

COMPUTER BLINDNESS AND POLITICIANS' HYPOCRISY

The Long Echo of the Challenger Tragedy

Alexandr Lyuty

The course of events is rapidly taking away America from that fatal day. Other affairs crowd themselves into the country's focus. There are ever more frequent calls that the causes of the disaster should be found out as soon as possible, the errors corrected and Shuttle spacecraft flights expedited. The inquiry commission set up by the President is to present its report within four months. And some National Aeronautics and Space Administration officials publicly target the summer for the resumption of the programme. It is even said that this would be the best memory for the dead, notes the TASS correspondent in Washington in his dispatch written on an assignment of Sovetskaya Rossia.

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Yet one cannot shake off an impression that NASA is again becoming obsessed with haste, characteristic of the entire US space programme. The well known journalist Thomas Wolfe, who has written a nationally popular novel about astronauts, has justly remarked that the race for pre-eminence in competition with the Russians underlies the philosophy of the US space programme. It is tragic, however, that Washington increasingly persists in giving a purely military character to this "race."

Most theories now boil down to accepting that a malfunction of one of the solid boosters was the cause of the disaster. In NASA TV sequences and photographs one can indeed well see how fifteen seconds before it a flame burst out from a gap in the righthand booster's plating. It gradually heated up the giant suspended fuel tank, this resulting in an explosion.

But the question arises: what place does the faultiness of

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the booster occupy in the cause-and-effect chain? Was it the main source of the tragedy, or did something else cause a fuel leak? The first variant suits very much those who are interested in having the flights resumed. As Philadelphia Inquirer says, rumours are there that if the cause of the explosion is reduced to a single mechanical fault, Space Shuttle launchings may be resumed by June.

Other NASA officials are all too eager to present matters so as if someone's negligence or lack of conscientiousness, that is, a purely human error, constitutes the story. For to say that the computers are unreliable means to admit that the entire system of "star wars" might incinerate the world only because of a computer fault.

Observers also have not failed to notice that the NASA leadership came to believe too strongly in the dependability of the solid boosters themselves. Emergency situations involving them had occurred before. A similar disaster was but narrowly avoided during the eighth Shuttle flight in October 1983. So what? Instead of increasing the number of sensors mounted on the boosters, which register deviations in the work of the system, NASA cut them down. Some experts say outright that this was done at the insistence of the Pentagon and commercial companies. They needed a lighter general design so as to stuff the Shuttle with as large an amount of military equipment and commercial devices as possible. Did not the seven astronauts become in the end the hostages of the policy of turning outer space into a military range?

Such a thesis is not to the liking of official Washington. It particularly irritates the Pentagon. And although American news commentators themselves suggest the Pentagon's indirect implication in the tragedy, its generals have attacked... the Soviet mass media, which have only reported the point of view of some US scientists. The notorious Richard Perle, Assistant

Defence Secretary, in whom everything linked with the Soviet Union causes an indigestion, has assaulted our press from as far away as Davos, Switzerland, where he is attending a symposium. After hearing that the Soviet press in the light of the tragedy raised the question of the dangers of the "star wars" programme, Perle indignantly exclaimed: "Such statements reek of insensitivity and hypocrisy!". The Challenger flight, declared Perle, "had nothing to do with the SDI programme."

Perle was only the herald of a campaign of bewildering attacks on the USSR. The discussion around the Challenger tragedy is lately ever more clearly passing from a technical look at the causes of the disaster to a political noise with an unmistakably anti-Soviet accent. "I would like to tell the USSR," White House spokesman Speakes declared a few days ago, "that the SDI is a research programme and its linking with the tragedy that has occurred is a manifestation of extreme callousness."

But maybe it's time to say "enough of hypocrisy" and that they should better start listening to the voices of informed people who are concerned with the present directions of American science? What happened to Challenger, science fiction writer Isaac Asimov feels, "is a lesson for us all." If SDI computer systems fail, then, in his conviction, not seven people, but the entire Earth will perish. The SDI system, believes the world famous astronomer Carl Sagan, is "extremely vicious and ruinously expensive."

...Christa McAuliffe was going to give two television lessons from outer space for American children. She wanted to show the children outer space through a prism of the simplest peaceful experiments. Those who knew McAuliffe say that she, a mother of two children, sincerely wished the planet peace and welfare. Soviet cartographers have named one of the craters on distant Venus after the American school teacher. Man's

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peaceful strides in the Universe, and not its conversion into a weapon depot will be a genuine tribute to her memory.

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TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
TÜSTAV

WHAT'S BEHIND EUREKA

S.Smolnikov, Ph.D.(Economics)

West European political and scientific communities have been quite busy for some time discussing a project for technological cooperation named "Eureka" (ancient Greek for "I have (found) it!"). The second conference of ministers of the West European countries involved in the project is due to open in Hannover, West Germany, on November 5. So what is the essence of "Eureka" and what is it that they "found"?

The idea broached by France of establishing a "European Technological Community" within the framework of the Eureka project was approved, in principle, at a session of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities in Milan in July 1985. Half a month later, Eureka came up for a more down-to-earth discussion at an inter-governmental conference of seventeen West European countries, including those of the Common Market, Spain, Portugal and also Austria, Norway, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. The conference failed, however, to clear up the issues that are crucial to the project, that is funding and the organisation of joint activities of West European firms. All it did was to agree that cooperation would proceed under certain subprogrammes.

The first thing that claims attention is that the Eureka project was proposed in the wake of the US Administration's programme for large-scale military-industrial research and development to create an ABM system with space-based elements.

Without mincing words, Washington called on its West European allies not just to "approve" its sinister designs but to get actually involved in carrying them out. Furthermore, in an effort to bring the research, financial and intellectual potential of West European countries into its extremely dangerous plans, the Administration promised them no end of technological benefits through military space research. The obvious intention, however, is to shift the stupendous burden of the "Star Wars" programmes onto West European firms, thereby drawing off a considerable proportion of the rival industrial and research potential.

It is not for nothing that President Mitterrand should have declared that Eureka's main objective was to "ensure Europe's technological independence in vitally important areas". Political and business circles in Western Europe want to forestall a technological decline and stop the Old World from becoming a US industrial hinterland.

At the same time, there are serious misgivings in the capitals of the Old World lest Eureka, conceived as Europe's "technological response" to the American challenge, should turn into a variety of Reagan's "Star Wars" plan one day, which would, of course, fit in perfectly with the ambitious designs of some West European politicians and the self-seeking interests of the military-industrial complex of NATO countries. It is obvious, however, that the transformation of Eureka into a full-scale military-technological programme would, far from responding to the interests of West European countries and peoples, be fraught with extremely dangerous consequences for peace and cooperation.

(Sovetskaya Rossia, November 5. Abridged.)

SDI: CONSPIRACY AGAINST PEACE

In this article Academician M. A. Markov, Chairman of the Soviet Pugwash Committee, Hero of Socialist Labour and member of the presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, writes about the present stage of international relations, war and peace, the need to curb the arms race and the dangers of the American Strategic Defence Initiative plans.

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Before the development of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction war was thought to be a continuation of politics. Then people created nuclear weapons, which, if war breaks out, may destroy all life on our planet. War can no longer be a continuation of politics because after a nuclear war politics will simply cease to exist. Everything must be done to avert a world war and this requires new political thinking.

How is war to be averted? Generally speaking, this is a part of a bigger problem, the problem of peaceful co-existence of two opposite social systems. President Reagan suggested a global solution to this problem. It is a technical solution known as Strategic Defence Initiative, or Star Wars. President Reagan and his close aids think that it is quite possible to develop a weapons system that would make nuclear catastrophe impossible.

I believe that this is an attempt to solve the problem of co-existence unilaterally, that is in the interest of the United States alone. The Soviet Union is still seen as a source of all evil in the world, "an evil empire," as the President said, and must be fenced off with a stockade of space-missile systems. The message is this: we defend ourselves and you do as you like.

The Strategic Defence Initiative, or SDI, does not presuppose negotiations on arms reductions, though it allows for strictly pro forma the fruitless talks as camouflage for US war preparations.

The advocates of SDI claim that SDI is a purely technical concept which has nothing to do with politics. This is not so. SDI is in the centre of major political issues, which go against the grain of the idea of peaceful co-existence and detente.

You can judge for yourself. The implementation of SDI would require tremendous expenses. What must be done to get the money from the taxpayers? There is an old, tested method: scare them by communist menace and Soviet threat. This is a political reality. Furthermore, the United States believes that the Soviet Union also will have to spend a lot of money if it wants to build a similar system. Washington politicians hope that the arms race will exhaust this country economically. This is also a political factor.

Bent on achieving military superiority, the United States is trying to hinder scientific and technological progress in countries which it considers potential enemies. Hence the policy of embargo, trade restrictions and curtailment of scientific contacts.

Now I have come to the main point. SDI is a long way off. It is a programme projected for many years to come. And what will happen in the meanwhile? In the meanwhile, the nuclear arms race is escalating to unprecedented proportions. Here are but some of the US main strategic arms programmes: MX, Midgetman, Trident, Stealth... Thus, SDI is a political concept. It is, in effect, a global antithesis to detente and the latter-day version of the Cold War.

SDI supporters say that SDI is a strictly defensive programme. Incidentally, this argument allowed them to win

many people over to their side. This raises the following question: is a tank's armour defensive or offensive? And what about the Stealth bomber, which the United States is currently developing? Does its ability to evade radars make it a defensive or offensive weapon? There was a time when mines were made of metal and could be found with the aid of a mine detector, but later they began to make them in wooden and plastic casings. Incidentally, during the war I worked on a device designed to detect non-metal mines.

Same with SDI. Suppose space weapons have been created and put to use. Under the cover of a "space shield," a vast number of enemy missile launchers is wiped out. Not all will be destroyed, and the more launchers will survive, the more of them there initially were. So, should the full-scale development of SDI begin, there can be no talk of any missile reduction whatsoever. The opposite is also true: the fewer missiles the enemy will have, the more likely their destruction in a nuclear strike. This is why, while persistently coming out for a drastic cut in nuclear armaments, the Soviet Union makes such reduction contingent upon limiting SDI to laboratory research.

History shows that for each type of weapon a counterweapon is always found. An answer to SDI also will be given if necessary, and it won't necessarily involve the creation of an analogous system. Our country's leaders have more than once declared this. But there is one more danger inherent in SDI - the spillover of the arms race into a new area which has never before been used for military purposes - into outer space. Tests are indispensable for creating fundamentally new weapon systems. This also explains the US stubborn refusal to stop underground nuclear explosions which are needed to develop components of space arms. It is the energy pumping of the appropriate installations. Under the influence of public

opinion voices began to be heard in the US Congress suggesting a yield restriction on explosions. At the Pugwash Conference, too, some American scientists tried to convince us that explosions within a one-kiloton range were innocuous, that they would not make it possible to develop elements of SDI. But, one may ask, why then conduct them at all? Whereas the cessation of underground nuclear tests is a guarantee that not only the realisation of SDI, but also the perfecting of the usual nuclear arms will be substantially impeded.

The greatest danger of the arms race lies in their qualitative development. It is the advent of qualitatively new types of weapons that each time was a major destabilising factor in international relations. Remember how multiple individually targeted reentry vehicles complicated the international situation at a point in the past? Or how the appearance of tactical nuclear weapons made the negotiations much more difficult? And the neutron bomb? If SDI is realised, the arms race threatens to get out of control altogether.

There is one more serious danger. Without going into technical details, I shall say: with the realisation of SDI the risk of an unsanctioned or accidental nuclear war will increase. In order to deploy space weapons, it will be necessary to create unprecedentedly powerful computers which would instantly calculate for highly sophisticated space and Earth observation systems and identify thousands of objects. On the other hand, the qualitative improvement of military technology leads to the fact that there is less and less time left for the taking of a response decision. Therefore man is forced to transfer to the machine the right to decide and instantaneously fulfill the decisions adopted. But a physical law exists according to which the number of failures and erroneous decisions by a computer with greater sophistication of supporting systems at first decreases, and then increases

as the complexity of the tasks before the computer grows. In other words, the SDI variant leaves deciding on the further fate of mankind not to human reason, but to the soulless robot, a "mechanical" construction of which science knows that in principle it cannot be absolutely reliable. So that SDI is the likelihood of a destruction of mankind by the robot created by man himself.

In contrast with this very sophisticated, expensive and, above all, unreliable programme, the Soviet Union has put forward this simple idea -- once there are no nuclear arms, there will be no nuclear war.

That is the essence of our peace policy and of the all-embracing peace proposals of the Soviet leadership. The summit meeting in Reykjavik gave humanity a very real chance, unlike the fantastic and dangerous SDI idea, of removing for ever the damoclean sword of universal nuclear destruction. Although no accords were achieved in Reykjavik, the historic significance of the meeting is great, indeed: the Soviet proposals stood the hardest test in the discussions and came near to producing major historic decisions. The package of Soviet peace proposals presented in Reykjavik had a great impact on the international anti-war movement and once more showed who really wants peace. The world community has drawn its own conclusions also from the fact that the talks had "stumbled" over the Strategic Defence Initiative. That is very important because Washington has so far succeeded in persuading some of its closest allies to join the SDI programme. But if the vast resources set aside for SDI were channelled into civilian areas, like fundamental sciences, the effect of new technologies would be no lesser. I know that from the experience gained in developing new technologies through fundamental research on the properties of matter.

Of course, the SDI idea has powerful support from the

corporations deriving fabulous profits from munitions production. The corporations will want more orders. Obviously, they will not miss opportunities arising from the production of Star Wars hardware. For it is some business that involves profits running into trillions. Neither will the US Administration so easily accept disarmament and drop SDI. There has to be some pressure, some heavy pressure, indeed, from public opinion.

There is this view, besides: aren't we overestimating the role of the anti-war movement? Say, three years ago, when it came to siting American medium-range missiles in Europe, the peace movement acquired sweeping proportions, and still European parliaments voted for the missiles.

Nevertheless, the anti-war movement is a great force. Simply it was not strong enough at that point. It was damped a little by the hope the Europeans had for the success of the talks in Geneva and President Reagan was quick to play on that. I have said it at the Pugwash conferences more than once and I say it again that talks are good if they produce specific results. But they are no good if they drag on and on and reach a deadlock, even though still allowing people to hope for a happy ending. Regrettably, this situation seems to be repeating itself. So what Reagan and those around him want is just that new political thinking so indispensable for humanity today.

(Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 12.

Abridged.)

FIRST-HAND EVIDENCE

Melor Sturua

Each day makes it increasingly clear that the spread of the arms race into space and the latter's becoming an arena of military rivalry may have extremely dangerous consequences for mankind. This fact was re-emphasised in Mikhail Gorbachyov's reply to a message by the Union of Concerned Scientists, an American non-government organisation uniting several hundred leading scientists, members of the US National Academy of Sciences.

The development, testing and deployment of weapon systems in space, envisaged by the American "Star Wars" programme, would be undoubtedly a fatal step which would increase the risk of a nuclear war and stimulate an uncontrolled arms race in all fields. The fact that the programme for militarisation of space was dubbed by its advocates "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI) can hardly mislead anyone. It is an offensive, aggressive initiative which has nothing to do with defence.

I shall not repeat the numerous convincing arguments to prove that SDI is an aggressive programme. I shall confine myself to mentioning only one fact which for some reason has been overlooked by the public.

To begin with, I would like to make some preliminary remarks. Publicising SDI as a humane programme, official American propaganda claims that its enactment would replace the "cynical" concept of nuclear deterrence with a "noble" concept of an impenetrable shield. Moreover, such "impenetrability" allegedly would make nuclear weapons useless, hasten their "withering away" and eventually lead to universal disarmament.

Critics of that thesis justly argue that an absolutely

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impenetrable space shield is a chimera. It is a product of fantasy rather than a concept based on scientific and technological reality. Unwillingly the salesmen of "Star Wars" agree that this is true but only in the beginning. Later, they say, in 20 or 30 years or in half a century at the outside that objective would be achieved. "What will be in the meantime?" the critics inquire. In the meantime, the official doctrine says, there will be a hybrid between "nuclear deterrence" and SDI, with the former gradually "withering away" and giving way to the latter.

Is it so? Of course not. Such a hybrid will lead to the escalation of the nuclear arms race rather than its withering away. A very competent person said that "if paired with offensive systems, they (defensive systems) can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy." This view is 100 per cent right. It is fully confirmed by the policy pursued by the United States. While giving a go-ahead to "Star Wars," Washington is escalating the development, production and deployment of first-strike weapons, such as MX, Midgetman and Pershing-2 ICBMs, land-based long-range cruise missiles, B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers and the submarine-launched Trident-2 missile. Incidentally, the House of Representatives of the US Congress has allocated more than 500 million dollars for the production of an advanced submarine-based missile, D-5. According to the Pentagon's plans, the United States is to launch a total of 24 Trident submarines, each with 24 missiles aboard. (It should be noted that at the present time the United States has 36 nuclear submarines, each with firepower greater than that used by mankind throughout its history.) One should also take into account the barbarous chemical and bacteriological weapons. While waiting for the development of an impenetrable space shield, the Pentagon is stepping up the production of these weapons.

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The competent person I have quoted above is right. The combination of the deployment of defence systems, which undermine the ABM Treaty, a major element of nuclear arms control, with a buildup of first-strike weapon systems can only be regarded as the implementation of an aggressive policy. I should only add here that the person I have quoted is President Reagan and the quotation was taken from his notorious address on March 23, 1983, the first public statement in which he announced the "Star Wars" programme.

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TÜSTAV

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FACTS AND FICTION

Valentin Falin, Izvestia political
correspondent

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From the middle of the seventies Washington was again in doubt: what if it had made a bad margin by vowing allegiance to peaceful coexistence, parity and equal security, to the primacy of reason over force? But things had long so gone with US politicians that they would rather admit their physical retardation than mental. The lack of self-confidence most often shows itself as suspicion toward others. And suspicion is a sheer poison for relationships. In an atmosphere of distrust negotiations get stalled, and signed treaties are put on ice.

But while the SALT-2 Treaty waited in vain for ratification, decisions surfaced on having Pershings and cruise missiles placed in Western Europe, on creating a "rapid deployment force" and on a five-year program for the rearmament of the USA, the implementation of which, as was especially qualified, should not depend on any negotiations on disarmament. Those were Carter's variants of a "renovation" of the US war potential, of a "cutdown of arsenals through their inflation" and of subordinating the content and pace of the arms control talks to American plans and schedules for the arms race.

In a word, the idea box of militarism inherited by Reagan was packed to overflowing. More missiles, planes, ships - this

⁺) (The end. See the beginning in Izvestia № 100)

was good, but, to the taste of the new White House chief, waiting till quantity evolved into quality would be too long and troublesome. What if the quality of political and military thinking itself could be changed? But how? It appeared easy: Why not discard the amorphous notions of world peace and of vague universal prosperity? Did the USA not bake a pie for itself in the first place? To the rest - what there would remain of it. It was they, the rest, who were peacefully to coexist with Washington, seeking its trust and respect. The Americans were strong enough to scorn others' anger or admiration and do without compromises or familiarity. A state was no brother to a state, but a rival or an enemy unless it took its assigned place of an outrunner in the team. So it had been and so it would be. Such a philosophy is called neoconservatism.

Among the agreements which the neoconservatives condemned, like mammoths, to extinction was the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. But before the official ceremony of announcing a program of "space wars" as the antithesis to this treaty something had to be completed. Obviously enough, the idea of an "impenetrable defence" could not have been launched in January 1981. The question would at once have arisen at NATO: Why to bring new American missiles to Europe if several years later such weapons, as claimed by the USA, would be worthless? A similar question was also relevant in the spring of 1983, after the proclamation of a line of space militarisation. It did arise, but the situation had changed: the missiles had been manufactured, US personnel was already in the FRG, Britain and Italy to receive them, and Bonn, London and Rome had been finally tied up hand and foot.

As a safeguard, the "space wars" doctrine was nonetheless called "defensive", which, however, by no means implied anything completely outdated as when a plane is ranged against a plane, a ship against a ship and a missile against a missile, but claimed "universality," meaning that it was designed to kill

in people any wish to war once and for all. This was presented as almost a step in the direction of what the antiwar movements were after. Didn't they want a cessation of the spiral of military rivalry? Washington now gave them this chance. Never mind the Pershings and cruise missiles, they were but a forced measure in order to gain time, so necessary for a revolution in the art of war, that would open the way for lasting peace. References to the program of space militarisation as one of a purely "scientific research" character were to give the enterprise the appearance of respectability and to underscore the seriousness of the "noble motives" behind it.

No doubt about it, a time gain was indispensable. Mark it that of the consequences of the research they began to talk, and then also not in a full voice, after the placing of the US missiles in Western Europe on combat duty. Also then, the search began for another term to replace the phrase "strategic defense initiative". The term "shield" sounds well. But what kind of shield? "Impenetrable"? No duties are levied on lying, only from too much salt even a blind merchant might recover his sight. "All-embracing"? Likewise doubtful as it is impossible to embrace the unembraceable. "Reliable"? That seemed closer to what was being looked for, though a puncture could occur here too. In general, they decided as follows: promise nothing definite and even gradually adjust the public mind to the likelihood that the idea of large-scale "defence" may explode earlier than it becomes inflated to the skies. In the meanwhile assurances have been forthcoming: the knowledge and experience acquired for a hefty sum will have their spinoff; if not applicable in one sphere, they will work in another. A "trump card" has been thrown in: they say that about 90 per cent of the work planned under "strategic defense initiative" will have civilian ramifications of use. So the program is almost "civilian"; and if, as the traders know so well, the public comes to like a commodity, its opposition will vanish.

The sops to the public were to conceal the gradual slight shift in the spectrum of research and emphasis of development. Now in the centre is no specific "defensive" technology, but a war technology that is entirely new. And not as the substitution for the current one, but in addition to it. The anti-missile element is present, but it does not set the tone. The all-inclusive umbrella has been folded down. Offensive systems are again said to be "universally reliable" and therefore irreplaceable. It is emphasized that, whatever the outcome of the research and experiments, the policy of "deterrence", that is, the use of offensive arms, will remain the most important principle of US military doctrines. It turns out that the multi-storeyed "strategic defense initiative" has a multi-layered bottom.

What are the facts that confirm this thesis? Firstly, it is the statements made by the President and his close aides. They make no secret of the fact that the research initiated within the framework of the Strategic Defence Initiative should not necessarily produce the results for which it was started. Congress does not allocate money for a dubious enterprise. This is not the case of act first and think later. Such things do happen in politics but not too often and not with such extravagance.

Secondly, on March 24, 1985, the British Sunday Times said that since Christmas a number of government officials, including Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger, had been hinting that the SDI was more than a research programme and that the decision was final and irreversible. Indeed, one cannot doubt the feasibility of a project and, at the same time, stubbornly stick to it. This means that something is being kept secret.

Thirdly, Washington is going ahead with the "modernisation" of offensive nuclear and conventional arms, making special emphasis on first-strike systems and technologies that make it more difficult for the other side to combat missiles, aircraft

and military satellites.

Fourthly, evidence is gathering that missile-defence systems deployed in space should be able to hit small-size land- and sea-based targets.

Fifthly, the advocates of the confrontation policy are particularly pleased with the fact that the basically new detection, guidance and homing-in systems, on which research and development is underway, can be both defensive and offensive and that, regardless of the final decision to develop or not to develop a large-scale missile defence system and without waiting for such a decision, they can substantially enhance the strike potential of existing nuclear and conventional weapons. Moreover, the side that will be the first to develop such super-technology will achieve vast military advantage over other countries.

Judging by everything, this is not "defence" research of academic interest but a pragmatic effort to develop new generation means of warfare. New instructions are being written for the new weapons. In 1984 the Americans issued "for use in office" the Air Force basic combat manual, "Aerospace Doctrine", which said that the US Air Force should seek to ensure superiority in space. The manual further said that the Air Force should seek to maintain US technological superiority in aerospace and ensure the potential for protracted combat by developing means of space warfare because space ensures unlimited scope and potentialities for warfare. It is not a passage from a propaganda pamphlet. It is an instruction from a manual "for use in office".

What about the defence then? The simpletons who persist in searching for the truth begin to annoy the Administration. Replying to a question about the future of tactical missiles in Europe, Caspar Weinberger said that tactical missiles were quite a different thing. They are battlefield weapons and the Strategic Defence Initiative has nothing to do with them, as

it has nothing to do with aircraft. It is a curious statement, taking into consideration that more than half of the US nuclear warhead yield is carried by bombers. The share of Cruise missiles, which Washington does not consider strategic, keeps growing. Taking all this into account, one can understand the implication of the Defence Secretary's statement.

It appears that a missile defence system is not even regarded by the United States as a means of protecting its own land-based strategic missiles. Of course, a defence system for missile bases on American territory would be a desirable addition to the first-strike potential, but, on the whole, this is not the main objective. The principal goal is to find an effective means of "neutralising" Soviet land-based missiles, which are the backbone of the Soviet military potential. An effective method of combating this type of weapons would enhance the US offensive capabilities several times over. In that case, Washington would be able, without too much risk for itself, to use nuclear weapons on theatres of war and in battlefield, as they are wont to say, and, under favourable circumstances, test in practice the "Airland Battle 2000" doctrine or the strategy of deep strikes into the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries. Of course, this would be done as a means of "self-defence."

In short, offence remains the best defence. All the talk about "defence", especially strategic defence, is the best camouflage for the modernisation of offensive weapons and techniques. What can be more sophisticated than military bases hung over other people's heads? To maintain the appearance of peace-makers, the American leaders changed with one stroke of a pen the Damoclean sword into the Damoclean shield, trying to make us forget that to thrust a shield against someone once meant to declare a war.

If the situation were different, the Washington "researchers" would surely try to find out whether the key to the

problem of peace on Earth got lost in space, in ocean depths or in missile silos. It is insatiable militarism that is longing for superkill bombs and shells. To achieve stability one should first of all halt the arms race in all fields, including offensive and defensive, strategic and non-strategic, nuclear and conventional and land- and sea-based and aerospace weapons. That would be a great deal more effective and cheaper if one means universal security and not something else.

The problem is that this is not what the United States wants. A few days ago US Secretary of State George Shultz reaffirmed his commitment to Harry Truman's doctrine that peace can only be ensured through strength because justice, goodwill and good intentions were not enough for that. Force breeds violence and violence leads to war. This is something Washington knows only too well. That is why Washington prefers to be a kind of connecting rod in politics. That is why Washington works out aggressive doctrines and requests unheard-of armaments for them, whose development is funded in the budget and presented by official propaganda under the inconspicuous heading "research".

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FACTS AND FICTION

Valentin Falin,
Izvestia political correspondent

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The phrase "scientific research" nearly always sounds intriguing, and indeed bewitching when the promise is almost of a revolution in life and concepts. And not just out of respect for the scientists; common sense intrinsically refuses to associate science and evil, it expects from science good things only.

It is on this human dream of a better future that designs are built. Piously the US leaders promise to hatch chickens on a cuckoo's eggs. Of all the manifestations of dishonesty that permeates the debate (in the USA) on these issues, noted the Washington Post, perhaps the most dishonest is the assumption that the creation of a "star wars" system will somehow end the arms race.

No, says Reagan with put-on anger, the USA talks of peace, not war; of averting the need for, not focussing on, retaliation; of hope, not fear. It, the President asserts, has taken upon itself the initiative in carrying out a series of studies that would ascertain if wars can be precluded. Or is a striving for progress forbidden? What's bad about the idea of destroying weapons with weapons? So let us not be stingy, let's cover the sky with a shield made up of the latest technologies and a resolve to depend not on paper and the seals of treaties, but on the space "guardians of peace." An American variety of placid, idle dreaming? If it only were so...

Actually, the "star wars" system, as the peoples of the world rightly suspect, is a Pandora's box. So in order to assuage

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their fears, a thesis has been maintained since the end of last year that no one can now say what the research will end in or when. Things may clear up ten years from now, or possibly after a full twenty. Then, the tests might altogether not justify the hopes of the developers-theoreticians. In general, everything is uncertain; so far mere theory; no cause for worry. But they will at once add: you must admit that it would be so enticing to acquire invulnerability, even if relative. And it would do no harm to the Americans if as a prelude to "worldwide reconciliation" the bliss first descended upon the United States only! Indeed, it is no sin to devote the remainder of the 20th century to "strategic defence initiative." The game is well worth the billions of dollars that will have to be scraped up for the research and tests.

The money will be chiefly America's, they reassure other countries. But what about time and stability? These will be borrowed from all, though with "humane intentions" and at a high interest rate: with its discoveries, if made, the USA will endow the entire population of the planet or the part of it that will deserve the gift by "good behaviour." Much, of course, will hinge on how effective the shield will prove, if it does at all. Given, say, a 50 per cent or less reliability, crumbs may also fall to those of the closest allies who have not shirked their bit of investment in the research. Be it as it may, the Washington "knowledge bank" will not open before the combat buckling of American "defence belts." Weinberger indites it thus: the promise to share achievements will stand only after the systems have been fully developed.

Since it is impossible to predict with certainty what kind of technology the future anti-missile system must be, experiments proceed in all directions, including the work on X-ray lasers that can transform a nuclear explosion into radiation energy. Propaganda, however, has been ordered to play up the so-called non-nuclear anti-missile defence, for, as admitted by one of the directors of the "star wars" program, the use of nuclear charges,

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in a sense, kills the whole of the idea.

This is true; it spoils the mass, as befooling others as well as one's own people is thus more difficult. In inducing non-nuclear-weapon states to cooperation with Washington in "strategic initiative," the whisper is made: don't miss the opportunity of equalising yourselves de facto with the powers having a nuclear potential. But this is a separate topic.

So far let us return to the Reagan assessment: everything is vague and unclear as to whether the system will work and how effectively. The firm offers no guarantees. But what if physics and mechanics are suddenly outwitted? Though according to the formulas of aerodynamics the may-bugs wouldn't fly, they do fly. So the "defence initiative" number might also come off.

Suppose the enormous sums the US administration allocates on "anti-missile defence with space-based elements" - four times the amount swallowed by the creation of the atom bomb and 50 per cent larger than the total spending on all war missile-related research in the past thirty years - go fully for intended use. Unlike the developers of the bomb and rocketry, the handlers of the current program will have to deal not with just the laws of physics, but also with the human factor. If other countries deem it undesirable for them to go along with the USA and change along with it, as Paul Nitze put it, the common approach to strategy as a whole, they can almost infinitely add to the number of "unknown quantities" over which the scientists and engineers are to wreck their brains. Alas, such are the usual ways of life: the only route often leads to success, whereas a host to failure.

It is not at all necessary to double or triple the number of strategic delivery vehicles of the presently adopted type in order that the "strategic shield" should be rendered irrelevant. According to scientists' estimates, this is achievable with tens of times lesser expenditure by using heat protection, by the

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imparting to missiles of rotatory movement, by employing wave- and light-absorbing coatings and so forth. It hardly needs saying that anti-missile complexes will be no less sensitive to the very same technologies that they will incorporate.

The expenditure gap in variant selection is all too obvious. Ex-US Defence Secretary James Schlesinger thinks that today the technology of defence costs thrice as much as that of attack. Let us assume that somewhere down the road in the 21st century the ratio will be 2:1. All the same, the consideration of how, in the context of the arms race, to secure for oneself adequate security with greater cost effectiveness will not lose its significance. It is not without meaning that Weinberger recommends figuring out the "real value" of the available military potential by adding all the expenditures for it since 1950, plus the spending to replace its components with necessary periodicity. Against this background the cost of anti-missile defences, in his estimation, should not appear exorbitant.

To make his allegations sound more convincing the Defence Secretary omits the details. The main funds for the production of existing security systems have already been spent by states and the funds for the deployment of anti-missile systems have not yet been released. The Pentagon's chief makes out as if he does not see the great distance between the technology of the past and that of the present and the record-breaking rise in its prices. If it is to be deployed, the missile defence system is to pass through all these stages of infantile disorders, growing up, increasing sophistication and rising costs. The contractor can ignore estimates and budgets, but the customer will have to rack his brains for some inexhaustible source of money to fund the missile defence programme.

Only a political solution, not the development of counter-technologies, can put an end to competition in military technology. I am sure that Washington is well aware of that. Planners,

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especially in the military field, take into consideration all thinkable and unthinkable options. The Americans are not launching some abstract research programme, blanketed in sentimentality. They are opening the way to an unprecedented cycle of actions and counter-actions, threats and counter-threats, exhausting for all countries, to a life on the brink of a fire-spitting volcano. In short, whatever the result of the research begun in the United States, it will inevitably raise the level of confrontation, further destabilise the situation and increase the risk of war.

Many American scientists and politicians are trying to convince Reagan by facts that the United States will gain nothing from his "Star Wars" concept. However, their arguments and estimates are dismissed in favour of the views of other experts, who assure the President that everything is possible in this world, given the will and the money.

The Americans explain the situation in many different ways. Some attribute the desire to create a "superweapon" to Washington's allergy to any manifestation of political dissent, which the US Administration considers heretical. Others say that Reagan is too ambitious a man to give up at once his brainchild, the "Star Wars" plan. Still others claim that space may become a gold seam for the American corporations for decades and the interests of the corporations have always been uppermost in the Administration's plans. The Washington Post put its finger on it when it said that the "Star Wars" programme meant new windfall profits for the military-industrial complex.

Though each argument is justified, one should dig deeper. One should make clear why the "Strategic Defence Initiative" appeared in the first place, shake all the fig leaves off its family tree, and see what is the soil that makes it blossom and bear fruit. I shall try to accomplish this task in the next article.

(Izvestia, April 9. In full.)

ORI15VP-343

THE ANATOMY OF A NEW ADVENTURE

Valentin Falin, Political Commentator for Izvestia

I

Before the Gromyko-Shultz meeting and after it Washington threw piles of paper into a new propaganda campaign and poured a flood of words upon listeners and viewers. It did so not to quench the thirst for truthful information but rather to create a psychological mood that would meet the objectives of ruling quarters in the United States.

The signing of the Soviet-US ABM Treaty in 1972 was no rash decision. That treaty formalized the voluntary recognition by both sides of an objective necessity. The fact that the treaty was signed for an indefinite term served to show that both powers were convinced that they had made the right choice in favour of arms control and equitable cooperation. It would be no exaggeration to say that the ABM Treaty was and continues to be a bridge leading to the limitation of strategic armaments and their subsequent reduction, and to agreements on all other types of nuclear and conventional weapons and on the building of a peace based on equality and equal security.

When the present administration took office it launched a campaign of scathing criticism not against some elements of the policy pursued by Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. It denounced the fundamental principle of their policy and the idea underlying their position. The neo-conservatives came to consider security ensured by an agreement with another country as a security granted them as a favour. They thought that was something the United States could not accept. The Americans ought not to become directly or indirectly dependent on anyone or have their freedom of manoeuvre or action restricted in any way. The United

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States with its "inexhaustible" technological and economic potential cannot fail to find its "own" way out of any hopeless situation and make everyone else toe Washington's line.

In an address made on February 24, 1983, that is, a month before the announcement of the "long-term programme" for a total missile defence, President Reagan demanded that the United States must regain its "leadership" by building up its military potential and fostering in itself the determination to act without regard for conventionalities and with unflinching belief that fate is favourable to America.

President Reagan took the liberty of interpreting history as he pleased. Washington was not on the defensive when it attacked Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos or when it organised intervention in Africa and the Middle and Near East and masterminded coups in the Western Hemisphere, Asia and Europe. Nevertheless, the US leaders want more: some events they want to preclude and others they want to provoke whenever they like, the way they did in Grenada.

The President's American Legion address was not the beginning, however. I shall not make here a tiresome excursion into the distant past, but only recall the facts which preceded the public announcement of the US decision to militarize space.

On January 18, 1983 UPI familiarized the public with details of the defense guidance for fiscal 1984-1988. The agency noted that this document had been okeyed by the head of the administration and represented a key element of the strategy of countervailing. The guidance ignores a possibility of reaching agreement or peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union, UPI went on. The document states US intention to change the alignment of forces with the USSR and to defend its security interests if need be and without the imposition of arms control. The United States is not inclined to sign treaties which would interfere with its effort to develop weapons systems which are to be sited in space and which add a new aspect to its military potential.

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Nor does it welcome treaties which would impede preparations for the transfer of troops and for effective conduct of warfare from space. It is against any restricting commitments, and does not rule out amendments to the ABM Treaty.

The 136 pages of the still operating classified guidance abound in a host of what UPI called blood-chilling revelations. It is enough to mention its orientation to the decapitation of the structure of the military-political power, nuclear and conventional forces, and to the destruction of industries which form the military potential of the Soviet Union. Or take the US plan for the accumulation of the reserve of nuclear offensive potential which would survive the most exhausting nuclear war. No comment is needed for the demand to draft variants involving the use of nuclear weapons, which are to be brought into play if the escalation of conventional war would fail to ensure its completion on terms suitable to Washington. But here we have reduced our task to analysing the development of the US position on space. So, let's focus on this task.

March 23, 1983 -- the day when Reagan made his "star speech" -- was not a proclamation of the beginning of an arms race in space. The main idea was presented to the public in the following way: in the past two decades US security was maintained on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. This is bad. The Americans must remain alive under any circumstances. It is time to abandon the "balance of terror" and to adopt a doctrine of guaranteed survival. To do this, it is essential to neutralize the threat created by nuclear ballistic missiles. This can be done with the use of fundamentally new technology deployed on Earth and in space.

Launching into the political orbit its doctrine of assured survival, Washington did not limit in any way the methods and weapons of anti-missile effort at first. It is only recently (the new doctrine must be made appealing at least in some respects!) has Washington specified that nuclear weapons will be

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neutralized by conventional weapons, and begun to present the whole idea as a first real step towards the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

When the President made his March speech, the USSR was not accused of "violating" the ABM Treaty, nor was Washington's step presented as a forced response. But, maybe, the desire to pioneer the military use of space and to gain the initiative was so great that even the favourite pretext was discarded?

The United States was eager to do away with the remaining contractual fetters and to unilaterally "restore" its absolute security. Its impatience led to a hitch: the USA forgot even to tell the allies about yet another crucial change. The closest friends and partners in blocs no longer knew whom to listen to, what to believe if there was anything to believe at all.

It is more difficult to disavow one's own words and promises than those of others. It is better to try and "systematize" the whole thing. This seems to be the most flexible method. This is how a booklet on strategic defense initiative made its appearance. It begins with a preface addressed by the President to his compatriots. You will rush to read it willy-nilly. If you manage to get through numerous reservations, instances of reticence, and statements covering up the gist, you will probably understand that it is not only means on intercepting missiles that are being studied. The mental abilities of people are being subjected to test even to a greater extent. Have they come up to understand the peculiar features of our age?

II

The future of the United States is at stake, says the booklet of the White House, advertizing the space programs of the Administration. Stop arguing, say its authors, and start building space castles all together. These castles are to guard the peace of the "free world". Having neutralized the weapons of the other side, and, naturally, having preserved its own

weapons, the USA will carry out the lofty "humane" mission -- establish its own indisputable order in the world.

By the beginning of the 1970s the USA and the USSR reached a strategic stalemate, notes the booklet. The level of technology did not make it possible to overcome it with confidence. But science did not mark time, and there appeared at one time an opportunity to "render ballistic missiles harmless and obsolete", to "create a genuinely effective non-nuclear defense system" and to "seek other means of preventing war".

To do this, one "merely" has to belt the Earth several times with super-sensitive devices, super-powerful energy sources, super-perfect equipment and super-accurate weapons. It is impossible to do this at once and for all. So, it's all right if the Americans alone are to benefit from this project at first.

"Multiple-layer" defense implies destruction of enemy missiles at every stage of their flight: when the boosters come into play and before the missiles leave the aggressor's territory. Enemy strategic forces would be attacked immediately upon the issue of warning, no matter whether false or real. In other words, a war would be started automatically on the whim of a computer. The second and third layers of defense would contain devices for the destruction of warheads which would remain intact after the "acceleration phase" and reach their combat trajectory. And, finally, the weapons of the fourth layer are to intercept warheads which would surmount obstacles in their way and approach targets on US territory.

But here comes the first surprise. We learn that the aggregate effectiveness of a "multiple-layer" defense system does not necessarily ensure one hundred percent protection.

The next surprise was not long in coming. "A strategic defense system" will not solve the problem if it is not backed by a ramified system of air defense. Without a dependable anti-aircraft shield, all ABM efforts would be futile.

A third surprise. As distinct from statements of two years

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ago when not a trace of doubt was left in the ability of American technology to do everything, now emphasis is being laid on the need to grow wise, to learn more, and to stage experiments. The doubt in the ultimate success of a project is always there. A failure at the finish is assumed to be quite probable. For this reason, any hint at curtailing the arsenals of ostensibly undependable offensive weapons pending the development of absolutely failsafe defensive systems is nipped in the bud.

The effectiveness of a hypothetical ABM system is highly dubious. A bird in hand is worth two in the bush. Isn't it more sensible to tackle our common problems step by step so as to settle them by consent and to mutual advantage? This is your opinion, dear reader. But the present US Administration is sceptical about this effort, first of all because technology seems too tempting to it.

Nobody in Washington will bet that the "star wars" program will justify even the most modest expectations linked with it? O'key, but neither will anyone bet that the failure is inevitable.

Trying to do away with some lapses, the authors of the booklet made a lot of others. A special briefing had to be held, at which a "high-ranking Administration official" was compelled to buttress once again the motives behind the departure of the US leaders from the principles which governed Soviet-US relations in the 1970s. He said that at that time deterrence based on offensive forces had been not only sensible, but also necessary (sic), because then none of the sides was capable of developing a defense system which could effectively deter the other side from dealing a strike. Ground-based anti-missiles, which were discussed at that time, were both expensive and unreliable. Progress in their development was not so tangible, he noted.

So, the course towards gaining military superiority reached a stalemate. No trouble that up to now no weapons have been

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developed for use against many types of missiles, Cruise missiles, for one. There is still much time left before the end of the century, and maybe fresh ideas will come up in this field.

In less than 20 days after the first statement, the same Administration official added, developing his own thought: Our country took part in the SALT-1 and SALT-2 talks when we had no new systems, when we had no weapons which would prompt the Russians to agree to strategic arms reductions.

Let's make conclusions from what he said. US policy is subject to continuous fluctuations and changes. It is wholly predetermined not by principles, but by considerations of current expediency and expected gains. US approach to gains is most simplistic: yesterday it was too expensive to pursue today's policy, and, besides, the arsenal was short of weapons which would make "the potential adversary" uncomfortable. And what about tomorrow? According to Washington's view of political morality, if the USA has to pay too much for something, the Department of State, the Pentagon or the White House will play a new trick or, if the worst comes to the worst, they will try to resume the old line, for the USA, thank God, is ruled by "democracy", and the next President is not responsible for what his predecessor did.

And what about the admission that the USA became involved in the SALT process due to its intellectual and physical weakness? What the world saw as a sign of Washington's turn to realism and its belated readiness to steady down proved to be just a kind of ailment in real fact. American imperialism was in a rush, made blunder, was caught into a crafty trap of detente, and so now it has to get out of it by hook or by crook. Nothing is too bad for the effort. Reagan's predecessors are no longer accused of being stupid. It is their simplicity that let them down, their dull imagination which prevented them from taking exciting risks.

After the Geneva meeting of the Soviet and US top diplomats, Washington's non-diplomats tried to outdo one another in a bid

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to prove that the goal of preventing an arms race in space, sealed in the joint statement, would not entail any changes in the Administration's position. Caspar Weinberger and a number of other officials see the gist of the talks on space in explaining to the Soviet side the "greatness" and "humaneness" of the President's "star" scheme. Their reasoning is as follows: the Russians are so slow-witted that it will take one, two or even three years of intensive lectures to bring home to them what alluring prospects will open before them if they agree to live under US guidance backed up by a combination of offensive and defensive systems. Thus, the Americans themselves assume the role of a class-marm.

But the USSR does have an ability to uphold its interests, and to check whether words are matched by deeds. What if we stick to our own opinion, what if we continue to believe that the US plan for space is fallacious and extremely venturesome? No trouble, hint Washington's high- and not-so-high-ranking officials: the United States will continue doing what it would be doing without any talks.

The dates of the Soviet-American talks have been fixed. The delegations have been appointed. Soon we shall learn the real worth of the peaceloving statements of the US President and of the commitments undertaken on his behalf.

Attentive reading of the booklet and of the statements by US officials strongly suggests the conclusion that the decisive argument for the powers that be in the United States is "what price". The debit and credit of the first and second world wars have been meticulously calculated in the United States. It is known what firms stood to lose from these wars and what stood to gain. The United States still weighs, and not at all on the scales of humaneness, the costs of "neutralizing" its rivals and adversaries. This is one of characteristic, inherent features of the system. Maybe, for this reason the Americans will better understand the situation

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ON THE SO CALLED "STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE" OF

THE USA

Izvestia Editorial

The outcome of the Geneva meeting between A.A. Gromyko, Politbureau Member of the CPSU Central Committee, First Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, and US Secretary of State George Shultz has evoked wide positive response in the world. A way has been opened to concrete and purposeful talks on the elaboration of effective measures to prevent an arms race in space and terminate this race on Earth.

It will be new talks, embracing a set of integrally related questions of averting space militarisation and reducing nuclear arms, strategic as well as medium-range. By virtue of the objective current situation, a different approach to the matter is impossible. This has found clear reflection in the recently-published joint Soviet-American statement. Only strict observance during the forthcoming talks of the reached understanding in all its parts can, stresses a communique on the discussion by the CPSU Central Committee's Politbureau of the results of the Geneva meeting, ensure real progress toward the cessation of the arms race, the removal of the danger of nuclear war and, ultimately, the liquidation of nuclear weapons.

Of course, the way to adopting agreed decisions will not be easy. But the Soviet Union is ready to travel its part of this road. It has a right to expect the same from the USA.

Yet the keynote of a continuing spate of remarks by both the US mass media and administration spokesmen is significantly calls not to give up the plans of extending the arms race to space but to lead matters toward the creation of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system and try to use the forthcoming

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talks for legalising such ventures. Incidentally, at the beginning of January the White House circulated a special booklet under the title "The President's Strategic Defence Initiative" (the "star wars" program, announced by the President in March 1983, is thus officially styled in the USA) where space militarisation is elevated to the rank of a top priority of US state policy till the end of this century.

The announced key aim of the "strategic defence initiative" is to set up a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile system which, so Washington asserts, could shield the entire US territory from strategic ballistic missiles of the "enemy". A considerable part of this system is to be deployed in space and include missile-destroying elements based on new physical principles (lasers, beam weapons and so on).

Billions of dollars have already been allocated for the achievement of this aim. Intensive research and development work is going on to develop experimental samples of individual elements of the comprehensive anti-ballistic missile system. The samples will then be tested to demonstrate that the system "works". Plans are being devised for its consistent deployment stage by stage, to the extent that the corresponding technological problems are solved. Special commands and centres for control of its space units are being established.

Confronted with opposition to the so called "defence initiative" both from the American public and abroad, Washington has launched a broad propaganda campaign, in the course of which they are trying to justify the White House space militarisation line in people's eyes. The publication of the booklet was just such an attempt. Complaining that they are simply not being understood on this question, the Washington people have churned out a new portion of propaganda stratagems, exaggerations and open falsifications designed to bring home to the "slow-witted" and wavering the "advantages" of the US administration's "star wars" program.

Stratagem 1. Mindful of worldwide public concern over the continuing avalanche of American military preparations, the architects of the "strategic defence initiative" are laying the main emphasis on presenting the creation of a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile system with space-based elements as a means to reinforce strategic stability. As US leaders have declared, they have opened up encouraging prospects of an effective self-protection capability founded on this system, which makes it possible to shift from strategy based on an offensive might threat to a strategy that would threaten no one. And this, according to them, will assure the possibility of attaining a more stable deterrent.

But what is the real state of affairs in this matter?

US and Soviet strategic nuclear arms have existed for over 30 years, and all this time, since their appearance, the Soviet Union has been forced in their creation and subsequent deployment to respond to the challenge of the United States of America, which is bent on gaining military superiority. The strategic parity achieved by the early seventies deprived the USA of a possibility to blackmail the USSR with a nuclear threat and compelled it to agree to talks on the limitation of strategic arms.

The USSR and the USA arrived in that period at a clear understanding of the fact that in the conditions of parity in strategic offensive forces the acquisition by one of the sides of an additional defensive potential would be tantamount to its acquisition of a preemptive nuclear strike capability.

The logic of nuclear confrontation is such that the creation of a ramified anti-ballistic missile system does not pursue defence objectives at all, but is integral to a bid for military superiority. Such a system would erode the strategic parity of forces and destabilise the strategic situation as a whole. To redress the balance, the other side would have to react by reinforcing its strategic potential either by a direct build-up

of its offensive forces or by supplementing them with defence facilities. In any case, the net effect would be an unlimited arms race.

The recognition by the USSR and the US of an interconnection between the offensive and defensive strategic systems found expression in the simultaneous signing, on May 26, 1972, of the Treaty (of unlimited duration) on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The ABM Treaty has become the cornerstone of the whole process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction. The Contracting Parties said they considered "that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons". In other words, only mutual restraint in respect of the ABM systems makes it possible to advance towards offensive arms limitation and reduction.

It is this cornerstone provision about the interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive arms that is now being undermined by the American "Star Wars" advocates. They pretend that the earlier agreement was arrived at not as a result of the recognition of the role of the ABM systems as an arms race booster but only because of the absence of technical opportunities at the time to create effective ABM systems.

In actual fact, such an interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive systems has an abiding character and exists objectively. Nor does it disappear, of course, upon the appearance of an opportunity of creating technologically more advanced and effective ABM systems. On the contrary, the creation of such systems would have an even more appreciable effect on the strategic balance, making it extremely unstable. By the same token, the danger of a nuclear war breaking out, with all the consequences it would have for humanity, would drastically increase. Expert estimates show that even with both sides having

roughly equivalent large-scale ABM systems, a rather insignificant difference in their performance would by itself mean substantially eroding the strategic parity and destabilising the overall strategic situation. Incidentally, sound-minded research workers in the US proper have been rightfully pointing out that the work of carrying out the programme announced by Washington is itself of a provocative and destabilising character regardless even of its end results.

Stratagem 2. The US Administration's spokesmen have been saying much to the effect that the creation of a comprehensive ABM system complete with space-based elements has the "humane" purpose of making strategic nuclear missile arms "unnecessary" and "outdated" and will just about open up the way to the elimination of nuclear weapons. However, all that the US Administration is doing shows that the actual design is entirely different. While getting down to carrying out its "Star Wars" programme, Washington is by no means proposing to forgo the multi-billion programmes for building up all the constituent elements of their so-called strategic triad and, first of all, ballistic missiles. What kind of "outdating" of missiles can one talk about, if the US Administration is, along with keeping up its large-scale ABM system, developing six new types of strategic offensive arms simultaneously. The Pentagon intends to have new intercontinental MX ballistic missiles by 1986, Midgetman missiles by the early 90s, and new strategic sea-based Trident-2 missiles by 1989, and is developing two new types of heavy bombers and planning to deploy over twelve thousand long-range Cruise missiles of all basing modes.

When the men in Washington talk about "scrapping ballistic missiles", they mean the Soviet IBMs which constitute the backbone of Soviet strategic power. They mean, by having them substantially cut, to secure a substantial weakening of the Soviet Union's retaliation capability. And that is all against the backdrop of the rearming of the American missile-armed sub-

marine fleet with first-strike ballistic missiles (Trident-2), with the US having first-strike nuclear missiles stationed in Western Europe and with it illimitably deploying around the USSR long-range Cruise missiles of all basing modes and new types of conventional armaments near-equivalent to nuclear systems in terms of performance.

One cannot find a better way of commenting on the American leaders' assurances that the US intends to "defend" its European allies with its prospective ABM system. In actual fact Washington is not particularly concerned over the lot of the Europeans. There is outspoken speculation in the US about the advantages of the deployment of American space weapons because that would make it possible to wage a nuclear conflict over Europe, not over the US.

The true design behind the US "strategic defence initiative" is to disrupt, rather than strengthen, strategic stability. The "dependable antimissile shield" Washington is dreaming about is nothing short of an intention to create an opportunity of carrying out a nuclear attack from behind that shield and ward off a Soviet retaliatory strike. So what we are talking about is not a weapon for defence against nuclear systems but a new type of weapon for nuclear aggression.

Washington fails to take into account, however, that those against whom it is taking such measures will not sit idle. They will do everything to foil the aggressor's adventurous plans and will foil them. The United States will never achieve military superiority over the socialist countries, even if it deploys its new armaments in space. By so doing it will achieve only one thing -- a dramatic increase in the risk of a nuclear war and a senseless wasting of the material and intellectual resources of its own country and the world as a whole. The American "Star Wars" plans are not a favour but a mortal threat to the peoples.

Stratagem 3. In a bid to misguide people, the US leaders say that the implementation of the "strategic defence initiative" does not go beyond the bounds of research and development (R&D) and that this R&D does not carry the risk of deployment of a national missile defence system and does not contravene any of the US commitments in the field of arms control, especially those envisaged by the ABM Treaty.

There is not a grain of truth in these allegations. It is clear that billions of dollars are spent on R&D not for the love of science and technological discoveries. The testing of various elements of a large-scale missile defence system, which is being conducted or planned by the Pentagon, is designed to create conditions when the United States would only have to take a decision on the practical deployment of such systems. The United States wants the USSR to accept the fact that the Americans will have a national missile defence system anyway and have it soon, and also get from the Soviet side, if possible, consent for such actions.

It is clear that the Soviet Union will not sit and wait to see how the American R & D will end but will have to take adequate countermeasures. The reservations about R & D change nothing therefore. The US plans seriously undermine the foundations of the arms control process. They not only block all nuclear arms limitation agreements but directly aim at escalating the arms race.

A national missile defence system with space-based elements can only be deployed at the price of demolishing the ABM Treaty. The implementation of large-scale R & D and the practical testing of individual components of a missile defence system would undermine that major Soviet-American treaty. Even the Pentagon has to admit this. On September 12, 1984, Caspar Weinberger bluntly said that the United States was conducting research to establish whether an absolutely reliable system could be developed. If it could, he said, the United States would

have to go beyond the bounds of the ABM Treaty.

Gen. James Abrahamson, director of the missile defence programme, did not bother to conceal the Pentagon's intentions when he said on December 17, 1984, that when at least a part of a comprehensive missile defence system was developed and ready for use, the United States would have to reach agreement with the USSR on modification of the ABM Treaty, because some of the clauses of that treaty ran counter to the objectives of such a system.

The Washington leaders do not seem to care that the development of a comprehensive missile defence system with space-based elements would cross out the fundamental provision of the ABM Treaty, which pledged the sides not to create a missile defence of the territory of the country. Nor do they care that they would violate the treaty clause banning the development of space-based components and anti-ballistic missile systems and limiting the development of such systems on new physical principles. They also intend to wreck many other multilateral agreements, such as the 1963 treaty banning nuclear tests in three media, the 1967 treaty on the principles governing the activities of states in space exploration and use and the 1977 convention forbidding environmental modification for military purposes.

The USA's continued violation of its international commitments will not be concealed by allegations that the Soviet Union does not comply with the ABM Treaty or other agreements. The purpose of such charges is all too transparent, and it is clear who does not want to honour the agreements concluded, and seeks to steer clear of them, and even scuttle them.

US research on space ABM systems is jeopardising the whole fabric of international law (which as yet is holding back war-related efforts by some states) and is likely to make positive limitation and reduction of arms impossible.

Stratagem 4. Washington, eager to persuade all Americans of the need for a national ABM system, is alleging that the

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Soviet Union itself is engaged in anti-ballistic defence programmes covering its whole territory. But the Soviet Union has no such programmes, and this is well known in Washington. So it is trying to befog the issue by saying that the Russians are either about to establish such a system, or already have it in operation. Since any proof is lacking, the false case is strengthened by references to the Soviet Union's limited ABM and anti-aircraft defence systems.

The authors of these fabrications, intended for the uninitiated, seem to be unconcerned that the limited ABM system (defending one area only) has been built in the USSR in accordance with the ABM Treaty (a similar system had previously been created in the USA) and bears no resemblance to the large-scale ABD space system conceived in the USA. It is also obvious to any unprejudiced person that the Soviet anti-aircraft defences have nothing to do with anti-ballistic defences.

Besides, there is little if any consistency in the arguments put forward by strategic defence initiative advocates. On the one hand, the implication is that both opponents - the USA and the USSR - should have all-territory ABM systems to have the promised "stabilising effect". And still, not in the least embarrassed, Washington politicians claim that the situation will be "stable" even with the USA alone possessing such a system, and the sooner this is done the better. If, however, the Russians were to be ahead in developing such a system, then, in Weinberger's words, the world will be very dangerous to live in. It would be like a world in which the Russians had nuclear weapons and the USA did not.

That's the "stabilising" role of defence installations, short and sweet, as hypocritically discussed by Washington. The US warlords are well aware of the consequences of an all-embracing ABM system set up by one of the sides and that is why they are pushing for one in the USA. That explains also their attempts to impute to the Soviet Union their own dan-

gerous plans and veil the efforts to tip the balance in their favour and get a strategic edge over the Soviet Union.

The fact, however, is that this "initiative" is being increasingly opposed both in the United States and outside it, in spite of the US administration's propaganda of a space ABM system. Among the opposition are leading military and political experts who held high posts in previous administrations, leaders from some NATO countries, and some sections of public opinion.

US leaders are being warned. They are cautioned time and again that the Star Wars idea is a highly dangerous miscalculation.

To begin with, this ^{is} a political miscalculation. One cannot profess a realistic and responsible policy and at the same time bank on ever new weapons developed, reject arms limitation understandings reached, and ignore the security interests of all peoples, one's one included.

It is also a scientific and technical miscalculation, as was made clear in a message by members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences to all scientists in the world. Their view agrees with what has been stated by presidents and representatives of academies in 36 countries. It is also shared by many American scientists who describe the claims of ultimate ABM systems as the most irresponsible statements ever made recently by the US administration.

Lastly, it is a highly perilous miscalculation from the military point of view. The launching of work on a new ABM system is not the strengthening of US security, but a step towards the nuclear war threshold beyond which the USA will not escape retribution. Attempts to weaponise space will inevitably touch off an even more threatening spiral in the arms race, with all responsibility for this falling on the present US administration.

+ + +

The rapid advancement of space technology, the opportunity to use space for military purposes and America's sustained effort towards this end have made preventing space militarisation one of the most pressing tasks. Unless banned, strike space weapons would become a major destabilising factor promoting an uncontrolled arms race.

Space non-militarisation is a life-or-death issue for mankind. It would be fatal to turn space into an area of the arms race and a base for aggression. We must do everything to prevent this.

The USSR is working to outlaw the use of force in space and from space with regard to Earth, and from Earth with respect to objects in space. No weapons, manned or unmanned, conventional, nuclear, laser, beam, etc., should be orbited or deployed in space. Strike space weapons, based on any principle or employing any basing scheme, should not be developed, tested, deployed or used in or from space against targets on Earth, in the air, or at sea. The existing weapons of these types should be destroyed.

Space non-militarisation would pave the way to major reciprocal cuts in nuclear weapons and their eventual phasing out with the strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. Furthermore, it is clear that the nuclear weapons issue cannot be tackled without a simultaneous ban on strike space weapons. Connected inseparably, nuclear and space weapons should be tackled at the talks in package. First priority is given to strike space weapons. Scrapping the anti-missile defence treaty and not prohibiting space militarisation would make the nuclear arms talks meaningless and prospectless. A.A. Gromyko said this unambiguously in a talk with Soviet political correspondents.

The Soviet initiative, which made talks on all matters

relating to nuclear and space weapons possible, reflects the USSR's firm course towards effectively reducing the danger of nuclear war and improving the international situation. It is to be hoped that Washington would realize the responsibility which goes to America in connection with the forthcoming talks and that it would draw practical conclusions to ensure their progress and major results favouring peace and lessening the threat of nuclear war.

As K.U. Chernenko put it, it is not deception of one's partner and public opinion -- we would not agree with this -- but the quest for mutually acceptable solutions promoting peace that should become the objective of the talks. We must not lose the chance of producing such solutions.

(January 24. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARŞİVİ
TÜSTAV

ORIOVO-458

PENTAGON PLANNING WARS IN SPACE

Militarisation of space is being propagandized so vigorously in the United States today that for Americans space is associated more often not with scientific discoveries but with the term "theatre of war", L. Koryavin writes in Izvestia. Since the commencement of Reagan's second term in office a big propaganda campaign has been started in the United States with the aim of promoting the idea of "strong America".

The tone of the campaign is set by the US President. His programme address to the members of the two houses of the Congress with the traditional "State of the Union" message reflected exactly these concepts, mostly the concept of "star wars". Reagan was joined in besieging the Congress by the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex that fulfils the Pentagon's multi-billion orders.

The budget of the American military establishment is now being vigorously debated in Washington.

The size of the budget and the requests for "star war" weapons are being increasingly criticised by many members of the Congress who insist on their certain "adjustment" so as to avert the growth of the budget deficit. Senator Hatfield stated that if the military budget is not frozen higher taxes will become unavoidable. But the Republican election programme, as is known, emphatically rejected any whatsoever increases in taxes.

Representatives of the administration have not only started their attempts to influence Congressmen so as to make them vote for the military budget but are also vigorously trying to effect "psychological impact" on broad sections of the American public. The first member of the President's newly formed cabinet to appear on American TV with a programme statement was Caspar Weinberger who asked the millions of American TV viewers to support greater military spending and in particular spending on "star war" preparations, L. Koryavin writes.

(Izvestia, February 13. Summary.)

WHAT IS SDI?

Lev Semeiko, Disarmament Expert and
Vice-President of a Commission of the Soviet
Peace Committee

I. Attack Plus Buildup

Mankind can and must enter the year 2000 without nuclear weapons, under a peaceful sky and peaceful space, without the fear of destruction. Only then will people be confident of their own survival and of the survival of the future generations. This is a difficult but feasible task. The ways and means of bringing about an overall ban on nuclear weapons are spelled out in a recent statement by General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachyov.

The problem of banning nuclear weapons is inextricably linked with that of preventing the development and deployment of space weapons. One is impossible without the other.

The advocates of the Star Wars programme say that it is a defence against nuclear weapons, which would eventually lead to the elimination of these weapons. The opponents of the Star Wars plan argue that the SDI is not a defence but an offensive weapon system that would stimulate a buildup in nuclear arms. What are the key facts on which this view is based?

First. Any defence is effective if it can effectively fulfil its task. The kernel of the matter is that a missile defence system cannot fulfil the task of ensuring protection against nuclear weapons, even if the "defensive" space strike weapons realise military and technological achievements based on new physical processes, even if it is a large-scale defence in terms of the area it can protect, the amount of technology and weapons it incorporates and the comprehensive nature of various support measures and even if the development of a

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space-based missile defence system costs not one trillion dollars, as the United States now believes, but two trillion dollars or even more. In any case, the system will not guarantee a hundred per cent reliability. Anything that would penetrate its layers would inevitably lead to catastrophic destruction.

Second. The advocates of SDI would like to avert a catastrophe by reducing US losses to an "acceptable" level. How are they going to achieve this?

Judging by everything, the United States envisions two answers, politico-diplomatic and military. The politico-diplomatic answer (Washington offers it at the Geneva negotiations for fruitless theoretical debate) implies that the deployment of a space-based missile defence system should be accompanied by a reduction in nuclear arsenals. The United States wants this to be agreed upon in principle now. The Soviet Union rejects this plan, however. As Mikhail Gorbachyov said, it is futile to expect us to help the United States weaken our strategic potential. The opposite would happen: to restore parity the Soviet Union would have to enhance the effectiveness, accuracy and destructive potential of its arms.

The military answer which is advocated by the hotheads in Washington and which is not theoretical is this: it is possible radically to reduce the number of missiles and warheads capable of penetrating an American missile defence and thus reduce American losses only by delivering a pre-emptive (disarming) first strike at the other side's nuclear missile bases.

The force of the Soviet counter-strike would be reduced twice, first by massive offensive strikes at missile bases and then by defensive strikes in space at weapons that would survive the attack.

This makes a large-scale space-based missile defence a purely offensive system, because its aim is to disarm the

Soviet Union. And it does not matter where a disarming strike is delivered (on the land, in space or in the air) and how.

Third. There is growing awareness in the US today of the fact that reliable anti-missile protection of the entire territory of the country is impossible even with the use of space-based lasers and beam weapons. That is why the Administration is already apparently leaning towards the establishment "for the time being" of a roof not over the entire American territory, but just over the nuclear missile bases.

But these designs are not defensive either. Protected by a space "shield", offensive nuclear weapons, especially in their modernized versions, will become still more dangerous.

All those statements about "defence" are just as hollow as the promises of securing the elimination of nuclear weapons by way of assuming the "defence". The real stake is being put on the retention of nuclear weapons or, rather, on their buildup. What else can explain all that talk about protecting the sites of future deployment of the latest MX missiles each of which carries three times more warheads than today's Minuteman-3 missile? And is it not because MX missiles are typical first-strike weapons that the US would like to cover them under a space umbrella?

Fourth. The deliberations about "subsequent" (after the implementation of the SDI programme) elimination of nuclear weapons can best be described as demagogical if one is also to take into consideration such an infrequently covered subject as the US policy in the production of fissionable materials which serve as fuel for nuclear weapons.

The production of fissionables in the US is being resumed. According to the American press, work to develop new, this time "third-generation", nuclear weapons is conducted within the framework of as many as 22 programmes. Why? This line

directly contradicts the widely advertised official goal of the SDI which purports "to liberate the world from nuclear weapons". It is also at variance with the Soviet position: in 1982 the USSR suggested stopping the production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. And now it is at variance, too, with the concrete Soviet plan for nuclear disarmament over the next fifteen years.

Fifth. There is another reason why with the implementation of the SDI programme the question of the "elimination" of nuclear weapons will be left suspended in the air. The SDI is aimed at destroying missiles with their warheads. But what about nuclear bombers, cruise missiles, nuclear artillery and what is described in the West as "suitcase bombs" which are also nuclear, of course? Why, all these weapons are left unaffected by laser and other elements of the space shield! These could be eliminated, of course, by common agreement and irrespective of these or other capabilities of the SDI. But then there is the question: why not getting down to the destruction of all nuclear weapons right now if they can supposedly be destroyed later? What's the point of building a shield costing billions, and possibly even trillions, of dollars now only to destroy the nuclear arsenals "later"? Is it not simpler to go straight instead of making an expensive and dangerous anti-missile detour?

Sixth. Finally, a few words about the "nuclear madmen" which President Reagan claims might blackmail the world in the future. Sure enough, the question of "third" countries - potential possessors of nuclear weapons in the future - is a serious issue. The danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons is only too obvious. But should it really be averted through the establishment of an anti-missile shield? Of course, not. In any eventuality involving the arms race - with either bilateral or multilateral variant - action invariably brings

about counteraction. So, the establishment of a shield might well stimulate not only the development but also the build-up of nuclear "swords" by third countries. What is required is a totally different approach: consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and attainment of a universal agreement on the prevention of revival of nuclear weapons after their elimination.

Now, could the shield be advisable against accidental, unsanctioned nuclear missile launches? This argument is often used in the West. At first glance, the answer seems to be yes. But such a shield would at best be an uncalled-for luxury. There are appreciably less sophisticated systems and procedures that can be used against such launches. Equally important are political measures. Take, for example, the well-known Soviet pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

In this manner, from the viewpoint of political and strategic logic, the US "Strategic Defense Initiative" cannot be rightfully called defensive. This is in fact not a defensive shield but a political smokescreen behind which the US is trying to get itself a still sharper offensive sword for a disarming blow.

II. Line Towards Destabilisation

How would translation of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) into reality tell on strategic stability? This is, in effect, the central question because preserving strategic stability is an indispensable condition for preserving peace in the nuclear age. That is why it is necessary to strengthen it in every way. Any shaking of its foundation would make peace much more fragile.

The US Administration is seeking to convince all that the "Star Wars" concept is a "great boon" in ensuring strategic

stability. The space anti-missile shield would discourage the opponents from launching nuclear missiles once and for all, they claim. Peace would no longer be based on the threat of nuclear destruction and would, therefore, become more reliable and secure.

It would be very well if it were the way they put it. But the real situation is far more complicated. The star will-o'-the-wisp of "much more stronger" strategic stability disappears as a careful analysis of this question is made.

First. It is relevant to begin with a pronouncement by the US Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, who has said that if a Soviet ABM defence were set up, it would necessitate an increase in the offensive forces and a build-up of their capability of overcoming the Soviet defence systems. In other words, the Pentagon chief has directly admitted the objective truth that development of defensive armaments would cause a build-up of offensive arms in return. We admit this truth, too. And not only do we admit it but also strike the bell in advance, stating that a qualitatively new arms race would be extremely dangerous from the viewpoint of its consequences. It would inevitably destabilise the situation and increase the war threat.

But the Washington top officials have adopted an altogether different approach. In a simplified form it can be formulated as follows: if an ABM system is deployed over the USA the Soviet Union would better embark on a radical reduction of its strategic offensive potential, but if an anti-missile umbrella is spread over the USSR the Americans should immediately build up their offensive arsenal. At any rate, this is the idea behind all the claims by Weinberger. To put it mildly, this approach looks very strange from the standpoint of equality and justice for which the US leaders themselves are calling. The official American approach, taken

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as a whole, is based on the idea that a combination of reduced offensive armaments plus newly-made defensive strategic ones, a kind of "equilibrium" between them must strengthen strategic stability.

But what is the idea of talking of any "equilibrium" regulated in the American style if the measures taken by one side would inevitably cause countermeasures by the other, which, in turn, would be followed by counter-countermeasures? A logical flop in the American stance is clearly visible here. It is not accidental because translation of the SDI into reality is a deliberate line aimed at uncontrolled escalation of the arms race but not at agreed-upon curbing of it. As is known, the arms race has never done any good. It can maximally destabilise the strategic situation by introducing ever new elements of tension, up to emergence of a most dramatic situation.

Second. The SDI is in conflict also with the idea of the existing strategic balance between the USSR and the United States.

The realisation of SDI would upset all the established concepts of power balance and even the possibilities of reducing nuclear arms. Strategic balance would truly turn into a strategic chaos. To determine if balance is preserved would be extremely difficult because not only the offensive components of balance, but also the defensive, deployed now not restrictedly but on the widest scale, would have to be considered, and in interaction at that. A most indefinite situation would arise. It is hard to imagine all the dangerous consequences of one of the sides substantially getting ahead in something and at some point in the future. The USSR has never sought and will not seek this. The situation with the United States of America is more complex. On the one hand, at the meeting in Geneva it was declared, and that is a positive

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step, that the American side also would not seek to gain military superiority. On the other, there are no signs of at least a slowing down of the wheel of Washington's gigantic military programmes. Under these conditions, with the realisation of SDI there could arise not only still greater asymmetries in the composition of the strategic forces of the sides, which would make much more difficult the analysis of power balance, but the threat of a disruption of strategic balance as a whole would also become obvious. Such a disruption - real or even erroneously perceived as real (chaos is chaos) - automatically would mean the planting of a mine beneath strategic stability. And undermined stability spells undermined world security.

Third. The realisation of the "star wars" programme engenders and would engender in the future a destabilisation in all the stages of its implementation. Indeed, nuclear disarmament is already being questioned now at the so called stage of "research and development." In order to dispel these doubts, it is necessary to shut the door tightly through which weapons could penetrate into outer space. To shut it already at the very initial stage. This would permit maintaining in force the ABM Treaty, which prohibits (Article V) the development, testing and deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based and mobile land-based. And this is a treaty of fundamental significance for the entire process of the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms. Agreed-upon restrictions on ABM systems are an integral part of relations and negotiations between the USSR and the USA as a whole. Washington's attempts at undermining the ABM Treaty by "innocuous research" already tell negatively on Soviet-American relations and on the course of the Geneva negotiations. These attempts lay down the basis for

undermining strategic stability.

Failing to put up obstacles to the creation and testing of space attack weapons, the curve of destabilisation would steeply rise upwards at the following stage - with the deployment of space attack weapons. Apart from the aforesaid factors, others would also tell, with the appearance of a possibility suddenly to put nuclear attack early warning satellites out of action among them. And even the case of these (especially these) or other satellites becoming accidentally disabled could be viewed as an act of war undertaken by the other side. Furthermore, militarising outer space with the employment of the newest scientific and technological achievements would lead to a still greater automation of the process of the adoption of strategic decisions in a crisis situation. The question of "to be or not to be" would in the end be decided not by people, but by electronic machines - with all the extremely dangerous consequences of possible malfunctions of the highly sophisticated computer systems. From this point of view, too, one cannot fail to see the most important thing that SDI is really a prelude to the undermining of strategic stability.

Fourth. In examining the problem of strategic stability, it is important not to forget that it cannot be approached from a narrow technological point of view, that is, from the standpoint of the influence on it of some or other specific armaments. The point is not that particular missiles or space attack weapons are involved. The point is that Washington is beginning a qualitatively new round of the arms race, both in terms of nuclear and space weapons. It does so attempting in the process to becloud the close relationship between them. Such an approach of the American side is explosive for strategic stability. All the more important it is in practice to observe the pledge, confirmed in Geneva with the signature

of the US President, a pledge involving the need to carry out the objectives set in the Joint Soviet-American Statement of January 8, 1985. Among these objectives is the consolidation of strategic stability. That can and should be achieved. To a decisive extent this depends on whether the efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space and end it on Earth will succeed. And this, in its turn, depends on the political will of Washington.

III. Erosion of Security

The US establishment is insisting that the SDI will enhance security. The argument is that it will rest not on the "balance of terror", on fear of mutual nuclear destruction, but on the impossibility of such destruction guaranteed by an impenetrable "nuclear umbrella". The SDI is presented as all but a pioneering approach to security. Actually, this is the greatest hoax of the nuclear age.

First. The pioneering approach to security in the present conditions cannot give priority to the arms race and power buildup. There is a limit to everything. And all sensible limits to the size of military arsenals have long been passed. Raising their levels further is absurd with the present multiple mutual destruction capability. But it is even more absurd trying to get rid of this overkill threat by piling up more mountains of weapons.

A truly pioneering approach would be:

- renunciation of the Stone Age mentality in our times (having a big nuclear stone in one hand and a large space shield in the other); resisting the momentum of the nuclear race and rising above national selfishness, tactical calculations, and disagreements and differences, all for the sake of peace; readiness to draw a line under the nuclear confrontation before the turn of the century; preparedness to

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drop any ambition to reach military superiority and readiness to be guided by the principle of adequate defence; adoption of the non-first use concept while nuclear weapons still exist.

Second. Security problems in the nuclear age are impossible to resolve if national interests alone are taken into account, for all their unquestionable importance. A distinctive and novel feature of the present military and political situation is that it is wrong to believe, as in the past, that your security grows at the expense of your opponent's. The reverse would happen: security would decrease, both your own, the other one's and the world's. Military counter-measures and increased tensions with the threat of growing not just into a war to add to the just about 15,000 witnessed by humankind, but into an all-destroying war, are inevitable. Hopes must not therefore be pinned on one's own security ensured by a space anti-missile shield. Looked at from this angle, Mikhail Gorbachyov said at the Geneva summit, US diminished security, as compared with the Soviet Union's, would not be good for the USSR, because such a situation may lead to mistrust and instability. Quite understandably, a similar US approach to Soviet security is needed.

Third. Security under "an anti-missile space umbrella" would be fictitious security also because this "umbrella" cannot but leak. A retaliatory strike, even attenuated by several echelons of anti-missile defence, would be disastrous for the aggressor. People should think not only of the known medical and biological consequences of nuclear blasts for life in all forms, but also of the climatic implications, recently discovered and quite possible, of even a relatively small number of explosions. That is why it is sacrilegious to speak about the security of the Americans who could be not only turned to ashes or exposed to deadly radiation but, as has now been established, killed by "a nuclear winter". And all this

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under "an effective" anti-missile umbrella!

Fourth. The SDI would not enhance security, because self-deception as regards a possibility "to survive" can only push the United States to an attempt to neutralize the USSR at a time to be considered proper for this. It is hard to say what Pentagon people would "think" about in a critical situation. However, it is now generally recognised -- and this is no exaggeration -- that, given an anti-missile shield, more Americans, authorised to take a fatal decision, would favour a first strike. This should put the planet on alert because this would mean undermining security.

Fifth. This would inevitably undermine the security of Europe as well, irrespective of the quality of a space anti-missile umbrella over the United States. "Holes" in this umbrella, as has been shown, may speed up a fatal decision which would be disastrous also for the countries in Europe. US allies in Europe would not be able to feel secure even in the improbable case of "the umbrella" being 100 per cent effective. In that case America, confident of its "security", would be more bold in deciding on a nuclear blow. This would also make its allies the losers.

There can be only one proper conclusion: this nuclear and space age dictates the need for a new way of political and military thinking. A solution to the security issue should be sought first of all in the political field. It can come with peaceful coexistence rather than uncontrolled military rivalry.

Orientation on security geared to an unpunished first strike may have only disastrous results for America itself. Such an orientation should not be tolerated.

If we really want greater security, we must begin with joint practical efforts without delay. A radical revision of the Star Wars concept and its replacement by the Star Peace

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concept would provide the foundation for a subsequent effective summit meeting. The Americans have every ground to reassess the illusory "assets" of the SDI.

(Izvestia, January 28-30. Abridged.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VAKFI
TÜSTAV

Academician B.Rauschenbach:

THE PRICE OF ERROR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

Q. The Star Wars programme of the present US administration which it now calls "strategic defense initiative" is being unanimously opposed by the public of many countries, sober-minded politicians and scholars. What are the motives and arguments of the scientific community against this programme?

A. The key motive is that scientists not only clearly see but also definitely know that the SDI is a road not to peace but to war.

When President Reagan announced his "strategic defense initiative", the immediate reaction to it was dual. The "average American" treated the idea quite positively. On the face of it everything looked quite tempting. The programme provided for the deployment of a giant shield over the United States which would not allow a single missile reach its territory. So why should Americans be opposed to this idea?

So the emphatically negative reaction of the international scientific community to this idea came as a total surprise for the US administration and for those short-sighted American citizens lulled by its promises. Not only the Soviet and West European, but also the majority of American scientists rebelled against it.

What is behind this vehement opposition? Why is the Reagan initiative rejected by the Federation of American Scientists, Princeton University and many other reputed research centres. The answer is precisely because these are reputed and serious research centres, serious scientists and serious science. They are used to getting at the core of all things.

Scientists were probably the first who saw and publicly

announced that the "defense" initiative was utter bluff. First of all, they exposed the technological invalidity of all these laser, beam and other space-based weapons. It did not take them long to figure out that creating a reliable anti-nuclear shield with these weapons systems today was unrealistic and that the prospects for its establishment in 10 to 15 years were unclear, so they came to the conclusion that the US administration was just fooling the public by claiming the opposite. They also revealed the fantastic costs of this wild venture. Some are putting these costs at 300 billion dollars, others at 500, while still others think that they would be even higher. The most important thing, however, is that experts are proving that the establishment of such a system will destabilize the international situation and exacerbate the danger of a nuclear conflict.

So, the US administration is painting the picture in the imagination of the American public of an idyllic anti-missile umbrella over the whole territory of the country. Scientists are convincingly dispelling this illusion and proving with hard facts and figures that this initiative cannot produce any shield or umbrella over America. Their calculations show that at best it is possible to protect individual points and areas such as, say, the launching sites of strategic missiles, but certainly not the whole territory and even not all the vital centres of the US. First, because absolute defense is impossible and, second, because there is a whole number of weapons systems which practically cannot be destroyed by the planned system - for example, bombers, cruise missiles, etc.

What makes the "defense" initiative particularly dangerous is that it creates and provokes the illusion of effectiveness of the first-strike strategy. This fallacy was thoroughly and accurately exposed in a whole number of recent statements by Soviet leaders as well as in the world press and, notably, in

Izvestia. This allows me not to examine the provocative nature of the SDI in greater detail now.

Q. The economic and scientific potentials of the US and the USSR are impressive and are growing at very dynamic rates. So how can one possibly think of the possibility of building an impregnable anti-nuclear shield and thereby gaining unilateral military advantages without taking into consideration the development prospects of the other side?

A. This is a fallacy which is built into the very foundation of the SDI, and this was immediately noted by scientists. Indeed, only a very naive person can be sold the notion that while the US will be building its shield, the USSR will be passively and enchantedly watching that construction. It is not that we cannot come up with a proper response. If necessary, we will surely take adequate counter measures. Investigations clearly show that destroying such a shield is not really difficult. But this is certainly not the premise on which we are building our "star peace" policy.

We are proceeding from the obvious truth that before it is too late we can and must stop this madness, i.e. the runaway space arms race which may well spur up the offensive arms race, too. As protagonists in Stanley Kramer's famous end-of-the-world film "On the Beach" put it, there is still time. It is simply impossible now to predict the forms which this race without end may eventually develop.

Q. The practice of all the postwar decades has revealed the following regularity. All the American administrations sought to break away in the development of new weapons systems but every time the Soviet Union found an adequate answer to all such "initiatives". So is there any sense in the attempts to secure unilateral military advantages now of all times when the standard of the development of fundamental and applied sciences with the leading scientific and technical powers is

so high that as soon as a discovery or breakthrough is made by one of these powers, the very logic of research leads scientists of the other side to a similar discovery?

A. Yes, such attempts are senseless. It is obvious that neither side will ever come to possess absolute weapons. The fundamental laws of physics and chemistry which are essential for the research and development to modernize arms technology are known to both sides. It is simply impossible to invent anything which would leave the other side totally at a loss. What appears today in the possession of one of the opposed sides will necessarily appear tomorrow on the other side.

Q. Why does the US administration so stubbornly cling to extending the arm race to outer space?

A. I think that it is simply pursuing the strategy of the military-industrial complex, which has brought it to power. And the main engine here is the enormous profits that the new, mankind-endangering round of the arms race gives to this complex. Even if it may spell deluge tomorrow, superprofits now is all that they care about. For war, if it happens (and it might not!), is something belonging to the future. And today billions of dollars are put on the table. Why not take them?

A very dangerous "philosophy" and psychology. The "philosophy" of an ostrich hiding its head in the sand. If a particular man takes the money from the table in the hope that no one will notice that and there will be no consequences, this is after all a matter of his conscience, a matter of the observance of moral and legal standards by him. But here it is an altogether different thing. It involves the future of mankind and of the planet.

There have been precedents in history when a national economy's orientation to war only created the semblance of that this ensured the employers profits and the common people

bread and jobs. But we well know what a tragedy this proved for nations.

And yet the present situation is without a precedent. For it involves an ability to think in the nuclear age, an ability to understand what can and what cannot be done in this age. Today one cannot think as in the Stone Age, and even in terms of post-war thinking. The error of a tribe chief could bring about the perishment of the tribe at most. The price of the inability to think realistically shown by the nazi leaders of Germany was tens of millions of human lives. The price of such an inability today is the life of mankind.

Q. The modern technological level of production has risen to such a point where man's physical and psychic potential is used up and he has to hand over his functions to automatic machines. In a civilian economy this is in the end a boon. But what about military technologies, in particular those that will be taken as a basis for SDI?

A. In military technologies each new advance in automation is a new step towards war, towards the added possibility that it may break out by accident.

This factor is usually mentioned less than others. But it is perhaps the most fearful in all this playing with atomic fire. From the studies by a number of US universities and by European scientists (Soviet experts have also cited mathematical estimates in this field) it follows that Reagan's SDI cannot work according to the usual war scheme.

Say, missiles have been launched. This is reported to the President. A decision on response follows. This chain, which currently exists, in this case loses meaning. From the appearance of missiles over the atmosphere to their destruction, according to American estimates, 100-300 seconds must pass. During this time it is necessary to detect and hit the missiles. And there is no time for reporting to the

President. Automatic systems will take decisions and start war. The President, the political leadership will no longer be able to play any role here.

Naturally, only automatic machines can respond to automatic systems at a required pace. So what will we have if the other side also creates the necessary automatic systems? The fate of mankind will be placed in the hands of automatic machines. This is a very remarkable situation which is arising on the horizon and which is extremely dangerous.

Even from our personal experience, from the way automatic pieces operate in our homes and at the workplace, we know that they can err. That malfunctions occur not only in household gadgets, but also in computers. Well, what if we relate this to the implementation of the Star Wars programme?

The problem of an accidental outbreak of a nuclear conflict becomes extremely aggravated and, in some researchers' studies, comes to the fore. They confirm that after both sides have produced these most sophisticated automatic systems, the destiny of mankind will prove to be in the hands of the automatic machines, not of people. And automatic machines do err. The more sophisticated they are, the greater the likelihood of an error. These automatic systems must operate for dozens of years and not err once. This is unreal.

The probability of disaster increases also because in this case we must consider the totality of two automatic systems not dovetailed between themselves and opposing each other. The rules for perfecting this kind of systems would require joint field tests. In a peaceful international project this would be logical. But it certainly is impossible in this case! The USA will not give the Soviet Union its automatic system so that the latter could adapt its response measures appropriately. And vice versa.

So, two unadjusted and uncoordinated systems will be in operation. And in such cases the probability of malfunctions is even greater. This does not only mean that reliability of both technological systems drops dangerously. This also signifies increased probability of an accidental war which, according to all its forecast variants, can end in complete destruction of human civilization.

There have already been cases when the American services sounded false alarms, taking flocks of wild geese and so on for Soviet bombers. Each time, however, people proved to have enough time and reason to comprehend the situation. But there will be no time in that case! And, as a result of a fatal error or technological failure, the automats will trigger off a war without asking anybody.

Q. So, it turns out that man can be destroyed by the automats which he himself has developed...In this connection I recall one sci fic story. The author visits a scientist at his home and sees there his double, his genetic replica, preserved in alcohol in a huge cupping-glass. He naturally feels horrified by such immorality and inhumaneness. "How could you first create a living thing, a man, and then kill him?" he asks. And this is what he hears in reply: "Why do you think that I created him? It was he that created me." Does not this grim phantasmagoria remind you of the situation which you have just depicted?

A. Yes, these two situations are very much alike. But let us hope that humankind will have enough reason not to entrust its destiny to automats which can go out of control, though the very idea of transferring military confrontation to outer space is certainly such a grim phantasmagoria which even the most pessimistic-minded sci fic writers did not think of.

By the way, the very notion of "star wars" has come into political language from sci fic stories. Such wars have long

been waged in them, from the time of "The War of the Worlds" by Herbert Wells or even earlier. But it is characteristic that the "star wars" invented by sci fic writers were always waged by Earth as a planet, by mankind as a whole against an aggressive civilisation from some other planet. No writer has ever thought of a "star war" between people themselves, between the continents and countries of planet Earth. This is so wild, absurd and contrary to nature that human imagination simply could not invent it.

Even from the viewpoint of the technical essence of its exploration outer space brings people together but does not disunite them. For instance, an aircraft may not cross a state border without a special accord on this score. But a satellite flies over all continents and crosses all borders, and this has been legitimatised by international agreements. It is technologically impossible to make a spacecraft which would fly within state borders. A satellite is something that belongs to the entire planet. It can be launched by America, or it can be launched by the Soviet Union. This does not change its global essence. From its board Earth would be perceived as an integral whole.

It might seem that, as man penetrates into outer space ever more deeply, this would be a way uniting people. This is so natural! Only an absolutely perverted mind can view space flights as a way to military confrontation. The road to space can and must remain a road to peace.

The interview was taken by Kim Smirnov.

(Izvestia, November 12. In full.)

THE END

ROGERS ON EUROPE'S VERSION OF SDI

Melor Sturua

In an interview the other day to the West German newspaper Die Welt, Gen. Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, warned Western Europe against SDI, or the Star Wars Programme. Though unbelievable, he really did.

Indeed, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) goes against the national interests of West European states. Moreover, it poses a threat to them, as it spreads the arms race to space. But Gen. Rogers did not mean that at all. His purpose is to goad Western Europe to have their own SDI so as to ease Washington's financial burden and to step up still further NATO's military preparations. True, Rogers speaks about an anti-missile system, and not so much about a West European SDI.

Naturally, he implies nuclear missiles, Soviet medium-range and tactical ones. But why should a West European version of SDI be developed if there is a much more reliable method of ensuring the security of those for whom Rogers is showing "concern"? The Soviet Union has proposed clearing Europe of nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical. Together with the other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, we also stand for sweeping reductions in armaments and armed forces in Europe combined with measures that would preclude any possibility of surprise attack.

But Rogers's love of Europe is something really special. He is against ridding it of nuclear arms. He is even against the "zero option" of his superiors in Washington. In the above interview, he said that he was strongly against the idea that in an agreement on arms control with the Soviet Union the West should give up the NATO complex of Pershing-2s and Cruise missiles.

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Rogers is bluffing. But his bluff is not subtle at all. It hinges on a crude logic: let the Soviet Union not eliminate its SS-20s; this will give the West a right to keep Pershing-2s and Tomahawks in Western Europe and, this being the case, it is, according to him, essential to have a West European SDI. Rogers's love of Europe is, indeed, sinister, as he visualises it as the scene of an accelerating nuclear-missile and space arms build-up.

(Izvestia, July 24. Abridged.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA
TÜSTAV

WHO WILL PAY FOR SDI

Remark

V. Drobkov

This question was put by a correspondent of the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur to Wassily Leontieff, a prominent American economist and a Nobel Prize winner.

The answer was no less overwhelming than it was concrete:

Of course, Europe! You financed our Vietnam war, as you remember, this was in Johnson's time - he ordered printing green banknotes for circulating them in Europe. Those were Eurodollars. Then, by means of the dollar and through the introduction of higher interest rates Europe was forced to pay for our deficit. Nothing prevents doing the same in the SDI case...

It is relevant to add here to this quite correct remark that Europe had and has to pay now not simply for the deficit of the US state budget but for what caused it - the unbridled and wasteful arms race, the Pentagon's adventures far from the American coasts and even beyond the NATO zone, and the military "aid" which the US Administration so lavishly renders to the Nicaraguan "contras" and Afghan dushmans.

By skilfully manipulating the bank interest rates, enticing West European investors with "dynamic character" of the US economy, and imposing its own policy and priorities on its allies Washington has achieved an unprecedented inflow of finance from abroad, in this way rendering its partners' economy lifeless. And now there is ample reason to say that the White House has managed to prove the invalidity of the old proverb: in the Western world the United States calls the tune even when others pay the fiddler.

The American researcher was right to recall this. He has

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proved to be much more far-sighted than some European politicians and businessmen enchanted with the Washington promises to "share the profits" from SDI.

(Pravda, July 25. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA
TÜSTAV NAKFI

NUCLEAR REACTORS FOR SDI

Y. Zhukov

The San Francisco Examiner has discovered one more dangerous component in the Star Wars programme, camouflaged under the false sign "Defence Initiative Strategy."

As is known, President Reagan has been repeatedly telling -- how should I put it mildly? -- a knowing lie when he says that space weapons are not nuclear. But the sharp edge of the truth cut through the thick records of his speeches and it became common knowledge that an X-ray laser, for instance, can be effective only if it is activated by an explosion of a hydrogen bomb launched into space. In professional jargon this is called nuclear pumping.

The more the worse. The San Francisco Examiner said that for space weapons to circulate and work in space, a nuclear reactor must be stationed on a platform carrying these weapons.

General Electric is now developing in its Sunnyvale, Calif., laboratories an experimental model of a space-based nuclear power unit which is small enough to be carried aboard a spacecraft.

According to the paper, this reactor is a prototype of more sizeable nuclear power unit systems to be designed to destroy nuclear missiles trained on the United States with the aid of lasers and beam weapons. Such a system can be composed, in the long run, of hundreds (sic) of Star Wars battle stations initiated by nuclear reactors using atomic reactors as sources of energy.

The Associated Press confirmed these sensational reports. It said that a Star Wars reactor with a capacity of several hundred megawatts was being developed at a nuclear centre in the State of Washington. The news agency quoted the project's

director as saying that such reactors could generate an electric impulse of tremendous force for beam weapons systems. Besides, they will be used in manoeuvres of space systems built within the framework of the Strategic Defence Initiative. The project, which is codenamed SP-100, is financed by the Department of Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The San Francisco Examiner justly noted that the efforts to develop such systems, whose estimated cost is 4,500 million dollars, contradicted President Reagan's statements that a space defence system would eliminate the threat of nuclear war.

The President promised that the Star Wars programme would not be nuclear and that its systems would not be deployed in our backyard, said Daniel Hirsch, director of the nuclear policy study programme at University of California's Adlai E. Stevenson College in Santa Cruz. However, these reactors revolving about the Earth at the height of 100 miles would be closer to us than the nuclear power plant at Diabolo Canyon and what is 100 miles high may pretty soon fall on your head, he said.

Reassuring the alarmed Californians, a consultant to the General Electric company, Neal Brown, hurried to explain that a space-based nuclear reactor will be able to work in the automatic mode for seven years. But what will happen next? ask the Americans. There is no answer.

In the meantime, it has turned out that the US has started developing a still more powerful reactor for Star Wars which, to quote The San Francisco Examiner, will probably be ten thousand times more powerful than the current experimental model.

The systems built by General Electric are designed for experiments on board a military spaceship, which are scheduled

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for 1993. Their objective is the development of energy sources for lasers and beam weapons. Sure enough, these experiments involve enormous risks and may well end up with the whole dangerous system falling upon the people's heads, as Daniel Hirsch has put it.

There is also much concern over what will happen when the term of "useful(?) operation" of such a reactor expires and it starts gradually slipping down from its orbit and closing upon Earth, as it happened with the Skylab in 1979. And don't forget that the US is planning to orbit hundreds of platforms with such reactors!

On top of everything, American specialists, notes The San Francisco Examiner, do not rule out the possibility of an accident due to the development of a "supercritical mass" with the power of the reactor growing beyond any control to cause melting, evaporation and explosion of the radioactive fuel.

Playing with fire - that is what the people from the US military-industrial complex are doing in their readiness to jeopardize the future of the whole mankind for the sake of their profits.

(Pravda, November 12. In full.)

TELLER, HOLD YOUR TONGUE!

Y. Kuznetsov

The infamous Edward Teller, who is referred to as the father of the US hydrogen bomb, has also become notorious for his, putting it mildly, blatant pronouncements on various issues, particularly international ones. Lately, however, he has just surpassed himself in dilating upon the accident in one reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Teller is in a hurry to pour oil on the flame of the anti-Soviet campaign, spreading utterly absurd data on the emission of radioactivity during the accident.

Where did Teller take such data from? He, you see, "compared indirect data" on radiation in a number of West European countries.

Let us not speak about the shaky and speculative arguments based more often than not on the unscrupulous reports carried by some West European newspapers. Incidentally, could not Teller be supplied with the figures from the Federal Republic of Germany after measurements of radiation were taken by the reactor at Hamm, where a leak of radioactive gas occurred on May 4? Indeed, they kept silent about the incident, putting all the blame on the Soviet Union.

Even more essential, however, is another point. The alarm over "Soviet radiation" is being sounded by that same Teller who has long preached the idea of nuclear war against the USSR, alleging that such a war can be won. Well known is his interview to the West German magazine Stern in which the idol of the US "hawks" made truly monstrous utterances, saying, for example, that a third world war, which might take a toll of from 100 million to 1,000 million human lives, would not spell mankind's destruction. Evidently, the magazine was somewhat

put out by such a contributor: it introduced him as a "fanatical anti-communist".

Teller's profile as a nuclear-war monger would have been incomplete without another detail. As pointed out in the Washington Times, for example, he was and remains one of the moving spirits of the SDI, or the Star Wars Programme. It is also known that Teller views hydrogen warheads, which by far surpass in their yield of radiation all conceivable leakages at peaceful nuclear power plants, as just about the chief component in SDI.

In other words, it would have been much more sensible for Mister Teller to keep silent on the situation.

(Pravda, June 6. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ANAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
TÜSTAV

AGAINST MILITARISATION OF SPACE

Viktor Linnik

Washington announced the appointment of General Lew Allen, former Chief of Staff of the US Airforce, as director of the California Institute of Technology jet propulsion laboratory. The appointment of a career military man to the post that was traditionally held by civilians is a move by the Reagan administration to step up the militarisation of US space exploration programmes.

Washington's course towards an arms race in space is part and parcel of the US strategy to undermine the military equilibrium between the Soviet Union and the United States. He who controls space, will also keep the world in his sights. These words of a Pentagon official aptly illustrate the feverish activities of the Pentagon in near-Earth space.

The White House's recent directive on national space policy for the coming decade is another vivid confirmation of the administration's militaristic aspirations. A mere enumeration of the compilers of this document eloquently testifies to its character:

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National Security Council, the Department of Defence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which used to lead in space explorations, is mentioned somewhere at the end of the list.

The Pentagon Directive shows that the Pentagon wants to station anti-satellite systems in space and orbit military space stations with laser weapons on board. Until 1994 nearly half of the projected flights of Shuttle space vehicles will be subordinated to the Pentagon's aims. A US space command, which is currently being established, will begin the tests of anti-satellite missiles on September 1. A bill was submitted to the US Congress to rename the US airforce into a US space force.

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Officials from the Pentagon and the National Security Council continue to allege that the Soviet Union is much ahead of the United States in anti-satellite and laser weapons. They assert that "concern" about the notorious "Soviet military threat," in space this time, gives rise to a series of "retaliatory moves" on the part of the Pentagon.

This is a trite and unconvincing trick. The numerous initiatives the USSR put forward at international forums show that this country is emphatically against space becoming a place of military confrontation between the two systems. The international community is justly outraged with US attempts to enforce an arms race in space on the world.

(Pravda, August 2. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI
TÜSTAV

Thursday, October 31, 1985

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NATO IN ITS REPERTOIRE

V. Drobkov, Pravda's own correspondent

Brussels, October 30. Nuclear Planning Group meetings have ended here at NATO headquarters today. To judge by local press reports, the US delegation led by Caspar Weinberger set the tone at them.

The Americans were anxious to gain full allied support for Washington's SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) plans. It is known that the NPG was the first NATO agency to back the US Star Wars project in March. But since then only a few allies identified themselves with this dangerous scheme, and then most often privately. Some countries - France, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Canada and the Netherlands - have even formally rejected the US solicitations.

So the US emissaries did all they could to force the doubting partners to join the program for space militarisation. The Pentagon chief argued that SDI "does not contradict" the clearly excluding provisions of the ABM Treaty.

All these unseemly pains were taken in direct relation to the upcoming Geneva summit. Washington tried at all costs to wrest unreserved support for its policy, twist the constructive Soviet initiatives and prevent independent West European action to slow down the arms race.

According to NATO, it is "still premature" to give a concrete reply to the Soviet proposals for drastic nuclear arms cuts. Obviously, the North Atlantic strategists, despite everything, intend to carry on their dangerous line of achieving military superiority.

(Pravda, October 31. Abridged.)

TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE

The 39th session of the U.N. General Assembly has considered, at Soviet initiative, as an important and urgent question the item "On the Use of Outer Space Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes, for the Benefit of Mankind." As a result of the discussion, the General Assembly on December 12 passed a resolution which was carried by 150 votes, i.e. by the absolute majority of U.N. member-states. The United States alone did not support the resolution which meets the aspirations of the peoples of the whole world.

The resolution reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognising the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming further the will of all states that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes,

Recalling that the states parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in

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the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding,

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that states parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Reaffirming also paragraph 80 of the final document of the 10th special session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling its resolutions 36/97 S and 36/99 of December 9, 1981, as well as resolutions 37/83 of December 9, 1982, 37/99 D of December 13, 1982 and 38/70 of December 15, 1983,

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space, in particular the impending danger of exacerbating the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by member-states in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its 10th special session, devoted to disarmament, and at its regular sessions and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Noting the grave concern expressed by the 2nd United Nations conference on the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space over the extension of an arms race into outer space and the recommendations made to the competent organs of

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the United Nations, in particular, the General Assembly, and also to the Committee on Disarmament,

Convinced that further measures are needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Recognizing that, in the context of multilateral negotiations for preventing an arms race in outer space, bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could make a significant contribution to such an objective, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the final document of the 10th special session of the General Assembly,

Deeply regretting that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the prevention of an arms race in outer space have not taken place,

Taking note of the report of the Conference on Disarmament,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by member states to the Conference on Disarmament, particularly concerning the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its draft mandate, which had been considered extensively by a contact group and through informal consultations and by formal and informal meetings of the Conference on Disarmament,

Expressing its deep concern and disappointment that, although there was no objection, in principle, to the establishment without delay of such an ad hoc committee, the Conference on Disarmament has not thus far been able to reach agreement on a mandate for the ad hoc committee during its 1984 session,

1. recalls the obligation of all states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities;

2. reaffirms that general and complete disarmament under effective international control warrants that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race;

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3. emphasizes that further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;

4. calls upon all states, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interests of maintaining universal peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding;

5. reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space;

6. requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

7. also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in ^{outer space in} all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals, including those presented at the Thirty-Ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly;

8. further requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its session in 1985, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space;

9. urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to initiate immediately and in a constructive spirit negotiations aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and to advise the Conference on Disarmament regularly of the progress of their bilateral negotiations; so

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as to facilitate its work;

10. requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its Fortieth Session;

11. requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its Thirty-Ninth Session;

12. decides to include in the provisional agenda of its Fortieth Session the item entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space."

(Pravda, December 14. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI MERKEZİ

EDI: WHAT IS IT?

Yuri Zhukov, Pravda political correspondent

The Western press has been reporting plans for setting up a so-called "European system of defensive space arms," a kind of European SDI that would complement the American "Strategic Defence Initiative." The word "defensive" is, of course, used once more as a blind.

The Woerner Plan and General Rogers'
Clarifications

This design was thrashed out back last spring in the Rightwing-dominated political circles of Paris and the governing quarters of Bonn which showed particular interest in them. And it is not by chance, apparently, that the EuroSDI should now be more and more often associated with the name of the West German Defence Minister, Woerner.

Here is what the well-informed West German Der Spiegel magazine said, for example, back in December, 1985: "The American anti-missile space system will have a European brother: Defence Minister Woerner is demanding the approval of EDI -- 'European Defence Initiative'."

The Associated Press reported on March 2 that Woerner had proposed a "European Defence Initiative" as a project to discuss at the NATO ministerial session in Brussels last December but the idea did not win too much enthusiasm among the other Europeans. Yet he did find some friends and fellow-thinkers in Washington, and there was nothing particularly surprising about it: for EDI is, indeed, the "junior brother" of the American SDI. They have the same father: the Pentagon.

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As Woerner himself admitted in his article "Europe Needs Anti-Missile Defence" in Die Zeit, the Hamburg weekly, on February 28, "the Federal Republic has been cooperating with the US for several years(!) in working out a system that ... by its tactical and technical characteristics means going a stage ahead towards obtaining increased capabilities in anti-missile defence."

Though coarse-worded, the idea is quite clear!

To reassure West European opinion, there is the argument that the creation of "independent" space arms would make it possible for West European states to "become independent" of the US.

However, this smart version came under heavy attack as early as February 13 from none other than the Supreme NATO Commander in Europe, American General Rogers, who lashed out at it in an interview with the West German Neue Osnabrucker Zeitung. He must have found the West German press references to "European independence" and "autonomy" to be a dangerous heresy.

Incidentally, this American General made it quite clear in his interview with the Frankfurter Rundschau last November, that is when news about the EDI concept got into the press, that all it meant was a military-technological complement to SDI and that this complementary system would be under his control.

Moreover, he inadvertently disclosed that the idea of making such a complementary system had been suggested to West European allies by Washington: "Specialists engaged in the SDI programme," he said, "assured me that it would also be necessary to create a system against such weapons as the SS-20 and other missiles. I set much store by our(!) setting up a defence system against such weapons in Western Europe."

Later on, the restless Rogers, while speculating on the

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"Star Wars" programme, peremptorily declared that "West Europeans must (!) begin to carry out a parallel programme, a European Defence Initiative, as the Germans call it. And he added that this system was conceived as an SDI sub-programme.

Now, speaking for the Neue Osnabrucker Zeitung last February, Rogers again made it clear that the "European SDI" was seen as no more than a branch of the American "Star Wars" programme. Elaborating on it, he said that the US was prepared to play its full part in the implementation of the Woerner plan: "Should the Europeans succeed in pooling their technological potentialities and organising this, it would be possible to work out such a system, notably, through scientific exchange across the ocean in conjunction (in conjunction! -- Y.Zh.) with SDI."

The only thing that has irritated and angered the high-placed American General has been the lukewarm attitude to the Woerner plan of a number of West European allies who do not support it. "I am most disappointed," he said, "that other nations have not followed up the initiative of the official quarters of Federal Germany. I have not noticed so far any sign of any particular desire of the Europeans to follow up the West German proposal... Yes, I am disappointed."

While playing along with the American Supreme Commander, NATO's Secretary General, Lord Carrington declared for the Italian Corriere della Sera a few days later: "In my view, all that may induce the Americans to think that we don't need them any more and that we intend to go it alone, would only do us harm." In his turn, he called on the West European countries of the North Atlantic military bloc to get down to making anti-missiles in a "joint effort" with the US...

Witches' Sabbath in Munich

Since the West European NATO members still have doubts and

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fears, EDI supporters employed the heavy propaganda artillery. In early March, at Munich, they called a regular conference of the military-science society Wehrkunde, which West Germans rightly style an "Areopagus of cold war."

This time it drew 150 high-ranking Atlanticists, including Fred Ikle, US Under Secretary of Defense; Paul Nitze, special consultant to the US President; Maynard Glitman, head of the US delegation at the Geneva talks; the same General Bernard Rogers; Edward Teller, "father of the American hydrogen bomb"; and the defence ministers of a number of West European states. Their meeting immediately assumed the character of a real sabbath of witches conjuring up infernal schemes.

Ikle set the tone for this sabbath. As reported by West German television, he declared for achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and urged Washington's allies to join the SDI project. FRG Defence Minister Manfred Worner, seconding him, warned NATO of the dangers (!) inherent in an all-pervasive striving to eliminate nuclear arms. (I refer here and further to a report of the American news agency Associated Press.) And right there he spoke for the realisation of a European programme similar to the American Star Wars programme.

That fanatic of the Star Wars idea, Edward Teller, also "sang." In an obvious wish to inspire the attendees, he, as reported by The Washington Post on March 3, boastfully declared that Soviet near-range missiles could quite easily be destroyed by a laser beam deflected from a mirror lifted up into space.

These bellicose speeches caused no enthusiasm in Western Europe, though - even among the firm supporters of military partnership with the USA. Thus, in Bonn the Free Democratic Party Bundestag faction's foreign policy expert Helmut Schaefer, addressing a press conference, called on the US

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President to disassociate himself from Ikle's statements. The SDPG Bundestag faction's disarmament expert Hermann Scheer also protested against the speech of this Washington emissary. Horst Ehmke, deputy chairman of this faction, rejected Worner's EDI proposal and said that its realisation would cause a further arms buildup in Europe.

Protest was also voiced in other West European countries. But still this does not embarrass the Washington "hawks" who, as time passes, ever more openly act in the role of the major interested side in creating EDI. They now bet on the interest of West European arms manufacturing concerns in the profits that involvement in this scheme would bring them.

It is by no chance that the same General Rogers, in an interview with the Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung, recalled that he had several years before suggested creating for research, development, production and adoption a "pool of West European military concerns," which could result in the United States beginning to buy the necessary materiel from (Western) Europe at more favourable prices.

In Pursuit of Profitable Orders

Blandishments of this kind are a music to death merchants waxing rich on the arms race. That's why the military-industrial corporations of the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, France and some other West European states are in a hurry to draw up plans for participation in both the US Strategic Defense Initiative and the European Defence Initiative, a European variant of SDI.

The FRG corporations have begun to invest considerable funds in R & D for this end. As reported by the West German press, Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB), for example, together with the Nuremberg Diehl company, has spent 25 million marks on the development of a high-energy laser model.

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MBB is ready to spend about 100 million marks on research and development into and the full-scale production of such lasers.

Their French, British and other competitors are not lagging behind the military-industrial corporations of the Federal Republic of Germany, which are now openly boasting that they hope to get profitable orders.

Detailed information on this was given in the issue of the American journal, Aviation Week and Space Technology, dated December 16, 1985. The British corporations British Aerospace, J.E.C. Marconi and Thorn EMI Electronics; Matra of France; CITES (Italian Consortium for Strategic Technologies), which comprises eight major aerospace and electronics companies, and others are vying with one another in offering their services as contractors of both SDI and EDI.

These facts confirm that the EDI is nothing but a branch of the US programme of preparations for Star Wars, with the Pentagon interested in establishing it. False arguments to the effect that this plan meets the interests of strengthening Western Europe's "independence" and very nearly stands in opposition to SDI are built on sand and meant to distract attention.

In reality, however, EDI is nothing but an attempt to develop a new type of arms, which means opening a new additional line in the arms race. Implementation of this plan will sharply destabilise the situation in Europe and make it uncontrollable. It will considerably lower the level of security of the European countries, bringing nearer the threat of nuclear war.

The only correct conclusion suggests itself: the peace forces of Europe should redouble their efforts in the struggle against the militarisation of space, no matter under what signboard--SDI or EDI, attempts may be made to carry it out.

(Pravda, March 24. In full.)

THE END

FOR PEACEFUL COOPERATION IN SPACE

Article of US Scientist Sagan
in Parade Magazine

A joint American-Soviet space mission to the planet Mars is quite feasible, both from the standpoint of politics, and technology, a prominent American astronomer writes in the Parade magazine.

Carl Sagan, President of the US Planetary Society, stresses that success of an expedition of this kind would create groundwork for establishing settlements on other planets, and would facilitate the expansion and consolidation of peaceful cooperation between the USSR and the United States.

Similar aerospace, electronic, rocket and even nuclear technologies are used in space flights and in the nuclear arms race, Sagan writes. That is why an alternative programme that would use all that for peaceful purposes would be of positive importance. A mission by a manned spacecraft to Mars, the American astronomer stresses, would be much cheaper than the 'Star Wars' programme. Should a joint expedition be organized, the cost for each side would be even lower.

Both Houses of US Congress adopted and President Ronald Reagan signed Resolution No.236 in 1984, making it a law, Sagan recalls. Joint space activity of the United States and the USSR is characterized in the document as an alternative to an arms race in outer space, this race being in no one's interests.

Subsequent resolutions, tabled to the senate, review the possibility of joint East-West actions with regard to Mars,

which would envisage the taking and delivery to Earth of Martian samples with the aid of an automatic probe and other steps that would bring about an international expedition to that planet.

Mars for decades attracted Soviet pioneer of space flights Konstantin Tsiolkovsky and his American colleague Robert Goddard, the scientist writes. The rockets which they invented were intended for the transportation of people to other planets, not for the destruction of life on earth.

Both countries can act together in the name of common interests, Sagan stresses. This was during the second world war when the United States and the Soviet Union fought against the common enemy, and in July 1975 when the American Apollo and Soviet Soyuz spacecraft docked in orbit.

We asked Academician R. Sagdeyev, Director of the Institute of Space Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, to comment on the article in Parade periodical. This is what he said:

"Carl Sagan highlights peaceful cooperation in space by pooling international efforts to accomplish the crucial tasks facing mankind as an alternative to the Star Wars programme.

"Of interest in this respect are the research exercises relating to undertaking a manned expedition to Mars, which have been carried out by our American colleagues," the Soviet scientist said. "The cost of such a project is estimated at half of the spending on the SDI programme which is planned for the period ending in 1993.

"Implementation of such a project would not only produce fundamental scientific results in the exploration of the planet nearest to Earth but also mark a major advance in the technological sphere, an advance which would find wide use on Earth.

"To be sure, manned expeditions to Mars are not a project

of today or even tomorrow. Before making a manned flight it is necessary to organise expeditions with the use of probes to test and polish technological decisions ensuring safety. At the first stage, research with the use of unmanned space vehicles can give not smaller but, perhaps, even greater scientific results.

"Our experience in preparing projects to explore far-out space shows that implementation of such grandiose projects as an expedition to Mars is impossible without international cooperation."

(Pravda-TASS, February 6. Summary.)

THE END

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI
TÜSTAN

Monday, February 25, 1985

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MORALITY WASHINGTON STYLE

America is a land of publicity. If they wish to sell something, they will try to prove anything they like: that black is white and that a wolf is a sheep. They will even advertise the guillotine as a cure for headache. It may sound absurd, yet should it serve the Pentagon's book they will try to prove even that.

This is precisely what is happening now around the "strategic defence initiative" declared by the US President in March 1983. They are advertizing this invention of the American military thought as no less than a highly humanitarian, exceptionally moral initiative allegedly aimed at delivering mankind from the fear of nuclear destruction.

A futile attempt is made to prove that the creation of a large-scale anti-missile system with space-based elements planned by the Washington administration will make the nuclear weapons unnecessary, hence it will even become possible to scrap them.

The calculation is that an uninformed person may begin to think that this is almost a program for nuclear disarmament.

Yet this demagogic verbiage does not achieve the aims its authors would like it to. People alarmed by the Washington "Star Wars" designs ask simple questions calling for explicit answers. And under the impact of these questions the cheap glitter of the trumpery, by means of which they were trying to camouflage the real essence of Washington's outer space "initiative", begins to fade.

The question is asked, for example: If the said "initiative" is put forward in order to make the offensive nuclear weapons unnecessary, why then is it accompanied with an unprecedented

buildup of the American strategic nuclear arsenal?

This buildup includes the production of intercontinental MX ballistic missiles, the deployment in Europe of Pershing-2 missiles and the manufacture of B-1 bombers. A go-ahead has been given to the development and production of new Stealth bombers, cruise missiles and Trident-2 missiles for nuclear powered submarines. Meanwhile, US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger does not even deem it necessary to conceal that the implementation of all of these programs in the field of strategic weapons is aimed at a sharp increase in their first nuclear strike capability. And the outer space ABM shield is designed to serve as a cover for these weapons.

A reasonable question is asked: If it is proposed to lay emphasis on "defence", why should they deploy first strike nuclear weapons near the borders of the USSR and its allies?

Or such a question is asked: If the USA aims only at ensuring "defence", why then does it refuse to follow the USSR's example and commit itself not to be the first to use the nuclear weapons? At the recent UN General Assembly session more than a hundred states declared that the nuclear powers which have not yet done so, should make similar statements. The USA voted against that resolution.

Another question is asked: If the USA favours the renunciation of nuclear weapons, why is it against nuclear disarmament talks? The latest UN General Assembly session adopted by an overwhelming majority vote three resolutions calling for such talks. The USA voted against all the three of them.

At last comes the question: How do the American statements on the "humane" character of its outer space initiative tally with the US stand at the UN on the issue of outer space?

At the latest General Assembly session 150 states declared for taking immediate measures to prevent the arms race in outer space. The USA was the only country not to support that resolution.

They in Washington do not give any answers to these and other questions, rather they stubbornly evade them.

Then wherein does the morality of the "strategic defence initiative", which Washington boasts of, lie? Does it lie in the fact that, as Colonel Jack Lousma, commander of the space Shuttle, has put it with cynical straightforwardness, one can keep the whole world in fear from outer space?

In other words they dream of obtaining the capability of launching with impunity the first nuclear strike from beyond the outer space shield and win a dominating position in the world so as to dictate their will, and bluntly speaking, to blackmail other peoples.

Then wherein does humaneness, which is even described as lofty, really lie? Is it in the fact that they are trying to jeopardize the lives of hundreds of millions of people, even the whole civilization on earth?

Recently a team of authoritative American scientists has given a short and explicit definition of the publicity wrapping in which the US administration is trying to sell its "strategic defence initiative". A book on that issue, published by them, is rightly entitled "The Fallacy of Star Wars". The American plans for a militarization of outer space are aptly described as an act of terrorism against the whole mankind.

Washington's stubborn reluctance to give up the drive for the spectre of military superiority -- now through outer space -- cannot but be a source of serious alarm for the world's peoples. Particularly now that an agreement has been reached on the USSR's initiative on Soviet-American talks on the complex of nuclear and space weapons, that a real opportunity is opening to resolve the tasks of curbing the arms race on earth and preventing it in outer space. The peoples expect the USA to show a responsible and serious attitude to the talks and a wish to conduct a constructive dialogue at them, and to search for agreement on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.

(Pravda, February 24. In full.)

A Document That Has Not Been Refuted

All this greatly worries people who realize what disasters can be invited on mankind by the star-wars plans being currently worked out by the US military. This matter was in the focus of attention of a session of the World Peace Council Presidium in Moscow a few days ago. Calling for intensified effort against the delirious star-wars programme, the session stated that the US military experts have already produced plans for space weapons. In particular, participants in the session pointed out to a major Pentagon document which was made public by the Washington Post on January 15 and which has not been refuted by the military.

Not intended for publication, this document confirms, as the newspaper said, that while US and Soviet delegates are preparing to discuss space non-militarisation, the US air force is following a policy designed to ensure superiority in space.

What is meant here is an air force manual signed by General Charles Gabriel, chief of the air force staff, and published as aerospace doctrine in 1984. In particular, the manual says that space ensures an unlimited potential and opportunities for combat operations and a place where the air force can fulfil or support all its operations and missions. It is further said that the air force will maintain US technical superiority in the aerospace field and ensure capability for sustained military operations by deploying means to wage combat operations in space.

Of course, the US air force would have not produced and enacted this document without the knowledge of the supreme leadership.

The last thing. As The New York Times wrote on March 7, experts in the US government agencies and industry frankly say that space weapons are intended not only for defence, but for major offensive functions.

The newspaper said further that space weapons can become a defensive component of an offensive nuclear strike because it will make it possible to launch nuclear missiles while defence will be kept for cushioning any retaliatory strike that might

follow. These weapons will be able to attack and kill enemy satellites.

Furthermore, according to experts, this weaponry can also be employed to deal lightning strikes from space to relatively undefended ground targets--aircraft, tankers, power stations and crops -- to cause instant fires and damage.

+ + +

This lays bare the treacherous lie concerning the defensive character of space weapons to be produced allegedly in the interests of mankind to make nuclear war impossible. Some people who gave in to this deception, having realized that they were duped, are becoming involved all the more actively in the campaign against the intentions frankly set off in the US air force manual.

It is the task of all who are against star wars which would become part and parcel of an aggressive nuclear war to prevent space militarisation, and ensure sticking to the Soviet-US agreement as regards the subject and objective of the current Geneva talks. These talks can and must yield constructive solutions if space and nuclear weapons are treated in package.

(Pravda, March 30. In full.)

THE END

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NEWS AND VIEWS

Novosti political analyst Svyatoslav Kozlov writes:

The world public has focussed its attention on the forthcoming talks between the USSR and the USA on nuclear and space weapons. At a time when Soviet approach to the solution of problems to be discussed at the talks is integral and consistent in every respect, the other side's approach gives rise to doubts.

There is no unanimity on the problems to be discussed in the US ruling circles. The conflict of opinions and the clash of influential forces continue. One of the forces which is emphatically against any disarmament is the Pentagon. Closely linked by vital interests with the arms merchants for whom disarmament is like a terminal disease, the Pentagon is stubbornly defending all of its undertakings. It wants all its programs to remain intact.

Thus, in the four years of Reagan's first term, the Pentagon's budget grew from 180 billion dollars in 1981 to 280.5 billion in 1984. A draft budget for 1985 is 305 billion, and for 1986 314 billion dollars. This money is primarily channeled into the development and build up of new generation weapons, such as the MX and Midgetmen missiles, Trident missile subs, B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, first-strike medium-range ballistic and Cruise missiles.

Systems of space weapons which create an additional threat to peace are likely to set a record in these appropriations. A total of 26 billion dollars are projected for investment into the development of these systems, while all in all, it is planned to spend from 800 billion to one trillion dollars on militarization of space.

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1984, in the course of which one missile warhead was intercepted and destroyed by another. This project has now been included in the "Star Wars" programme.

The US Air Force is preparing to build a new giant rocket for launching super-heavy satellites designed for the "Star Wars" and for the establishment of a "not too expensive space defense system".

Other plans provide for the orbiting by the start of the 1990s of 100 satellites each carrying 150 interceptor missiles. Reporting on these plans, three proponents of the "Star Wars"-- Z. Brzezinski, R. Jastrow and M. Kampelman--voiced the following idea in The New York Times Magazine: "There is nothing exotic about these technical systems. By completing some additional research and design work, we could develop and deploy a two-tier defense system even now".

So it is absolutely clear what these 26 billion dollars are meant for.

In San Francisco local businessmen told us of the plans to make profit which are associated with the "Star Wars" programme. First, the captains of the military-industrial complex are thinking not of tens of billion dollars for "research" but of hundreds of billions for "full-fledged" deployment of weapons. Second, aerospace, electronic and other corporations are already perceiving contracts for the manufacture of various types of rockets and satellites, lasers, optical reflectors and so on. And third, the corporations are planning to make extra profits on the commercial application of some developments in space arms technology.

"Technical progress cannot be stopped", said some of our interlocutors with a tinge of reproach in their voice. Most of the others agreed, however, that technical progress can and must be reversed from the development of new weapons systems to the settlement of the poignant global^{and other} problems on which the well-being of mankind depends. And the main thing is to prevent

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the imperialist military-industrial complex from putting mankind on the brink of catastrophe with their "space games".

In the masses of Americans we saw deep concern over the continued "star boom" among the Pentagon's arms contractors, a bright hope for the success of the new Soviet-American talks which are to open in Geneva in March, and a growing conviction that the historic task of barring the arms race from space can and must be accomplished. Much depends here on Washington's good will and realism and on its preparedness for reasonable compromise and for the strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

New York-Los Angeles-San Francisco-Moscow

(Pravda, February 18. In full.)

CUNNING FRAUD

Yuri Zhukov, Pravda political correspondent

The US Administration has, indeed, laid itself out to lull the vigilance of the peoples disturbed by the news that the US is out to militarise space.

The US President himself as well as his ministers have been claiming day in day out for almost two years in succession that all they mean is innocuous research to find out a way of creating a defensive wonder weapon that would destroy only the enemy's missiles, not human beings, so that nuclear weapons could become impossible to use, and so would be scrapped. To this, they have invariably added another argument: this is, generally speaking, a job that will take uncommonly long to do and that research studies will not produce any tangible results until the 21st century. So why worry on that account now?

However, there have been more and more facts coming up to show that the American leaders' reassuring speeches are cunning fraud designed to head off the mounting resistance everywhere, in NATO countries, in particular, to the plans to militarise space.

Fiction or Reality?

When President Reagan put forward his much advertised project on March 23, 1983, for creating a "space shield" which he claimed would dependably protect the US and its allies, many, including prominent scientists, reacted to that concept sceptically, taking it for a flight of fancy inspired by the Hollywood films about "Star Wars".

Naturally, the development of the newest types of weapons, using laser, high-energy particle beams and other things, is not for today. However, in the future, such "exotic" means of warfare, as the American press has been calling them, may well pose

a tremendous threat to humanity.

It is not by chance that the US Administration, banking on the "exotic" types of weapons of the future, is stinting no money. The initial stage of elaboration and implementation of this programme, which is scheduled to be carried out before the early 1990s, will alone cost 60,000 million dollars, four times as much as the notorious Manhattan Project, and half as much again as all of the military research relating to missile technology for thirty years, from 1954 to 1983. These figures have been published in a report of February 10 by the Assistant Director of the Federation of American scientists for space research John Pike.

Knowing how practical the Americans are, it is impossible to believe that they would be spending such a vast amount of money out of sheer curiosity to see whether anything comes out of such "research."

Yet, even that is far from all there is to it. While advertising the "exotic" types of weapons for "Star Wars", which will require a sustained effort to develop, American representatives have only grudgingly been referring to another component of space weaponry--the missile systems which have already been tried out and can be deployed within relatively short time--limits. It is not for nothing that the Under Secretary of Defence Fred Ikle, speaking in the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 21, declared that the plan for "Star Wars" project is not a "reserve programme" but a "central point of American military planning." He said also that a "partial defensive system" designed to "protect American missiles" (missiles!--Y.Zh.) will begin to be created as early as the next decade.

It is worth while noting this "clarification" as extremely important.

While in March 1983, the US President, trying to make the space militarisation project look attractive, alleged that the "space shield" was to defend the population of the US and the

allied nations, now, once the publicity campaign has been essentially completed, nobody is any longer referring to that kind of argument.

What they do talk about now is not the "defence" of the population but only the cover to be provided for thousands of intercontinental ballistic missiles, stationed on US territory, by means of counter-missiles which the US is preparing to deploy, partly down on the Earth, and partly up in space (in violation of the treaty about the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems).

Their Immediate Objective

On December 23 of last year, the New York Times said, quoting reliable sources, that the plan for the near future had been drastically reduced from that of building an impenetrable defence to that of creating a defence system to protect the US land-based nuclear systems.

On January 14 the Washington Post, also quoting "official sources," said that a certain group within the Administration and the military were stepping up pressure in a bid to consider limited use of Star Wars technology without waiting for the results of the long-term research programme. They say, the paper went on, that technological progress in some areas of this research is faster than many people believe it to be.

Michael Getler, a Washington Post analyst, said that that applied to the efforts to develop an anti-missile defence for Minuteman silos converted to accommodate MX missiles, command centres and submarine bases.

Lastly, on January 30 the Washington Post reported that the Pentagon had long been developing a "more prosaic" system to protect American strategic missile positions. This programme, the newspaper explained, has been carried out for 18 years now, getting into public view only occasionally, and the United States can, therefore, develop an effective system a great deal sooner than expected.

Explanations and comments followed in a steady stream. Max

Kampelman, chief US negotiator at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former advisor to President Jimmy Carter, and Robert Jastrow, a researcher, said in an article published in New York Times Magazine late in January that the United States was to complement its land-based missile defence with the launching of 100 large military satellites, each carrying 150 interceptor missiles.

They further said that there was nothing exotic about those systems and that after carrying out some additional research and development, the United States could develop and deploy a two-layered defence even now.

On February 19, the United Press International quoted Lt.-Gen. Abrahamson as saying that the first testing of a space-based missile defence system was planned for 1987.

On March 27 the New York Times said that a group of American scientists had prepared a detailed report for a "private organisation," which said that by 1989 or, possibly, 1988 some of the techniques now under development would be brought to the stage of field testing and engineering development.

Speaking in London on March 13, George Keyworth, chief scientific advisor to the President, said, according to the Financial Times, that a concept had evolved to assemble a missile defence system by using a broad range of technologies available in the United States. During a homing-in test conducted last June, Mr. Keyworth went on, US Army experts succeeded in hitting a ballistic missile by a high-velocity projectile with pinpoint accuracy. It was a wonderful demonstration of long-range precision targeting in a system built with the use of a set of standard technologies and worth only (sic) \$300 million, the President's advisor said.

Now I should only add here that on February 22 the President himself made it clear at a press conference that Washington would not confine itself to "research and development" and had quite definite plans to deploy space-based weapons.

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US BACKS OUT ON ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS

I. Zakharov

Reagan's "Star Wars" programme has provoked a flood of letters to Pravda. These letters testify to serious anxiety of Soviet people and broad sections of the world's public about the US aggressive policy aimed at achieving military superiority. One of the questions most frequently asked is this: how do such actions accord with US legal and political obligations in the field of strategic arms limitation?

The Soviet government has repeatedly warned the US government of late about the inadmissibility of flouting the obligations it has assumed. A principled assessment of US violations of the arms limitation agreements was made in a memorandum handed to the US Department of State in January 1984, a statement by TASS and a memo by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, which were published in Pravda on January 30, 1984, October 21, 1984, and February 28, 1985, respectively. Those documents characterised the US attitude to the arms limitation and reduction process as a whole and to compliance with the legal and political obligations the United States has assumed in various fields, from strategic to conventional arms, with treaties and with their individual clauses. That assessment of US actions and the Soviet attitude to them still hold good to the full extent.

The agreements on the limitation of strategic armaments include: the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, or the ABM Treaty, which was signed for an indefinite term, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (both were signed in May 1972 and resulted from the SALT-1 talks) and also the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

(SALT-2), which was signed in 1979 but was not ratified by the United States. It should be noted that when the term of the Interim Agreement had expired, the sides exchanged official statements in which they pledged to comply with the obligations they had assumed under it. The US government made an official statement that it would refrain from taking any actions that would run counter to the provisions of the SALT-2 Treaty. These are the three main agreements that regulate Soviet-American relations in the field of strategic weapons.

How does the United States comply with the obligations it has assumed under those agreements?

Signed for an indefinite term, the AMB Treaty is the main obstacle to the US administration's plans to achieve military superiority in the world. The US President's "Strategic Defence Initiative", known as the "Star Wars" programme, envisages the development of a large-scale missile defence system with space-based elements and thus constitutes a flagrant violation of the letter and the spirit of that treaty. Thus, Article One of the treaty pledges each side "not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defence," and in Article Five the sides undertake "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

It is certainly not "defence" and not development of "antimissile means" that are now being planned in the United States. These words are used for camouflaging the essence of the matter - the plans to develop a whole dangerous class of armaments, of strike space weapons bound to become a weighty addition to the US nuclear arsenal and to ensure for the USA a possibility of delivering a first nuclear strike unpunished.

Washington makes use of far-fetched arguments, seeking to justify the plans of "star wars". The phrasemongering that the "strategic defence initiative" means nothing else but only research, the carrying out of which is allegedly not banned by

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the ABM Treaty, is quite fashionable in Washington. This is a deliberate lie. The US Administration has long meant not "harmless research" but purposeful programmes of developing strike space armaments. This work, in essence, aims to destroy the ABM Treaty and is incompatible with the aims of the Treaty as a whole and with its concrete provisions.

First, the very aim of the so-called "research" - to develop strike space weapons and a comprehensive antimissile-defence system - stands in stark contrast to the Treaty. Second, the measures which are already being taken by the US Administration show that purposeful work is being done to develop models of space weapons. This is to be followed by emergence and deployment of this new class of armaments. One can judge of the proposed "tempo" of this work by the astronomic appropriations--26,000 million dollars for the next five years. Washington clearly does not intend to spend this money on "pure science". Third, an intention to start testing these weapons and their components in a couple of years has been openly declared. Fourth, Washington does not make a secret of the fact that it intends to translate its plan into reality at all costs, including an open refusal to observe the existing agreements. US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger has brazenly stated to this effect that at the present stage the USA is conducting research with a view to finding out whether a perfectly reliable system can be developed. If it can, we shall have to go beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty, Weinberger said.

Other facts also show that the American side, to put it mildly, arbitrarily treats the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

A large radar station has been stationed on one of the Aleutian Islands, Shemya. In violation of the existing accords, elements tested for the antimissile-defence purposes have been used in its construction. This station can be used for creating a radar field of the antimissile defence of the US territory, which contradicts the obligation laid down in Article I of the

Treaty.

A similar violation of the Treaty - creation of a radar field covering a greater part of the US territory - is also the construction of the Pave Paws large radar stations the tactical and technical characteristics of which have been brought to the level of the requirements of ABM radars. Two such stations have already been set up on the western and eastern coasts of the USA, and two more are under construction in the south.

In violation of the obligation "not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at localities along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward" (Article VI) the United States is building a large Pave Paws radar station far beyond its territory, in Greenland.

The USA is carrying out work to develop components and systems prohibited by the Treaty, specifically mobile ABM radar stations and multicharge head parts of antimissiles. The Minuteman anti-ballistic missiles are being tested with a view to imparting to them qualities of antimissiles. This also violates the obligations assumed by the United States in keeping with the Treaty.

Washington's current persistent efforts to involve the United States' allies into the implementation of Reagan's "Strategic Defence Initiative" constitute a flagrant violation of the ABM Treaty.

The United States has committed as many violations in the field of strategic offensive arms where the Soviet and American obligations are regulated by the Interim Agreement and the SALT-2 Treaty. In those documents the sides admitted the existence of strategic balance and determined measures to maintain it in the future. This is not to the liking of the US administration, which has set out to tilt it in its favour and try to achieve military and strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Washington is trying to find loopholes in the agreements and

whenever it fails to do so, it resorts to their direct violation.

The protocol to the SALT-2 Treaty, which is an integral part of that treaty, pledges the sides not to deploy long-range sea- and land-based cruise missiles. Having refused to ratify the Treaty, the American side violated that provision and, having blocked further negotiations on cruise missiles, began to deploy land-based cruises on the territory of several Western European member countries of NATO. Last summer the United States also began to deploy long-range sea-based cruises on its submarines and surface ships.

By deploying in Western Europe ballistic Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles the United States violated the provision contained in Article XII of the SALT-2 Treaty, which pledged the sides not to circumvent that Treaty "through any other state or states, or in any other manner" and "not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty" (Article XIII). No subterfuge can help the United States deny the fact that the siting of these first-strike nuclear weapon systems capable of reaching targets in Soviet territory and augmenting the US strategic nuclear potential is a violation of the SALT-2 provision pledging the sides to preserve strategic balance.

The United States is guilty of flouting its obligations with regard to deliberate concealment measures. The Interim Agreement pledged the sides "not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification" (Article V). This provision was also included in the SALT-2 Treaty. However, the United States violated it so frequently that such violations have become a rule rather than an exception. The United States used concealment when it conducted work on its IBM and SLBM launchers. The Soviet Union had repeatedly told the American side that its actions were illegal, but the practice of using concealment continued.

The existing situation is all the graver since it undermines the confidence that the United States observes one of the main accords -- on limiting the number of MIRV-equipped

IBMs The launchers of the Minuteman-2 monoblock
IBMs re-equipped in shelters, do not differ from the launchers of the Minuteman-3 missiles, fitted out with MIRVs. And in this case there are objective reasons to believe that missiles with three warheads each at the minimum have been stationed at all the Minuteman silo launchers.

The use of shelters also in carrying out work at the launchers of the Titan-2 IBMs has also been noted more than once. And the United States has recently violated the agreed-upon procedures for dismantling such launchers: instead of leaving the dismantled launchers open for six months, as it is envisaged by the agreements, they were filled with earth after a month or two. This reduces the confidence in the efficiency of the dismantling measures and does not guarantee their irreversibility.

The actions of the US Administration call in question its willingness to observe also Article VI of the SALT-2 Treaty which prohibits development of new types of IBMs (except one type). The IBMs of the MX type have already been developed, and Washington is embarking on implementing plans to develop and build IBMs of one more type, Midgetman.

These are only a few examples of the American side's disregard for the spirit and the letter of the accords reached. The violations of the provisions of the Treaties inevitably undermine the basis of the package of legal and political norms worked out in the past ^{few} decades, and adversely affect the whole spectrum of Soviet-US relations.

The US policy aimed at undermining the existing agreements in the sphere of strategic armaments and at eroding the system of mutual obligatory agreements drafted through joint efforts demonstrates not only the unwillingness of Washington to follow

the road of detente but also its efforts to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union at all costs, despite the fact that the entire history of the arms race has shown the futility of such attempts. As has been repeatedly noted in the statements by the Soviet leaders, the USSR will not tolerate such superiority and insists on strict observance by the USA of its international obligations in the sphere of arms limitation.

(Pravda, May 12. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI
TÜSTAV

Sunday, May 12, 1985

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(Pravda, May 12. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI
TÜSTAV

OML2VO-779

NO TO "STAR WARS"!

Appeal to the Peoples of the World

Humanity faces the gravest danger: all life on our planet is threatened.

In defiance of the clearly expressed will of millions of women and men of all continents and the overwhelming majority of governments, the US preparations for "star wars" are going ahead relentlessly.

The so-called "strategic defence initiative" has nothing "defensive" about it.

Its actual purpose is to secure nuclear first-strike capability from behind a "space shield", and thus threaten and dominate the whole world. That is why, while speeding up the space weapons programme, the United States has increased the rate of stockpiling strategic nuclear weapons, of stationing its medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, and of the production of barbarous neutron, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction.

Militarisation of outer space would mean the start of a new extremely dangerous type of arms race, increasing confrontation and the threat of a global holocaust.

Peoples and governments concerned for world peace welcome the beginning of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva which provide a great opportunity to prevent the arms race in outer space, to stop and then reverse it on earth, with the aim of total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

But the US insistence on the implementation of its "star wars" plans threatens to wreck the talks.

The "star wars" plans must be stopped now! The Geneva negotiations must succeed!

We call on all peace movements and other non-govern-

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mental organisations, all peoples and governments which stand for the prevention of nuclear war, to raise their voices louder than ever in a world-wide campaign against militarisation of outer space.

If the "star wars" plans are not stopped today, it could be too late tomorrow.

'No to star wars!' is the common call of all peace forces.

Outer space must serve peace and progress!

(Pravda, March 26. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VAKFI
TÜSTAV

VORIO-850422-510

NORWEGIAN DECISION

Yuri Kuznetsov

Norway has refused to join the plans for the militarisation of outer space which the United States is forcing on its allies as an ultimatum. This has been announced by an official spokesman for the Norwegian government, who added that Oslo was seriously concerned over the intensified arms race, and the danger of it being taken into space.

Norway's move, which is the first NATO country to renounce participation in the Washington "star wars" programme, is timely and reasonable as is indicated by the reaction from the widest sections of the Norwegian public. The adventurist programme of the Pentagon has come in for most sharp criticism in the country. It has caused active protests in practically all sections of society, political parties, trade unions, women's and youth organisations. Many MPs have repeatedly called on Willoch's coalition government to dissociate itself from the policy of the United States. In describing the sentiments current among the Norwegians, Ny Tid wrote that "the absolute majority of the population are demanding that the government display political independence and resolutely denounce the dangerous intentions of the Washington Administration which will result in a further nuclear build-up on Earth and in space and a growing threat of a world-wide nuclear catastrophe."

In less than five months Norway will go to the polls in the next parliamentary election. The leaders of the parties comprising the government coalition could not shrug off the clearly expressed opinion of an ^{absolute} majority of Norwegians.

In speaking about Norway's decision, it will ^{not} be amiss to recall that the population of Denmark, the second Scandinavian

NATO member, is also actively opposing the US policy of militarising space. The Danish Folketinget has voted overwhelmingly in favour of binding the government to make a stand against weapons deployment in space and the country's involvement in research and development for space arms.

What is manifest, therefore, is a clear-cut stance by most people in two Scandinavian countries against the dangerous plans of Washington. The anti-war sentiments of the Scandinavians are merging with similar and increasingly stronger sentiments in other West European nations. With each passing day the people of goodwill are gaining firmer positions in the campaign for peace.

(Pravda, April 20. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI
TÜSTAV

IN CHASE OF ILLUSIONS

"Star Warriors" Arguments Are Built on Sand

A. Kokoshin , Doctor of History

The US Administration's plans to carry through the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" or, to be exact, a programme to develop strike space weapons, are coming up against mounting resistance from the public and political circles of most diverse nations. There is growing criticism of this programme in the US itself, from competent scientists, in particular. The opposition to space militarisation plans is compelling Washington to cast about for additional arguments in an effort to justify them, to resort to trickery and manoeuvring. In so doing, the Administration has to take into account the fact that scientists of various countries are conclusively proving that it is scientifically and technologically impossible for an impenetrable anti-missile shield to be created.

A number of research studies, including those made by American scientists, have borne out the conclusion made by Soviet Academicians in the "Address to All the Scientists of the World": such weapons, allegedly "defensive", wholly or partially placed out in space, can do next to nothing to help the country coming under a massive attack because it is incapable of protecting the overwhelming majority of the population. An "anti-missile shield" is more appropriate for the attacking side to use in an effort to reduce the power of the retaliatory strike (let me note that it cannot avert the retaliatory strike just the same).

Contrary to these conclusions, the "Star Wars" partisans are bent on speeding up the development of space weapons. A space-based anti-missile system, even if limited in terms of

potentiality, mission and scale, will, they claim, produce a "stabilising effect" on the strategic situation in the world. That does not mean, of course, that the US may consider forgoing the development of a full-scale anti-missile system in the long run. It does see the original system as an intermediate stage on the way to a full-scale one.

One argument played up in an effort to justify the development of an anti-missile system having a limited effect is that the US has to defend itself from "third countries", that is, those that may come into possession of nuclear weapons before long and can, as some Western experts believe, use those weapons to blackmail even the Great Powers. This is a preposterous argument, of course. So another one is that a limited anti-missile system, incapable of warding off a nuclear strike of any consequence, can still make it possible to safeguard the country concerned from accidental, unsanctioned launchings of nuclear missiles.

The advocates of this system maintain, furthermore, that it will reinforce the deterrence of a nuclear war by adding to the uncertainty of the adversary's strategic planning and creating what they describe as prohibitive complications in the way of a potential aggressor's planning of a possible first strike.

Besides, they consider it desirable and technically feasible to have a large number of anti-missile facilities (including those out in space) deployed in the foreseeable future only for the defence of intercontinental ballistic missile launchers which, in their opinion, become ever more vulnerable as the accuracy and striking power of IBM warheads increase.

One should note right away that any of the above-mentioned versions, should it come off, would mean scuttling the 1972

Soviet-American Agreement of unlimited duration on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, which has been playing an important stabilising role in the present involved and strained international situation. The preservation and unfailing implementation of that treaty is basic to effective progress towards accords in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons. It is not by chance that it is heavily shelled by the US militaristic forces.

The arguments of those who are busy inventing all kinds of "Star War" versions do not hold water. Suffice it to base oneself on normal logic, rather than the perverse self-seeking reasoning of the chieftains of the American military-industrial complex, to see that a far more effective way to protect the nations from nuclear blackmail, not to speak of the use of nuclear arms, would be for all nations in possession of nuclear weapons to pledge themselves, just as the Soviet Union has done, to refrain from using such weapons first and to establish certain standards of relations between them to preclude nuclear blackmail and pressure tactics involving nuclear intimidation. Naturally, the US and other nuclear Powers should, following the Soviet example, demonstrate to other nations by their actual performance their desire to have their nuclear arms limited and reduced, as they must, indeed, under the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Now, the argument about the need to create a major space-based system for defence against accidental, unsanctioned combat missile launchings, may look attractive to somebody in the West, at first glance. Yet those who are putting it forward, deliberately omit to say that the risk of such launchings can be reduced by technologically far less sophisticated and not so dangerous measures.

It is imperative to evaluate the risk of an accidental, unauthorized launching of missiles not only due to the military-political and economic troubles involved in the establishment of a large-scale ABM system, but also due to the danger of self-activation of such attack weapons as a result of an error in the system of target detection and identification or in the control chain. Experts have estimated that the probability of an error or malfunction of one of the elements of control over such a missile defence system which the Pentagon strategists are planning to build will be substantially higher than the probability of an accidental launch.

Equally groundless are the arguments of the US Administration that an ABM system with space-based elements, even if it is limited in terms of its scope and tasks, will have a stabilizing effect due to an "increased extent of uncertainty in strategic nuclear-strike planning for the other side".

First, the authors of this argument ignore the unilateral Soviet pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons which, incidentally, ensures still tougher control over ruling out any unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. If the US and its allies possessing nuclear weapons adopted a similar pledge, the situation would become much more stable and safer as regards the reduced probability of both a deliberate first strike and of accidental and unauthorized missile launches.

Second, the current strategic situation is already distinguished by a considerable degree of uncertainty because of the very existence of nuclear weapons which have never been used in combat operations on a large scale. So what's the point of enhancing this uncertainty? Once introduced into strategic and operations planning of one side, it will

inevitably heighten the degree of uncertainty for the other side, too, which would destabilize the strategic situation, undermine the existing strategic balance and enhance the threat of an outbreak of nuclear war.

One of the truly effective measures to remove the "first-strike" danger could be a nuclear arms freeze in both quantitative and qualitative respects. That would prevent, in particular, the build-up on both sides of the number of high-precision nuclear systems inherent with the danger of such a strike (such as the new American MX ICBMs, Trident-2 SLBMs, Pershing-2 medium-range missiles and long-range land-based cruise missiles). It is also necessary to undertake steps to reduce naval activities and, notably, the operations by aircraft-carriers, which exacerbate strategic instability, as well as a series of other measures reducing the probability and possibility of a first disarming strike. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has made important proposals to this effect.

Finally, if contrary to the ABM Treaty of 1972 the US still begins to develop a variant of an ABM system with space-based elements, which is alleged to be exclusively meant to ensure the survival of ICBM silos, then the other side will have all grounds for regarding this as a step towards the establishment of a large-scale missile defence system. A multi-complex US missile defence system for protecting ICBM installations beyond the limits stipulated by the ABM Treaty of 1972 and by the 1974 Protocol to that Treaty would itself constitute a destabilizing system as one of the major means of material support for the concept of "protracted" and "limited" nuclear war.

In their mind's eye American strategists see an exchange of strikes at ICBM silos without any damage to industrial projects and administrative centres and without any major

losses among their own population. They are also contemplating such a scenario as an unpunished first strike at such silos. Their arguments are that their "ABM shield" will "do the trick" and attenuate the force of the retaliatory strike. The Soviet military doctrine rejects the ideas about "limited" nuclear war and about fighting such war "by the rules" as deceptive and highly dangerous delusions.

Even so, the USSR and its allies must take into consideration this kind of concepts of American military-political thinking no matter how unrealistic and adventurist they may be. Any attempts by the US to upset the existing military balance and to gain unilateral advantages will continue to be countered with utmost resolve. In this the Soviet Union naturally has the opportunity to choose the measures best meeting the interests of its defence capability and adjusted to the general tasks of its social and economic development. At the same time, seeking to prevent a new round of the arms race and to keep it out of space, the Soviet Union advances constructive initiatives and is resolutely working for concrete mutually-acceptable agreements in Geneva.

(Pravda, June 14. In full.)

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PLAYING WITH FIRE

Academician G.Arbatov

A report that the US Congress earmarked a tremendous sum on "research" under the program of the so-called "strategic defense initiative" (commonly referred to as "star wars") was almost unnoticed in the United States. Apparently this is explained by the long-time conditioning of both the American MPs and the public to this program, which was accompanied, as always, by many lies. Some of the lies were rather neat. This is why the action went through Congress practically without debate. Meanwhile, viewed in terms of the arms race and the threat of war this is, perhaps, the most dangerous action for years...

Those who follow US policy have long realised that the Reagan Administration has embarked on the course of eliminating the regime established by arms limitation treaties and agreements, and of wrecking the talks on these arch-important issues. At first -- during the 1980 election campaign and in the first year of Reagan's term -- this was openly admitted in Washington. Treaties with the USSR, especially the SALT-2 Treaty, were declared to contradict US interests (The President himself called it "fatally flawed"). The Republican leaders expressed their readiness to resume talks with the USSR only after they build up arms and gain military superiority over it, and are able to dictate their will to it. However, having met with a serious opposition to this line inside the country and in allied countries, the Administration declared that it would abide by the already signed treaties and agreed to resume talks with the USSR. But subsequent developments showed that the aim remained the same, and that this statement was a manoeuvre, that contractual commitments were being eliminated gradually, in a new, salami-slicing

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tactics. The talks were being conducted in such a way as to make agreement out of the question.

Simultaneously the Reagan Administration made a big step backward in its attitude to nuclear war. Contrary to its earlier solemn declarations and even contractual commitments, Washington concentrated its efforts on the ways of breaking the nuclear impasse and return to a situation where it could wage a war with impunity in the hope of winning it. Again, at first this was openly admitted. I mean the Republican platform at the 1980 elections, numerous statements by Defense Secretary Weinberger and his subordinates and other Administration officials, as well as official documents as Defence Guidance for 1984-1988. Their leitmotif is that the USA must restore its ability to win a nuclear war. One of the options was a "limited" nuclear war in Europe, the plans of which were discussed in the open in the early '80s. Later on the rhetorics were toned down, again in view of growing anxiety in the USA and allied countries. But the policy remained the same. The USA did not give up a single military program called upon to restore the US ability to go to war without risking a suicide, to gain what is called in strategic lexicon a "first-strike capability".

Both schemes are embodied in full in the "strategic defense initiative" (SDI). On the one hand, it is called upon to serve as the chief weapon of wrecking the whole process of arms limitation, and on the other, as a means of gaining first-strike capability (naturally, in combination with other weapons systems -- missiles being developed for a preemptive strike against Soviet strategic forces of retribution, command and communication centers).

Needless to say, all this is being silenced or concealed. Moreover, the US President presents the "star wars" project to the public as that which will do away with the nuclear threat

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and will lead mankind to universal well-being (as he himself put it, this is "a way to move away from a future that relies so heavily on the prospect of rapid and massive nuclear retaliation and towards greater reliance on defensive systems which threaten no one"). In other words, the Americans, and the rest of mankind, for that matter, were promised a long-awaited solution to the security problem, based on new technology. Those who doubted the feasibility were subjected to criticism by the US Government which declared that the record of technological development convincingly disproves an unjustified assertion on the technical unfeasibility of anything.

But the incantations hardly made this fantastic idea more convincing. To begin with, the assumption that any problem has a technological solution is incorrect. It is wrong even for technical problems. Thus, it is impossible in principle to build a perpetuum mobile, to overcome the action of physical laws, or to make man physiologically immortal.

Likewise, what Reagan promises to achieve with his "star wars program" is unthinkable in principle. Of course, one can well imagine that with time (even enthusiasts promise to do this no sooner than in several decades) it will be possible to develop a system using new weapons like mysterious beams, super-super computers and the like, which would be rather effective in downing the now existing missiles. But will these missiles still be "the now existing" by that time? The US President has ignored a perfectly obvious truth: the same human brain, the same research capacities, and the same instruments which will be involved in the effort to develop "defensive weapons" will be working at the same time on the weapons designed to destroy these "defensive weapons", to overcome or evade them, or will be even trying to invent something new against which these weapons will be powerless.

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In this sense there can be no absolute weapons promised by the President -- it is really impossible to stop technical progress, science and technology.

A failure of technology to ensure security is explained not by its weakness, but by the fact that the security problem is essentially political rather than technical. There is no need to launch an enormous military program to prove this again. This has already been proved. After all, there was a time when an ordinary machine-gun was said to be a weapon which could "put an end to war". Later on Dr. Teller, who is now a "star wars" advocate, advertized a thermonuclear bomb as a weapon of "eternal peace". In a word, history gave the answer to a naive question which is being raised to mislead the ignorant people: but what if we make it, why shouldn't we try?

The unfeasibility of the project in the form in which they are trying to sell it to the American law-makers, to the American public and to the allies of the USA, does not, however, make it less dangerous. Moreover, the danger of the project will make itself felt not some time in the future. It is dangerous already now, at the stage which is being hypocritically referred to as "research".

In real fact this is by no means research, not even the development and testing of new weapons systems, but a new round of the arms race, which may be unprecedented in scale and danger.

Take, for one, the scope of this "research" -- 70 billion dollars have been earmarked for it for eight years. This is almost five Manhattan projects (in today's prices), and more than two Apollo projects. Meanwhile, until now the programs of the development of atomic weapons, and of man's landing on the Moon were record in terms of spending.

Standing behind what is called R&D are the plans of

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unprecedented mobilisation of the funds, the scientific potential, and all possible resources for a new qualitative breakthrough in military technology all along the line: in defensive and offensive, nuclear and conventional, space, beam, kinetic and any other weapons. This is a breakthrough to new, hitherto unknown dangers which would outdistance by far the dangers of military nuclear technology although mankind has not yet managed to cope with the latter, either. Is the world community ready for such a leap to the unknown, to the dangers, to the uncertainty? And does it want it? Nobody has yet asked this question. The problem has not yet been even practically discussed on such a plane.

Moreover, the gist of this problem is being concealed in every possible way. They are trying to reduce it to something much safer and simpler. Why not try and do away with the nuclear threat by means of new defensive weapons? Let's at least study this problem and then decide what should be done.

But "then" it will be too late to decide anything for a whole number of reasons. One of these is that in addition to the 70 billion dollars a tremendous political price will have to be paid for what is called "research" already "on the way", so to speak. The Soviet-American talks on arms limitation would most probably become the first victim. Their goal was defined in January in an agreement between Andrei Gromyko and George Shultz as prevention of an arms race in space and its cessation on Earth. But now, Washington declares, in defiance of the agreement, the USA will be working on the development of anti-missile defense in any event in order to find out whether the proposed system will work or not. When this is found out (not before 1993 under the current plans), a decision on whether an ABM system should be deployed or not will be taken. If the USA decides to deploy it, a moment will come for another decision: whether to break the ABM Treaty

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unilaterally, or try to persuade the Soviet Union into emasculating the Treaty to an extent where it would no longer interfere with the implementation of the American plans.

A surprising approach! But what are the USSR and the USA supposed to negotiate in Geneva in this case in the next eight or more years? That is, until the moment when the USA itself, depending on the success of its work in military technology, decides what should be done next? If the question is raised in such a way, the discussion of space weapons in the next few years is ruled out altogether. And in this case there is no point in discussing weapons on the Earth. After all, in the late '60s -- early '70s the USSR and the USA agreed that the limitation, and, all the more so, reduction of offensive weapons is impossible without the limitation of defensive armaments. The "star wars" project does not change one iota this immutable strategic logic. This suggests the conclusion that in the next eight or more years the USA is not even planning to conduct the talks in real earnest, regarding them sooner as a propaganda trick, an instrument (may I be pardoned for such a free expression) of swindling everyone. I can well believe that Washington wants this. But do they in Washington really think that the Soviet Union will take part in these unseemly and dangerous games? Comrade Mikhail Gorbachyov expressed the Soviet viewpoint on this question in perfectly clear terms the other day: if the USA continues just to drag out time in the future, we shall be compelled to reassess the entire situation.

What has been said suggests the conclusion: "star wars" are a destructive mine under the entire process of arms limitation and reduction, it is destructive already at the current stage of the work on the project. Another conclusion: "star wars" are a powerful generator of the arms race, which is destabilizing the military-political situation in the

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world, regardless of the utter inconsistency and unfeasibility of the idea of building an "impenetrable shield". The point is that even a not completely perfect anti-missile defense of US territory may become a component of what is planned as a "first-strike" arsenal, all the more so since the launching of work on a new ABM system is being accompanied by the continued escalation of efforts to develop many types of offensive systems -- the MX, Midgetman, Trident-2, B-1-B, Stealth and others. Last but not least, it is being accompanied by the further deployment in Europe of American Pershing-2s designed for "decapitation", that is, a strike at the other side's control and communication centers. In such conditions a stake may be placed on the ability of even an imperfect defense system to cope with the other side's small part of the retribution forces which would survive a first, "disarming" strike, thereby giving an aggressor freedom of action.

This is why far from disappearing, the nuclear threat will grow with the beginning of work on SDI.

Maybe, for President Reagan himself "star wars" have become an object of faith, insane faith which has no room for doubts, a fanatical faith. But, as far as we can judge, there are few faithful even in his close entourage who support SDI without any reservations. Pragmatic calculations of the rest have nothing in common with what the President promises. In my opinion these calculations consist in the following.

The present Administration represents an extremely conservative part of the US political spectrum, and is under a very strong influence of the extremist circles and the military-industrial complex, of which the White House host is a placeman. To be sure, there are quite a few people sharing these extremist views among the President's entourage, who understand that a right, and all the more so, extremist wave cannot last for long. Therefore the deliberate attempts both

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in domestic in foreign policies to consolidate the policy of the far right, to impose it on the country for years ahead, and thus to impose it on Reagan's successors, no matter who wins the next elections, and, significantly, also on the American allies, are becoming increasingly obvious now. People in Washington are in feverish haste precisely because they want to make irreversible a new highly dangerous round of the arms race under the present Administration. They want to do this by using the inertia of the systems started and creating around these systems economic and political pressure groups with self-seeking interests.

I don't know whether the threat posed to peace by this policy is realized by elderly American politicians who have nothing to lose, or by their younger colleagues who, without seeing a real misfortune, not to mention war, have already got used to playing in it, and have made this their career. But I'm positive that this pastime, so to speak, may lead to the death of all mankind, that they are really playing with fire.

(Pravda, July 1. In full.)

TOKYO'S TACTICS AND WASHINGTON'S "DEFENCE" STRATEGY

V.Dalnev

The US administration is now increasingly trying to involve its allies in the implementation of plans to develop strike space weapons. Its recent target has been Japan.

At the end of March the Japanese government received a message from US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, which contained an official proposal that Japan join in developments for the "star wars" programme, called "strategic defense initiative" in Washington. The Pentagon must have decided that by tying one of its closest partners to the space militarization plans it could ease in some measure the problem of developing strike space weapons through the use of Japan's considerable achievements in high technology, and Japan's R and D effort, especially in the military field.

The 60-day deadline set for reply to the above "invitation" in the message from the head of the US military establishment has expired. Concerning the matter mentioned in it the Japanese leaders say that the question is "frozen" in the study stage and Tokyo's final line will be determined later on as "more information comes in" about the notorious "strategic defense initiative". Some day in the future ... But why is the Japanese progressive public sounding the alarm now, why is there talk in the country about a very real threat of Japan's direct involvement in the practical efforts of those who are trying to raise the arms race to a qualitatively new level, which will be considerably more dangerous for mankind?

Here we come across the problem of words and deeds in Tokyo's policy, the tactical course of the Japanese government in relation to the US "presidential initiative" and Japan's true approach to the plans of overseas strategists pursuing

far from "defensive" aims.

The Japanese leadership showed its bias in support of Washington's adventurist "initiative" back in January of this year, during the Japanese-American summit meeting in Los Angeles. In conversations with the US President the Japanese Prime Minister was not slow in expressing his "understanding" of the "star wars" plans, including the setting up of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements. This stand taken by the head of the government touched off a storm of indignation in Japan where in the course of parliamentary debates officials had to work hard to "explain" the Premier's statement and to motivate it with a certain semantic difference between the words "understanding" and "support", with references to a lack of information on the American "initiative", etc. Meanwhile, resort was made to propaganda arguments, causing sceptical smiles even in the US, about the "purely defensive" nature of the concept of a non-returnable first nuclear strike and that the "strategic defense initiative" pursues the aim of making ICBMs "useless" and is directed at nothing less than the "elimination of nuclear weapons". According to Japanese Premier Yasuhiro Nakasone, this was an "interesting" and "promising" idea. And that being so, it could be supported more vigorously, it seemed. The only thing to do was to make a thorough "study" and take into account the possible line of the US West European allies in NATO, where the response to the American plans has been far from enthusiastic.

So the "study" went ahead full steam, involving the nation's leading experts. A headquarters was set up in Tokyo to look into the various aspects of the "strategic defence initiative". It comprised representatives of the National Defence Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the scientific and technological board and other official

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institutions. The Japanese Foreign Office set up a special subdivision to gather appropriate information. Japanese military departments are reported to have also begun their "studies". In April, a group of Pentagon experts visited Japan at the invitation of its Government and held a series of briefings with the Japanese side on technological aspects of the "Star Wars" programme, with accent, naturally, on the "advantages" of sharing in the development of strike space weapons. Now, the Japanese Government's representatives have, in their turn, kept on hinting at the possibility of joining the so-called "research studies", going on in the US within the framework of the "strategic defence initiative", although stressing the importance of a "considered approach" to the matter.

Yet another step was taken by the Japanese leadership during the latest capitalist summit in Bonn. While conferring with the West German Chancellor and the US President, Prime Minister Nakasone made it already quite certain that he was willing to accept Washington's proposal and contribute towards the implementation of the "Star Wars" concept. He did, however, come forward with a series of reservations which, in his judgement, would make that idea more acceptable to the NATO States, and so help tone down the criticisms on that account in Japan proper. What reservations?

For example, at the Bonn talks, the Japanese leader subscribed to the argument that the "strategic defence initiative" feasibility studies must not clash with the so-called "concept of nuclear deterrence". But what kind of a "non-nuclear" character of the "Star Wars", which Tokyo had plumped for earlier on, could one talk about then? And how is such a "reservation", put forward as a pre-requisite for Japanese involvement in American plans, to be squared with the status of non-nuclear Power, declared by the Government of

Japan?

That and other similar reservations did not achieve the purpose they were designed to achieve: the Bonn summit failed to produce the "unity" Washington craved for in respect of the "Star Wars" idea. Yet the Japanese leadership may have had their political stock in the US raised a little. For Japan has been among those who made an attempt, even if ineffective, at hammering out a "common" NATO platform on that problem, naturally, in the sense of an approval of the militaristic "initiative" of the White House.

So much for the political dividends. What about the actual contribution Washington may expect Tokyo to make towards putting its "initiative" into effect at this point? Although there has been no official announcement so far about Japan's participation in the "Star Wars" programme research, the Japanese Foreign Office has declared more than once that the Government "does not object" to private Japanese firms joining this research venture. So all that is required is the orders. Besides, according to press reports, there is Japanese-American cooperation in certain research studies which journalists relate directly to the "strategic defence initiative". For example, the American Los Alamos Research Centre is in contact with Osaka University in the area of laser beam research, and is getting necessary machinery from some Japanese manufacturing firms. This Centre, as the Asahi newspaper reports, has been carrying on research for two years to develop a beam weapon, with its main element, magnetic block, produced by the Japanese Hitachi Magnetics, a subsidiary of the Hitachi Kinzoku, a well-known company. The two countries have their representatives cooperating in neutron and laser beam research at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California. Yet another point to note is the appreciably increased links between Japan and the US in

matters relating to space exploration. The two countries have quite recently signed an agreement providing for Japan to share in the construction of an American space orbiting station, although, as Japanese officials claim, that would have nothing to do nominally with the "Star Wars" research.

The scale of cooperation is not very great so far, at first glance. But even at this point it implies Japan's eventual full-scale involvement in the implementation of the Pentagon's "strategic defence initiative". Lieutenant-General James A. Abrahamson, chief of the "Star Wars" programme, in a recent TV interview named the areas in which the US is seeking to cooperate with Japan: computer technology with operational and programming equipment, electronic and optical equipment, and appropriate technology and laser equipment. And it is Japan that is going to be asked to supply all that within the framework of "defence initiative" research, as the USA General remarked in no uncertain terms. The Pentagon would not care whether its requests would be met with the Japanese Government's explicit permission or by private firms. What it does care about is the end result.

Judging by all indications, such an approach should not meet with objections in Tokyo because it accords with the tactics of the Japanese leaders. In actual fact, real assistance will be given to the Pentagon while the government will reserve the right to, as it were, remain uninvolved, stressing that the question of its "final decision" continues to be "studied." Evidently, it is not mere chance that Japan's Prime Minister has recently stated in the parliament that the question of the participation in the "star wars" programme would not be the subject of official debates and that the government "does not intend to conclude any new treaties or agreements with the USA even if it takes part in research."

There is actually no need in any new agreements because

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the existing ones suffice. In November 1983, Japan bound itself by an agreement with the United States on cooperation in the sphere of military technology, having "forgotten" for the sake of its "special partner" the principles, adopted in Tokyo, which regulate exports of arms abroad. The implementation of this agreement is now beginning - a request to supply the results of the newest military technological research exercises has been received from the Pentagon. As the Japanese press writes pointing to the Japanese military quarters as the source of information, the matter concerns primarily systems which could be used in the "star wars" programme. Does not this mean the beginning of a "new era" in the Japanese-American military cooperation, an "era" which the head of Japan's Defence Agency mentioned in his talks with Caspar Weinberger?

So, well-grounded is the anxiety of the Japanese and world public over the dangerous evolution of the Tokyo government's position towards ever more open connivance at the US hegemonistic ambitions which now involve also outer space.

It is well known that those who connive at the attempts of the forces which are hostile to peace to gain military superiority and to escalate confrontation by all means, including space militarisation, also bear their share of responsibility for the deterioration of the situation in the world. At the same time, some people in Tokyo voice the view that participation of Japan in carrying out the "strategic defence initiative" would help it take a place among the world's leading powers, specifically in the military sphere. But it must be abundantly clear that actions in such a direction can do tangible damage to the prestige of any country and that the dangerous effects of the moves in support of the sinister strategy of war cannot be masked by any, even the most artful tactic. The point is that the approach to the

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adventurist "star wars" plans advanced by Washington is a kind of litmus-paper, an indicator of the attitude of one or another state to the questions of strengthening peace and international stability, and of its sincerity in these matters.

(Pravda, July 9. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VAKFI
TÜSTAV

Monday, September 9, 1985

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VORI15-850909-506

FALSE ARGUMENTS OF WASHINGTON

Washington, September 6. TASS. In connection with a TASS statement about the intention of the US Administration to hold tests of the ASAT anti-satellite system trained on a real target in outer space, the White House and the Department of State came up with identical statements which said that the US Administration intends to continue the preparations for its launching.

To justify this decision it is asserted in the statement that the ending in this connection of the operation of the Soviet Union's unilateral obligation not to put anti-satellite weapon systems into space is of little significance from practical viewpoint since the Soviet Union allegedly has an operating system which can implement tasks set before it. The statement stresses that the USA intends to hold the test so as to promote the discussion of relevant issues at the Geneva talks.

The Administration's decision on the test of the anti-satellite weapon actually means that the United States has not given a positive answer to the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on putting anti-satellite weapons into space. The assertions that the Soviet Union was the first to make such a test contradict the facts which are as follows: back in 1959 the United States was the first to effect the interception of the "Explorer-6" satellite by means of a missile launched from the B-47 bomber. Research into the creation of interceptor satellites (Bamby and Saint projects) was carried out in the 60s. In 1963-1967 the US deployed an anti-satellite complex on Kwajalein Atoll on the basis of the "Nike-Zeus" anti-missile, and the experimental-combat anti-satellite complex on the

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basis of "Thor" missiles was created on Johnston Island in 1964-1975.

In announcing the intention to launch the ASAT system, the United States actually embarks on testing the second generation of anti-satellite systems. Washington's statement that such tests allegedly give an impetus to holding serious talks in Geneva on space problems serves to distract the attention of the public from the factual aspect of the matter. It is precisely the United States that is intensively preparing the militarisation of outer space and it is in this context that the planned tests of the ASAT system should be viewed.

(Pravda, September 7. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI
TÜSTAV

STAR WARS LABORATORY

Kwajalein is the main laboratory preparing Star Wars. Three thousand US technicians live there in a territory measuring 364 hectares.

"Kwajalein is our strategic laboratory," said one American general. The missile ground on the Kwajalein atoll (which forms part of the US Pacific trust territory of Micronesia) is crucial in three spheres--combat and experimental missile tests, anti-missile defences, and the so-called anti-satellite defences.

Twenti five times a year the Vanderberg air base in South California, USA, fires a missile which cover 7,700 kilometres to Kwajalein in less than half an hour. Placed around the atoll's lagoon is an array of sophisticated instruments which analyse the trajectory, monitor the blasts of individual warheads, assess the accuracy of hits, and rate the efficiency of electronic interference. These data go into the Pentagon's predictions on the consequences of a strategic nuclear strike.

Apart from that, Kwajalein looms large in the anti-missile defence programme, i.e. a programme for developing weapons capable of destroying ballistic missiles. The programme aimed at killing enemy missiles in flight is a major element in the "strategic defence initiative"(i.e., the Star Wars programme--Ed.).

The third sphere where Kwajalein is most important is space monitoring. Serving as a sentry is Altair radar on the Roi-Namur Islet north-east of the atoll. Altair is the principal part of the Pacific barrier, the main US anti-satellite network comprising radar stations on the Philippines and Guam.

(Pravda, July 9, in full.)

be withdrawn from Europe. The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies also want the Old World to be cleared of nuclear weapons.

The Advisory Council proposed that the negotiating powers should introduce a moratorium on the deployment of any new armaments as long as the talks were underway. However, Washington has shown no interest in starting talks on a moratorium. Moscow, on the contrary, declared that such a moratorium would be an important prerequisite for the negotiations' success.

Meanwhile, Mikhail Gorbachyov has declared in a Pravda interview: "We are for an honest dialogue. We are again prepared to demonstrate our goodwill. Since today--and I want to emphasise it--the Soviet Union imposes a moratorium on its medium-range missile deployments and suspends the implementation of other retaliatory measures in Europe. The moratorium will be in force until next November. What we will decide to do next will depend on whether the United States follows suit by halting its medium-range missile deployments in Europe."

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The real designation of a "space shield" is easy to guess: it is to protect American first-strike nuclear weapons, writes Edgar Cheporov, Novosti political analyst. But this is just one aspect of "star wars" strategy. The other, closely linked to the first one, consists in the use of space weapons against enemy targets on Earth. While the politicians keep mum about it, the generals have said more than once that they are going to use the space shield as a space sword.

One of US Air Force high-rankers Robert Marsh says that the USA must gain a capability of waging a war from the Earth against targets in space and from space against the Earth. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Edward Aldridge does not conceal that one needn't strain imagination too much to see that a nation which controls space may control the whole world.

These are not just words. Their desire to "control the whole world" has brought about practical moves as well.

The New York Times wrote that the specialists working in US government bodies and in industry now openly declare that space weapons are designed by no means for defense alone, but also for "important offensive functions". These weapons may be used as a defensive appendage of a nuclear attack, because they will make it possible to launch nuclear missiles, while keeping defense in reserve against potential retaliation. These weapons can attack and destroy enemy satellites, the paper writes. Moreover, in expert opinion, these weapons can be used for strikes from space against such ground-based targets as planes, tankers, electric power stations and fields sown to grain crops in order to cause immediate fires and inflict damage.

(APN, April 8. In full.)

THE END

WILL OUTER SPACE BE PEACEFUL?

Leonid Zamyatin

New ABM Defence System -- Weapon of Aggression

In March 1983, the US President declared establishment of an all-embracing anti-ballistic missile defence system with space-based elements to be the aim of his state policy. According to the schemes of the authors of this project, it is planned to deploy ^{in space} a system of weapons (laser, beam and others) designed to destroy Soviet ballistic missiles on the way from the start to the final flight path of their warheads. Land-based missile-killers are to be added to space weapons. As a result, a multilayer complex is being set up in the atmosphere, in space and on the earth.

The Washington Administration believes that in this way it can protect the US territory from Soviet missiles by destroying them at all the segments of the flight trajectory, at the same time preserving the entire system of American strategic weapons aimed against the Soviet Union, weapons which are supposed to operate under the protection of this "shield." The authors of the "strategic defence initiative" are trying to portray their idea of space militarisation as "highly moral" and "humane."

What is the real sense of the large-scale space anti-missile defence system? According to the preliminary estimates, 26,000 million dollars are to be spent on developing it over the next five years. The advocates of setting up such a system claim that in this way the United States allegedly wants to "pave the way to a stable and secure peace." However, this is nothing else but the deception of the public. When US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was asked what would happen if the

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Soviet Union were the first to build such a shield, he said that if the Russians were the first to set up such a system it would be very, very dangerous in the world... This would very much resemble a world in which the Russians would have nuclear weapons whereas the United States would have none of them, he said.

So, this is the real "stabilising role" of the defensive armaments of which the Washington Administration at all its levels is now talking hypocritically day and night. The large-scale anti-ballistic missile space defence, as it is called in the USA, is in fact an offensive system, a weapon of aggression, which serves the aim of gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union from outer space.

In his State-of-the-Union Message the US President claims that the deployment of the ABM space systems pursues an aim of "containing war both in space and on the earth." But this claim turns everything upside down. It is not mere chance that in the United States this programme is called "star wars." By deploying space systems, including nuclear ones, the United States wants to obtain a possibility of delivering a first nuclear strike hoping that retaliation will not follow. This programme forms one whole with the intention of the USA to build up its offensive potential.

One should also keep in mind that these days the US Administration is sparing no effort to make Congress agree to new massive appropriations for continuing to develop six new types of strategic offensive armaments -- the MX intercontinental ballistic missile, the Midgetman mobile missile, the new Trident-2 sea-based missile, two new types of heavy bombers, and long-distance Cruise missiles (it is planned to manufacture over 12,000 of them). The stationing of new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe continues. Of course, these militarist preparations, which are unprecedented in peace time, have nothing to do with the statements by Washington about its striv-

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ing for "dismantling nuclear weapons" as the ultimate goal.

The intended US deployment of space-based anti-missile defence systems increases the danger of a nuclear war and leads to a new round of the arms race which threatens to spill over into outer space.

This makes Ronald Reagan's references to the "humane" nature of the "star wars" idea in a recent "private" interview with Wall Street Journal, the mouthpiece of the banking community, stand out as particularly cynical, with the President calling for an unstinting expenditure on its implementation.

A "Research Project"? A False Argument

This is yet another of Washington's arguments which has been widely used by the US propaganda media to prove the allegedly "harmless nature of a large-scale space-based anti-missile system." It is contained in the President's State-of-the-Union Address. The same argument came up in an address by the US Secretary of Defense in early February to the international conference in Munich of the West German military research Wehrkunde society. The "star wars" programme, the Americans say, is merely a research project and it is so far premature to talk that it is dangerous. This is not so. Any weapons system goes through a research stage. The Manhattan project that brought forth the A bomb had been through a research stage too. Yet what it led to was the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

According to competent US specialists, the US research has approached the boundaries of the Soviet-American anti-missile defence treaty. Moreover, some US officials claim that the United States will renounce the treaty as soon as it considers that the research results make it possible to tackle the whole of this programme.

It is not by chance that we have mentioned the Munich conference which was attended by representatives of the main NATO countries. Speaking in support of the American plans for

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the militarisation of outer space, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the FRG said what even the Americans sometimes prefer to hold back. According to him, there are serious differences on all issues involved in the Soviet-US talks, which give no ground to hope for a positive outcome during at least the next ten years. It follows from this, he said, that it is necessary to conduct "research" in line with the programme for the military uses of outer space to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union. One could not spell it out clearer.

The USSR Will Not Stand By

Thus, by using cunning propaganda tricks, Washington and its NATO allies are seeking to sell to the public a "secure project" of space wars which will allegedly result in the creation of "non-nuclear space weapons" capable of removing the nuclear threat to Western Europe and the United States itself.

This is an illusion and deception. Asked by the Wall Street Journal whether the alleged "impregnability of the space shield for nuclear weapons" was true to fact, the President had to admit that it gave no one-hundred-per-cent guarantees of anti-missile security either to the USA or its allies.

The Reagan Administration is doing its utmost to hide the fact that preparations for "star wars" would dramatically destabilize the strategic situation in the world, and entail a sharp build-up of new weapons. Behind the soothing and primitive idea of a "strategic shield" in outer space there is the fact that the United States is developing new weapons of mass destruction. US strategic armaments are not being reduced by a single unit. In other words, that will be a "sword" instead of a "shield," and the former, in US strategists' view, will increase their ability to deliver a first strike at the Soviet Union.

But does the United States think that the Soviet Union will sit idle, awaiting the results of the US "research" in

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the field of space anti-missile defence? Faced with such dangerous plans, the Soviet Union will do all in its power to prevent a US superiority over itself, as the leaders of our Party and State have said more than once. The Soviet Union would have to increase the power of its weapons in retaliation to the attempts of the United States to get an opportunity to deliver a nuclear strike with impunity. The Soviet Union will do so because the Soviet leaders have warned many times that the USSR will never allow a military superiority of the United States over itself.

Will the Talks Be a Success?

The sober-minded public is aware of the danger inherent in the American plans; it calls for preventing the militarization of space. Such plans, harboured by the White House, are being opposed in Western Europe and in the United States. James Schlesinger, former US Secretary of Defense, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the other day that the idea of creating an absolute defence shield for the United States, an idea so popular with President Reagan, is thoroughly illusory for it only channels vast material and spiritual resources of the country in a direction which is fraught with fatal military and political consequences for the United States.

There is vast positive response all over the world to the Geneva meeting between Andrei Gromyko and US Secretary of State George Shultz. The world is eager to hear good news about ^{the} curbing of the arms race. In solving the problems of space and nuclear armaments the Soviet Union not just proceeds from positions of ensuring its own security, but is taking into account the interests of mankind. The agreement reached in Geneva on the subject and aims of the Soviet-American talks reflects this stance of the USSR. And the question arises at this point: how will the Geneva talks proceed? The answer is both simple and complicated. If the United States adheres to the Soviet-American agreement both within and outside the framework of

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the talks, a real possibility may arise of their success and effectiveness. Meanwhile the talks, as has been recognized by the sides, are aimed at reaching effective agreements to avert the arms race in space and stop it on the Earth.

(Moskovskiye Novosti, February 24. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VAKFI
TÜSTAV

Friday, October 31, 1986

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VOVPO-861031-504

FOREIGN AFFAIRS BRIEFING

Gennady Gerasimov, a spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry, described as a "lame duck" at a briefing at the Foreign Ministry press centre on October 30 a report in the West German newspaper Bild echoed by Australian mass media to the effect that the USSR had allegedly outstripped the United States in SDI, installing strategic defence lasers, one at Sarochiganak in Kazakhstan.

These fabricated reports allege that the Soviet Union has put such lasers to combat use and has brought down or, at least, put out of action three US satellites. On October 29 The Washington Post also carried an article claiming that the Soviet Union is using anti-satellite weapons. It alleged that over the past six months powerful microwave beams sent from Soviet territory into outer space have on several occasions put US reconnaissance satellites out of action.

If the USSR has outstripped the United States in SDI, Gennady Gerasimov said, why then does not the United States accept our proposal that research in that field be halted, laboratories be opened for inspection and everything be taken under control so that no space-strike weapons are created?

The Soviet Union has no laser weapons and the USA is well aware of that, because the USSR has already given explanations to the USA on that score. There is an experimental laser plant in Sarochiganak, but that is not a weapon. It can neither bring down nor put satellites out of action; its aim is only to watch space^{and} installations in space. The West German Bild, The Washington Post and the Australian mass media have spread slanders.

Gennady Gerasimov then touched upon the report in The Washington Times, which is known for its ties with the current US Administration and which quoted US intelligence sources in

issuing inventions that the USSR was planning to open consulates in the Mexican cities of Ensenada and Ciudad-Juarez. According to the newspaper, the USSR Consulate in Ensenada would be an ideal base for connections with "Soviet agents" employed at numerous arms manufacturing plants in California. As far as the consulate in Ciudad-Juarez is concerned the newspaper claims it would be very advantageously placed for Soviet radio-electronic intelligence to monitor tests within the SDI framework at the US proving ranges at Fort Bliss and Whitesense.

This, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said, is a fresh spy-scare. By spreading such absurdities, the USA would like to beshadow the development of Soviet-Mexican relations. In real fact the question of opening the afore-mentioned consulates was not raised, and no such question has stood at all. Everything was invented from beginning to end. It is pure fabrication.

Answering a question about the arrest in San Francisco on October 27 of a certain Allan John Davis on a charge of spying for the Soviet Union, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said that the FBI was continuing its game of FBI agents posing for officials of the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco and tempting Americans into selling them secrets so as to arrest them as "Soviet agents". That was the case that time too. Thus, Gennady Gerasimov noted, you find thousands of "Soviet spies".

That provocative game is used for whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria and spy-scares in the United States to discredit Soviet representatives. Gennady Gerasimov added that none of the personnel of the USSR Consulate General in San Francisco had ever met Davis or contacted him by phone.

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An announcement has been made in the FRG on discontinuing

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investigation into the cases of former figures of Hitler justice, the so-called judges and prosecuting attorneys as well as the "people's court" of the Nazi Reich, which passed from 1937 to 1945 a total of 5,243 death sentences on anti-fascists and other opponents of the Nazi regime.

Gennady Gerasimov commented that Soviet people could only condemn the decision to stop prosecuting former Nazi judges in the FRG. He recalled that the Soviet Union suffered the greatest losses in the fight against Hitler Germany.

Satisfaction was expressed at the briefing in connection with the decision of the Swedish government to deny political asylum to Carl Linnas, former commandant of the fascist concentration camp in the Estonian city of Tartu, who has been sentenced by Soviet court to capital punishment in absentia. The Soviet Union proceeds from the corresponding international laws under which the Nazi war criminals should be extradited for trial and punishment to the countries where they had committed their crimes. As regards Carl Linnas, the Soviet side has repeatedly requested the USA that he be extradited.

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Moscow, October 30. (TASS.) Asked by the London Times correspondent the attitude of the Soviet Union to the 150-mile "defence zone" proclaimed by the British government around the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman stated: "It is regrettable that the British side has taken unilateral steps contradicting the UN decision on those islands. Britain has done nothing to fulfil the decision and is impeding its implementation by its unilateral actions".

(TASS, October 30. In full.)

THE SOBERING OF AMERICA

T.Kolesnichenko

It is already clear that the latest Congressional elections in the US will have a special place in the country's history. The main distinction about them is that the pre-election campaign of the Republicans and the Democrats was centred not only and not so much on the traditional internal problems as on other issues. This time the focus of the struggle was on the foreign policy of the administration and, first of all, on the notorious Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI. There is nothing strange about this. The Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik has revealed a "moment of truth" and shown who is who and the real value of things. Even the most apolitical Americans have started asking why such a unique chance was missed in Reykjavik although the two sides were on the verge of the adoption of historic decisions in the field of disarmament. Is SDI, they ask, which became the stumbling block in Reykjavik, really worth rejecting the idea of the elimination of nuclear weapons which threaten the existence of mankind, naturally including America itself?

This is precisely the factor that decided the strategy of the Republicans at the last-week elections. Their task was to distort by all available means (including downright deception and disinformation) the meaning of the talks in Reykjavik, and to portray that meeting as a "US victory". This particularly applied to SDI - all the more so since the Democrats, having sensed the mood of the electorate, lashed out against it with renewed vigour. This is one of the reasons why the US President himself decided to join the election campaign. Like an experienced salesman, he travelled all around the US (more than 25,000 miles altogether), visited 23 states and made 54 speeches, laying the emphasis on SDI in each of those speeches.

It has turned out that SDI has two faces. One of them is turned to the outside world and first of all to the Soviet Union. We are being convinced that SDI is not at all a Star Wars programme, not the deployment of new weapons in space and certainly not a first-strike weapon. What is wrong, indeed, about a scheme under which not people but only ballistic missiles will be destroyed?

But then the President turns to the American audience and everything gets into its place. Under the "defensive" mask of SDI comes out the scary face of the god of war. It is strategic might, "invulnerability" of America and its position of strength.

It seemed to the White House that all these propaganda incantations were falling into receptive soil. Public opinion polls taken before the Reykjavik meeting indicated that about 70 per cent of the Americans saw SDI as a "happy idea". The Americans were told that in addition to the promised "invulnerability", SDI would lead to an economic boom in America and would all but end unemployment. Even during the first days after the Reykjavik summit support of SDI in new opinion polls was still quite solid.

Why then this sudden sobering? Why the elections which the President himself actually turned into a referendum on his policy and, first of all, on SDI ended in defeat for the Republicans and put the Democrats ahead of them? As I see it, there were several reasons for that.

First, the "echo of Reykjavik" and, first of all, the accurate and honest presentation of facts by Moscow in its account of the events at the negotiations in the Icelandic capital has reached America and shown the whole incongruity of Washington's propaganda campaign and the perversity of its logic. Many Americans must be given credit for not buying Washington's naive stories that the "position of strength"

expressed in SDI "has led the Soviet Union to the talks and concessions".

Second, the practically-minded Americans have eventually started to realize that their President has lost, having chosen a chimera instead of the real, unprecedented proposals of the Soviet Union which, in contrast to SDI, would have ensured general security, including that of the United States.

It can be said that the voters have also seen at last that the SDI programme will not liberate them from internal problems but will only exacerbate them as well as the economic situation and push down their living standards. Billions of dollars have been thrown into the bottomless pit of the arms race under the pretext of "strengthening the country's security". Where is that security now? Has it really been achieved? In the meantime, the tax-payers are being now asked to produce no longer billions but several trillion dollars for the development of SDI. As it is, America is already living deeply in debt because of its huge budget deficit. So SDI is not an "insurance policy" but a "bankrupt's policy" and the way to a still heavier debt.

(Pravda, November 9. Abridged.)

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VORI40-861031-505

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TECHNOLOGICAL GENIUS IN THE SERVICE OF PEACEFUL
OUTER SPACE

Discussions in the First Committee of the 41st Session of
the UN General Assembly

V.Sukhoi, Pravda own correspondent

New York, October 30 - The views exchanged in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly (political issues and security, including disarmament) reflect the serious concern felt by the world community over the dangerous plans to extend the nuclear arms race to space.

Why does the Soviet Union consider the Strategic Defense Initiative a symbol of obstruction to the process of nuclear disarmament? A concrete and well-argued answer to the question was contained in a speech made at the Committee's meeting by Academician R.Z.Sagdeyev.

Proceeding from the results of the Reykjavik meeting, the Soviet representative outlined the scientific, technological, and military-strategic aspects of space militarisation, which are all closely interlinked. SDI champions prefer mainly to fire the imagination of tax-payers with exciting prospects likely to be offered by the Star Wars programme to scientific and technological progress. But they say little or nothing about dangerous military-strategic consequences which would inevitably stem from SDI. Among these mention must be made of a change in the existing doctrine based on nuclear deterrence; narrowing down of the strategic balance - and as a consequence - the loss of ability to move to ever lower levels of nuclear confrontation, up to and including elimination of all nuclear weapons; inevitable competition between the offensive and defensive kinds of weapons, in which, as history suggests, the advantage will always be with offensive weapons.

Deployment of so-called defensive systems in space would

lead to a highly dangerous kind of instability, which may be described as "space" instability. As for speculation about SDI "secrets" being shared with a potential enemy, there cannot be any talk of this procedure in the light of the ever-toughening embargoes clamped by the US administration even on what seems to be the most innocuous types of technology.

The historic lesson of the Reykjavik summit, indicated Sagdeyev, shows that there is hope for a political way of removing the nuclear threat, a way leading to elimination of nuclear weapons entirely. Spreading of the arms race to outer space has a peaceful alternative - exploration and utilisation of space in the interests of all humanity. American science and American technology have made outstanding advances in this area, including in international space cooperation. So it is to be hoped that the American strategic thinking proves worthy of the American nation's technological genius.

(Pravda, October 31. In full.)

SDI: US MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERIALISM

Academician V. Avduyevsky

International security is now at an impermissibly low level. It survives only thanks to a rough Soviet-US strategic balance. To upturn this parity, Washington is engaged in the unprecedented mobilisation of the resources and research and technological capabilities of the West for another breakthrough in weapons with the aid of the Strategic Defence Initiative.

Although its aims are illusory, SDI is dangerous because it is not just another arms buildup programme. SDI aims at developing global space weapons to hit in a fraction of a second targets in space and from space on Earth. The US militarists want to use space weapons to terrorize other nations and force them to comply with American diktat. It is very dangerous that the SDI system will have computers to decide what targets to hit in space and on Earth.

To divert attention from its aggressive purposes, the US Administration is staging a farce. The greatest liar on record, Washington pledges to remove the nuclear threat and ensure a hopeful future allegedly possible with ever more deadly weapons.

To develop such weapons, physical principles, not yet fully grasped, are to be used and new discoveries made to facilitate a technological leap.

To handle problems under the SDI programme, the United States is profoundly militarising its major economic sectors, research institutions and universities. However, militarisation and the concentration of effort on new weapons undermine basic research and new civilian technology, which can make US commodities less competitive internationally. As a result, Washington is losing the economic leadership of its allies.

Bent on global domination, the US military-industrial complex sees the way out in controlling new technology research and scientific and technological projects in other capitalist countries. What makes this control all the more important is the fact that some Western countries are much ahead of the United States in powerful lasers, computers, optical-electronic systems, optics and control systems crucial to SDI.

The Star Wars Programme is a major instrument of the projected economic and technological expansionism. Pledging to develop a space umbrella for protection from Soviet missiles, the United States is signing thousands of contracts under the SDI programme.

The governments of Britain, West Germany, Italy and Israel have signed agreements on participation in Star Wars research. Talks are underway on Japan's involvement.

Some NATO countries are developing lasers to destroy missiles, and systems for electronic warfare and other purposes. Greatly ahead of the West in microcomputers, optical-electronic systems and robots, Japan has agreed to transfer its secret military technology to the United States. The Pentagon is signing contracts, running into millions of dollars, with private firms in those Western countries which have refused to participate in SDI.

The Western governments which pledged to participate in SDI say they want to have access to new technology and enhance their role internationally. In reality, by joining the SDI club they become dependent on America economically and technologically. Let me say it once again that the hopes the United States entertains with regard to SDI are illusory. However, SDI can lead to a massive merger of imperialist corporations. In view of the existing military alliances, this merger would result in the NATO countries and Japan becoming

subordinated to US military and economic diktat. These nations would become part and parcel of a Washington-led military and technological empire. Attempts by some Western states to develop the Eureka space programme of their own will hardly change this prospect. I think that the Eureka programme will for various reasons become a constituent of the American SDI.

The leaders of major capitalist countries certainly have all information on doubts as regards SDI's technical feasibility and its real designation and see through the US imperialist policy of technological and economic expansionism. However, some of them deliberately back US imperial ambitions. Seeing the US as the bulwark of reaction, right-wing elements in capitalist countries are going against national interests to preserve their class privileges. It is not accidental that after the Soviet-US summit in Reykjavik some Western leaders have come out against abolishing nuclear weapons in Europe.

Contradictory actions by the United States and its allies in the international stage and their desire to avoid certainty at disarmament talks show that the political stand of the opponents of detente is shaky and the aggressive intentions of the militarists are doomed.

The USSR and other socialist countries counter imperialist aggressive plans by a restrained and confident policy of peace aimed at abolishing nuclear weapons and preventing space militarisation. This policy is meeting with growing understanding and support on the part of all peace forces and realistically-minded Western leaders. Acting in concert, they can and should upturn US domination plans. Science and technology should and will promote the prosperity of humankind.

(Pravda, November 5. In full.)

Monday, January 21, 1985

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STAR WARS--EARTHLY CONCERNS

Under this heading the newspaper Pravda carries an article by its Washington correspondent Gennadi Vasilyev telling about the increasing struggle in the US between opponents and supporters of a space arms race, with the help of which "Washington hopes to achieve the elusive but cherished aim of gaining strategic military superiority over the socialist states."

It appears that some people in Washington are still thinking least of all of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, writes the Pravda correspondent.

"Of late, especially after the Soviet-American meeting in Geneva, where it was decided that averting space militarisation would be one of the key points of future talks on curbing the arms race, certain representatives of the US administration have begun to say that it is still premature to be concerned about military space plans because so far it only involves the research and experimental stage."

In particular, according to the Washington Post, the US President's national security adviser Robert McFarlane has declared so, notes Vasilyev, adding that ambassador at large Paul Nitze, informing the West German allies of the Geneva meeting, argued that the NATO countries "should maintain pressure on the Soviet Union" and continue the deployment in Western Europe of 572 missiles "until an agreement is reached which will either limit, or liquidate them."

Yet, stresses the Pravda correspondent in this connection, pressure on the Soviet Union is an absolutely futile undertaking, which has never produced the results hoped for by the warhawks. For the success of the talks something different is needed: that they should be conducted on a basis of equality, consideration of mutual interests and strict observance of the principle of

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parity and equal security.

Realistically thinking Americans, Vasilyev writes further, are opposed to space militarisation. They are concerned about the future of their country and the future of the entire world. In their ranks are people of the most diverse social status and from different walks of life, representing the Democrats and the Republicans, the liberals and the conservatives. Thus, the sponsors of the "national campaign to save the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," a ratified and operating Soviet-American strategic-arms restriction agreement the existence of which is threatened by Washington's plans for a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system, include: world-famous scientists Hans Bethe, Sidney Drell, Marvin Goldberger, Richard Garwin, Carl Sagan, Jerom Wiesner, Herbert York, John Kenneth Galbraith; former President Jimmy Carter; former ambassador to the USSR Averell Harriman; former Secretaries of State Dean Rusk, Cyrus Vance, Edmund Muskie; and retired Generals and Admirals--Tom Davis, Noel Gayler and John Marshall Lee.

Among those concerned are even such apparently unlikely candidates for the role of opponents of the arms race as former CIA directors William Colby and Stansfield Turner.

Recently, the Pravda correspondent notes further, Robert McNamara, Defence Secretary in the administrations of Kennedy and Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, a former presidential national security adviser in the same period, and Gerard Smith, former head of the US delegation at the SALT-1 talks, have strongly denounced the "star wars" program. Together with eminent historian and diplomat George Kennan they published a joint appeal to the US administration to stop before it is too late in its space ambitions.

In the USA, Vasilyev writes in conclusion, an ever larger number of people are beginning to see that the world is living

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through an exceptional moment and that it is necessary to do everything to avert the danger hanging over mankind. It is precisely the antiwar movement that has been one of the main component forces which have induced Washington to start talking about peace.

(Pravda, January 21. Summary.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
TÜSTAV

THE SEVEN STOREYS OF SDI

V. Chernyshev, Ph.D. (Techn.)

As military experts say, the SDI's mission is to create the conditions for a pre-emptive nuclear strike at the Soviet Union without fear of a retaliatory one which must be warded off by a space-based anti-missile defence system. So, the pre-emptive nuclear strike is the major objective of the whole Defence Initiative. That is what accounts for the present full-scale drive in the US to build up the strategic offensive nuclear potential -- the ballistic MX, Trident, Midgetman missiles, strategic B-1B and ATB (Stealth) bombers, strategic air-, sea-, and ground-based Cruise missiles, and the medium-range ballistic missiles. Washington strategists just need a "space shield" to make sure they can use the whole of this arsenal.

There is an intensive development effort under way across the Atlantic to design strike space weapons, find the ways of deploying them "most effectively", choose the orbits for them to follow and figure out how many space-based combat platforms are necessary and what particular types of weapons are best to use in space.

A general "integrated" plan for a large-scale anti-missile defence system with space-based elements has already been worked out in the US. A special group of ten corporations--Pentagon contractors--working under SDI Programme direction, has examined alternative variations of the system which first comprised four, then five, six and now seven echelons (in the US they call them "storeys" and "tiers") for the deployment of strike space weapons.

What do they mean by the "storeys"?

The first two, those of the propulsion stage, will be occupied by combat space stations with directed radiation weapons (laser and particle beam weapons) as well as kinetic weapons (self-homing small-sized missiles and electromagnetic guns). The next two storeys, also comprising the above-mentioned weapons, are for hitting missiles in the ballistic stage.

There can be yet another, fifth storey of the system to be created for the ballistic trajectory. The New York Times has reported that the idea in this respect is to create "clouds" of particles or aerosols which must facilitate target "selection" up in space. The last two storeys will be "controlled" by ground-based interceptor missiles of two types designed to destroy missile warheads right before their entry into the atmosphere and in the dense layers of the atmosphere.

The Pentagon has already carried out appropriate calculations for the initial deployment of the Star Wars system. The first stage will mean putting up 3,200 space-based combat platforms capable of carrying self-homing small-sized missiles as well as stations equipped with radiolocators and special sensors. There will have to be some 600 space launchings to that end during a three-year period, US Department of Defence people estimate. Time magazine says that a total of some 1.2 million kg of SDI devices of all kinds will have to be put into space within the first year only. The entire Star Wars programme will require up to 5,000 shuttle missions.

The strike space arms now in the making must, as the Pentagon sees it, possess a whole series of unmatched properties. They are intended for almost instantly hitting their targets up to thousands of miles away.

Some American specialists consider chemical lasers to be best suited for use from space-based combat platforms. Such a

laser is like a jet engine in operation: it has the working chemical mixture pumped through a resonator at a supersonic speed. Some of the energy released in a chemical reaction can be obtained as directed streams of electromagnetic radiation within an optical range. This energy is made to converge within a narrow directed beam by means of a system of mirrors and resonance chambers.

An X-ray laser with nuclear blast pumping is particularly prominent in the US Star Wars Programme. Appropriations for an X-ray laser in fiscal 1986 have recently been estimated at 200 million dollars. It is the X-ray laser that has been reported to be one of the reasons why the White House is refusing to join the moratorium announced by the Soviet Union because this kind of work requires underground nuclear explosions.

There is an intensive effort under way, too, to develop another type of strike weapon -- particle beam weapon which will be using high-energy particle beams (electrons and protons).

Yet another line of research is on "electrodynamic mass accelerators" or "electromagnetic guns". An experimental gun of this type, named Gedi, has been developed in the laboratories of the electrical mechanics centre of the University of Texas. A ball-shaped "shell" weighing some 150 grammes has been test-fired at the initial speed of 5 km/sec. It is presumed that the starting velocity of such shells can be brought up to 45 km/sec, which means, foreign observers note, making such weapons more effective than missiles in space. At the present time, work is in progress to develop yet another version of electromagnetic gun, Gedi-2, 39 metres long.

While working intensely on the "new kinetic" weapons, the Pentagon is not giving up "classic" schemes either. Since neither laser nor particle beam weapons have yet been created

and since there is still no opportunity of mass-producing electromagnetic guns, the men in the Pentagon are reasoning, it is important not to lose time in "stuffing" the Earth and space with common missiles, such as small-sized missiles with radiolocator or infra-red self-homing warheads.

All that shows what a sweeping front of work is on in the US to produce arms for the Star Wars. Some in Washington clearly hope that, having started the stage-by-stage militarization of space in the next few years and relying on its will-o'-the-wisp "technological superiority", the US will be in a position to upset the military-strategic balance to its own advantage and get an opportunity for nuclear aggression without fear of retaliation.

That is why the Pentagon is at pains to try and "legalize" the actual testing and "experimentation" under the Star Wars Programme. That is why it is so adamant in opposing the Soviet proposal for a more effective enforcement of the Treaty on the Limitation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, including the mutual commitment about unfailing compliance with the restrictions it provides for.

The Soviet Union's position with regard to Star Wars advocates has been spelled out by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his recent television Statement. They should not think they can frighten us in this case either, or goad us into unnecessary spending. If we have to, we will quickly find the answer, and that answer will not be the one they in the US expect it to be. But it will be an answer that will make the Star Wars Programme good for nothing.

(Krasnaya Zvezda, August 28. Abridged.)

SELF-MESMERIZED BY POWER POLITICS

M.Vasiliev

If anyone cared to analyze Washington's current political vocabulary, he would find the word "strength" used more often than any other. In fact, it is uttered practically every day from the pulpits of the White House and the State Department, not to speak of the Pentagon. There is nothing surprising about it, by and large: the present Administration drummed itself into office six years ago with a clamour for the restoration of U.S. military superiority. The new thing about this kind of incantation is the claim that superiority alone is compelling the Russians to talk about disarmament.

This campaign would seem to have reached its peak in the few weeks between the Reykjavik summit and the U.S. elections early in November. But the campaign rhetoric, with everything it implies -- promises, braggery and downright lie, and with a poorer-than-expected showing for the Administration, is long since over. So it would seem to be the right time to consider what is, indeed, required for the success of the talks on the most important issue of modern times, that of human survival.

Unfortunately, that appears to be the last thing on its mind. The President keeps on saying! "We negotiate from a position of strength." He sees that as the way to success. Moreover, there is a rather uncommon show being put on. Through a chorus of cheers for Reagan's "intractability" on the arms-in-space business, one can hear a distinct warning note coming from the conservative elements who are up against a Reykjavik-style approach even on the issues that were agreed on in principle. The NATO brass hats as well as the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and the right-wing elements around the U.S. President himself have joined in calling for any talks with

the Soviet Union to be conducted from "tough" positions.

Is SDI really building up America's power and, looking at this problem realistically, does it increase the chance of success at the talks? Of course, SDI is mobilizing some of the technological resources of the U.S. and its allies. But it is drawing these resources off into the "black hole" of unpredictability. Of course, SDI is a doping injected into the U.S. economy. But that at the cost of trillions of dollars that the nation will have to pay, although the U.S. Federal Budget deficit has swollen to unprecedented proportions and the nation is in debt as it is. Of course, SDI is heating up a wave of chauvinism, but raising jingoist passions means increasing the danger of war that may well spell the destruction of all living things and, consequently, those behind it as well.

To sum up the "tips" that the U.S. Administration has been following and is, evidently, going to follow at the Soviet-American talks, these boil down to a denial of the very essence of the talks, that is, the pursuit of a compromise arrangement between equal partners for the sake of common interests. There is a kind of attack from the right even against the accords reached in Reykjavik, and those accords themselves are being called in question. The militarist circles in the U.S. and in Western Europe recognize only this concept of negotiation: one side makes concessions, and the other graciously accepts them. But the world has changed, and there is no more room in it today for any U.S. supremacy or for that of any other power, for that matter. It requires a clear understanding of the need to combine the interests of each particular state with the interests of others, with the interests of all humanity.

(Pravda, December 1. Abridged.)

SDI: PUMPING MONEY, BRAINS AND TECHNOLOGY

OUT OF ALLIES

A.Kireyev

Taking advice from the SDI lobbyists, the Administration has decided to make a new technology injection to US industry at the expense of its allies. The best camouflage for the operation is believed to be SDI which US propaganda is selling to Western Europe as the best protection of the "free world" from the "Soviet threat".

In view of the character of the Star Wars programme, Washington's partners do not haste to take up SDI. France, Canada, Norway, Greece, Denmark and Australia have refused to join SDI officially. Following protracted talks, Britain, Italy, West Germany and Israel have decided to back the Pentagon's space programme. Japan expects big profits from SDI. Other US allies still do not know where they stand on SDI.

The SDI memorandums Washington signed with some of its allies deprive them of all rights as subcontractors. It is clear now why the United States was in no hurry to place major contracts with foreign companies before signing corresponding intergovernment agreements. Washington wanted to have documentary guarantees that the allies' new technology would go only to the US military-industrial complex.

As soon as allies signed the agreements, Washington demanded a monopoly right on all research projects.

Intimidating the West with the "Soviet threat" and urging allies to unite, the United States is projecting their technological backwardness. Sober-minded politicians in Western Europe and Japan say that Washington wants to see them as an appendage to the US military-industrial complex.

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Allies increasingly realize that they are being drawn into another US militaristic programme designed to combat America's economic headaches at the expense of other nations. The space aspect of "Atlantic solidarity" doesn't give US partners either billions of dollars in promised contracts, access to the newest technology or, most importantly, greater security. Unless they resist American diktat, US allies would become technological vassals to the " Big Brother".

(Izvestia, November 12. Abridged.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI
TÜSTAV

Monday, November 3, 1986

VORIO-861103-514

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SDI: THE GREAT SWINDLE

Prof. G.Tsagolov, Ph.D.(Econ.)

Every day U.S. television networks show American space craft firing laser rays at Soviet missiles in American skies as part of a campaign to bolster support for SDI. Knowing that political and military arguments to justify space militarization are no longer plausible after the Reykjavik summit and that many even see them as dangerous, the advocates of Star Wars are devising a new publicity framework for the Presidential pet. The American public, not well versed in the intricacies of politics and strategy, is being told SDI will mean a thriving economy with high employment rates, etc.

The U.S. media say in protecting the "free world" from the "Soviet nuclear threat" SDI will be a powerful locomotive of the scientific and technological revolution to carry American society into the 21st century ahead of schedule. They allege that the building of the notorious "space shield" will give a fresh impetus to the economy, ensure long-term prosperity and generously share its numerous technological advances with civilian industries.

But what the SDI program in fact makes quite clear is that attempts to achieve prosperity through arms buildup are doomed. Militarism has hit hard at the working people by bringing down living standards and depriving the working class of its social and economic gains.

Where will the United States get the many trillions of dollars it needs for Star Wars? First of all, from the tax payers. So taxes will inevitably be up, and so will the U.S. federal debt, already running into two trillion dollars. This will rest as a heavy burden on the shoulders of several generations of Americans who will have to pay for the military adventures of the present Administration.

The Administration, which satisfies the demands of the munitions industry and the Pentagon uncomplainingly, tries to slow down the record growth of the budget deficit through drastic cuts on education, health services and other social needs. SDI will certainly cause a further onslaught against the social programmes which are already shrinking very much like shagreen leather. Some American economists fear with good reason lest SDI cause a new wave of inflation, dramatic soaring of prices, and consequently a drop in the real incomes of the American working people.

Can SDI mitigate mass unemployment in any way? All promises of this kind are a deliberate deception. It has been proved that investments in the military sector create approximately one-third of the number of the jobs which the same investments would create in the civilian sector. And the SDI programme stands out among all militarist programmes for its hypertrophied spending on research and experimental-design work. By diverting the better part of the scientists and engineers to military research and development SDI will impede the growth of the civilian sectors of economy, which will, in turn, further increase the number of jobless.

The gap between the military and civilian work has now become so wide that development of new consumer goods on the basis of the SDI research projects is hardly probable. The bulk of the up-to-date military technology is far removed from the civilian needs of the mass consumption market. Even if SDI gives something to the non-military branches this will be much more expensive than direct investments in the civilian sphere.

The debate on SDI is mounting in the West. But no matter what propaganda ploys and hypocritical promises of social prosperity its advocates resort to, increasing numbers of the Americans are coming to realize that the Star Wars programme is the main obstacle to elimination of nuclear-missile

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armaments and to establishment of a durable peace and, therefore, undermines the basis of well-being. This has become particularly clear after the Reykjavik meeting.

(Pravda, November 3. Abridged.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VAKFI
TÜSTAV

Tuesday, November 25, 1986

VORI2-861125-514

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SDI DISSECTED

T. Kolesnichenko

Nobody, I am sure, neither we in this country, nor anyone in the English-speaking world, has yet such a wealth of data put together about the SDI weapons-in-space programme as one can find in "Weaponry in Space: the Dilemma of Security", the new book just put out by the Mir(Peace) Publishers in Moscow, edited by Academician Y.P.Velikhov, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician R.Z.Sagdeyev and A.A.Kokoshin, D.Sc.(History). It has been produced (in Russian and English) by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Threat of Nuclear War. The book considers the possibilities and potential components of the space weapons being developed in the United States.

This is the first-ever full analysis of the implications of an eventual large-scale space-based anti-missile system in terms of science and technology, military strategy as well as international political consequence. The conclusion: such a system cannot be regarded as purely defensive. It is, in fact, a new, comprehensive type of weapon which would boost the arms race and increase the risk of a nuclear war breaking out.

The first five chapters consider the components of the space echelon of a large-scale anti-missile defence system and some of the new means of destruction, like laser, beam, kinetic and electromagnetic impulse weapons, and counter-missile combat space stations. The authors irrefutably prove that none of these are "purely defensive" means. Their eventual deployment right above the enemy territory, the use of powerful energy sources instantly transmittable over unlimited distances, and things like that would provide an ample opportunity for attacking various air and ground targets. In short, what is to be created under the SDI

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programme is a weapon that could be used for a first strike at ground targets. Significantly enough, this aspect of the problem is not mentioned, in fact, in any of the official American documents on SDI because it totally disproves the "defensive logic" of the programme-makers.

The sixth chapter looks at ways and means to counter space strike weapons. That is an important matter. For the emphasis official Washington lays in its SDI campaigning is on the "invulnerability" of this system which is advertized as a dependable "shield" to keep the U.S. safe from ballistic missiles.

The scientists, however, produce undeniable evidence to prove that it is not difficult even today to find active means of neutralizing and defeating a large-scale ABM system. Its most vulnerable elements include space communication which can be disrupted, blocked or altogether put out of action, a combat control subsystem and, above all, the central computer system, all kinds of energy carriers (nuclear installations, combustible material), etc. So, it is not the response that poses a problem. It will be found. The point is -- and that is what the book shows quite well -- that SDI will precipitate a quantitative and qualitative leap in the build-up of strategic nuclear arms, above all, intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBMs) and so-called "false missiles".

The deployment of a large-scale ABM system by the U.S., with space-based elements or individual combat subsystems, would be a clear breach of the 1972 ABM Treaty. In such a situation, the Soviet Union might well find it necessary, in the interest of its own security, to consider itself no longer bound either by Article XII of that Treaty, which proscribes deliberate deceptive action to obstruct monitoring, or by the SALT-II Treaty which limits the number of IBMs and the construction of additional launchers for them. These and other

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measures (like mounting more warheads on IBMs, shorter engine-on time) would drastically reduce the dependability of the "space shield". So the scientists arrive at the conclusion that one of the dangers of a large-scale ABM(or SDI) system is that it means bringing about yet another round of the arms race and compelling the other side to build up its strategic forces and counter-missile capability with all negative consequences following therefrom for international security.

It should be noted that many American scientists have arrived at the same conclusions. Nearly 7,000 scientists, including 57 per cent of the teachers of physics at twenty major U.S. universities, The Washington Post said, have declared their "determined opposition" to the Star Wars programme and refused to accept money for SDI research. This wave of protest is mounting throughout America. An appeal to scientists to abstain from all work relating to Star Wars has been distributed at 110 universities.

The closing chapters of the book deal with SDI's international political and legal aspects. The authors appear to sum up all the findings from SDI dissection and arrive at important political conclusions. The main one is that the objectives of preventing a nuclear-missile disaster threatening humanity are incompatible with the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons, the implementation of the SDI programme and violation of the ABM Treaty. On the contrary, given agreement about the actual reduction of nuclear arms, still more so about their elimination, it is necessary to make this treaty more effective still. It is observance of this treaty that is a real guarantee against all kinds of "surprises", tricks, evasions and other violations of the mutual disarmament process. Seen against this background, the SDI programme is a massive attempt at assuring the U.S. a military-strategic

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superiority, a continuation of an international policy from a position of strength, and, finally, total neglect of international legal commitments by the U.S. and of the interests of international security.

The prevention of a nuclear disaster makes it imperative to impose a total ban once and for all on the use of force in space and keep space from being militarized. A Star Peace, not Star Wars, that is the principle we counterpose to the SDI masterminds. It is one that holds out the promise of a peaceful future for this planet and the very survival of civilization on Earth.

(Pravda, November 22. Abridged.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI
TÜSTAV

Tuesday, November 25, 1986

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SDI: ANOTHER "BIG STICK"

Vitaly Korionov, Pravda political commentator

In the light of Reykjavik the sinister role of the infamous Strategic Defense Initiative has been revealed with particular clarity. SDI has become an instrument used by the enemies of international cooperation to block the path leading to the settlement of issues which are vital for the entire mankind.

In the 70s when strategic military parity set in between the USSR and the US, our countries signed a series of major agreements which immensely benefited the general peace cause. In contrast to that, the present US administration has not signed a single agreement with the USSR and is actually trying to undo everything sealed before. The damage this would do to universal peace and, notably, to the security of the United States itself is obvious to all sober-minded people.

The point is, however, that there is a clear shortage of sober-minded officials in the Washington corridors of power. The strongest positions there are held by the "mad" ones. The notorious US Under Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle, for example, insists that SDI is like a locomotive "that pulls along the arms control train". The Reykjavik summit has clearly shown, however, that SDI is taking that train in the exactly opposite direction. As for the question of verification, it is indicative that as soon as the Soviet Union announced that it agreed to any form of verification, the American advocates of verification, who had grown hoarse shouting that this issue was the only obstacle in the way of the cessation of the arms race suddenly lost all interest in the matter.

And now let us try to look at the whole thing from a different angle. Washington insists that as soon as it had

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boosted its SDI programme the USSR appeared at the negotiating table in Geneva to discuss space and nuclear armaments. Hence the argument that SDI is Washington's trump card at those negotiations. Now, what if the Soviet Union resorts to the same trick and declares that it will by no means agree to reductions in the number of land-based ballistic missiles since this particular threat is bound to keep the Americans at the negotiating table? What will be the fate of the talks in that case?

In putting forward its far-reaching proposals in Reykjavik, the Soviet Union made considerable concessions to the American side. That was done in the name of peace. But let the officials in Washington not forget the following words by Vladimir Lenin: "We have reiterated and reiterated our desire for peace, our need for peace... But we do not propose to be strangled to death for the sake of peace". This is something which we will certainly never allow to happen!

(Pravda, November 25. Abridged.)

PRESSING ISSUE
American Public and SDI
V.Gan

Shortly before the latest press conference of Ronald Reagan newspaper The Washington Post addressed a number of prominent US politicians and public figures with a rather unexpected request. The editorial board asked them to send in questions which they would like to be answered by the White House boss.

The questions varied. But, in my view, the sharpest one was put by former Congressman J. Brademas. He formulated it as follows: in the context of the flops in the international arena, first of all in Reykjavik where no arms reduction was achieved through the fault of the White House, is the President planning any changes towards restoration of trust in the US foreign policy?

Brademas, most likely, listened to one of Reagan's latest speeches in which the President did not say anything reassuring to this effect and again offered a falsified interpretation of the Soviet-American meeting in Iceland. And at the end, losing his bearings in reservations, he preferred to simply declare that he continues to be optimistic.

Today, a month and a half after the Reykjavik meeting, it is difficult to say whom the Washington leaders' regular expressions of optimism are addressed to. Continuing to think over the situation obtaining and to sift the real facts from the lies, America is now pondering over the true meaning of what has happened.

It is a generally held view that in Reykjavik Ronald Reagan had a chance of making a choice in favour of genuine disarmament but he about-faced at the last moment.

How are they explaining here the really maniacal obsession of the Administration with the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)? Explanations are many, and all of them somehow boil down to the old but continually reanimated dream of dominating the world and ruling destinies, and of nonplusing the Soviet Union militarily, politically and economically.

This is their long-term plan. And at the present stage (it is too early to speak about SDI's practical military effectiveness) the motives are mainly of the political-economic character. Apart from the unprecedented profits which it is already bringing to the munitions industry, the programme of space militarization is viewed as the most reliable means of blocking any mutually acceptable agreements between the USSR and the USA in the arms control sphere, as an attempt to force the Soviet Union to work out countermeasures and, hence, to distract the resources necessary for implementation of the tremendous plans of socialist construction, the plans which arouse the whole gamut of negative sentiments, ranging from irritation and fury to open fear, in America's ruling elite.

It is clear that few, if any, speak about this bluntly here. This is easy to explain. The matter is that the American people as a whole unmistakably demonstrates its striving for an agreement with the Soviet Union, for a radical reduction of armaments and elimination of the nuclear war threat. That is why right are the experts pointing to the fact that if the Administration renounced at least its lipservice to the cause of arms control it would immediately lose all public support.

In this situation, the Washington Administration is desperately wriggling, manoeuvring and lying in a bid to mislead people. For instance, while the President himself says that all American proposals are, as before, on the negotiating table, the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

Kenneth Adelman, states in Congress that the Administration is no longer laying emphasis on these proposals. In turn, his pronouncements are disproved by Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Perle who is a day later refuted by State Secretary George Shultz who insists on necessity of preserving a small part of missiles as an insurance policy. And according to President's adviser Paul Nitze, it is not the United States but the Soviet Union that is seeking to revise the ABM Treaty. The CIA professional liars echo him by declaring that the USSR is about to annul this Treaty because Moscow, having spent 150,000 million dollars (sic), has already set up an anti-missile defence system of its own. As a matter of fact, it is a confused picture of the current stand on armaments issues, The New York Times has to conclude.

This is certainly true, but there are also obvious facts. The Reykjavik meeting has galvanized in the USA the debates on the future of the country and of the world, bared the shortage of honesty in the present Administration, and showed a split in the ruling quarters on the issues of nuclear disarmament. But in this context it becomes clear to many people that the road to history-making agreements which could be attained in Reykjavik is always open because the Soviet Union does not withdraw its proposals. And for this reason the following question is sounding ever more pressingly and loudly: does America intend to lose another two long years as the previous six have already been lost?

Washington.

(Pravda, December 2. Abridged.)

SDI AND WHITE HOUSE MYTHS

L. Semeiko

1.

From a scientific (purely theoretical, near-ideal) point of view, the creation of an effective large-scale space missile defence system may be feasible. In technical terms, it is more than dubious. From a military point of view, it is unfeasible. And politically, it is both unjustified and extremely dangerous. Regarding the political aspect of this venture Washington is presently contemplating three variants: SDI No. 1 - covering with a "thick shield" the entire territory of the country; SDI No. 2 - protecting missile bases only; and, finally, SDI No. 3 - seeking protection under a "thin shield" from "nuclear madmen." They have to select the optimal method of space defence. But it's sheer confusion so far.

Weinberger is for the "protection of cities," that is a countrywide defence. His assistant Richard Perle, this "black prince" of the ultrarights, wants to protect "US retaliation (that is, first-strike) weapons." Seconding him is Jack Kemp, who intends to get through to the presidential post in slightly more than a couple of years and demands an immediate abandonment of the ABM Treaty and the deployment of a limited anti-missile system already in the eighties.

But this is an obvious political cheat because all the variants of SDI are full of contradictions. Really, if SDI is a colossus on clay feet unable to ensure a reliable defence of all US cities from nuclear destruction, then why make all that fuss? Why wreck in Reykjavik the opportunity to destroy nuclear weapons, which would eliminate the very danger of

nuclear destruction? There is no logic here.

SDI No.2 is also in conflict: Once you exhort for making nuclear weapons "powerless and obsolete" (Reagan's words), then why try to defend them at missile bases? It likewise won't wash. Nor is SDI No. 3 valid. Just as in the war against terrorism one cannot justify the bomb strikes at Tripoli, so in the struggle against the danger of missile strikes from "nuclear madmen" one cannot justify the construction of an astrodome. You don't use cannon to shoot sparrows. It is necessary to remove the deep-going reasons of both terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons - this is far more promising, even though it requires tremendous efforts joint and concerted and, most importantly, political.

Of course, the political aspect of the public misinformation campaign regarding SDI is not limited to this. So far it is known that Washington is taking advantage of the fact that for the general public the SDI programme is an equation with many scientific-technical and military-political unknown quantities. But it is already clear: the continuation of this programme will involve the world in an unprecedented arms race and destabilise the strategic situation.

2.

The basic trends of political disinformation circulated by Washington in the wake of Reykjavik are taking shape day by day. SDI dominates all comment. The Star Wars programme said to be designed to "defend" America tomorrow is itself being defended today. It is pictured in all colours, while Moscow is blamed for the failure to get an all-embracing accord out of the meeting in Iceland, and the Washington Administration, clinging to this idea, is being cleared of all fault. Stories to this effect are galore. Here are three that are, perhaps,

most typical of them.

First. The USSR is said to be in deadly fear of SDI. "One of the things the Russians fear is that we will have SDI. This is our trump card. We must not give it up". This comment was made by the White House staff chief, Donald Regan, while in Reykjavik. Let us be straightforward: we do have a feeling of danger. But not because of SDI as such. In the military sense, this programme does not worry us because this space "umbrella" over the US would be full of holes even before we take any counter-measures, and still more so when we do take them.

What worries us is the inevitable political upshot. The Star Wars programme would entail dangerous consequences, indeed. In fact, SDI, though still in the cradle, so to speak, has already proved, at Reykjavik, to be a monstrous political killer for nuclear disarmament. Once it comes of age, the world would find it far more difficult to avoid creating new nuclear and space strike weapons and carrying on nuclear tests and, above all, to escape the growing threat of "universal assured destruction".

Now, how do the Washington leaders see the danger they may have to face if, suppose, the USSR cared to build a space shield identical to theirs? Washington's concern, it turns out, would be confined to military technology: we would, they say, have to work harder to build up the weight of and sharpen our nuclear sword. Those are typical American approaches and just as typical preoccupations...

Would we, in this country, have problems to worry about in military technology? Of course, we would. To create a system of counteraction to the Star Wars programme is not an easy thing, although, as has been stressed by the Soviet political and military leadership, it would be done more quickly and more cheaply. The point is that the Soviet response would not be symmetrical to American SDI deployment -- either in the

choice of means or in the use of ways of counteraction. This kind of response to the Pentagon's "astrodome" would be a forced one. However, it would be not only quite feasible technologically but sufficiently effective in the purely military sense.

To illustrate this point, let us refer to the evidence of the American experts who have had a chance to leaf through the seventh volume of a confidential report analyzing SDI prepared by the Fletcher Commission for the US President. This volume is devoted to the examination of possible counter-measures given the deployment of the ABM system. It offers devastating evidence of the futility of all hope to discover anything useful in SDI. That is a fairly clear statement. Not only many American but also Soviet scientists and other specialists have arrived at such conclusion.

A report by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat contains a brief, yet very conclusive analysis of the particular means and ways by which to counteract space strike weapons. There are a lot of means and ways of drastically reducing the combat efficiency of the ABM system, and the Soviet Union does possess sufficient economic, scientific and technological capability to put through the necessary counter-measures.

There will, one must presume, be inevitable difficulties, as is common to any new defence or peace-time venture, though one should hardly attempt to specify their character and scope. But whatever they might be, they would surely be effectively overcome. Let us recall, in this context, the balanced and confident statement by Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik that SDI does not scare us: "I say this with confidence, for it is irresponsible to bluff in such matters. There will be a reply to the Strategic Defence Initiative. There will be one, though it will be asymmetrical. And it will

Thursday, December 4, 1986

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not cost us much at that".

Second. It is alleged that SDI helped return Moscow back to the negotiating table in Geneva and Reykjavik. "A position from strength" was allegedly decisive in this respect. This is an obvious attempt to justify not only the Star Wars concept, but the entire programme for America's strategic rearming which started five years ago and which will end in the 1990s.

These allegations have nothing to do with reality. It is the USSR that on many occasions since the war has called on the United States to start disarmament talks. Significant progress in this respect was registered, incidentally, in the 1970s, when, as the present Administration alleges, the United States could not "act from strength". The USSR was forced to leave the Geneva negotiating table in 1983 when the United States began to deploy nuclear Euromissiles, trying "to act from strength" and thus frustrating the talks. On SDI as talks stimulant, the Geneva talks became a failure three years ago, eight months after Reagan proclaimed his Strategic Defence Initiative.

This does not mean that the USSR did not see the danger of SDI, particularly for the future of nuclear disarmament. That was why this country proposed beginning current comprehensive talks on nuclear and space arms. So there was no need to force us back to the negotiating table. On the contrary, it were precisely the consistent Soviet efforts that made it hard for the United States to avoid a serious dialogue.

The Americans are erring, to say the least, on this score. An error is also found in the plans to make SDI small change in the talks and to sacrifice some of its elements, at worst, in exchange for the USSR's consent to "genuine and fair" cuts in nuclear weapons in US interests. The USSR firmly believes

that an agreement should give the sides equal security and that it is necessary not only to reduce but abolish nuclear weapons while excluding the arms race in space.

Third. It is also alleged time and again that SDI is the sole salvation from the "Soviet threat". It is alleged that Star Wars can save all humans from death in a nuclear war. However, this myth doesn't hold water if only because many things convincingly show that the projected space umbrella would leak and no anti-missile defence would be salvation from nuclear catastrophe.

The conclusion suggests itself: to get rid of this threat (which is real unlike the alleged "Soviet threat") it is necessary to get rid of nuclear weapons. However, Washington does not want to get rid of nuclear weapons.

What about the accords to liquidate nuclear weapons, which Reagan accepted in Iceland? He did accept them but this does not mean that he did so willingly. This does not mean either that the preliminary accords would be eventually implemented. For those on the right and the far right, SDI means not so much salvation from the "Soviet threat" as refuge behind the space varieties of the Maginot line from accords to abolish nuclear weapons.

Juggling with these and other myths around SDI is by no means evidence of Washington's serious approach to pressing issues. Far from saving the US leadership from an embarrassment, SDI predetermined it: to be two or three steps from historic agreements and not to make these steps after covering "strategic kilometres" in talks can be permitted only by the side which stands for logging more kilometres along the circular route. Such a side cannot but be seen as the culprit behind the abortive talks in Iceland. The culprit, who dodged the realities of the nuclear age, and who is resorting to myths to save face.

(Izvestia, December 2-3. Abridged.)

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND AMERICAN CRAVINGS

Vitaly Korionov, Pravda's
political commentator

The whole world knows today that in Reykjavik there was an opportunity for accord on the cardinal problems of international security. The only reason why it was not exploited is because the American side placed its Strategic Defense Initiative higher than the vital interests of all nations, including the American people.

After the Reykjavik summit, the broad international public and many political circles have clearly understood that the Star Wars programme became the principal obstacle to radical reductions and subsequent elimination of all nuclear weapons. Not so in Washington. There, the time after Reykjavik is being lost for nothing. The military-industrial complex and the political and militarist circles which are at its service are stubbornly sticking to SDI. Representatives of the Administration keep praising this scheme which is highly dangerous for peace and for the future of the planet. It is being presented in Washington as an all-purpose instrument for the assertion of American "interests".

Let us find out what these "interests" are. Why are the Americans so obtrusive with their Star Wars programme, trying to rope its allies into its political, economic, technological and strategic military framework and pushing mankind with all their might into the bottomless pit of new spheres of the arms race? There is no secret here, just as there is none in the fact that SDI is the brainchild of the military-industrial complex and of the more reactionary circles in the United States whose interests it reflects instead of those of the American people.

Equally obvious is the fact that SDI has nothing in

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common with the officially proclaimed goal of the White House to remove nuclear weapons. For the irony is that to put into effect the components of the "non-nuclear space shield" nuclear pumping is required. The chairman of the American Natural Resources Defense Council, de Wind, puts it as follows: The development and construction of a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser alone will call for about 200 nuclear tests. Hence the stubborn refusal of Washington to follow the USSR's example and stop nuclear testing.

The SDI is also a tool in the designs to break up the international system of treaties and agreements checking the runaway arms race, which was created at the cost of such great efforts in the 70s. The primary target of this attack is the ABM Treaty which disrupted the tragic cycle of the defensive and offensive arms race.

SDI, rabid enemy of peace, is part and parcel of hegemonistic plots by US imperialism. As the United States is losing ground on the international scene, its monopolies see SDI as a way to ensure American technological leadership in the non-socialist world. Brains and sophisticated technology are being drained to US research centres from Western Europe and Japan; that is one of the means to ensure US supremacy.

SDI goes hand-in-hand with imperial appetites, with attempts to ensure military supremacy, and the US aspirations to have the global say--that is evident. It is no less evident that the present US Administration offers no resistance to the demands of the military-industrial complex and other notorious Star Wars partisans: either the Administration does not want to do so, or cannot afford to, or it has some other reasons to mark time. As they watch this sad picture, millions the world over can't but wonder if the Administration is dependent on military-space monopolies to such an extent that it can't raise a finger without their

consent. If so, can one call it a vigorous Administration?

If such is the present situation, another question arises: why has the world to suffer from the self-seeking aspirations of US war tycoons and politicians supporting them, who would like to make the human race hostage to their ominous policy and to SDI? Imperial aspirations determine the stance of those circles who have assumed the right to gamble in the fates of billions of people. But today's world isn't likely to let them do it.

Naturally, the global peace-loving forces see the opposition to the sinister plot brewing in Washington as the focus of the effort to defend world peace, and national freedom and independence. The Soviet Union counterweights the warlike stance of the US ruling circles with the clear-cut programme it has offered in Reykjavik, whose central premises include strategic weaponry reduced, medium-range missiles in Europe eliminated down to the last one, ABM Treaty buttressed, and nuclear tests banned.

Vital national interests contradict the dependence of life on Earth on predatory aspirations by those who want to achieve global diktat by brandishing the Big Stick in space.

(Pravda, November 1. Abridged.)

YILDIZ SAVASLARI VE TEKNİK

- Lenin : Modern teknolojinin gelişmesi
Sanayinin emekçiyi hale getirmesi
- Yıldız Sav. Örgütü / İnsanlar, gözetim
teknik
- Sanayiye göre kendine bakış, rekabet
etme.
- Teknik ne amaçla kullanılmak
istiyor?
- Teknikler

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARASTIRMA KURUMU

WOR. Keln /
(5 Bruch 86)

Cenure deli. Por-Am. atabinglann
vörsmelen hakkunda bilgi vurdı yon
~~Loopt~~ özel Antena'ya Gelen
Loopt özel den sitemi Rodionov
halıyın de yozetiji girmade,
etad'mın yıldı Savaylari projesini
elestirecek "eğer mükteer atab-
eplanmay. fideetnek, yıldı savay-
lannın ne işek vın" dedi.

7 Türkiye, Yıldı Savaylarına katılacak,
bu konuda olumlu emti yapmay
Kollayt, 9 Bruch 86, An.

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARASTIRMA

(1. 5. 85 Pers.)

② Lebi Yanyizick (9 May 1885) "Bizim de Yildiz Savastan
projesine katkımız olur. Ben projenin asaat ile bir eij komsu
oldugunda, celt konstruksiyonları siz komsu oldugunda
birun T'inin katkısı olur." / 20 May 85'te gelenekt.

③ Uray Savastan 'nın kademi T'inin elinde (16. 7. 84)
④ Patriot fuzelan - Rijaylar. (Rogers'in gizli raporu)

⑤ Ayn Razi 'na taay etleri yerlyotulmas. / Hollit Bergen
(Yeni benden).

⑥ Amerikan uyay mehtillerin
Van - Doyabahn 'i kullanan / İHT 'in uyay meht. jini

zoruyla mis alantamyla ilgili yengimlady. han tnda
Doyabahn da gosterily. / Eylül '85

⑦ SSB 'profesinin bas. Ben. Abrahamson Bruchel 'de
Birond 'a "Lzde bu projenin belirti alantamına katkısı
bulunabilirlik beynder van. tste big bu kiplerle ityotuz."

(Ekim 9. 7. 85).
⑧ Bekram kunumiz (Global Foundation)
Atay

SSB denden
Ukumiz SSB 'in 'Yildiz Savastan' profesinin
uim itleek mi?

Politik dende
de T'inin
egayyonun kullanan matr.

Asheri yam

Politik ekonomik yam

ASB askeri sanay konglomerat
asker sanay askeri ve proje ve
politik ekon tekn ve statistik
askeri tekn denden
başlang proje matr.

Türkiye ekonomik gelişmelerin dünyada kullanış
Köleer gaja uygun bu gajdun manifi perell.

Monday, March 23, 1987

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VORI4-870323-512

AGAINST STAR WARS

James Carter, former US President, has said in an interview with a correspondent of the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda in Algeria that he opposes "Star Wars" first because they have nothing to do with an anti-ballistic missile defense, being purely offensive weapons. Second because the very idea of putting a nuclear umbrella over the American continent is senseless and faulty. Its realization will not give genuine security to the US. Both sides have accumulated such a great amount of missiles that even if half are destroyed, the second half could destroy human civilization. Third this program is absurdly expensive. It is going to cost not less than two to three trillion dollars, while US economy is not at its best today.

And, finally, the SDI is not a stimulus for talks. On the contrary, it is a major obstacle, because it makes the arms race impossible to control, and that makes for unpredictable consequences.

Carter said that he had signed SALT-2 in Vienna in 1979 and he was proud of it. It was an important and necessary treaty both for the US and the USSR, as well as for the world in general, because it effectively curbed the development and accumulation of strategic nuclear armaments. Moreover, he said he was sure that, in working out any other agreement, SALT-2 had to be the starting point.

The former US President said that he sincerely supported the proposal for complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and would be truly glad to witness it. Although, unfortunately, one could hardly expect the US administration to take responsible and positive decision, he was optimistic. The sincere stand of the Soviet Union expressed in the recent initiatives of Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the

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CPSU Central Committee, inspires special hope for a dramatic reduction in all nuclear armaments, both intermediate-range and strategic, with their subsequent elimination.

(Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 21. Summary.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TÜSTAV
TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VAKFI

"YILDIZSAVAŞLARI" VE TÜRKİYE

Mehmet ERGÜL

İnsanoğlu, daha önce görmediği bir savaş türünü gördü, yaşadı yirminci yüzyılda. Dünya savaşıdır bu. İnsanoğlu, hem de iki kez yaşadı bu acı felâketi. Birinci Dünya Savaşı, 34 devleti içine aldı. 74 milyon insan cephelere yollandı, 10 milyon ~~kişi~~ ^{insan} öldü. 20 milyon insan yaralandı, sakat kaldı.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın alevleri 72 devleti sardı. 110 milyon insan silah altına alındı. 55 milyon insan yaşamını yitirdi.

İkincisini değil ama

savaş

Yirminci yüzyılın ilk büyük felaketini ülkemiz de yaşadı.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda

~~sayıları~~ 325 bin insanımız yaşamını yitirdi. 400

bin kişi yaralandı. ~~Aslı~~ Savaşın azdırdığı açlık ve salgın hasta-
insanlarımızın
lıklardan ölenlerin sayısı 2,5 milyonu buldu. Her dört erkekten biri demektir bu.

x

Bu kez bütün insanlık bir üçüncü dünya savaşı tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya. Çıkarssa, ^{bütün uygarlığı,} yeryüzündeki bütün canlılığı toptan yok edecek nükleer bir savaştır bu.

İşte Reagan yönetiminin "Stratejik Savunma Girişimi" denilen Yıldız Savaşları projesi, nükleer silahlanmanın en yüksek düzeye çıkarılmasıdır. Özü uzayın silahlandırılması demek olan çağımızın en canavarca ~~projesi~~ girişimidir bu. Amerikan askeri-sanayi kompleksi, bu canice programa bağlaşıklarını çekmek için her yola başvuruyor.

Fransa, Kanada, Norveç, Yunanistan, Danimarka ve Avustralya, ^{Japonya,} Yıldız Savaşları programına katılmayı reddettiler. İngiltere, Batı Almanya, İtalya, İsrail, Pentagon'un uzayı silahlandırma girişimini kabul etti.

Önce Federal Almanya'nın Göttingen kentindeki toplantıda, "Uzay savaşının kaderini, coğrafi konumu nedeniyle Türkiye belirleyecek" deniyordu. ~~Yapılan~~ 137 bilim adamının katıldığı toplantıda konuşan Federal Alman Profesör Reiner Labusch, şöyle diyordu: "Çeşme'de yapılan NATO Savunma Bakanları toplantısında ilk kez açıklanan Amerika'nın uzay stratejisi, Türkiye'nin onayı olmadan gerçekleşmez. Türkiye'deki radarlar, Sovyetler Birliği'nden kalkan ilk roketin sinyalinin Amerikan uydularına bildirmekle görevli. Ayrıca yine Türkiye'de kurulması hesaplanan atom reaktörü büyüklüğündeki lazer santralleri, Amerikan uydularına yöneltilecek Sovyet füzelerini imha etmekle görevlendirilecek. Bu konumundan ötürü, Yıldızlar Savaşı'nın kaderini Türkiye belirleyecektir" (Hürriyet, 16 Temmuz 1984) "Amerika'nın geliştirdiği sistem, ilk vuranın savaşı da kazanacağı anlamına geliyor. Bu nedenle, Sovyet füzelerine karşı ilk darbenin Türkiye topraklarından gelmesi de kaçınılmaz oluyor. Türkiye böyle bir rolü geri çevirirse, Amerika'nın 500 milyon dolar harcayarak geliştirdiği sistem iflas eder."

Bunu Savunma Bakanı Zeki Yavuztürk'ün şu demesi izliyordu:

"Gerek Silahlı Kuvvetlerimiz içindeki kuruluşlarımız, gerekse sivil enstitülerimiz, üniversite araştırma merkezlerimiz vardır. TÜBİTAK vardır. Silahlı Kuvvetlerimiz Balistik Araştırma Merkezi vardır. ASELSAN vardır. Bütün bunlar araştırma konularına girebilirler. Hatta bu konuda açılacak ihalelere de girebiliriz." (Tercüman, 1 Mayıs 1985) "Bu projenin bir de yerüstü teçhizatı var. Atış rampaları var. Radarların çelik karkasları var. İnşaat işleri var. Bu inşaat işleri söz konusu olduğunda, çelik konstrüksiyonları söz konusu olduğunda, bizde birim var, üniversitelerimiz var. Projeye Türkiye'nin katkısı tabii yapım sahasındaki işler olacak." (Cumhuriyet, 1 Mayıs 86)

Bir süre sonra Yavuztürk, ~~Buikankıdaki NATO'ya~~ "Dahe önce ~~xxxx~~ yapmış olduğum açıklama yanlış anlaşıldı. Bu açıklamamda olaya bir mühendis gözüyle yaklaşmış ve Türkiye'nin bu projeye katılması durumunda bazı altyapı ve rampa tesislerinin inşaatına katkıda bulunabileceğini ifade etmiştim. Oysa projenin nasıl gerçekleşeceği henüz aydınlanmamıştır ve Türkiye'nin Yıldızlar Savaşı'na ilişkin kararı, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu'nun onayını gerektirmektedir. Türkiye'nin bu projeye katılması konusunda almış olduğu ne resmi, ne de gayriresmi bir kararı vardır." (BBC, 21 Mayıs 1985)

Aynı günlerde, NATO Başkomutanı General Rogers'ın Türkiye Genelkurmay Başkanlığı'na verilen "Nükleer İhtiyaç İncelemesi" adlı raporunda, Patriot füzelerinin Boğazlar'a yerleştirilmesi gereği bildiriliyordu (Milliyet, 28 Nisan 1985). ^{Amerikan kaynakları} Bu füzelerin Yıldız Savaşları projesinin bir parçası olduğunu yazıyor. ABD'li Tuğgeneral James Sears uçaksavar bir silah niyetiyle geliştirilen Patriot ~~xxxx~~ sisteminin ~~xxxxxxvaxkixsilahaxçaxkix~~ füzeleri yok etmek için de kullanılabilecek "çok amaçlı" bir silah olduğunu doğruluyordu.

Aynı konuda dış politika uzmanı, Doçent Dr. Halûk Gerger şöyle diyor: "Neden Türkiye'deki Nike Hercules'lerin sökülüp Patriot füzelerinin yerleştirilmesi gündeme geliyor? İşte burada Yıldız Savaşları projesi devreye giriyor. Bu projenin şu ana kadar çözülmemiş iki sorunu var: Birincisi, eğer bu sistem, ABD topraklarında kurulursa, dünyanın yuvarlaklığı nedeniyle Sovyet füze üslerine göre ufuk çizgisinin altında kalacaktır. Dolayısıyla fırlatılan Sovyet füzelerini ancak belirli bir yüksekliğe ulaştıktan sonra görme imkânına sahip olacaktır. Bu nedenle, Yıldız Savaşları silahlarının yerdeki üsleri, kesinlikle ABD toprakları dışında ve bu ufuk çizgisi sorununu çözmek için Sovyetler Birliği'ne en yakın yerlerde bulunması gerekiyor. İkinci sorun, Yıldız Savaşları'nın teknolojik gelişmesi, egzotik silahların yanı sıra, anti-balistik füzelerin de geliştirilmesine bağlı. Yani

bir tür entegre proje. ABD çevrelerinde şimdiden, Türkiye'den açıkça, Yıldız Savaşları Projesi'nin yerdeki lazer sistemlerinin yerleştirelebileceği en elverişli yer olarak söz ediliyor." (YeniGündem, 12-18 Mayıs 1986).

Burada söz konusu olan excimer lazerleridir. "Enerjiyi üreten araç çok ağır ve büyük olduğu için bunun yerde (dağ tepelerinde) üslenmesi gerek. Bu tür lazerlerin ışınları da atmosferden geçerek uzaya yerleştirilen yansıtıcılar vasıtasıyla hedefe ~~gönderilir~~ yönlendirilir. Bu lazerler değişik bir kimyasal reaksiyonla çok güçlü ışınlar üretir ve bir-iki saniyede bir füzeyi yokedebilir." (Milliyet, Sami Kohen, 17 Kasım 1985). Sovyetler Birliği'ne en yakın yüksek dağlardan biri de Ağrı Dağı'dır. Ve Astronot Irwin'in Ağrı Dağı'na ^{nin ana nedeni de budur.} iniş-çıkışları ~~şayx~~

Yine Yıldız Savaşları projesiyle bağlı olarak, Amerikan uzay mekiklerinin Diyarbakır ve Van'ı kullanması ~~şayx~~ söz konusu edilmektedir. International Herald Tribune gazetesinde yayınlanan uzay mekiğinin zorunlu iniş alanlarıyla ilgili bir haritada Diyarbakır da gösterilmektedir.

Stratejik Savunma Girişimi görevlilerinden General Padden, Piriçlik Üssü'nden gelen bilgilerin bu projede önemli rol oynayacağını söylemektedir. (Sami Kohen, Milliyet, 18 Kasım 1985).

SSG Projesinin başı General Abrahamson, Brüksel'de Milliyet yazarı Birand'a "Sizde bu projenin belirli alanlarına katkıda bulunabilecek beyinler var. İşte bız bu kişilerle ilgiliniz" demiştir. (Milliyet, 9 Temmuz 1985).

Son olarak da ~~şayx~~ Yıldız Savaşları'yla ilgili olarak bir heyetin ABD'ye gideceğini Savunma Bakanı açıklamıştır (Cumhuriyet, 23 Nisan 1986)

bu projede
Görülüyor ki, ABD yönetimi, ülkemizin politik desteğini almak ve coğrafi konumundan yararlanmak için çeşitli yollara başvurmuştur.

Nükleer silahlanmayı nitel olarak bir üst düzeye çıkaracak olan bu canice proje, İzlanda doruğunda anlaşmaya varılmasını engellemiştir. Bu projeyle ABD askeri-sanayi kompleksi, bir yandan askeri üstünlük sağlayıp nükleer şantaj yoluyla dünya hegomonyası peşinde koşmaktadır. Bir yandan da, müttefiklerini politik, ekonomik askeri, ve teknolojik bakımdan ~~zorunlu~~ kesinkes kendine bağlamayı, rehin almayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu proje, bütün NATO ülkeleri ve Japonya'nın ABD'nin askeri ve ekonomik dayatmalarına boyun eğmeleri demektir. ABD'nin uzantısı durumuna gelmeleri demektir.

TKP Merkez Komitesi Genel Sekreteri Kutlu yoldaşın yurtdışı parti örgütleri konferansında yaptığı konuşmada belirttiği gibi, "ulusal kurtuluş bayrağını açan ilk ülkelerden biri olan Türkiye'ni insanlığı yokedecek böyle bir proje için ABD'ye kölece boyun eğen ülkelerin başında gelmesi hem düşündürücü, hem de utanç vericidir. ABD'ye halkımız adına verilen bu onayı, halkımızla birlikte geri almalıyız."

SPACE AGE RESEARCH: FOR PEACE OR FOR WAR?

Jurgen Reusch

deputy director, Institute for Marxist Studies (FRG)

EUREKA is an acronym for "European Research Cooperation Agency", a West European research coordination project. The letter "C" which should have been there has been deliberately replaced with "K" to coincide with the famous exclamation "eureka" ("I have found it") Archimedes is said to have uttered upon discovering the principle of specific gravity. The transparent hint at the great discovery of the mathematician from Ancient Greece insinuates that a long sought-after solution has been found to the issue of how Western Europe--torn by rivalries, national egoism and pressure from its US and Japanese competitors, concerned over the US Strategic Defense Initiative programme, half dragged into SDI already and half resisting it--can retain access to the latest, high technology or become involved in its development. However, how specific is EUREKA? Is it really more than a vision, a castle in the air? Whose interests are behind it? What objectives do its architects pursue? How should the peace movement approach it?

The emergence of the EUREKA project is, on the one hand, a result of reflections on the need for Western Europe's greater degree of independence in economic, political and particularly, strategic military fields. These reflections came to the surface when US medium-range nuclear missiles began to be deploy-

ed and gained ground with the announcement of SDI. Washington's strategy of nuclear deterrence adopted in 1945 does not at all proceed from the principle that war must be prevented; it has always been aimed at military superiority, at advantages for one side, at a capability to limit--and therefore fight--nuclear war. So far the Soviet Union has been able to prevent realisation of such schemes. SDI is designed to return nuclear deterrence to the original stage of nuclear blackmail, to give the United States an exclusive capability to win a nuclear war. This signals a radical change for the worse in the strategic position of the West European NATO countries.

At the same time, EUREKA was a product of a fundamentally new stage in the scientific and technological revolution. Large-scale transfer of information processing, regulation and control functions until now performed by man to computers and automatic devices is the main distinguishing feature of this stage.

The first project, conceived in 1983 to give an impetus to the too slow process of West European integration within the EEC framework, was called ESPRIT (European Strategic Programme on Research and Development in Information Technology); it was followed by BRITE (Basic Research on Industrial Technologies for Europe) and RACE (Research and Development in Advanced Communications Technologies in Europe). However, in April 1985 the French government seized the initiative from the EEC by proposing the EUREKA project as a follow-up on its earlier efforts to step up cooperation with the FRG. Initially, EUREKA

was the French response to SDI--not as an alternative to SDI but as a way to complement it.

Paris had dual reasons for taking this step. On the one hand, the technological competition with the United States would endanger the advanced positions of Western Europe, particularly France, if the FRG joined SDI. On the other, SDI undermines the role of the French nuclear capability, although it is excessive even now. Therefore, presented as a mostly civilian project, EUREKA was supposed to enhance the West European high-tech effort while benefiting France militarily by promoting cooperation in arms manufacture (perhaps within the framework of the Western European Union) and playing on the West German desire to carry greater weight in matters involving nuclear weapons. But the French and the US projects essentially deal with the same technologies. Whether these are used for civilian or military purposes depends on the socio-political situation.

The ruling coalition in Bonn did not welcome the French initiative at once. Having officially joined SDI despite strong domestic pressure to the contrary and having concluded a secret agreement with the United States, Bonn identified its priorities clearly. The EUREKA project is being conducted on a different basis.

In July 1985 representatives of 17 West European countries and of the Commission of European Communities gathered in Paris on an invitation from President Mitterrand and gave the official seal of approval to EUREKA. In November 1985 the second

conference of interested governments was convened in Hannover. Everything looked impressive enough at the preparatory stage. France proposed various projects in the fields of informatics, biotechnology and electronics. Other countries also submitted proposals which totalled more than 300. These, however, mostly remained on paper. Ten projects were approved for launching, and a small, "flexible" secretariat was established to act as a coordinating body.

Specifically, the projects envisage joint development and manufacture of a standard minicomputer for student and personal use; a compact vector computer; a robot for processing textiles; a high efficiency laser (Eurolaser); technologies for the manufacture of liquid silicon crystals and membrane filters and for neutralising environmentally harmful substances in the troposphere over Europe (EUROTRAC); a West European research network, that is, an international data processing network comprising institutions of higher learning, as well as government and private research centres; diagnostic techniques for AIDS-type diseases; and a flexible manufacturing system based on the application of optoelectronics (an automated factory).

The next conference held in London in June 1986 approved about 60 more projects of different scope and nature; these will cost a total of 2.1 billion dollars.

Not yet fully drawn up in detail, EUREKA presents a motley picture. There is something in it for everyone. Participation in it is perfectly compatible with different concepts of hege-

mony and with different types of policy. The French aims have already been mentioned. Bonn's right-wing coalition sees EUREKA compromise solutions as yet another effort to speed up integration and to assert distinctive West European interests--side by side with profound loyalty to Washington and support of SDI. The aim is to improve the ability of the West European centre of imperialism to uphold its political, economic and military interests while staying under the protective umbrella of US hegemony.

Acting in accordance with this approach, the government of the FRG, quite logically, accords priority to SDI and does not support those elements of the French project which impart or can be construed as imparting an excessively independent West European slant to it. Participation in EUREKA is regarded as secondary; today it is a smokescreen which is to conceal the frightening scope of West German submission to Washington.

Opinions within the right-wing coalition differ widely on how EUREKA and SDI should be approached. While Chancellor Kohl, an open and fervent advocate of the US project, began by obstructing the French initiative and thus provoked a certain deterioration in French-West German relations, Foreign Minister Genscher announced his support for EUREKA. He responded coolly to SDI, although was ready for a compromise. The right wing got the upper hand. Genscher's concept of a large-scale and concerted EEC policy on research remained unfulfilled.

The ruling quarters of the FRG interpret EUREKA not so much as a means of asserting greater West European independence as a clearing-house for projects, to be considered among the miscellaneous items of the agenda. Kohl defines it as an undertaking which, while capable of strengthening the hand of Western Europe, must not be allowed to confront the United States with a bloc in opposition: "We do not want a technological bloc. This is a matter of considerable political, not only economic importance. For the goal is to consolidate our European alliance with the West, not to break it apart."¹ And while the March 1986 agreement on SDI between the FRG and the United States regulates political and military aspects of bilateral relations, the Bonn cabinet holds that this must not be the case with EUREKA. It is no accident that space projects have been excluded from its framework. By constantly stressing the civilian character of EUREKA, the West German government brings the military aspects of SDI into bolder relief.

That is why the FRG does not earmark too much money for EUREKA. While Mitterrand has announced the French intention of allocating one billion francs (although through a redistribution of resources), the chief of the West German budgetary agency blocked an attempt by the Research Ministry to appropriate an additional 60 million marks for EUREKA. The rumour that another billion marks would be allocated from the national budget over

the next few years remains unconfirmed. The intention is to finance the project mostly from the private funds of the participating companies. According to Research and Technology Minister Riesenhuber, EUREKA must not "use money to attract participants"; the state should perform only coordinating functions. Kohl was even more straightforward: "We maintain that in principle, the enterprises themselves should finance the EUREKA projects they wish to undertake."² Thus, in accordance with the right-wing views of encouraging private monopoly enterprise, the lucrative contracts will be shared among big and powerful enterprises, and medium and small businesses will get nothing. This is also true of smaller countries with less developed state-monopoly structures.

The ruling coalition considers EUREKA as part of an aggressive strategy to corner the world market. These intentions are, of course, obscured and embellished in the Declaration on the EUREKA principles: "The purpose of EUREKA ... is to enhance the productivity and competitiveness of European /West European--J.R./ industries and national economies on world markets."³ The increasingly acute rivalry involving Western Europe and the two other imperialist centres, the United States and Japan, will produce not so much new jobs as a new wave of streamlining and growing structural unemployment.

The so far civilian character of EUREKA does not mean that it will necessarily benefit society. Some of the projects may bring benefits--for example, EUROTRAC or medical diagnostic techniques. Still, the degree to which research results will

be applied depends, in the final analysis, not on their technological aspects or interests of society, but on the big concerns with their unbridled pursuit of profit.

Even if one does regard EUREKA as a civilian project, one cannot rule out the possibility of the technologies developed being put to military uses. That is obvious, as is the fact that France has military plans for EUREKA. Of the ten projects approved in Hannover, at least five can be used directly for military purposes: compact vector computers (in military aircraft and tanks); liquid silicon crystals used in sensor technologies; fabric-processing robots (to produce fabrics for the armed forces); powerful lasers (in anti-missile and anti-aircraft weapons); and the automated factory (for the manufacture of chemical and biological toxic agents and high-tech types of weapons). Virtually all new technologies can be used, directly or indirectly, for similar purposes. Whether this will really be the case is above all a socio-political question. Conditions being what they are, it is very difficult to prevent such abuse.

Aside from joining SDI, the government of the Federal Republic is considering the possibility of creating a West European ABM system. A relevant project has already been drawn up. It consists of three components--a West European ABM system called "European Defence Initiative" (EDI); "smart weapons" developed within the framework of the NATO "follow-on force attack" concept; and a multisensor surveillance satellite for military (and also, allegedly, civilian) purposes, to be coproduced by France and the FRG. All these components are technically com-

patible with SDI and other military programmes. This is all the more true of projects not yet approved but slated for the future. The companies that are to develop these projects are already participating in EUREKA—for example, the Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm concern, an arms manufacturer, or Siemens. One cannot therefore seriously accept EUREKA as a purely civilian project.

The fact that EUREKA is limited to Western Europe is another flaw of this project. Participation of Third World or socialist countries is virtually ruled out. The government of the Federal Republic rejected a relevant proposal of the GDR at once, although Chairman Mischnick of the FDP faction in the Bundestag did raise the question of possible involvement of European socialist countries in some of the projects.

The general impression is that in terms of foreign policy and defence, EUREKA reflects the contradiction between West European independence (although deformed in the military field) and submission to US diktat. Under the conditions that prevail, it can also be used as a West European contribution to NATO capabilities.

Those are the reasons why democratic movements and left forces cannot regard EUREKA in its present form as an alternative to SDI or unconditionally accept its positive essence. Rather, it gives the reactionaries an opportunity to step up the confrontation, the arms race and the offensive against social gains. At the same time, the project reflects the aggravation of interimperialist contradictions between Western Europe and the United States, a factor which must not be ignored. Democratic forces, above all the peace movement, should use the

contradictions inherent in EUREKA to dissociate Western Europe more resolutely from the US policy of confrontation.

However, saying a simple "yes" or "no" is not enough. It would be politically pointless with regard to EUREKA. For, even having said "no", one cannot block the implementation of the project which is moving ahead, although slowly and running into numerous difficulties. Rather, the question is whether EUREKA creates a basis for a more realistic policy than today's aggressive private monopoly course. Can it help Western Europe to steer clear of the aggressive US stand and to pursue a broadly European peace policy which would also cover the economic and social spheres? On what conditions and in what areas should one work to secure this objective?

West Germany's Social Democrats reject SDI and welcome EUREKA, criticising the government approach to it. The position of the SDP (and of the Socialist Parties' Union of the EEC countries) is that if EUREKA is made into a civilian project, it can become an alternative to SDI; the government should allocate resources to it, and countries unaffiliated in the Common Market should be given flexible access to it. Several socially useful technological projects are also envisaged in the fields of environmental protection, energy, health care and food production. Other wishes expressed in the course of a relevant discussion within the SDP included arguments in favour of government-sponsored coordination and planning of research and development, involvement of the Commission of the European Communities in this process, and more extensive participation by universities and small and medium businesses. The Left demands disarmament, conversion and nationalisation of the arms manufacturing concerns.

These SDP views are, of course, better than the stand of the right-wing bloc, but they cannot fully satisfy peace champions. The social democratic proposals proceed from a belief in a type of government which, in contrast to the conservative system, can be described as statist and social integrationist. It is oriented on the state playing a bigger role in capitalist modernisation. In terms of foreign policy, the preference is for ties with the EEC and for methods of collective imperialist domination, although the policy of detente with the socialist countries is also upheld.

However, this whole concept is not aimed at disarmament; there is no clear line of demarcation separating it from the conservative pseudo-solutions suggesting the establishment of a relatively autonomous West European deterrent capability on the basis of the military-industrial complex. The concept in question indicates no readiness to confront Washington. It fails to explain what the response should be to US reprisals. On the contrary, it pins its hopes on the allies' ability to "get on well with one another". The goal is to restore the internal consensus in NATO on a reformed basis.

Still, this policy option opens much greater opportunities for the democratic forces to bring pressure to bear on the government in favour of disarmament. If EUREKA is implemented within the context of this type of policy, the working class and trade union movement and the peace champions should, taking the projects's contradictory nature into account, advance an anti-monopoly socio-political alternative.

One must admit that for all its inherent contradictions, the attempt to enhance the role of Western Europe with the help

of EUREKA does feature certain progressive elements. Objectively, they are rooted in the clash between the interests of the United States and Western Europe over issues of security, external economic policy and attitude to the Third World. The United States would like to replace the joint (at least with regard to trends) system of domination by the three major imperialist centres with its own exclusive hegemony. The US strategy of using military superiority to undermine the positions of Western Europe is coming increasingly into conflict not only with the latter's economic interests but also with its efforts to survive in the nuclear age.

For reasons of Western Europe's geographical position, traditions, distinctive aspects of economic and political development and widespread recognition of the positive significance of detente, our continent has a much greater stake in political normalisation and economic cooperation with the socialist countries, and this is precisely what Washington refuses to accept. The so-called community of values shared by the United States and Western Europe is not questioned when the future is considered. However, West European interests are becoming ever more pronounced within the framework of this community. These interests can serve as a basis for switching to a more realistic policy that would keep clear of the US course aimed at confrontation.

These trends arise inevitably even in imperialist alliances such as the EEC. But since the right-wing pro-Atlantic forces are dominant in it, the EEC can hardly be expected to encourage

independence from the United States. In contrast to the US pursuit of hegemony, West European countries would prefer collective forms of domination; therefore, the EEC can become a forum in which Western Europe's own interests can be identified and asserted in contrast to US objectives. Projects such as EUREKA can enhance or weaken this process depending on which policy option prevails.

Although hard to discern, the West European interests potentially built into EUREKA should be oriented on the creation of new "consumer values", democratisation of society and assistance to disarmament and comprehensive security.

We hold that EUREKA should also include socially useful civilian projects that would be environmentally safe, lead to greater employment and be consonant with the interests of working people in capitalist, socialist and Third World countries. Such projects could be undertaken to ensure environmental protection, develop environmentally safe energy sources, improve urban transport and the distribution of food, and combat disease.

EUREKA would thus serve society, not make the monopolies more competitive on international markets or accelerate the monopoly-sponsored "technology race". The capitalist logic of profit and the modernisation and flexibility of production it dictates should be countered with the use of technology for the benefit of man, and this approach should determine the organisation of labour and the division of functions between man and machinery. In that case EUREKA would be oriented more on the tackling of domestic economic problems, on job creation and on government support of technological development. Besides, the project should

also include humanitarian and economic research. Why not raise the issue of what social phenomena breed neofascism in Western Europe? All this would make technological policy part of an alternative economic and social policy.

This restructuring of EUREKA to make it socially useful would inevitably and soon come into conflict with the constraints imposed by the capitalist relations of power and ownership. Therefore, it is important to advance demands for democratisation not only at the level of individual enterprises or projects. What we need is a change of the entire social background, an expansion of direct democracy, worker participation in economic management, democratic control and planning, socialisation, etc. One must not allow EUREKA to serve the monopolies' pursuit of profit and the expansion of their foreign trade. The programme must be controlled and coordinated by national and international parliamentary and political bodies; simultaneously, they must be profoundly democratised.

It is very important to link EUREKA with a consistent and long-term disarmament effort and with the strategy of comprehensive security. As far as our country is concerned, this would imply above all a gradual and tangible reduction of the military budget, including the concealed arms expenditures. Besides, the FRG should refuse to participate in SDI and in West European projects that complement it, such as the European Defence Initiative (EDI). Only then will the essential basis be laid for preventing the abuse of EUREKA for military purposes. Projects like EDI push the FRG deeper into the "star wars" programme,

turning our country into a West European supervisor of the new NATO strategy which, according to Washington, is to be aimed at military superiority. The implementation of such plans may destroy all elements of a more realistic West European policy inherent in EUREKA. Moreover, EUREKA itself will turn into a catalyst of the arms race. It follows that EUREKA must not be handed over to the monopolies that take part in SDI.


The task is to draw up a long-term concept for the socialisation of the military industry and of the big concerns as such and for their conversion to civilian production. Militarisation of science must give way to civilian research and development, including studies on the maintenance of peace.

West European military dependence on the United States must be countered not with pseudo-independence within the framework of the Western European Union which is now being revived, but with a system of economic, political, cultural and other ties throughout Europe, including the USSR. A gradual development of such ties will render the opposing military capabilities useless because relations of interdependence and mutual benefit will displace mistrust and suspicion. Instead, the principle of collective security will assert itself, and this principle includes the dissolution of military blocs. Naturally, this raises the issue of NATO. If, despite the United States, we are to uphold the West European striving for detente, open the way to an all-European order of peace and eliminate blocs, we must consider a weakening of the FRG's presently close ties with NATO. This would give Bonn greater freedom of political

action, allow it to advance its own disarmament initiatives, and thus consolidate peace in Europe.

An invitation to neutral, socialist and developing countries to take part in EUREKA on an equitable basis would be in keeping with the principles of all-European cooperation. On the other hand, this would reduce the chances of it being used to further great-power imperialist ambitions, whether under the hegemony of France or the FRG.

Should it prove possible to influence the organisational forms and the activities of EUREKA, to orient it on civic, socially useful and environmentally safe efforts, it can become a valuable additional instrument of social change for the better. Science and technology would then be used for social progress and serve a democratic all-European policy of peace and security aimed at arms reductions and detente.



¹ "Rede des Bundeskanzlers auf der zweiten EUREKA-Ministerkonferenz in Hannover", Bulletin, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, No. 121, 1985, p. 1054.

² Ibid.

³ EUREKA-Grundsatzzerklärung, Bonn, 1985, p. 11.

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VAKFI
TÜSTAV

"SPACE GAMES" OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

S. Menshikov

A short time ago I had a chance to visit the US as a member of a delegation of the Soviet Association for the United Nations. Among the many people we spoke to there were ordinary Americans who asked simple and wise questions in the course of TV debates, businessmen and military-political experts whose words are heeded in the White House. They included General B. Scowcroft (Ret.) who last year headed the presidential commission on strategic forces and the director of the California-based company Pan Eristics, F. Hofman, who supervised the drafting of one of the three reports on space armaments for the US President. We also talked to prominent scientists opposed to the militarist course, to taciturn staff-members of the Rand Corporation which is working under Pentagon, CIA and other Federal projects and to executives of the space research laboratory near Los Angeles. In other words, the range of the interests and opinions of our hosts was sufficiently broad.

In all cases though the principal point of interest was the prospects of Soviet-American relations and especially the problem of preventing the escalation of the arms race into space. The words spoken by our hosts reflected the feelings of anxiety experienced today by millions of Americans over the "space games" of the Pentagon brass.

We came to the US when the first round of broad public discussion over the "star wars" programme was already over. Its outcome was by no means in favour of the Administration. In the course of that discussion prominent scholars and experts managed to prove that the largely publicized presidential goal of building a reliable anti-missile shield for the American popu-

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lation was clearly unattainable at least in the next few decades. This was openly admitted by General J. Abrahamson who was assigned to supervise the missile defence programme, by the presidential adviser for scientific affairs, G. Keyworth, and by other officials. Even Reagan himself no longer mentions defence of the population as a task of any foreseeable future in the foreword to the official booklet "The President's Strategic Defense Initiative" which was circulated in early January. There are attempts, however, to replace the foiled argument with ambiguous phrases to the effect that space weapons are allegedly "designed to destroy missiles but not people."

Next, the Americans' trust in the official assurances that space weapons are supposedly meant for exclusively defensive purposes has been largely undermined. Many experts convincingly showed in the course of the discussion that with the continued build-up and modernization of strategic offensive armaments the plan to establish a "total" ABM system could not be viewed otherwise than as an aggressive action to enhance the nuclear first-strike potential. This was indirectly admitted by the President himself who said that if space weapons were combined with offensive systems, they could be qualified as a factor contributing to an aggressive policy.

It was also proved that the "star wars" programme was in direct contravention of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems which was signed and ratified by the two countries in 1972. Many people in the US realize that the abrogation of that treaty would remove the major international legal barrier against the arms race in space and a powerful means of limiting and reducing nuclear arms in general. There are open opponents of that treaty in America. They are mostly concentrated in the Pentagon and in the military-industrial corporations. Due to a number of factors, however, and notably under the influence of his West European allies scared by the prospects of the arms race in space,

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President Reagan was forced to go on record saying that the US would abide by the provisions of that treaty, at least for the next few years.

Having lost the first round in the heated nation-wide debates, the advocates of the "star wars" programme have now adopted new and more devious arguments which baffle many people, according to Americans themselves. These arguments are briefly as follows.

First, the proponents of the plan to militarize space are claiming now that what they are actually planning is not the establishment of an "absolute" anti-missile shield but just a system to defend the silos of the land-based ICBMs, which is supposed to enhance the American "deterrence potential." Second, the programme of a space-based missile defence system will ostensibly devalue offensive weapons and will pave the way for nuclear arms reduction treaties. Finally, in the next few years everything will be allegedly confined to scientific research in the field of space weapons, which is admissible under the ABM Treaty and will contribute (!) to scientific and technical progress.

If one gives careful thought to this, he will understand that these arguments, too, are meant for deception and will see the hairy hand of the militarists behind them.

Let us start with the "deterrence potential." This term was conceived in the US in the late 40s when it became pointless and dangerous to speak of a "preventive strike" after the USSR had developed nuclear weapons of its own. But the change of terms did not change the essence of the matter. Both the "containment" and "deterrence" theories meant exactly the use of nuclear weapons, including their first use.

It was assumed that the US would have a quantitative and possibly qualitative advantage in nuclear weapons, for without it the ability to "deter" or blackmail other countries would simply lack credibility.

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With the establishment of nuclear parity and of a strategic balance in the world in the 70s, the "deterrence" doctrine lost its material foundation. The result of the arms race, in which the initiative invariably belonged to Washington, was increased vulnerability of the territory of the US itself and notably of its military installations. In other words, the country's security failed to grow any stronger. It can be easily gathered from conversations with Americans that they do realize this unpleasant truth. The public assurances about "selective retaliation", or putting it simply about "limited" nuclear war, have done nothing to assuage these uneasy feelings. Apart from the most diehard "hawks", no one in America believes that nuclear catastrophe can be localized by sacrificing, say, Europeans, Asians or Africans.

So now the Pentagon is seeking to regain its "deterrence potential" by protecting missile silos in the US with space weapons. And no matter how hard the proponents of "Star Wars" may claim that all this deals with "defense", one can hardly believe them. Decreasing the vulnerability of the strategic weapons designed to destroy the enemy missile launchers is actually tantamount to upsetting the existing balance and to creating a new first-strike potential. This is exactly what the ABM Treaty, which is meant to prevent nuclear catastrophe, is aimed against.

None of the experts we have talked to could deny that space weapons have a dual purpose. Laser, beam and missile weapons stationed in space can be used both against enemy missiles and against other targets in space, in the air and on the ground. This is in effect a new class of offensive weapons. This explains the obvious militarist gusto with which General Charles Gabriel, the US Air Force Chief of Staff, has announced that space is eventually the most advantageous position.

Some people tried to convince us that the development of space weapons would help strengthen strategic stability and

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would even promote arms reduction. So how could one possibly object against such a highly moral and truly noble plan, they implied. But experts who examined this question both from the theoretical viewpoint (notably, from the viewpoint of the mathematical theory of games) and from the practical angle (the relations between world powers) have come to a nearly unanimous conclusion that the "Star Wars" programme will precipitate a still more intensive and staggering arms race in practically all spheres.

At Stanford University we got acquainted with the well-known physicist Sydney Drell. He and two other scholars had recently written a detailed book called "Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative: An Assessment from the Technological, Political and Arms Control Viewpoints". The book convincingly substantiates the very important conclusion which is shared by many people: the accelerated development of ABM systems "will have a destabilizing effect on the strategic balance and will be risky for our own security". The authors write that this will lead to "an unnecessary and destabilizing acceleration of the strategic arms race".

And now let us turn to that "innocent" space research. If the matter had dealt with programmes for peaceful space exploration, this would arouse no doubts or concern with anyone. By the way, professors from the California Technological Institute made a high assessment of the opportunities for Soviet-American cooperation in the peaceful use of space. But the 26 billion dollars allocated in the US for research in the field of space weapons are meant for a totally different purpose. Here are some illustrative facts from the American press, which reveal the actual contents of that "research".

The US Army is developing an ABM system which might be deployed in the 1990s. This programme has been going on for 18 years now, or since the mid-1960s. There were tests in June

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DENMARK AND STAR WARS

Yuri Kuznetsov

In a show of concern over the military ambitions of Denmark's senior NATO partners, the Danish Folketing (Parliament) passed another resolution against the growing nuclear threat to the world as a whole and Denmark in particular.

That marked the end of a debate over the modernisation of a large radar installation at the US Thule Air base in Greenland which enjoys internal autonomy within the Kingdom of Denmark.

The debate had been sparked off by the fact that the modernisation, according to a number of US and Danish experts, would constitute a breach of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty. Apart from that, the installation may be incorporated in the system of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In this connection, the Folketing adopted a resolution urging the government of Paul Schluter to do everything in its power to ensure that the installation is not used for attack purposes or be involved in Star Wars preparations. The Danish government, the resolution says, ought to call on the USA and the USSR in future to adhere to the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Given the USSR's insistence on an unconditional compliance with the Treaty, it is clear that the demand, in fact, implies the USA.

Around the same time, the Inuit Ataqatigiit Party forming a part of Greenland's ruling coalition urged greater control on the part of the local authorities over the operation of the US military facilities on the island, stressing that it was inadmissible to underrate the seriousness of what was going on at the Thule base.

Right until now the Pentagon has been absolutely free to

ISRAEL IN SDI TUNIC

On a summer day of 1985 British news agency Reuter reported a sensation from Tel Aviv. Israel's Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin told about a great woe which threatened to destroy the "Promised Land". What was the matter? The danger emanated from the "unprecedented weakening of Israel's military might", from the "reduction of the numerical strength of the personnel of its army combat units", from the "diminution of the ammunition stockpiles at its depots to the catastrophic level of the year 1973", and lastly from the "drastic cuts on the state's military budget."

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Readers abroad and in Israel itself regarded the pronouncements by Rabin, who drew a picture which had nothing to do with reality, as a joke. But it was not April 1 on the calendar, and the explosive situation persisting in the Middle east through the fault of Washington and Tel Aviv did not at all make for jokes. The press of many countries has written many times that Israel is firmly leading the world in the per capita military spending. In 1972-1981 alone it jumped by 25 times, the military expenditures now making up about two thirds of the state budget! Tel Aviv is also holding an absolute record in the mobilisation of the population for military service.

It did not take long to find the true motive behind all this phrasemongering. To put an end to the "tragic lag" Israel declared its intention to participate in the "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI) programme which is now being worked out by the United States. Already several days after the above-said events Rabin modestly stated in response to Washington's official proposal on cooperation which had been conveyed by US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger that he was

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inclined to favour the invitation to take part in the "Star Wars" plans and that he regarded this as further development of the strategic contacts between the two countries.

Some Israeli scientists also supported the American proposal, claiming that it can "give access to newest technology" and help stop the emigration of researchers caused by the economic crisis in the country. And shortly afterwards a correspondent of US news agency UPI reported from Tel Aviv that at least 3 Israeli universities and 5-6 private companies had begun research the results of which can be used in the "Star Wars" programme.

To date, the US Administration has already assigned to Israel the carrying out of approximately twenty projects for setting up weapons systems within the SDI framework.

The most important of them is the project of a laser with a several hundred kilometres range. The Pentagon intends to use it in the "Star Wars" plans. After the visit paid to Israel by US Lieutenant General Abrahamson, director of the special administration for the development of space weapon systems, in February 1986 (he brought new military orders) Israeli firms started developing technology for producing electromagnetic guns. Placed in outer space, they can kill missiles.

At the same time, the Israeli authorities launched a clamorous propaganda campaign with a view to justifying Israel's participation in the "Star Wars" programme. Special stress is laid on the economic "benefits" of the project, first of all on the fact that the placement of the Pentagon orders will scale down or even eliminate the growth of unemployment. In fact, the work on the new weapons for the Pentagon may create several thousand jobs in the munitions industry. But what will their price be? The sinister, destabilising influence of the SDI on the situation in the

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world, specifically in the Middle East, is perfectly clear.

Suffice it to say that, as the Israeli mass media have blabbed out, Washington and Tel Aviv are now coming to terms on deploying and storing American space weapons on Israel's territory.

Furthermore, the SDI programme promises to be the most costly in the history of the world military development. It is clear, therefore, that Tel Aviv will also have to come down with money.

This deal has become a perfectly logical result of US-Israeli "strategic cooperation". Both sides had certain experience in the joint use of outer space for military purposes long before President Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative". For a long time Israel had received intelligence data on the military and economic potential of the Arab countries from American spy-satellites, and then with the help of its own technical systems. The first reports to this effect appeared in the foreign press during the October war of 1973. After the beginning of the operation in October 1985 of the American satellite laser-tracking station at Bar Gior 24 kilometres south-west of Jerusalem, which is one of the 30 US satellite data gathering stations, Israel received direct access to that data on a continuous basis. Finally, in the autumn of 1984 reports appeared in the Arab and Western press, saying that Washington and Tel Aviv had signed an agreement providing for the development of Israel's own space system with American technical and financial assistance, which would include the construction of an Israeli satellite and a cosmodrome in the Negev desert. This fiscal year the US has allocated 150 million dollars of its military aid to Israel for the latter's space programme.

A short time ago Israel was visited by the "father" of the American hydrogen bomb and ardent proponent of the Star Wars,

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Edward Teller. His visit there was associated with the implementation of the plans for the participation of the Israeli military-industrial complex in the SDI programme. The American guest combined his mission with provocative statements actually urging Israeli strikes at Syria.

It is a fair guess that the Arabs should expect the course of the Israeli ruling circles to toughen still further. This is confirmed by the developments around Syria and in southern Lebanon.

The Israeli government cannot be unaware of the fact that the whole programme is aimed at extending the arms race into space and at turning it into an arena of military rivalry and confrontation. By making its contribution to the conversion of near-Earth space into an arena of confrontation, Tel Aviv thereby works up general tension in the world and, consequently, in the Middle East, too. As is noted in the Soviet Statement addressed to the Israeli government, "it is beyond any doubt that with the growth of tension the prospects for achieving a just Middle East settlement meeting the interests of all the local countries and peoples are getting even more remote".

(Sovetskaya Rossia, June 5. Abridged.)

SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROGRAMME: A YEAR LATER

I. Our Proposal

Alexander Bovin, political news analyst of the daily Izvestia, wrote in the January 9 issue that there was only one real way to make a nuclear war impossible: to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The implementation of the Soviet disarmament programme put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev a year ago would mean a true revolution in world politics. However, this radicalism which is so necessary today, the boldness and the thrust beyond what seems possible have evoked and continue to evoke doubts and objections. People expressing such doubts do not take into account that the dialectics of the historical process includes the turning of the impossible into the possible and the realization of utopias.

According to Alexander Bovin, capitalism by nature is not prone to disarmament and peaceful coexistence with socialism. He recalled the developments preceding World War II and its history. At that time the contradictions between the national-state interests proved to be stronger than class, social solidarity inherent in the nature of capitalism. An alliance took shape between a socialist state and a group of capitalist states, directed against another group of them. Many people believed that theoretically such an alliance was impossible.

At present the possibility of a war breaking out between the leading powers with the use of conventional weapons is blocked to a considerable extent by the fear lest it should develop into a nuclear war. The Soviet approach takes this possibility into account. That is why we propose that extensive talks on the reduction of conventional weapons begin at any time.

Answering those who believe that in a nuclear-free world a single nuclear system secretly created by any country would dramatically upset the military balance, Bovin pointed out that the Soviet Union was positive that world science could create control systems guaranteeing the preservation of a nuclear-free world.

II. Counter Proposals

In analysing Western proposals to counter the Soviet disarmament programme, Alexander Bovin singles out three main groups of alternative approaches to scaling down the risk of a nuclear war.

First, "defense instead of an offensive", that is Reagan's SDI. Alexander Bovin holds that a totally impregnable ABM system is a myth. "Given the existing potential of mistrust, any step by one side aimed at building an ABM system will inevitably enduce a retaliatory move by the other side. The race in defensive weapons is added to the race in offensive weapons. The arms race on Earth is combined with an arms race in space.

"Fear and suspicion will grow, the risk of war will be magnified. Still in its embryonic stages, the Star Wars programme has already deteriorated the strategic situation in the world."

Second, "an offensive plus defense", that is creating an ABM system shielding command posts and bases. From Moscow's point of view, the moves to develop such a limited, partial defense can be interpreted only as preparation for a first strike.

"Fragmentary defense is hardly designed for defense against a massive Soviet strike, a strike which is launched first. It is quite another matter if Soviet strategic forces

will be weakened by a first US strike. In this case, the planned defense can well soften the impact of a weakened strike of retribution, ensure survival and, hence, 'victory'."

Third, "neither defense nor an offensive". This means that a nuclear-free world is unachievable, unfeasible in the foreseeable future and in foreseeable conditions. Nuclear warheads are not weapons, they cannot be used as weapons. Their sole purpose is to contain an enemy. It is necessary that an agreement be reached on a maximum possible reduction in nuclear forces.

These considerations are fairly close to Soviet positions, Alexander Bovin writes. "We have long since stated that we would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. We agree that the sole rational purport of this weapon is to contain a nuclear attack. But we wish to ^Slessen and, moreover, to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war. To render it not only less probable but impossible. What is needed here is a breakthrough to a new mode of political thinking, to a new understanding of realities."

III. Security For All

Furthermore, on the issue of security Alexander Bovin writes that disarmament is a large and complex problem. But it is per se only a fragment, albeit an important one, of the comprehensive system of international security suggested by the 27th CPSU Congress.

The Congress not only proposed, but also formulated the basic principles of such a system in the military, political, economic and humanitarian fields.

This approach to security makes it possible to bring into sharper focus the fact that the danger of war, despite all its scale and gravity, should be seen together with other dangers

threatening humankind at the end of the 20th century.

Different analysts classify and define these dangers differently. But if one ignores the details so as to be able to see only the main things, there will apparently remain two groups of dangers, two groups of problems in the foreground.

They are, on the one hand, tension accumulating in relations between the industrialized capitalist countries and the developing countries or, as they sometimes say, between North and South and, on the other, growing tension between the 'second' nature and the original nature -- between the technosphere created by Man and the biosphere which has created Man.

Militarism today is not only the principal source of the war danger. It is also the principal obstacle to social progress and the principal force pushing humankind towards ecological catastrophe.

In these conditions the Soviet proposal for a nuclear-free world and for general and complete disarmament, a proposal actively backed by many countries, serves a prerequisite for general and drastic improvements in the world situation, the political, economic and the social.

The more weapons there are, the more dangers there are. The more dangers there are, the less possibilities there are for survival.

The causal relationships are elementary. The threats are common. And security is needed by all.

This is why the course of developments calls for stepping up the general protest and broadening the social and class makeup of the anti-war and anti-nuclear movements.

In conclusion, Bovin states that there is room in these movements for all -- the 'reds', the 'greens' and the 'violets' if they appear.

(Izvestia, January 9-11. Summary.)

SDI, NEW STAGE OF THE ARMS RACE

(A digest of Y. Lebedev's and A. Podberezkin's
article from the magazine Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn
No. 1, 1987)

The officially proclaimed aim of SDI - the creation of a large-scale multi-layer antimissile defence guaranteeing the security of the USA - has nothing in common with the true aim of the ruling circles in Washington; it has already been repeatedly shown that the creation of such a defence even against the now-existing nuclear missiles is an unfeasible task. Such a defence will be all the more ineffective in conditions of active countermeasures by the Soviet Union, which, quite naturally, will do everything necessary to neutralise the actions of the USA. Thus, the officially declared aim of SDI looks unconvincing, but the real, far more ominous and peace-endangering intentions are hidden behind it.

The true aim of SDI is to gain military technological superiority over the Soviet Union by creating fundamentally new types and systems of weapons and combat-control facilities that will enormously exceed the combat effectiveness of existing arms. SDI is a qualitatively new stage of the arms race, by launching which Washington intends to achieve strategic superiority in every field of military confrontation, in all the types and systems of weaponry and combat equipment, in all the forms of military activity and to shift competition with the USSR on to the lines of "technological" rivalry.

It is essential to stress that the work being conducted under the SDI and other scientific-technological programmes is already producing concrete results, which manifest themselves in an intensification of the arms race. Thus, one cannot fail to take notice of the US policy in the field of military

research and development. The new military budget of Washington, continuing the "weapon development requests" tendency of the 1980s, was increased in 1986 largely on the side of the requests for military R & D. In just one year expenditures for these purposes went up by 24 per cent. Moreover, the bulk of the increase is due to the financing of the development of basically new weapon types and systems, and includes a 75 per cent rise for SDI, a 136 per cent increase for the Midgetman programme, a 46 per cent increase for anti-satellite weapons, and a 52 per cent rise for strategic systems of detection, warning, command and control.

The military-technological consequences of the work under the SDI programme already tell now, long before this concept of the US President may be materialised as a large-scale missile defence system with space-based elements. In other words, the results of the work being conducted under the SDI programme are being embodied into concrete types and systems of weaponry before a decision is taken to deploy an antimissile defence. This essentially gives impetus to the arms race in new areas - the most advanced technologies - and the aim is to secure a many years lead over the USSR in the use of scientific and technological progress for military purposes.

The newest equipment and production processes, which are being devised under the SDI programme, will enable fundamentally new types of offensive armaments - space strike weapons - to be developed. These are powerful laser, beam and kinetic weapons (electromagnetic guns, homing missiles and shells), which can destroy targets thousands of kilometres away in space and on the ground, on a mass scale, selectively and within a very short time. From the viewpoint of the range of their operation, these arms are global because, stationed in near-Earth orbits and being able to manoeuvre, they can

create a real threat to the security of any state at any moment. Space strike weapons are, above all, offensive armaments designed to deliver a first strike against the USSR and its allies.

SDI is a purely military programme aimed at developing a fundamentally new type of weapons - space strike technologies which will exceed manyfold the existing offensive nuclear weapon systems in their combat effectiveness. From the viewpoint of the possible use of space strike weapons, they are typically offensive ones.

The results of Washington's efforts in the development of anti-satellite means are a graphic illustration of how the work on SDI contributes to the emergence of new types of weapons. These efforts are now made in three major fields. First (and this is, in fact, the best-known direction today), work to develop the ASAT anti-satellite complex has been under way since 1977. The complex is designed to kill Earth's man-made satellites in orbits at an altitude of up to 1,000 km. It comprises the F-15 modernised fighter and the SRAM-Altair two-stage missile equipped with a small-size interceptor with an infrared seeker. This weapon has already been tested several times, specifically against a real target in space (intercepting the Solwind satellite). These complexes are expected to be phased in already in 1987, and the US armed forces are supposed to have 40 aircraft and 112 SRAM-Altair missiles of the ASAT anti-satellite complex by the year 1992.

The second direction of Washington's efforts to create anti-satellite weapons is the development of an artificial satellite carrying missiles with a fragmentation-type head (this work is now at the stage of checking concepts and carrying out research). Furthermore, a variant of using satellite-mines, which could, at the command from the centre, approach enemy satellites and blast them, is also being

studied. All these weapons can be developed and produced with the use of the existing equipment and manufacturing processes and with low technological risk.

Finally, there are plans for the development of anti-satellite systems with the use of directed energy sources (high-energy lasers, super-high-frequency generators, particle accelerators) and electrodynamic accelerators.

What we are thus faced with is a wide range of efforts being undertaken by Washington to develop anti-satellite weapons. That work is going at an accelerated pace today with the use of all the latest advances in science and technology.

As everyone knows, the compromise proposals introduced by the Soviet side at the meeting in the Icelandic capital offered a real opportunity for coming to terms on the most crucial issues such as the elimination of nuclear weapons, prohibition of nuclear testing and prevention of the deployment of weapons in space. However, what seemed like a ready agreement on the major problems of modern times was never converted into binding treaties because of Washington's flat refusal to give up the idea of space militarization. This was notably reflected in the refusal by the American side to reinforce the provisions of the ABM Treaty which stands in the way of the materialization of SDI. So, no matter how the US may try now to interpret the position adopted by the American President in Reykjavik, it has become particularly clear after the summit meeting in the Icelandic capital that for successful advance in limiting and stopping the arms race it is essential that the US give up that dangerous idea of the "strategic defense initiative" which is nothing but the stake on a new spiral in the arms race.

If the work to implement the SDI programme is not stopped now, mankind will soon enter a new, still more dangerous phase of the arms race which will have most crucial influence

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on all types of weapons and forms of military activity. The growing sophistication of weapons is acquiring such a dangerous pace and momentum that they may strip us forever of the capability to limit or even control that process. Because of this unheard-of sophistication of weapons and other military hardware and the blurring of boundaries between specific types and systems of weapons, international verification of the observance of the agreements on the limitation of the arms race will be very hard to accomplish.

The development of "defensive" armaments will come hand in glove with the improvement and buildup of offensive nuclear weapons. It is as plain as day. If the United States proceeds with its "strategic rearmament" programmes (which Washington does not like to talk much about these days), in the forthcoming decade it will be in a position to add thousands of delivery vehicles and tens of thousands of nuclear charges to its strategic offensive arsenal. To put it differently, all talk about "making nuclear weapons obsolete" is just a disguise for a drive to develop an entirely new strategic offensive capability in addition to what the United States already has.

This perspective can hardly be regarded as conducive to strengthening international security. The situation is likely to aggravate further, if a massive ABM defence, a new and largely unknown factor, is introduced into the existing strategic balance. A strategic situation in which both sides have offensive and defensive weapons systems would be much more dangerous and destabilizing than one in which they have only offensive armaments. According to some estimates, if one of the sides gains even a slight edge in defences over the other side, the strategic situation will be immediately destabilized to a point of provoking a nuclear war. The danger will persist even if deep cuts in offensive armaments are

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effected, because there is no way to guarantee stability by offensive arms reductions if defensive systems remain intact.

The Strategic Defence Initiative is a fraud designed to mislead the peoples. In addition, it is, as Mikhail Gorbachev put in in his interview with Indian reporters on November 21, 1986, "the main obstacle in the the way of agreements which we nearly reached in Reykjavik".

Now that a new situation has emerged in international relations in the wake of the Iceland summit talks, the peoples have seen a real outline of a nuclear-weapon free world. The movement ahead so needed implies a new political outlook on the realities of today's many-faceted, contradictory and integral world.

(APN, January 5. In full.)

BORROWING FROM THE FUTURE

"Star Wars" Programme and US Economy

A.Kireyev, Ph.D.(Economics)

The United States is the main catalyzer of the arms race. But it is a specific feature of military production that the value created in it is not added to the country's national income but is deducted from it because military output acquires the form of objects which are altogether useless to society. For this reason, violation of the proportion between the civilian and military sectors of production is the major symptom of militarism's economic crisis. At the same time, further growth of civilian production becomes impossible in the context of the existing growth rates of military spending.

On the verge of the 1980s, the United States came close to such a crisis. At that time, the Reagan Administration faced the dilemma of either continuing the militarist race through direct reduction of the growth rates of civilian production or, conversely, limiting the military expenditures and giving a breath of fresh air to the civilian sectors. The first variant disaccorded with the election platform of the Republicans because the latter promised the Americans to considerably improve their well-being, while the second variant did not suit the Republicans for military-political considerations because revival of a "strong America" was a major thesis in the Administration's programme.

The market economy prompted a temporary way out. The Federal Government's high demand for loan funds needed to patch the budget holes resulted in an upswing of the interest rate which began to serve as a pump syphoning capital out of other Western countries. Furthermore, Washington, displaying the skill of a fakir, started manipulating the dollar's exchange rate with a view to attaining the same objective.

America from the alleged Soviet threat.

The very first year of the Star Wars programme, US\$992 million was squandered to implement it: a tiny visible part of the arms race iceberg whose summit reaches into space. The White House's SDI promptly integrated all ABM research which cost the US about \$40,000 million between 1954 and 1983. War lasers alone--an essential SDI component--cost over \$2,000 million. Getting fat on Reaganomics, the military-industrial monopolies supplied \$30 million a year from their internal revenues to develop space-based weapon systems they saw as the most promising. So SDI was started with a considerable initial capital.

After 1983, Star Wars allocations skyrocketed to reach \$3,500 million by the 1987 fiscal year. To support SDI's reputation for cheapness, the NBC asked economic advisers of the four preceding Administrations how the effort would influence the US economy. The experts came to the opinion that SDI implementation presented no economic or financial problem, and calculated that it could well stay within the usual annual Defence Ministry budget throughout the decade.

Really, at its first stage SDI will be an economic problem not so much for the United States as for its allies which will have to finance the new militarist venture. The allies have already sent funds for this to the US, tempted by the prospect of easily cashing in on high interest rates.

In their turn, Pentagon men are doing everything to prevent SDI from exceeding the budget of the Defence Department, at least during the first years, as the development and testing of prototypes do not call for huge spending yet. That is why they are coming out for the further reduction of social spending, are manipulating the military budget, channelling money from one programme into another and are calling upon contractors to fork out for SDI from internal

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will attempt to sell to its allies a nicely packaged merchandise called SDI. At the same time, like the famous woman character of William Thackeray's novel, the US intends to skim the cream and go on living in clover on God knows what.

The world community is strong enough to prevent the US military-industrial complex from satisfying its ambitions at the expense of a nuclear-free future which mankind is out to get for itself.

(Sovetskaya Rossia, February 26. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VAKFI
TÜSTAV

DENMARK AND STAR WARS

Mikhail Kostikov

The Pentagon is pressing ahead with the construction of an advanced radar installation at its base in Thule in the extreme north-west of Greenland. The American military have long been using that base not only as a bridgehead of electronic espionage against the USSR and satellite reconnaissance, but also as one of the centres of its planned nuclear-missile operations in the North. And now they want to adapt it to the control of combat operations in space, too.

The construction of a new radar at the base in Thule, notes in this connection the Copenhagen newspaper Politiken, alluding to the data of a whole number of American and British arms control experts, undermines the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972 and is closely linked with the Star Wars plans. As reported by the Western press, a similar radar installation is currently under construction at Fylingdales in Britain.

As far as Denmark is concerned (and Greenland is a part of that state with internal autonomy rights), these plans of Washington contradict the official position of Copenhagen. Why, according to a decision by the country's Folketing (Parliament), the government must speak up at all international forums and also in NATO against the Star Wars plans and space militarization in general, and for the need of honouring the ABM Treaty. This contradiction is the subject of a recent parliamentary inquiry made by the Social Democratic faction together with the other left-wing opposition parties to the country's Foreign Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. Although the question deals with matters of real importance, there is no answer to it still.

Handed over to the Pentagon as all but Denmark's contribution to NATO, Greenland is being converted by the

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American military into a major springboard of potential aggression. The US is turning it into one of its main tools in undermining the very foundation of Denmark's military and security policy. This is being done clearly behind the Danish people's backs whose opinion Washington is fully determined to ignore. The construction of a new radar is the latest confirmation of this fact. As it is, that radar puts Denmark into a position of an accomplice in the Star Wars preparations and in the Pentagon efforts to undermine the ABM Treaty.
Copenhagen.

(Pravda, January 30. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMASI
TÜSTAV

WHAT IS BEHIND RADAR MODERNISATION?

A.Sychev

Stockholm. (Izvestia own correspondent.) A radar facility at the U.S. military base in Thule in the north-west of Greenland has been in the past few days the subject of heated political debate in Denmark.

Concern has been mounting among the parties in opposition to Prime Minister Poul Schluter's right-of-center cabinet over a possibility that the proposed radar modernisation is part of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and as such may pose a threat to the 1972 Soviet-American Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The continuing arms race, which is about to be projected into outer space in line with Washington's Star Wars program, enhances the danger of a thermonuclear conflict. This bleak vision in the past few years has prompted the Danish Folketing (Parliament) to adopt a series of resolutions proclaiming, among other things, Denmark's desire to contribute to the cause of peace, help safeguard the termless Soviet-American ABM Treaty, and avoid being involved in SDI. As a matter of fact, Washington's plan concerning Greenland is an obvious blow at the foreign policy principles proclaimed by Denmark.

According to the Danish newspapers, the Thule facility is to be converted into a large Pave Paws phased-array battle management radar to increase its range to about 5,000 kilometers. Once the modernisation program is accomplished, the potential of the radar network will grow immeasurably and by so doing almost certainly constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty, no matter what the Pentagon officials say to justify moves by their bosses.

The U.S. Congress in 1980 officially admitted the fact by rejecting the plan to modernise the Thule facility and making

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SDI--THE LOCOMOTIVE OF THE ARMS RACE

Major-General Y. Lebedev

This year will mark four years since the US President announced the drawing up of the Star Wars programme, which he called the Strategic Defense Initiative for euphony. It has never ceased disturbing the world ever since. The programme, which has been extensively publicized by its supporters as "the deliverer from nuclear ballistic missiles", raises insurmountable obstacles to a nuclear-weapon free world. SDI was the main reason for wrecking possible agreements in Reykjavik on a reduction in nuclear arms and their eventual elimination. Aimed at deploying in space strike weapons, components of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system, the programme torpedoes the Soviet-US Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of unlimited duration.

Ignoring the experience of history, the real alignment of forces and the inevitable fatal implications of the project for the Americans themselves, the men in Washington hope to depreciate with the aid of space arms the Soviet nuclear potential of retaliation, making themselves "invulnerable" in a nuclear conflict. The stake on victory in nuclear war, on meeting their global claims--therein lies the real threat of Star Wars to all mankind.

The SDI programme is part of the US military plans based on offensive nuclear strategy and aimed at attaining military superiority over the USSR. It is meant to complement the offensive strategic arms programmes, which most fully meet the Pentagon's demands on first-strike arms. Among such arms are the latest MX intercontinental ballistic missile and the planned Midgetman, the qualitatively new Trident-2 submarine-launched missile, the new types of strategic bombers and a

whole generation of Cruise missiles with an increased range and precision. It must be said that all those nuclear weapon systems surpass existing types many times over in their effectiveness.

By their performance, space weapons developed under SDI cannot be described as defensive. They can be used in surprise strikes aimed at destroying vital spacecraft of the other side (early warning satellites, communications satellites, etc.) in order to "blind" it, to take it unawares and thereby to ruin its chances of resisting a nuclear aggression. Having a range of 4,000 to 5,000 kilometres, some strike space weapons are able to destroy various ground targets in a matter of seconds.

Obviously, the complex of space weapons within the US anti-missile defense system will be almost entirely computer-controlled. In this way mankind will become a hostage to machines. Even most sophisticated modern automatic systems are not absolutely safe from malfunctioning, failures, and, eventually, down-to-earth mistakes. In other words, with SDI implemented, military-strategic relations in the world will depend on the complicated space robots suspended over the Earth.

The White House leaders are duping themselves with the hope that by the agency of the Star Wars and a breakthrough in technology they will be able to outstrip others in the militarily and dictate their will to the rest of the world, the Soviet Union included. But these attempts are futile. This country has all the necessary means to foil these adventuristic plans.

In the new year, too, while space is still free from weapons, there is a chance of a political solution to the problem. The Soviet Union confirms that its Reykjavik proposals are on the negotiating table and that it is ready for mutually acceptable accords, including those on

Monday, January 5, 1987

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strengthening the ABM Treaty and on barring weapons from space, which would give the green light to the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the new year, this country will be pursuing this goal in an even more vigorous manner.

(Pravda, January 5. In full.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VAKFI
TÜSTAV

A WAY TOWARD "STAR PEACE"

Soviet Foreign Ministry Holds Press Conference

A news conference was held on January 6 at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's press center in Moscow to discuss international cooperation in a drive to prevent an arms race in space and promote its peaceful uses as well as the Soviet-proposed program for "Star Peace".

Chief Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Gerassimov said the program was based on an idea to convene before 1990 an international conference or a special session of the UN General Assembly to discuss all problems pertaining to space uses, institute a world space organisation and work out a program for space exploration in the 1990s and for a longer period of ten to fifteen years.

A. Dunayev, chief of the Directorate General for the Development and Use of Space Technology (USSR Glavkosmos), told the news conference how the Soviet Union was joining efforts with other countries in space exploration and uses. He said the USSR Glavkosmos was prepared to cooperate on a large scale with foreign companies and government and international agencies on a mutually advantageous and even on a commercial basis. He said it offered the following services:

- the launching of foreign satellites by Soviet booster rockets;
- the renting of Soviet Horizont communication satellites in a geostationary orbit after bringing them to a point registered by clients;
- the shooting from outer space of the territories of some countries and the selling of sounding data;
- the carrying out of works on Soviet equipment and the

installing of clients' instruments for the production or purification of materials in outer space on Soviet space vehicles.

Yet the chief obstacle to joint space ventures is the U.S. administration's embargo on delivery to the Soviet Union of any objects with American components that might be launched into outer space. This ban is discriminating not so much with regard to the Soviet Union as to organisations and countries which really need space-based facilities for the development and use of regional and national telephone, telegraph and television networks.

The program of international cooperation for the current five-year period, which is being implemented under the auspices of the USSR Glavkosmos, is distinguished for the diversity of projects and its peaceful orientation. Among the major projects of the five-year period are: a study of Phobos, a satellite of Mars, including photographing and TV scanning of its surface, and a number of other involved programs being carried out by the USSR conjointly with the other socialist countries, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United States, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden and the European Space Agency.

Journalists inquired about the present ideas of the structure of an international space centre, the founding of which was mentioned during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to India.

In our view, the head of the USSR Glavkosmos said, the centre will work with space satellites, first of all, for studying natural resources of the interested countries. Evidently, it will require launching grounds for orbiting satellites, and also tracking stations for guiding them. It may also become an establishment for training and upgrading experts in space technology from developing countries. Besides, the centre will also be responsible for training

future cosmonauts from the countries which will take part in founding it.

A correspondent of the Chicago Tribune asked about the development of a shuttle spacecraft in the Soviet Union.

"We are engaged in both theoretical and experimental work along these lines," A. Dunayev said. "We, however, view the problem on a broad plane. It would be incorrect to say that reusable systems spell only advantages in every sphere of space activity. In a word, the question of involving shuttle craft in the sphere of space activity requires a thorough study."

How many applications for Soviet carrier rockets have been received? Answering this question put by a Reuter correspondent, V. Ignatov, Director-General of V/O Litsenzintorg, pointed out that negotiations are now being held with dozens of organisations, including international ones.

(TASS)

(Pravda, January 7. In full.)

THE END

VORI4-870908DR36

SDI: PARAMETERS CHANGE, NOT GOALS

V. Likhovid

The actions of the present US administration clearly show that the Strategic Defence Initiative, announced by President Reagan four years ago, has definitely become the central element of his military and political programme. The White House attaches so much importance to it because it realises the potential influence it may have on the strategic balance of forces between the USSR and the United States, on the course of Soviet-American dialogue on arms control and disarmament and on the development of the relations between the two countries.

Presented as a defensive doctrine, SDI has been devised from the start as a strategic programme designed to ensure the United States superiority over the Soviet Union and as a kind of philosophy of pressure.

However, the implementation of the programme does not proceed as Washington wants it to. Opposition to the Star Wars plans is growing, which is particularly felt in Congress. There are differing reactions to it among the United States' allies and there is growing criticism in the world's scientific community.

However, though Congress had earlier cut allocations to the programme, expenditures on it keep growing from year to year. The Pentagon has already spent 9,200 million dollars on SDI.

The programme is now at its early stage. The officials whose job is to get credits from Congress from time to time report progress in carrying out the programme, but no breakthrough has yet been made.

Experts say that technical progress has been made in some of the more than 3,000 contracts that have been signed so far, but there is a long way from success in some

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projects, such as the development of microelements, optical devices and cryogenic coolers, and the creation of a multi-layer missile defence system.

Interception of missiles in boost phase still remains a major problem. Burning a hole in a missile with a laser on testing grounds is one thing and destroying hundreds of ballistic missiles from orbital battle stations in a matter of seconds is quite another. An experiment conducted with a Titan missile showed that a laser beam has too great a wave length to be a weapon.

SDI designers have so far failed in their efforts to make battle stations invulnerable. The problem is that their movement is predictable, so they can be watched from Earth, seen from space and, consequently, be constantly a target for attack.

As a result of these difficulties, many projects have been suspended, re-orientated or dropped altogether. Work has been stopped on the development of an infra-red sensor for a guidance system and a space-based chemical laser.

Earlier especially big hopes had been pinned on the development of the so-called directed-energy weapons, such as free-electron lasers, but now emphasis has been shifted to kinetic weapons -- anti-missile missiles and self-guiding rockets capable of destroying a target by sheer impact. Such missiles could be launched from Earth or from orbital battle stations.

Nor does the nuclear-pumped X-ray laser live up to the Pentagon's hopes. Its destructive power is too low for fighting warheads and missiles. Nevertheless, it is a fairly effective weapon against such targets as orbiting stations, satellites and sensors. On the other hand, it is a weapon that may hit both ways. An X-ray laser meant to neutralize enemy systems may pose a real threat to America's own space systems in orbit. Even so, the Americans continue to peg hopes on that weapon, seeing its primary task now not in the destruction of missiles but in the identification of real

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warheads among decoys by the targets' emissions under irradiation by the X-ray laser.

Alongside these problems there are others whose complexity was underestimated or deliberately overlooked earlier. Take, for example, the terms and expenses associated with the orbiting of anti-ballistic missile systems. According to some data, the US would have to deploy 100,000 tons of hardware in space for its ABM system, or 200 times more than it is capable of launching within a year now. That would necessitate 5,000 Shuttle flights, with the transportation costs alone totalling about 600 billion dollars.

In these conditions, technical considerations play a meaningful role in the reorientation of the SDI programme from space-based systems to ground weapons, and from directed energy weapons to systems based on traditional technologies: missiles and rockets in miniaturized versions. Having come to the conclusion about the impossibility of developing a hundred per cent failsafe anti-missile defence system, the Pentagon specialists have given up the idea of an impenetrable shield and have picked up instead the idea of so-called target ABM which could tackle limited tasks: defence of ICBM silos, control centres and so on.

Parallel with this, there has been a marked activization of the discussions in the United States about an early deployment of an in-depth space-based ABM system. This option is advocated by the Pentagon which suggests deploying that system in three stages. Under that plan, at the first stage the US would deploy space- and ground-based kinetic energy weapons in combination with sensors in geostationary orbits and probes for detecting Earth-launched ballistic missiles. At the second stage additional monitoring and warning systems as well as orbiting stations armed with countermissiles would be deployed, and at the third stage the ABM system would be reinforced with "exotic" means of destruction.

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In advancing SDI, the White House and the Pentagon are insisting that its materialization will guarantee the US an important breakthrough in various technological directions, serve as a catalyst for a "third industrial revolution" and lead to new technological ideas that could be extensively used for civilian purposes. But, in fact, civilian industry cannot expect anything really substantial from beam weapons. The maximum demand for lasers in civilian industries is much lower than the minimum requirements of the SDI programme. Or what peaceful application can possibly be found for the rail gun? At the same time, the technology associated with the production of that gun may have lots of peaceful applications. For example, the new ceramic materials developed for its barrel could prove highly competitive in auto-making and aircraft industry. But would it not be more rational in that case to use all those material and intellectual resources from the very beginning for developing equipment meant for peaceful instead of military purposes?

The civilian branches show little interest in the technology of the SDI program because of its sophisticated character and high cost. Military equipment is distinguished by special characteristics, since it must have very high indicators and be very reliable and super-protected. The sophistication of military technology results in its high cost. According to the American data, an integrated circuit for military purposes costs 5-10 times more than an analogous circuit designed for civilian purposes and, since high quality standards are set for it, the rejected products sometimes account up to 90 per cent of output. In the conditions of American competition, such low productivity could lead to bankruptcy of civilian production.

The work within the SDI program is isolated and is aimed at manufacturing products for military uses. The equipment and production processes which are being developed within its framework are designed to accomplish destructive

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but constructive tasks. From the viewpoint of its specifics and qualitative parameters, such as the destructive capability, capacity, range and utilization in space conditions, the program's technology, being special-purpose, would be inapplicable in the civilian sectors.

Contrary to Washington's claims about the non-nuclear character of the SDI program, its nuclear aspects ever more come into the open. The systems which are being developed within its framework and which are based on the use of nuclear-blast energy, are new-generation nuclear weapons, among them directed-energy weapons.

The project of developing a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser has become widely known. The possibilities of using atomic radiation to affect warheads and the ability of orbital stations to operate in conditions of a nuclear war in space are being studied. One of the projects envisages development of a device, based on energy of the nuclear explosion, for destroying dummy warheads by generating a flow of liquid drops or solid particles accelerated to superspeeds and directed at them. In other words, we are talking about the work on a new system of weapons.

The adverse effect of the Star Wars plans on the cause of peace and disarmament is perfectly clear. At the same time, the Soviet Union does not fear the SDI program in military terms. As Mikhail Gorbachev noted in his address to American readers, "the USSR can develop an anti-SDI program that will not be a duplication of the USA's program, and not so expensive. Furthermore, we can develop it sooner than the American Star Wars program will be carried out. But we don't want to do this. SDI and anti-SDI will mean an endless arms race that can get out of control".

(Izvestia, September 7. In full.)

VORI4-870812DR36

"FAUST'S ALLIANCE WITH THE DEVIL",

Or What the Star Wars Advocates in the USA
Are Doing Now

V. Sukhoi, Pravda's staff correspondent

The past two years were not easy for the SDI advocates. As many as 6,500 American scientists and researchers - people without whose knowledge creation of an anti-missile defence system with space-based elements is unthinkable - have declared against appropriation of funds for SDI. They hold the view that such system is too expensive and ineffective.

Peter Hart Research Associates company specialising in public opinion polls asked 6,549 leading American physicists to express their views on the Star Wars. As many as 75 per cent of them voiced serious doubts in SDI's ability to protect the Americans from ballistic missiles while 62 per cent of those polled declared against deployment of any military system in space. The company published the results of the poll while the Federation of American Scientists and the Union of Concerned Scientists made them widely known.

The US legislators could not ignore the arguments of the scientists and experts. They began to pursue a line of reducing the expenditures earmarked for the Star Wars programme. For instance, the Administration asked Congress to appropriate 5.4 billion dollars for the research work relating to the implementation of the SDI programme in the current fiscal year of 1987 but received approximately 3.5 billion. The White House asked Congress to allocate an even greater sum, 5.7 billion dollars, for the work in the field of Strategic Defense Initiative during the next fiscal year of 1988 but the House of Representatives of the US Congress voted to appropriate 3.1 billion dollars for these purposes. Since the Senate which has not taken such an irreconcilable stand had earlier voted for the allocation of 4.5 billion

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dollars the final sum will be now fixed by the House - Senate Conference Committee. Presumably, the sum will be about 3.7 billion dollars, i.e., 2 billion dollars less than the President has asked.

In this situation the pushers of the Star Wars resort to a new tactic. They claim that the opponents of SDI "distort" the essence of the programme, reducing it to the most exotic technology - X-ray lasers and beams of directed particles.

Robert Jastrow, the founder and former director of the Goddard Institute under NASA and a well-known advocate of SDI, classes the so-called kinetic missile-killers and the rail gun as "ready technology".

Representative Jack Kemp (N. Y.), a Republican hopeful at the next presidential election, vehemently advocates a go-ahead with the first stage of SDI in five to seven years. Kemp's reasoning is based on the conclusions of Robert Jastrow and the George Marshall Institute, a conservative organization that works out recommendations for the ways of using modern technologies for military purposes. Making it clear that the Star Wars is an important issue of his election campaign, Kemp introduced in the House a special amendment which provides the creation of one of the SDI systems as early as 1993.

The arguments of Kemp and the others who think like him are very simple. Deploying the first phase of SDI, they allege, will cost around 124,000 million dollars, which is far below the recent Congressional allocations for housing construction and highways maintenance. As a result, however, they go on, America will have an ABM system which will reliably protect its ballistic missiles launching pads and command centers. A "steel wall" of numerous metal pins that will be flying around each installation as a swarm of bees at a tremendous speed is to encircle these facilities. These kinetic weapons are to destroy enemy missiles by piercing through them at high speed, rather than blowing them up.

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The metal pins will be set in motion at such high speed by electromagnetic guns. An electromagnetic gun is an electric engine with two rails that form the gun's "barrel." An intensive electromagnetic field that forms between the two rails under the influence of a high voltage electric current is capable of imparting a truly fantastic speed to any projectile.

About 234 million dollars were allocated for the development of kinetic armaments in the 1987 fiscal year. The figure will go up to 303.5 million in 1988 and to 357.4 million in 1989.

At the initial stage kinetic weapons are to be deployed in space on board specially equipped satellites. Later such weapons are to be deployed on land-based ABM systems which have been code-named HEDI and ERIS. The two systems were tested last year, and more systems are to be tested again at the end of this summer.

Do the lately more frequent expatiations on the priority of kinetic arms mean that the remaining aspects of the Star Wars programme have been neglected? Of course, not. The fact that the development of kinetic weapons has swallowed up a mere 234 million of the 3,500 million dollars allocated for SDI in the current fiscal year speaks for itself.

One may be absolutely sure that the enormous Nova laser installation built at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory at the cost of 187 million dollars is not standing idle. The contractor companies involved in implementing the Star Wars programme, the number of which has now exceeded 1,300, have not been sitting twiddling their thumbs, either. Boeing Corporation, which has received from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization orders worth 131 million dollars, seized leadership among them in 1986. It is followed by TRW concern (61 million), Hughes Aircraft Corporation (40 million), Lockheed (25 million), and Rockwell International Corp. (24 million dollars). The

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activities of the arms manufacturing companies have affected the American tax-payers, too, each of whom had to part with 13 dollars for the SDI programme in 1986 alone.

There were 57 Nobel Prize-winners among the American scientists who signed the Appeal for Outlawing Space Arms. One of them has described the Star Wars programme as "Faust's alliance with the devil". A very apt and precise comparison.

New York, August.

(Pravda, August 12, Abridged.)

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VAKFI
TÜSTAV

VOVP4-870813DR44

THE RESPONSE WILL BE EFFECTIVE

Potential Measures and Means for Negating SDI

Col. V. Nazarenko, Candidate of Military Sciences

The Soviet leaders have said more than once that if the United States implements its notorious Strategic Defense Initiative, thereby creating a serious threat to the whole world, the Soviet Union will give an effective response.

Numerous works by Soviet and foreign experts convincingly show that despite the assurances of the US Administration, anti-missile defense which is being developed under the Star Wars program is an offensive rather than defensive system. To begin with, the systems envisaged by SDI are strike weapons which can destroy major satellites in order to blind the other side, thereby depriving it of its ability to retaliate a nuclear attack. Furthermore, these weapons can destroy targets not only in space but also in the air, on the ground, and at sea. They will help the United States to consolidate its strategic offensive potential, and acquire a first-strike capability.

Therefore, Soviet experts believe that the main task in countering a potential ABM system is to retain an ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy in retaliation to any nuclear attack. Retaliation should be approximately adequate to what the side subjected to an attack could inflict on the aggressor if the latter did not have anti-missile defense.

Potential measures and means of negating a layered ABM system with space-based elements are discussed at length in reports, articles and monographs of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against Nuclear Threat. They are dealt with in detail in the book "Space Weapons: the Dilemma of Security" which was put out by Mir Publishers in 1986.

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What possibilities exist in principle for negating a Star Wars system? What is meant under an "asymmetrical" response to SDI?

One of the most important possible countermeasures is the development of the "traditional" strategic nuclear armaments, and the buildup of their ability to penetrate a "space shield". This may be done by increasing the number of ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs), and the number of warheads they carry. "SDI weapons are very expensive, while ballistic missiles are cheaper," noted Academician B. Rauchenbach. "Suppose one side created a defensive shield which -- although it is sheer nonsense -- can intercept all of the incoming thousands of warheads. What will the side whose missiles may be intercepted do in this situation? It will produce thousands of warheads more for this is much cheaper than to set up a layered ABM system." Specialists maintain that the development and modernization of strategic arms with a view to overcoming such a "shield" will cost 20 to 30 times less than this "shield" itself.

A no small role here would be played by so-called dummy missiles with a simplified control system and mock-up warheads having the same size-and-weight characteristics as the real ones. It is practically impossible to identify them as dummies technically. Deployment of such missiles is economically effective. Massive use of dummies would compel the enemy's ABM system to waste much of its striking power.

To preserve an ability for adequate retaliation against the aggressor it is possible to build up the arsenal of those weapons which cannot be reliably intercepted for the time being. This applies to SLBMs launched in flat trajectories (within the atmosphere), and cruise missiles of different basing modes. Experts believe that their detection and interception is an incredibly complicated task.

Reduction of the ICBM boost phase, which is possible in principle, creates additional difficulties for the detection and tracking systems, thereby lowering the effectiveness of

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anti-missile systems. One more countermeasure consists in ordinary camouflage of missile launches, for instance, with smokescreens or dispersal of aerosols absorbing laser radiation in the air. In addition to that, a missile's body may be covered with a coating made of materials diffusing or absorbing laser rays. To sum up, a package of the afore-mentioned and other measures makes it possible to substantially enhance the survivability rate of ICBMs and SLBMs at the boost phase, and greatly complicate their interception subsequently.

At the ballistic (mid-course) phase the task of detecting targets and sorting out the true warheads from the decoys (whose number may run into tens of thousands in a massive launch) will be extremely difficult, since they are small-size and do not have missile plumes. The release of warheads may be accompanied by the dispersal of a cloud of minor, light metal objects and aerosols which sharply lower the potentialities of radar and infrared means of detection and tracking. The effectiveness of sensors of an ABM system largely depends on the enemy's ability to use radiological, optical, and electronic countermeasures.

At the terminal phase where warheads and decoys are easily identified during their re-entry into the atmosphere by detection and acquisition means, it is possible to use high-speed maneuverable MIRVs which can only be intercepted by systems with enormous speed and high aerodynamic characteristics.

Special mention should be made about the vulnerability of such ABM components as space battle stations with different kinds of weapons on board. Soviet specialists believe that these may be reliably destroyed with small-size missiles (charges) of different basing modes, as well as powerful ground-based lasers. The point is that it is much easier to develop such lasers than those which are designed for use at space platforms to hit ballistic missiles in flight. Moreover, there are practically no limitations for

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ground-based lasers as regards mass, energy consumption, and other critical parameters. It is much easier to track a laser beam to a space battle station because it is much bigger than a missile, not to mention a warhead. There is yet another highly-effective means of nullifying an ABM system -- so-called space mines, that is, satellites placed in orbits near space battle stations. They can be fitted out with different fuzes and a powerful charge to be detonated by command from the ground. A cloud of "space shrapnel" capable of piercing through the coating of a battle station may be used to block its movement in orbit.

And, finally, the entire system of information means (reconnaissance, targeting, acquisition and communications), and combat control is a very vulnerable component of space weapons.

It is very important to give a clear-cut answer to the question about possibilities of effectively negating SDI. In its Star Wars propaganda US officials are staking on the alleged "invulnerability" of an ABM system, claiming that it will create a reliable shield protecting the US against enemy ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, even now it is easy to find the means to neutralize and destroy any elements of a large-scale ABM system. The USSR stands for star peace, not star wars advocated by the authors of SDI. Star peace is a foundation of a peaceful future for our planet.

(Krasnaya Zvezda, August 13. In full.)

NEWS AND VIEWS

Four years ago on March 23 the US President announced the Star Wars programme as a way to save mankind from nuclear weapons. At the same time the Administration continued and continues to implement an "all-embracing strategic programme" envisaging further build-up of the American nuclear strategic potential, writes Lieutenant General Viktor Pavlov, military-political expert. National Security Directive 119 which ordered to hold four demonstrations of the most important technologies of an anti-missile system before 1990 was signed back in January 1984. The Fletcher Commission appointed by the US President also recommended that demonstration of the key ABM components be completed by the end of the decade. Both the document and the recommendation ignore the essence of the above-mentioned Treaty - prohibition of anti-ballistic defence for a country's territory and even of creation of the basis for such defence.

While the SDI programme gained momentum, work which must later become an integral part of it - the equipment of US territory with radars - continued. In addition to the two latest large phased-array radar stations which existed on the western and eastern coasts of the USA (Otis and Beale bases) the construction of three other radars of this kind - two in the south of the USA (Robins and Goodfellow) and one in Greenland (Thule) began.

The construction of such radar stations for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack contradict the ABM Treaty in characteristics and the fact that one of them is outside the USA. These stations perform anti-missile defence tasks. A simple comparison of the main characteristics of the radar stations of the Pave Paws type with the characteristics of the ABM radar stations, for instance, the PAR at Grand

Forks base, leads to such a conclusion. Their tactical and technical data coincide either fully, or in a greater part. This substantial fact prompts the idea that a network of such stations is being deployed on US territory and beyond (Thule) contrary to the ABM Treaty because a foundation for anti-missile defence of the country is being thus laid. These actions fully fit in with the SDI concept, which emphatically proves that it is aimed against the Treaty.

As for the radar station in Thule, its deployment outside US territory is an additional gross violation of the ABM Treaty. The new radar in Greenland and the planned deployment of a new radar in Britain create a precedent for SDI facilities beyond US territory. This way leads to further practical involvement of the NATO countries in the US military-strategic plans.

* * *

The Washington Post carries a contribution abounding in questions: why does the United States, for instance, always get into trouble supporting rascally dictators and opposing Marxists and patent Communists; or why any other views are sacrificed to the Monroe doctrine, which says that the United States can do anything it pleases to make other governments in the western hemisphere acceptable in Washington. The contribution does not answer those and other questions, but the very fact that they are posed is telling. If there are people who ask them, we may hope that others will think about answers, says Pyotr Romanov, Novosti analyst.

We should like to make the following comment. History provided ample proof that the White House supports rascally dictators to oppose not so much communism as any independence drive in the Third World. Here are some examples from the United States' relations with Latin America. In 1926, US troops landed in Nicaragua to suppress a Liberal rising

POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES TO SDI

Maj.-Gen. I. Anureyev, Ph.D.

The US Strategic Defence Initiative, aptly called Star Wars, aims at militarising space and upsetting strategic balance between the USSR and the United States.

Speaking at a press conference in Reykjavik, Mikhail Gorbachev said: "Our response to SDI will be asymmetrical, but there will be a response. And it will not entail many sacrifices."

What are possible responses to SDI? What is to be done to preserve strategic balance?

The military-technical measures to counter SDI can be divided into two groups: active and passive. The measures I will deal with below are no secret. They are well known to American specialists. That is why an arms race in space cannot ensure the United States military superiority. It would only create more difficulties for the efforts to bring about disarmament and international security.

The active responses include: destruction of SDI targets (elements) deployed in space, in the atmosphere and on Earth; the use of tactical methods of penetrating through various ABM defence echelons by missiles; suppression of the ABM defence control system; suppression of electronic elements of a defence system by electronic means; building up strategic nuclear armaments, modernising them and upgrading their structure.

The passive responses include: deployment of decoys; reinforcing missiles and warheads to protect them against laser attack; camouflaging missile launches.

Active Responses to SDI

The destruction of SDI targets (elements) is the most

effective means of sharply reducing the strength of the entire US missile defence system, allowing ballistic missiles to penetrate it. The main SDI targets (elements) are: orbital battle stations equipped with laser and beam weapons (or, possibly, with kinetic-energy weapons), space-based control stations (including reserve stations); decoy stations or targets and also a number of ground-based SDI elements.

The destruction of some major targets, especially those connected with control, will substantially reduce the efficacy of SDI and undermine its ability to perform the duties assigned to it by American military specialists. SDI targets, especially orbital stations, may be destroyed by various space-, air- and land-based systems equipped with directed-energy weapons (such weapons are based on the principle of direct transfer of energy from a source of radiation to a target with the speed of light or at velocities close to it), kinetic-energy weapons and interceptor missiles and rockets. These responses may prove to be especially effective against orbital missile defence systems with known trajectories.

SDI battle stations in orbit may be destroyed by "space mines," or spacecraft carrying high-yield warheads detonated on command from the Earth. They should be deployed in space in orbits close to those of SDI battle stations.

Land-based lasers also can be used to destroy battle stations and other SDI elements. Such lasers are simpler to build than space-based lasers (a land-based laser will have larger targets to destroy, it will be possible to use one laser against several warheads and a battle station will stay within a laser's range long enough to be destroyed).

A "cloud" of small objects may be used to destroy orbital battle stations. Such "clouds" can be created near

the orbits of battle stations on collision course. Moving at 15 km per second, a 30-gram particle could penetrate a 15 cm thick steel screen or the skin of an orbital station. A "cloud" of small particles is as effective as a kinetic-energy weapon.

The use of tactical methods of penetrating SDI by missiles will be a major means of sharply reducing the efficacy of SDI and increasing the effectiveness of a retaliatory nuclear strike. The essence of a special method of launching missiles was demonstrated by penetrating a missile defence system based on the use of nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers.

In the event of the use of X-ray lasers, an orbital battle station would explode in space, but laser rods trained on flying objects would destroy targets by powerful impulses. In this case, decoy missiles should be launched in advance to render a missile defence useless. Then a nuclear counter-strike would be delivered in planned sequence. Of course, decoy missiles should be built so that no target selection system could distinguish them from real missiles.

Disruption of the enemy missile defence control system is one of the principal methods of countering SDI.

According to American schemes, any SDI control system must comprise a land-based and an orbiting subsystem. The land-based subsystem will be linked with the US supreme military command and the Federal government. The orbiting subsystem must comprise satellite communication and various radio and electronic equipment. Suppression of elements in the control system will disrupt its functions and increase the probability of ABM penetration.

Radioelectronic countermeasures are likewise designed to reduce the combat effectiveness of SDI by jamming radio, radar, optical, infrared or laser means which any missile

defence system is to comprise a plenty of.

Build-up, modernization and structural optimization of strategic nuclear forces will be an effective response to the American SDI.

Since the US continues the work to develop SDI in order to gain superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has the right to take adequate countermeasures by building up its own strategic nuclear forces. They can be built up to such a level that a retaliatory nuclear strike at the US, even with a fully deployed SDI, will be truly devastating.

Besides, there is the possibility of certain modernization and advancement of the strategic nuclear forces, increasing the probability of SDI penetration. The emphasis in their development can be placed on those strategic nuclear systems against which SDI is ineffective. These may include low-flying cruise missiles, ballistic missiles with a short booster phase and flat-trajectory missiles. As the readers must have understood, the SDI programme will inevitably lead to a new dangerous spiral in the arms race, and it is to avoid that outcome that the Soviet Union is campaigning against the militarization of space and against SDI.

Passive Responses to SDI

Decoys are used to ensure a high level of engagement of ABM systems, to complicate the selection of targets by the enemy, to distract active ABM systems' elements into attacking those decoys and to reduce in general the effectiveness of SDI.

Parallel with the separation of nuclear warheads, the attacking side can send forth a cloud of small metal objects which will not only absorb but also reflect radio waves and scatter the radar waves reflected from the warheads. Infrared

detection and homing systems can be suppressed by spraying aerosol clouds emitting infrared radiation around warheads.

Protection of missiles and nuclear warheads against laser weapons with reflecting and absorbing coatings. The use of absorbing coatings will substantially increase (about a hundred times) the required density of the laser capacity for hitting missiles or warheads. The spinning of missiles or warheads will prevent the fixation of the laser beam on particular sections of their surface, which will also work for their protection. One may also mention the provision of missiles with an additional cooling system, generation of smoke and aerosol clouds absorbing laser radiation in the atmosphere and other countermeasures against lasers.

Protection against X-ray lasers. In accordance with one of the missile defence concepts on which the US is working, combat stations carrying X-ray lasers are to be put into orbit at the very last moment before a preemptive US nuclear strike. This is to be done by means of special carrier rockets deployed on nuclear submarines. US experts believe that such submarines must be kept on operational duty in the oceans close to the USSR's borders: in the northern sector of the Indian Ocean or in the Norwegian Sea. It is obvious that effective measures to detect in advance and destroy such submarines are perfectly feasible.

Missile launch camouflaging consists in setting up smoke screens and in using other means of camouflage. This should complicate the detection of missile launches by space-based early warning systems.

The Cost of SDI in relation to the cost of countermeasures. One of the major problems in the development of all new weapon systems is figuring out the relation between the cost of the new weapon system and of the system designed to counter it. If the cost of the counter-system is lower than

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that of the primary system, the development of such a system may well prove unwise.

Evaluation of the countermeasures against SDI shows that there are effective and less expensive means enabling to retain a devastating retaliatory strike potential. This evaluation also shows that the cost of such countermeasures may average just a few per cent of the cost of a large-scale space-based missile defence system.

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TÜSTAV