minor is in the hands of Allied expeditionary forces, our rear is threatened...all these barriers will fall under the blows of the national masses of the Crimea, Georgia, Armenia, Thrace and Greece.

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M.P.Pavlovich-Weltman: Voprosy Kolonialnoi i Natsionalnoi Politiki i III-i Internationalnatsional (Moscow, 1920) p.18  
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p.178 Karl Radek told the assembled delegates at Baku that Russian went to the peoples of the East not only to use their strength in the struggle with British imperialism, but to assist them in overthrowing their native exploiters. This last assurance seemed in part aimed at the objections which Roy and Sultan Zade had raised at the second Congress of the International. Radek's warning in anticipation of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement - "Russian workers may seek breathing spells during which revolution will grow more vigorously in other countries, but a lasting peace between the country of labor and the country of exploitation cannot be...."

Zinoviev's concluding remarks / Pervyi Sezd Narodov Vostoka pp. 31-49

p.180 Speech of Kemal's representative / Pervyi Sezd Narodov Vostoka, p. 21

p.181 The official resolution of the presidium of the conference on the Turkish question must have confirmed all the fears of those sceptical Turks who were accepting the Communists only as temporary Allies. It read / see Pervyi Kongress N.Vostoka pp.116-117

Another sour note was thrown into the proceedings of the Baku Congress by the complaints about Soviet administration by a representative from Turkestan / see Narbutabekov's speech in Pervyi Kongress N.Vostoka, p. 116-117/

✓ It has been suggested that his remarks were abbreviated and edited in the printed text of the proceedings / see Paul Olberg. "Sowjetrusslands Politik im Orient" Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik I (1923), 127-203, p.196/

p.182 How far the Russian communists were willing to go in their war with British imperialism is illustrated by the presence in Baku of Enver Pasha, who could hardly be classed with the advanced bourgeoisie.... In an article Kark Radek / "Kongress der Ostvölker Russische Korrespondenz, No.14/16 Oct. 1920, 907-910/ explained that Enver

p.183 Pasha was a politician/ and an opportunist/.

p.184 ...If the Baku Congress was primarily intended to free those portions of the Near and Middle East, contiguous to Russia, from British influence, the Baku Congress must be credited with a measure of success. A year after the Baku Congress met, Turkey was on the way to victory over the Greek armies; Afghanistan had acquired the right to direct her own foreign policy. Persia had ejected the British from her borders. However the Comintern and the Baku Congress were not solely or even chiefly responsible for the improvement of Russia's international position. The development of Turkish, Afghan, and Persian nationalism and the sympathy of the Moslem world played their role in the liberation of these countries from British influence. Even more important was the war weariness of England. - the speeches pronounced in Baku and the resolutions adopted by the Comintern dwindle in importance.

According to Karl Radek / Op. cited/ the Russians were probing in the dark, hoping that something grand and wonderful might happen. H.G.Wells, in a fleeting visit to Russia was able to appraise the situation correctly. He wrote:

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"Impatient at the long delay of the Western proletarians to emerge, Zinoviev.../etc./ have gone recently on a pilgrimage to Baku to raise the Asiatic proletariat.... I did my best to find out from Zinoviev and Zorin what they thought they were doing in the Baku Conference. And frankly I do not think they know. ...It is a counter-offensive almost as clumsy and stupid as the offensives it would counter./ from Britain/ see H.G.Wells. Russia in the Shadows. (N.Y. 1921)pp. 96-97 )

The aims expounded at Baku Congress were quickly relegated to the background. Part of the reason must be sought in the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement of March 1921 which called a truce between England and Russia. Russia was to cease her hostile propaganda in British possessions, and Britain was to lift the Blockade and abstain from supporting counter-revolutionary movements within Russia and the border states./ Accounts and Papers 1921, Vol.25, Cmd. 1207



At the Third Congress of the Comintern in 1921, not only was the revolution in the East slighted, but the world revolution was temporarily shelved. The following resolution explained the change of policy...." The war did not have as its immediate consequence ~~the~~ a proletarian revolution, and the bourgeoisie had come around to register this fact as a great victory for itself. Only petty bourgeoisie dullards can imagine that .../this/ is an indication that the program of the C.I. has failed. The Com. International is basing its policy on the proletarian revolution but that by no means implies either dogmatically fixing any definite date for the revolution, or any pledge to bring it mechanically at a set time./ These and resolutions adopted at the 3rd W. Congress of the Communist International, pp. 24, 25, 29, 30.

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Only one afternoon was devoted to the treatment of the Eastern question. The Indian representative Roy... complained of its neglect. The well disciplined Congress ignored this protest/

✓Tretii vseimirnyi kongress k. Internats. (Petrograd, 1922) p.472

The Turkish and Persian comrades, apparently irrevocably linked to the policy of the Comintern, complained bitterly of the treatment they had received at the hands of the revolutionary bourgeoisie with whom they were supposed to cooperate, but indicated their willingness to continue cooperating in the name of the greater glory of the proletariat./ Ibid, pp. 464-466/

At the next meeting of Comintern in 1922, the colonial representatives were allowed to adopt a more critical attitude toward the cooperation of communist and bourgeois nationalistic forces. Rot, for instance...was permitted to present a series of theses on the colonial problem. The reasons for this compliance with the desires of the native communist parties was not far to seek. Mustapha Kemal's treaty with Russia and another with Franklin Boullion, by which France virtually left the Entente as far as the Near East was concerned. In Russia this aroused the suspicion that M.Kemal might be grooming Turkey for Poland's role in the Near East.

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The Comintern prepared its minions for a change of policy, if necessary, but yet retained the principle of cooperation with those fighting national wars of liberation against the imperialists. The theses on the Orient outlined the difference between the various colonial countries and emphasized the necessity of adopting different policies to accommodate each of them. The theses also cautioned against the pseudo-communist parties which were created especially in Turkey to steal the thunder from the Communist parties inspired by the Comintern / see Roy's discussion in IV. Vesem. kongress (Moscow-Petrograd, 1923) pp. 261-70, p. 264/

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Turkey was a particularly thorny problem for the Comintern. The Comintern was most anxious for Mustapha Kemal to eject the British from the Straits and the Near East, yet they were wroth at the manner in which Mustapha Kemal unceremoniously imprisoned and executed Turkish communists. The reasons for Mustapha Kemal's actions were twofold. He feared the Communist threat to his political hegemony in Turkey, and he realized that publicized persecution of communists would win him support in the countries with which he hoped to make peace.

In this dilemma the Comintern could only swallow its pride and ask the native communists to suffer a bit more. Radek, after describing the infamies of the treatment of the communists in Turkey concluded: / see Fourth Congress of the C.I. ✓Abridged report of Meetings held at Petrograd and Moscow, Nov.7 /sic/-Dec.3, 1922 (London, n.d.) pp. 219, 220, 223, 235-39



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In 1919 when the shoe was on the other foot, M. Kemal allowed Bolshevik delegations with large numbers of expert agitators in tow to enter Turkey, although official relations with S. Russia were not yet established.

✓ Gotthard Jäschke "Der Weg zur russisch-türkischen Freundschaft" Die Welt des Islams XVI(1934), 23-38, p.30

In addition to the official and genuine C. parties in Turkey, there was still a third group - the Green Turkish armies led by Etem. Etem was a local guerilla leader who had been the first to organize resistance to the Greek landing at Smyrna. The Greens were in Kemal's bad graces.... The Green army was vaguely communist.... Etem was a pseudo-communist, but his activities were not deliberately sponsored by the Turkish Government.... During the war with the Greeks, the Kemalists forces accused Etem of treachery. The Russians, who were ill-informed or vindictive, smugly remarked that Etem belonged to the official communist party.... Kemal's speech

✓ Izvestiia, Jan. 25, 1921, p.3

described Etem as an anarchist // see A speech delivered by Ghazi M. Kemal, Oct. 1927 (Leipzig, 1929) pp. 401-04 - Gesellschaft zur Erforschung der Türkischen Geschichte:

✓ Geschichte der Türkischen Republik (Istanbul, 1935) p.84

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.... The Russo Turkish treaty / March 1921/ was hardly a brilliant success for Russian diplomacy. The Russians made territorial concessions; they promised to prohibit the Turkish communist party from operating from Russian soil. The conciliatory character of this treaty did not lead to Russian ascendancy over Turkish foreign or internal policy. In April the Turks finally evacuated Armenia, but showed no inclination to treat Turkish communists more leniently. In May Russian citizens suspected of being agitators were ejected and the persecution of native communists continued. It was at this point that the Russians learned of the drowning of Mohamed Subkhi the Turkish member of the Comintern who had operated from ~~the Turkish~~ Baku. The tragedy was lamented more in sorrow than in anger by Pavlovich who naively or dishonestly remarked that Kemal must realize what a loss Subkhi was to the revolution. ✓ Zhizn Natsionalnoei, May 14, 1921/.

Ali Fuad, the Turkish Ambassador to Russia, pointed out in a long note in answer to Russian protests about the treatment of Turkish communists that the Turks had not envisaged a social revolution in Turkey on Russia's scale.

But on the other hand, continued Ali Fuad, it is undeniable that the Turkish people by their struggle against imperialism for the preservation of their national independence, by protecting one flank of the Soviet Republic, by continuing to shed blood for their national ideal, have rendered particularly to Soviet Russia and in general to the world revolution incomparably more service than other countries which sought to make a social revolution and have declared themselves Soviet Republics..... ✓ Ali Fuad to Chicherin June 22, 1921" The Nation, N.Y. Sept. 7, 1921 CXIII, p. 273/

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Turkish policy towards Russia was a reflection of her relations with the western powers. When these relations improved, Turkey made difficulties for her own communists and took a firmer line with Russia; when Turkey's relations with the western powers deteriorated, Russia benefited. The treaty of Kaes between Turkey and the Caucasian republics is a case in point.... At the end of September, 1921 many prominent Turkish Communists who had been imprisoned for long terms were freed. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ✓ Sherif Manatov, "Obzor Turetskoi ~~pressy~~ pressy" Novyi Vostok, I, 1922, 358/



Some two weeks later the Treaty of Kars was concluded between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Republics (Oct. 13, 1921).

As if to prove that they were not dependent on Russia, the Turks concluded the Franklin-Boullion France agreement a week later on Oct. 20, 1921. The agreement provided for the cessation of hostilities between France and Turkey. / M. Rafail: Elizhni Vostok (Moscow, 1926, p.100) / Paillerés: Le Kémalisme devant les Alliés, pp.77-78

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In October, 1922 when the Greeks had been ejected from Turkey and Kemal wanted to make his peace with the Western powers, Turkish Communists were again jailed and accused of espionage on behalf of a foreign power. Turkey very wisely followed the best possible policy for a small power. She played off the conflicting interests of the great powers and avoided becoming the satellite of any of them. In this process Russia received her share, but it is probable that Russian relations with Turkey would have been better had it not been for the Comintern.

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Chapter VI  
Russia and Persia

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The Russians although they were kept from contact with Persia by civil war and separatism, kept their fingers in the pie. In January, 1918 Trotsky informed the Persian Ambassador in Petrograd that Russia had repudiated the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and now invited the Persians to do likewise. The Imperial Russian Ambassador to Persia had refused to enter the service of the Bolsheviks, but one of his subordinates, Bravin, agreed to become the S. Russian Ambassador. By July he had persuaded the Persians to nullify all the Russo-Persian treaties; and according to one account, the Persians were about to occupy the Russian and British banks when the British troops protested that it would be a violation of Persian neutrality.

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✓/ Elias Hurwicz; Die Orientpolitik der Dritten Internationale (Berlin, 1922), p.13; ✓/ Navai (Hosseini): Les relations économiques Irano-Russes (Paris, 1935), p.110; ✓/ Filmer The Pageant of Persia, p.336; ✓/ Iransky: "Russo Persidskie otnosheniia za piat let" Novyi Vostok III (1923), 90-113, p.95; IV(1923), 208-229; ✓/ Marc Modéle: "Le probleme persan" Mercure de France, t.141 (1920), 387-416, p.404/.....

For some reason which is not clear, Bravin was recalled by the Soviet Government. One soviet writer suggests that Bravin was recalled because he was not in sympathy with the Bolsheviks. This explanation is difficult to accept since he was soon sent to Afghanistan as the Soviet representative.

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After Bravin's recall, Shaumian, the Bolshevik Commissar for Transcaucasia was given powers to appoint a new ambassador. He chose Kolomiitsev, a former Russian soldier in Persia who had recently left the left Social Rev. Party to join the Bolsheviks. When he reached Persia he learned that the Bolsheviks had lost power in Baku and that Shaumian had escaped. The Persian government, perhaps, feeling that Soviet ascendancy in the Caspian and Persia was now impossible, never recognized Kolomiitsev as ambassador and in Nov. 1918 the Persian Cossaks led by a White Russian officer, raided the S. Embassy and had the British send the personnel to India. Kolomiitsev himself succeeded in escaping to Baku. / Iransky Op. cited, p.96 Iransky: "Stranitsa iz istorii krasnoi diplomatii (Pamiati t. I.I.Kolomiisteva) Novyi Vostok, VIII-IX, 151-160, p.157/ The Russian radio in reporting the news described the demonstrations of the Persian populace on behalf of the Russians. / Der Neue Orient, April 25, 1919, III,4

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...Mirza Kuchik Khan raised the banner of revolt in Persian Azerbaijan. His program was simple and calculated to appeal to budding Persian nationalism. His slogan was "Iran to the Iranians"; he advocated war to the death with the British, land for the landless, dissolution of the Cossak brigade, and the deposition of the Shah

✓/ M.Martchenko: Un voyage en Perse pendant la Revolution (Paris, 1920), p.39....

One of Kuchuk Khan's chief lieutenants, Ekhan Ullah Khan bears witness to Kuchuk Khan's political backwardness / Novyi Vostok XXVI-XXVII, 125-162, p.131 also XXIX, 88-110/

At first the British tried to buy off Kuchuk Khan by inviting him to march on Teheran and seize power. It was understood that he was to rule with British advisers.

✓/ A.Vinogradov: "Natsionalnoe-osvoboditelnoe dvizhenie v Persii" Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn, April 24, 1922, 15-18/ ~~Kuchuk refused~~ Kuchuk refused. Bicherakhov, acting of General Dunsterville's orders was successful in forcing Kuchuk Khan to flee back into the hills. Most of his success he owed to the use of airplanes. ✓/ Novyi Vostok XXVI-XXVII, p. 134/ ...In Baku, the Bolsheviks were in a quandry. They had invited Bicherakhov in, with some misgivings to be sure, to counter the Turkish threat. ...

Kuchuk Khan, for all his political naivete, was shrewd in his dealings with the Bolsheviks. In a letter to Izvestiia, he made renunciation of Russian influence in Persia a condition of Russo-Persian friendship. / Izvestiia, Dec.26, 1918/

When the Bolsheviks began to support Kuchuk Khan the Allies raised the cry that Moscow and Berlin were in cahoots, as they had been ever since Lenin entered Russia in a sealed train. There is not a trace of Russo-German collaboration in the Near East after the October Revolution....Kuchuk Khan had received some slight

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p.281 German assistance and German agents had penetrated into Afghanistan in an attempt to enlist the aid of the Afghans in the war. ...Increased Russian support of these anti-British elements after the war was interpreted as evidence of a Moscow-Berlin alliance. / A. Poidebard: *Au Carrefour des routes de Perse* (Paris, 1923), p.239; / Rene Pinon: *L'Offensive d'Asie* "Revue des Deau Mondes, April 15, 1920, pp. 799-816/

p.282 .....Yet there was a central point in Persian politics ~~during the British occupation~~ after the World war - the emigres who fled the country during the British occupation. The majority party wanted to call the Persian Parliament, the Mejliss before the emigres, most of whom were democrats, should return to Persia. The Mejliss was then to ratify a treaty with England to convert Persia into a British protectorate and preserve the existing social order. / Osetrov... *Pismo iz Tegerana in Novyi Vostok I* (1922) 147-153

Yet the Shah.... sent a delegation to Paris Peace Conference to gain complete Persian independence. / Pavlovich, Op. cited, Moscow, 1920 p.15; / Herbert Melzig: *Reza Shah. Der Aufstieg Irans und die Grossmächte* (Stuttgart, 1936) sec.ed. p.7/

p.283 ..... Instead of admitting them to the Peace Conference the British negotiated a treaty with the Persians in the best traditions of the old diplomacy which annoyed the "idealistic" Americans and the "realistic" French for the same reason - they were both effectively excluded from ~~Russia~~ Persia....The mercantile groups had a different viewpoint, if we are to trust the Azerbaijan representative in Persia in 1919. The merchant class, he wrote, saw in the Bolsheviks the only means of freeing the country from the British. "The commercial element, dissatisfied with the rapacious policy of England, would be passive to a Bolshevik movement in the best case."

-----Raevsky Op. cited p.13, 14 Raevsky is here using a diplomatic report in Azerb. archives.

p.284 ....When the treaty was made public in August 1919 the French were incensed. ....Chicherin issued an appeal to the workers and peasants of Persia in which he called the treaty a slave treaty...He also warned that the day of reckoning with England was at hand. / Kliuchnikov and Sabanin...II, pp. 341-343/....

p.285 British writers of varying political views agreed that the treaty was favored by the landowners and the nobility who saw the prospects of a more stable government and greater security for property under the influence of Great Britain. Opposed to the treaty besides the "democratic" elements were the conservative religious leaders who feared that British western influences might undermine their authority. Logically enough the Russian members of the Persian Cossack brigade opposed the treaty because it meant their elimination or the substitution of British for Russian officers. / Balfour: *Recent Happenings in Persia*, p. 122; / F.A.C. Forbes-Leith: *Checkmate. Fighting Tradition in Central Asia* (London, 1927), p. 23; / Graves: *The Life of Sir Percy Cox*. p. 257

p.286 The treaty made Persia break out into a rash of pro-communist ideas whose source must be sought in hatred for the British rather than in Persian understanding of Marxism. The Persian newspaper *Iran* said that the Bolshevik doctrine resembled the pure belief of Islam...and since the Anglo-Persian treaty offended the Bolsheviks, the English would be well advised to leave Persia, the editorial concluded. / *Navai Les relations economiques Irano-Russes*, pp.105, 1906, note 2./ In Persian practice once a secret treaty was made public it had to be ratified by the Mejliss. The anti-British elements, therefore, initiated a program to prevent the ratification of the treaty.

p.287 The situation changed radically in favor of the Bolsheviks when they invaded Azerbaijan in April, 1920. ...In May 1920 Bolshevik destroyers steamed into the harbor of Enzeli (Pahlevi) and shelled the city, claiming they had come after Denikin's fleet which had taken refuge in the harbor...and took possession of Enzeli. The British forces in the district retired... quietly and left the city in possession of the Russian forces. The country immediately decided against the



the ratification of the Anglo-Persian treaty, and it was necessary to recall Sir Percy Cox, the Ambassador to Paris. // Georges Ducrocq Revue du Monde Musulman (1922) LII, 84-180, pp.84-87

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The Near East, speaking for the British imperialists remarked that Krassin was in London negotiating the Anglo-Russian trade agreement while the Bolsheviks were taking Enzeli. // "The Bolshevik Menace to Persia" The Near East, June 17, 1920, XVIII, 866

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...The change in Persian attitude produced by the retreat of the British from Enzeli and by the negotiations for the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement was remarkable. The Shah later told the Russian Ambassador that he felt like a new man when he heard the firing in Enzeli. // Louis Fisher The Soviets in World Affairs N.Y.1930, I, p. 288/ The Persian population was delighted, seeing in Russian intervention a counterpoise to the British.

After the sovietization of Azerbaijan, Seid zia ed-Din, the Persian Ambassador Extraordinary to the Transcaucasus, who was a well-known anglophile, announced that Persia desired friendship with Russia. Two days after the firing on Enzeli, the Vossugh ed-Dowleh government, which had signed the Anglo-Persian Treaty, recognized Soviet Azerbaijan; and propose sending an ambassador to Moscow for the initiation of formal diplomatic relations with Russia/ Iransky, Op. cited p.100/

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...Kuchuk Khan had been informed of the landing in Enzeli before it was made, and his cooperation had been solicited. Kuchuk Khan, who was never a communist, cautiously reserved his decision until after the Bolsheviks had landed in Enzeli. Kuchuk Khan's communist advisors urged Kuchuk to march on Teheran, for although the Russian government had expressed its desire to conclude peace with the Persian government, it would hardly be averse to concluding peace with a revolutionary Persian government. This Kuchuk Khan refused, for he was apparently a man who did only one thing at a time. After the Bolsheviks had made a successful landing, he accepted their earlier invitation to cooperate and he set up the Soviet Republic of Ghilan in Resht in cooperation with the... Kuchuk Khan announced the formation of this new Soviet Republic in impeccable revolutionary phraseology in a telegram which was obviously drafted by another hand. At first Moscow was cautious about the new Soviet Republic, dissociating itself from it. // Karl Radek in Izvestiia for June 10, 1920 denied the presence of Russian troops in Persia. The whole action at Enzeli was purely naval and was directed against the remnants of Denikin's fleet. As for the reports that the red flag had been in evidence, Radek said the red flag was international; and there were sufficient revolutionary tendencies in Persia to account for a native revolution. Another article in the same issue said that the new Persian government was not communist, although it was the most democratic in Persia had ever known. A week later Izvestiia dropped its reserve. Trotsky and Kuchuk Khan exchanged revolutionary greetings on the front page; the headline read "Fire in the East"; the subheadline greeted the new Soviet Republic of Ghilan. // Izvestiia, June 16, 1920/.

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In Teheran the government which had signed the Anglo-Persian Treaty resigned on June 25, 1920 to be replaced by that of Mushir ed Dowleh on whose accession all activity toward the ratification of the Anglo-Persian Treaty was halted. // Iransky. Op.Cited, pp.100 ff./.

A month later the first meeting of the Iranian Communist Party took place in Enzeli. It was attended by 48 members who resolved to propagate communism in Persia and who, according to Sultan Zade, their leader, started to organize a Persian Red Army. // Sultan Zade...Kom. Int. 13(1920) 2551 ff.; and Zhizn Natsionalnostei Oct.1, 1920/ During the whole month of July the Russians made landings all over the northern coast of Persia. The population of Mazanderan appealed to the Third

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International and to Russia for assistance. / Ducrocq, Op. cited, p.91/ An author hostile to Bolshevism reports that as soon as the Bolsheviks took over northern Persia they started to export food to Russia, to requisition clothes, and even to tax mosques. They also announced their intention to unveil and emancipate the women. / Ibid, pp.89-93/

Kuchuk Khan must have been disappointed with the Bolsheviks because he abandoned his Soviet Republic of Ghilan and retired to the mountains with his band. A Soviet writer later explained the failure of the Persian Revolution by the differences between the right and left wings of the movement. This writer says that Kuchuk Khan wished to avoid further quarrels which might be turned to the advantage of the British or Persian government. Therefore he left the movement. / A. Vinogradov, Op. cited, pp.15-16/ Although Kuchuk Khan parted company with the Bolsheviks, he would only agree to make peace with the Persian government on the following terms: 1) Abolition of all foreign concessions 2) Departure of foreign military and economic instructors 3) The disbandment of the South Persia (British) Rifles 4) The exclusion of the pro-British deputies from the Mejliss 5) Agrarian reforms. / Vinogradov, Op. cited pp.15-18

.... What Russian intentions in Persia were, is difficult to determine. After the greetings in Izvestiia which differed in no way from the greetings addressed to Azerbaijan when it was sovietized, there was silence on the Republic of Ghilan. ... The Bolsheviks in addition to holding the ports of Enzeli and Resht initiated military operations in the direction of Teheran. But they overestimated the strength of the British forces which they were pursuing, and retired when they could have advanced with success. / Balfour: Recent Happenings in Persia, pp.198, 199/

Louis Fisher, who drew most of his information from Soviet diplomats, considers the ephemeral existence of the Soviet Republic of Ghilan as the regrettable result of the excesses of some Caucasian communists. He says that Moscow had to exert unusual pressure to prevent them from marching on Teheran. / Louis Fisher The Soviets in W. Affairs, I, p.288

.... It would seem more reasonable to suppose that this was an attempt that failed, although it is easy to understand the reticence of Soviet diplomats on that score...

Once the British retired toward Teheran the burden of the fighting fell on the Persian Cossacks officered by Russians. They were successful in retaking Resht from the Bolsheviks, but they unwarily advanced on Enzeli which is at the end of a narrow peninsula and were caught in the cross fire of shore batteries and Russian naval artillery. / Balfour, Recent Happenings in Persia, pp. 198, 199/ The British who had been paying the salaries of the Persian Cossacks withdrew their subsidy - an action which virtually abolished the force since the Persian government had no funds. ... The British demanded that the Persian Cossacks be officered by British officers if the subsidy was to be resumed. When Mushir ed-Dowleh refused, his cabinet fell. / Iransky Op. cited pp. 106-107/ This demand was published by the British in a Teheran newspaper with the added threat that no British assistance in the pacification of Ghilan could be expected unless these terms were accepted. / Nakhai: L'Evolution politique de l'Iran (Bruxelles, 1938), p.100; Balfour, Recent Happenings in Persia, p. 114./

By this time the Russians had given up the hope of Sovietizing Persia. A renunciation of the attempt to introduce communism preceded the negotiations for a treaty with Persia. In Turkey this renunciation was made only just before the conclusion of the treaty since in 1919 the Turks were in no position to dicker. On Oct. 22, 1920 the Central Committee of the Iranian Communist Party decided that Persia was not yet ready for a revolution since she had not yet passed through the bourgeois stage. / Ducrocq. op. cited 105-106, Zhizn Natsionalnoستي, March 17, 1921 prints the theses on the impossibility of revolution in Persia at the time. / .... The renunciation did not pass unnoticed by the Persian Government, for three days afterwards the Persian Ambassador to Russia set out for Moscow. / G. Tschitscherin "Ein Jahr Ostpolitik der Sowjetregierung" Russische Korrespondenz, No.12 (Dec. 1921), 986.....

.... In the middle of November the British demanded that the Persian cabinet call the Mejliss to ratify the Anglo-Persian treaty. The Persian Minister of the Persian Govt.



answered by valmly starting negotiations for a treaty with Russia which could not but be incompatible with the Anglo-Persian treaty. The Shah called an Extraordinary Supreme Council of Ministers, of the Shah's family and of the highest clergy who agreed to call the Mejliss, but proposed that the Govt. take up an expectant position with regard to the ratification of the Anglo-Persian treaty in view of the negotiations proceeding in Moscow. / Iransky, Op. cited, pp.106-107/ It was obvious that the Persians were exploiting the Anglo-Persian Treaty Russian differences to secure the best possible terms. Three days after the Persian decision to hold ratification of the Snglo-Persian Treaty in abeyance until the tenor of the Russian negotiations became clear, ~~Rothstein~~ Rothstein was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Persia.

p.298 At the end of December Churchill announced in Parliament that British troops would be withdrawn from Persia, although the Russians suspected that they would only be withdrawn to southern Persia. The Persian cabinet thereupon asked the Russians to evacuate their troops which were still in northern Persia. Karakhan answered on January 22, 1921 that the Russians would withdraw their troops after the last British soldier had left Persia. / Iransky, Op. cited pp. 108-109/

The negotiati ns for the treaty with Russia did not run smoothly because the conservative religious leaders, the Mullahs, were as much oppose to Russian influence as they were to British. In answer to the opposition of the Mullahs, Sephadre Azam resigned. No one could be found to lead the cabinet and carry out an anti-Russian policy, since it was dommon knowledge that the British would evacuate Northern Persia as soon as the snow melted in the mountain passes. Therefore Sephadre-Azam was returned to office./ Balfour, Op. cited p.209/

The time was ripe for a coup d'etat which was executed by Seid zia ed-Din with the assistance of Reza Khan, later Reza Shah. There was another group of adventurers in Teheran who issued Bolshevik slogans, taked of Lenin and rostky and wanted to expropriate the property of aristocrats. They had just about arranged a coup d'etat when they were anticipated by p.299 Seid zia ed-Din./ Osetrov Op. cited pp.152-153/

p.300 The coup d'etat of Seid zia ed-Din is a mooted point in Persian historiography.... It really makes little difference whether the coup d'etat was arranged by the British or not.....

p.301 Not satisfied with the imprisonment of pro-British elements, Seid zia ed-Din promulgated a whole series of of social reforms to demonstrate his good intentions....to steal the thunder from the democratic parties./ Iransky, Op. cited pp.112-113/....

p.304 On February 26, 1921 a treaty very favorable to Persia was signed between Russia and Persia....The Bolsheviks cancelled all Persian debts to Russia .../ Navai Op. cited pp.111-115. Kliuchnikov and Sabanin, III, Vyp.1, 89-91.... Since there still British troops in Persia, the Russians claimed the right, by the yet unratified treaty, to remain with their troops. It took another month of negotiations before Rothstein was allowed to enter. A German writer using Persian sources further explains that Rothstein's entrance was deferred until the clashes between Russian and Persian troops ceased./ Melzig: Resa Shah, p.44; Iransky, Op. cited, pp. 109 ff.

p.305 ....The way was cleared for the ratification of the treaty when Seid zia ed-Din's Cabinet fell on May 24. Reza Khan and Seid zia ed-Din broke on the issue or British instructors for the army, Reza Khan maintaining that the presence of British instructors would result in a continuation of British influence./ Melzig, Op. cited p.46/ Seid zia ed-Din fled to Baghdad where he was given asylum by the British, thereby confirming the belief that he was in British service./ Ducrocq Op. cited pp.106-107/

Kavam es Sultaneh, an anti-Britisher, now took poffice. Although he, too, was pro-British in heart, it was obvious that if the new cabinet was to be at all permanent, it was necessary for it to adopt an anti-British tone. The British therefore allowed the new cabinet to discharge the British instructors...and advisers. All this was calculated to strengthen Kavam as Sultaneh's position by decking him out in anti-British colors. As a matter of fact the British evacuated their troops to the last man by June 1921 so that they had little



p.306 choice but to gracefully relinquish their holdings./ Iransky, Op. cited pp. 210-215/  
....Now that the British had been ejected from Persia, the Communist Party of Persia became bolder. Sultan Zade in an article for Pravda for July 16, 1921 reviewed the progress of the communist party in Persia. He wrote that the party had suffered considerably from adventurers who had ~~masqueraded~~ masqueraded as communists, and it had been necessary to suspend publication of the newspaper and to increase the secrecy of the party. Yet he set as the minimum goals the overthrow of the power of the Shah and the great proprietors, the cessation of British influence and a democratic regime to make communist propaganda possible.

Pravda July 16, 1921 as quoted by Ducrocq Op. cited pp. 147-148

Russo-Persian relations could not have been called cordial....Rothstein handed the Persian Govt. a note in which he informed them of the possibility of further protracting negotiations. The protest was effective and the treaty was ratified on Dec. 15, 1921/ Iransky, Op. cited 215 ff./

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VE YAYINLARI  
TÜSTAV



Chapter VII  
Russia and Afghanistan

px225 p.323 In most of the areas retaken by the Bolsheviks from the Whites or the interventionist forces, the Bolsheviks were usually received with joy, since the local populations were disgusted with the Whites and the interventionists. In Central Asia the Bolsheviks had to deal with Pan-Turanianism and to a lesser extent Pan-Islamism. The idea of racism concocted by Gobineau and expanded by numerous successors had not reached the Near East until the beginning of the Twentieth century, where it found its most ardent advocates among the Young Turks. Using the specious, but widely accepted argument, that common language implied common racial origin, the Pan-Turaniens claimed as Turks all peoples speaking languages akin to Turkish from Azerbaijan to Siberia. Khalil Pasha during the siege of Baku in September 1918, confided to the German attache with the Turkish armies that the Turks intended to unite all the "Turaniens" as far as Siberia

Ernst Paraquin in the Berliner Tageblatt, Jan. 24, 1920 as quoted in the Near East, Feb. 19, 1920 XVII. 247

Mustapha Kemal had given up all these Pan-Turanian schemes, but the exiled leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, Enver and Djemal harbored them secretly. However, their status as Russian guests kept them from expressing them openly. These ambitions were later to lead to difficulties for the Bolsheviks.

p.324 The people who were to play the chief role in the Pan-Turanian movement had begun to take interest in their own fate.....

/ The First All Russian Moslem Congress in Moscow, May 1917 taken from von Mende, Der nationale Kampf der Russlandtürken/

p.325 ...The Executive Committee was apparently appealing / appeal of June 1917/ to the divergent ~~populations~~ elements of the Moh. population. Yet the Ex. Committee neglected to mention the serious divisions among the Moh. groups. The Volga Tartars felt they were the only

p.326 true Tartars, whereas the Bshkirs considered themselves distinct and culturally separate.

From all the information at our disposal, we may safely state that the Bolsheviks now enjoy the loyalty of the Moh. population. Yet there is no doubt that the Moh. were alienated from the Bolsheviks in the period of war communism. Had Pan-Turanianism been a vital force, and not merely the scheme of a few Turkish intellectuals, the dissatisfaction of the Moh. population might have been a serious threat to the Oct. revolution.

A Soviet writer has given us a description of the changes effected in Turkestan by the Febr. revolution / see S.Ginzburg "Basmachestvo v Ferhane" Novyi Vostok X-XI(1925), 175-202, p.181/ The same writer describes the Oct. Revolution as follows: see 175-202, p. 182/

p.328 For a time the Bolsheviks ignored the situation in Turkestan, but they turned their attention to it at the first opportunity. The Bolsheviks, however made no secret of their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs. When a deputation of the starving Turkestan population appealed to Moscow for relief, the Bolsheviks told them to eat autonomy.

/ Paul Olberg: "Sowjetrusslands Politik im Orient" Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, L.(1922), 121-203, p. 139, 144, / ~~142, 143~~ In February, 1918 the Red Army besieged the city of Kokand where a non-soviet government had been established. The city was shelled and twelve thousand persons are said to have been killed. The leader of the troops was later removed by the Bolsheviks. / Paul Olberg, Op. cited, pp. 142, 143/....These events were not soon forgotten by the populations of Russian Central Asia nor by their co-religionists - the Afghans/.

p.329 The Afghans during 1919 and the first part of 1920, before Mustapha Kemal had shown he could hold his own against the Greeks, considered themselves the only truly independent



Moslem country in the world. Consequently they saw themselves in the role of the legitimate guardians of Moh. interests the world over. During 1919 and 1920 they sent military instructors to Bukhara, and in Sept. 1920 the Bolsheviks recognized the independence of Bukhara. The Bolsheviks were nourishing the Afghan hope that Khiva, Bukhara and Turkestan might exist independently with Afghan influence predominating. Reisner, *Nezavisimyi Afghanistan*, p.211. The Afghans realized how great a store the Russians put in Afghan bad relations with the British and they were determined to extract some payment for these services.

/ Basmachi movement - source: Vasilevsky "Fazy Basm.Dvizhaniia v Srednei Azii" *Novyi Vostok* XXIX(1930) 126-141, pp. 132, 133/.

p.330 Description of Soviet power in Bukhara which fits also other regions is given according to D.Soloveichik "Revoliutsionnaia Bukhara" *Novyi Vostok* II(1922) 272-288, p.275/

...Naturally as soon as the Red Army garrison was reduced the Basmachi movement flared up once more, this time assuming very serious proportions since Enver Pasha himself assumed leadership./ *Ibid.* pp. 275-278/.

Our information on Enver after his flight from Turkey is vague and contradictory....In Western Europe it was assumed that Enver Pasha acted in perfect agreement with the Bolsheviks since he enjoyed their hospitality and sent such warm greetings to the Baku congress/ *The Near East*, Nov. 24, 1921 XX, 657-58/

p.331 But this was something of an oversimplification. Enver Pasha's position was most indefinite. ....Enver Pasha was kept/ by the Bolsheviks as a trump card in case Mustapha Kemal failed the Bolsheviks....Enver Pasha could be sent to Turkey to make difficulties in the policy/ of converting Turkey into another Poland./ Arthur Ransome "Enver Pasha" *Manchester Guardian* Dec.2, 1922, p.11. Ransome lived in the same house with Enver in Russia for a month./ Whatever Enver Pasha was he hated the British and French and could be relied on to fight them....Enver Pasha promised to refrain from mixing in Turkish politics as long as Kemal waged war with the Entente. However he broke his word and started to intrigue from Batum./ *Ibid.*; Louis Fisher, *The Soviets in W.Affairs* (n.Y. 1930) I, pp. 386-87/

p.332 The Bolsheviks then recalled him from the Caucasus, but Enver ignored their summons and went to Bukhara. The belief that the Bolsheviks were continuing the Imperial Russian policy of oppressing the Moslem populations, and Enver's inordinate ambition explain his attempts at putting Pan-Turanianism into practice in Russian Central Asia.

In Nov. 1921 Enver made his appearance in Bukhara as a guest, disappeared on a hunting trip and emerged as an associate of the former Emir of Bukhara. With him Enver arranged for a unification of the anti-Bolshevik forces and sent men to Ferghana, Samarkand and Khiva to secure support. Enver's slogan was the "union of all Moslems and the ejection of the Europeans.". Through a representative he suggested that the Bolsheviks recognize him as head of the Bukhara government and make an alliance with him to fight for common goals in the East./ Soloveichik *Op. cited*, p. 283/. Although the Afghan Govt did not officially support Enver's Basmachi movement, 800 Afghan soldiers were enrolled in Enver's ranks. The Afghan consul in Bukhara made his support of Enver so conspicuous that it was necessary to recall him. A Soviet writer informs us that the Red Commander in the area did not exclude

p.333 the possibility of an Afghan attack in 1922 / Vasilevsky *Op. cited*, p.134; Reisner *Nezavisimyi Afghanistan*, p.213....It would have been extremely difficult to unite the Russian Moh. in a common cause. In addition there was considerable friction between Enver and the former Emir of Bukhara, who rightly feared that Enver wanted to usurp his position. / Vasilevsky *Op. cited*, p.135/ Enver failed to win over the local population...the population revolted against him as it had against every ruler. When the Bolsheviks sent sizeable detachments into the area in August 1922, they had no difficulty in liquidating the Basmachi movement, Enver being killed in the process./ Soloveichik *Op. cited*, pp.286-87. See Fisher, *Op. cited* I, pp. 387-390 for the dramatic account of the circumstances of Enver's death.



- p.334 In the spring of 1919 the Russians and the Afghans exchanged emissaries. Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn March 27, 1922, pp.36-37 / The Afghan's radio communication intercepted by the British / Papers regarding hostilities with Afghanistan, Op. cited pp.18 ff. /
- p.335 ....Lenin's letter to Emir Amanullah - see L.Fisher, Op. cited I, p. 286 /
- p.336 Soon the Prof. Barkatullah referred to in the radiogram intercepted by the British arrived in Moscow....It would be advisable ~~the~~ Barkatullah's letter to the Emir continued, for the Afghans to unite with the Bolsheviki in driving the British out of the Middle East and India. Izvestiia, May 1, 1919 / Another laudatory article said that although Barkatullah was neither a communist nor a socialist, he fully agreed with the Bolsheviki in their intention of ejecting the British from Asia. Izvestiia May 6, 1919 / A few days later....it was pointed out that Barkatullah was not an official delegate of the Afghan govt., and that he had been a German agent during the World War. Izvestiia, May 8, 1919 / ....The official bulletin of the S.Commissariat of Foreign Affairs reported that the newspaper Afghan featured lurid articles on the success of Bolshevik agitation in Afghanistan. The Russian editor remarked that the newspaper was the personal property of the Afghan foreign minister, and that the reports of Bolshevik influence in Afghanistan was exaggerated. Bulleten: Narodnyi Kom. Inostr. Del, May 17, 1920 p.8 / .... this was the time of Afghan British negotiations....The British offered Afghans complete independence, i.e. the right to conduct their own foreign affairs, although Afghanistan had to promise to prohibit the passage of foreign troops through her territory. "Notes of the Week" The Near East, Aug.1, 1919 XVI, 110 / see also Reisner Op. cited pp. 197-98; Sykes: The History of Afghanistan, II, p.283 /
- p.339 ..... In the six months after the Peace of Rawalpindi in which the Afghans were supposed to be on good behavior, they made demonstrative gestures of friendship to the ~~British~~ Bolsheviki....Bravin, the Soviet ambassador, was allowed to reach Kabul in September 1919 after a protracted period of waiting in Tashkent. Sykes The History of Afghanistan II, pp.287-288. / An official Afghan delegation arrived in Moscow in October 1919 Its members were greeted...by Sultan Galiev... / The Times, Oct.16, 1919 /
- p.340 February 1920 speech made by Emir of Kabul - lamenting the deplorable state of Islam in view of the British desire to destroy the Caliphate. L'Asie Française June 1920, p.207 /
- Despite all these friendly gestures, a Russo Afghan treaty was not signed until February 28, 1921....
- p.342 We can safely accept the assertion of Soviet writers that the Anglo-Russian Trade agreement hampered their activities in Afghanistan, for they had no reason to dis-
- p.343 semble. Simultaneously there was an increasing sentiment in British imperialist circles for a rapprochement with Afghanistan. Col. A.C.Yates "Central Asia after the Peace" The Near East, March 25, 1920, XVII, 435 /
- p.346 ....It seems that the Russians were unusually successful in their relations with Afghanistan. The British had been forced to give ground and relinquish positions which they held since 1907....It cannot be denied that the Russian revolution of 1917 gave a great impetus to the development of nationalism in Asia as did the Revolution of 1905. However, the tremendous effect of Wilson's Fourteen Points in inspiring world nationalism cannot be overlooked. Soviet diplomats can rightly claim credit for recognizing the new situation and exploiting it, although it can hardly be maintained that they created the new state of affairs.
- p. 347

Although Russia's policy in Afghanistan was complicated by the Basmachi question, it did not suffer from the unpopularity which the Comintern brought in its wake in Turkey and Persia. ...It would seem that Russia's success in her Eastern policy stemmed more from the political benefits these countries enjoyed in association with her than from the opportunity to participate in world revolution.