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WHAT THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL'S LIMA CONGRESS SHOWED

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A span of several months now separates /^{us} from last June's 17th Congress of the Socialist International in Lima, capital of Peru. Nonetheless, it would be useful and even essential to take another look at it. There are several reasons for this, and I would like to begin by listing these reasons.

The attention that the Senegalese Communists give to everything related to the international social democratic movement is motivated, above all, by national considerations. The party now in power in Senegal calls itself "Socialist", parades "democratic" persuasions, is active in the Socialist International, and tries to put its strategy into effect in Africa. Although the ruling party's official policy is not determined by the Socialist International's resolutions and attitudes, it has, at least on some issues, to take this international organisation's guidelines into account. That explains why the Senegal Party of Independence and Labour devotes a certain measure of attention to them, taking into account the influence, even if it is limited, of these guidelines on our national life.

Indeed, we believe that the activities of the Socialist International are followed with quick interest also in other quarters. The Socialist International is represented in practically all continents and unites many parties of diverse status.¹ Some hold the reins of power, while others are in some instances the most influential opposition force in their countries. Many millions of people are members of these parties and many more vote for them at elections. Lastly, in some countries the likelihood of a left alternative to reactionary governments depends largely on how correctly the question of the relations between the Communist and Socialist or Social Democratic parties is resolved. In other words, the Socialist International carries considerable weight and is a real force in international political life and the Communists cannot be indifferent to its resolutions, activities, and attitudes. It would therefore be not amiss to take a close look at how the congress in Lima approached vital issues of our epoch and attempted to respond to them.

Humanity is today confronted with many problems and its future, perhaps even its existence, depends on how they are resolved. These are, in the first place: delivering the peoples from the threat of nuclear catastrophe; preventing militarisation of outer space; reorienting the material resources, the scientific and technological potentialities, and the natural wealth presently being wasted on the arms race towards the elimination of unemployment, poverty, hunger, and threat to the environment; establishing a new and just international/^{economic} order; and uprooting anachronisms such as colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and apartheid.

Unquestionably, all these problems had to be dealt with in the debate at the Lima Congress and in the resolutions adopted. I had the opportunity to observe the proceedings at this congress² and I would identify some distinctive features that allow piecing together an idea of the Socialist International's strategy for the next few years.

First, a responsible, positive and constructive approach was to be observed towards the most burning issues of our time. This approach was based on a sober, realistic appraisal of the modern world, on a clear awareness of the magnitude of the dangers threatening humanity, and a fairly explicitly expressed desire to move from words to concrete action in order to avert these dangers.

Second, problems were considered in their objective inter-relation. The mainspring of the universal need for fighting for peace and disarmament is that if this struggle achieves its aims it will open up better prospects for resolving other problems, such as fostering socio-economic progress and ensuring genuine national independence and democracy, problems that preoccupy the minds of the peoples of developing countries.

Third, a keynote of the documents adopted by the congress is that there is an imperative need to achieve unity of action on the part of all the forces seeking to make a solid contribution to the struggle for peace and disarmament.

Fourth, let us note that the Socialist International is entering a phase of ideological reappraisal in order to be able to act more effectively and, on the political level, to take

into account the effects of the growth of its influence in the Third World.

Let us consider this point. Evidently, there are two basic motivations for the reappraisal. One is the aspiration to renew the political offensive in the face of the neoconservative tide that in Western Europe has driven out quite a few Socialist and Social Democratic governments. The other is to isolate communist parties socially and politically in order to reduce them to the role of a springboard to power for the Social Democrats in some countries or even to edge them away gradually from the arena of social struggles. The latter aspect, in my view, induces the Communists to take a determined stand against this course to marginalise them. Of course, this should under no circumstances place in doubt the need ^{for} / unity of action in areas where such unity is possible, especially in the principal area, namely, the defence of peace.

The French author Antoine de Saint Exupery noted: "To be a human being means to be responsible." In the nuclear age the significance of the concept of responsibility has grown immeasurably. Responsible behaviour has today become vital for all states, peoples, and organisations. Students of antiquity know what Rome had to pay for the megalomania of an emperor who believed he could play with fire with impunity. While such irresponsibility was dangerous in that distant age, it can much less be permitted today when gigantic arsenals of self-destruction are endlessly increasing the gravity of its consequences.

For that reason our epoch, more than any other, demands that political leaders show, above all, a sense of responsibility, in other words, a clear understanding that the whole of humankind has a common destiny. In the face of the threat of nuclear catastrophe, which would be irreparable, all are in one and the same boat. Either we save ourselves together by combining our efforts to prevent the global threat, or we shall perish together, having failed to realise opportunely the need for such unity. This understanding of the responsibility of the moment permeates, I believe, the following words of The Manifesto of Lima: "The Socialist International calls upon all forces, people from all walks of life to join in urgent action for peace and disarmament and for the utilisation of resources now spent on arms for world-wide economic and social development."³

Moreover, a sense of responsibility implies an impartial study of problems despite the West's continuing efforts to confuse them by diplomatic and propaganda subterfuges. Hence, one hardly needs to comment on Willy Brandt's words spoken at the congress that "all serious proposals must be taken seriously ... even if they happen to originate in Moscow". These words of the Chairman of the Socialist International are unquestionably an acknowledgement of the efforts being made by the Soviet Union to find for humanity a way out of the nuclear deadlock. In the same statement one sees a diplomatically couched exposure of the posture maintained by the Reagan administration, which, while sitting on a huge nuclear "powder-keg", is not ceasing to play with matches like an unmindful child. Indeed, the Socialist Inter-

national explicitly stated that the USA "should reciprocate the Soviet moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests".

We see this call, addressed specifically to Washington, as being more than justified. Everybody knows that on August 6, 1985 the Soviet Union declared a moratorium on its nuclear tests, a moratorium that it subsequently extended four times--the latest to January 1, 1987. In the meantime, the USA responded to the Soviet initiative with some 20 nuclear explosions. Two such diametrically different approaches allow each person to draw obvious conclusions and have a clearer perception of who in fact stands for peace and respects the peaceful aspirations of nations and who brushes these aspirations aside. The special interest in drawing a comparison between these antithetical attitudes is that it cuts the ground from under the rope-walking theory of the "equal responsibility of the great powers" for the arms race. Credit must be given to the Socialist International for the fact that having noted the constructive initiatives of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community in questions related to peace and disarmament it has recognised that now the ball is in the court of the other side.

As I have already pointed out, the responsible and constructive approach taken by the congress to international problems is based on the entirely justified statement of the fact that in a nuclear war and in the arms race there will be no winners, there will only be losers. "As individuals and nations," it was declared in Lima, "we are being deprived of our right to life and survival; our right to fully develop our societies; and our right

to live in peace, freedom, and solidarity." What can be done to remedy this situation?

As a start the Socialist International rejects, quite rightly, the idea that innovations in weapons technology and defence systems effectively resolve the problem of nuclear safety: "Technology cannot liberate mankind from the nuclear threat." Hence the conclusion: "It ^{is} / not the quality of weapons but the quality of politics which must be improved." An essential element of this approach lies in a critical reassessment of the "national security" concept in the shape that it is often seen, namely, from a prejudiced and self-serving viewpoint.

"True security", The Manifesto of Lima says, "is common security. It can only be built in partnership, taking into account the security requirements of all countries and aspirations of all peoples." In accordance with this collective security concept, which, incidentally, underlies many of the proposals of the socialist countries, the Socialist International points out the "fallacy of security through arms build-ups and innovations in arms technology". The congress called for a broader "renovation of foreign and security policy" saying that "security should rely more and more on political and economic cooperation, openness, mutual trust and / in short, a new detente".

Rejecting the trend towards confrontation across the board, the congress called for the settlement of the problem "by patient and determined negotiations aimed at significant measures of arms control and disarmament". To secure this reorien-

tation of the prevailing international situation the Socialist International appeals to the goodwill of states, notably of the major military powers, urging them "to prove that they are not just trying to cover militarisation by speaking about arms control and deferring tangible results, which must include effective verification arrangements".

These words need to be specified. A person familiar with the recent Soviet statements and concrete proposals on the question of armaments verification is bound to assess a statement of this nature as a slightly veiled criticism of some Western countries, of the USA in the first place. With their demagogic pacifist rhetoric, unfounded charges about the USSR violating existing agreements, and dodges on the verification question they are in fact trying to provide a screen for their policy of unbridled militarisation. This duplicity, when one thing is vocally proclaimed and cynically the very opposite is done, was in fact exposed by the Social Democrats in Lima.

The congress called for concerted efforts not only by the great powers but also by all other states, big and small, that have something to say on problems of peace and disarmament and can advance realistic initiatives. Lastly, the Socialist International appealed to the peoples and diverse organisations to unite in the struggle for peace and disarmament and to pressure their respective governments into adopting a positive attitude on these issues.

In a more detailed examination of the various specific proposals and recommendations made by the Socialist International on the basis of its positions of principle, one can, of course,

find implications we cannot accept. But, I would say, the Socialist International's general line extends the possibilities of the Communists for common action in the interests of peace and disarmament with those who subscribe to the principal guidelines laid down by the Lima Congress.

There is today no Communist Party that has not put the question of preserving world peace in the focus of its concerns, political programme, and even work among the people. It would be hard to assume that on account of a sectarian attitude or of ideological divergences Communists anywhere have rejected joint actions with this or that component of the peace movement. Lastly, we know of no fraternal party that does not share the view that in the modern epoch differences between countries must be settled by political means accommodating respect for the independence, security, and sovereignty of peoples rather than by dictation, intervention, or state terrorism.

The Communists staunchly abide by the principles that characterise them as a force that most consistently champions world peace and social progress. They are always open to discussion and dialogue in order to develop the optimal means for mobilising the broadest sections of the people. Consequently, it is our view that if the Socialist International's call for unity of action encounters difficulties, these will not be difficulties created by the communist movement.

The Socialists and Social Democrats have the support of the Communists wherever they are seriously determined to move from words to deeds and pursue their own policy as defined in their

positive statements. Further, it must be acknowledged that while the communist movement has made considerable efforts to weed out manifestations of sectarianism in its ranks relative to the Social Democrats, among the latter anti-communist prejudices are still strongly entrenched.

In this context it is striking that not a single Communist Party, not even from any socialist country, was invited to the Lima Congress, in spite of the fact that in the communist movement the practice of late has been to invite representatives of socialist and social democratic parties to congresses and conferences. Further, it is doubtful that the presence at the congress of apparitions disguised as "parties in exile" from East European countries had in any way fostered the promotion of the mutual confidence propounded by the Socialist International.

It would be appropriate also to note that many socialist and social democratic parties adhere to positive positions in the period of struggle for power, but pursue an entirely different course once they are in power. The recent evolution of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party on the question of NATO membership is only one more case in point. Unfortunately, Spain is by no means an exception.

While the Communists do not write off positive statements, they set concrete actions above them. But even if leaders of socialist or social democratic parties refuse to move to such actions, their positive statements are of certain interest. They can serve the Communists as new terms of reference for a dialogue with sections of the people influenced by the Socialists and Social

Democrats, for a gradual clearing of the way to unity of action by all the peace forces at grassroots level. That is why we see as generally positive the Socialist International's stand on questions of peace and disarmament. We feel that to a large extent it can help to mobilise the people for the defence of peace, for the struggle for disarmament and the planet's definitive deliverance from the spectre of nuclear danger.

At the Lima Congress the delegation of the "Socialist" Party of Senegal attracted attention by taking a stand that conflicted with the attitude of others. This surprised many foreign observers. The delegation urged ^{converting} / the whole of Africa into a nuclear-free zone on the basis of an international agreement that would be recognised, complied with, and guaranteed by the ^{great} / powers; it pleaded for an unconditional ban on nuclear tests in our continent; it called upon socialist and social democratic parties to direct the efforts of the public influenced by them against the export of armaments to Third World countries; it suggested imposing a tax on the sale of armaments and on military budgets (beginning at some fixed level) and using the resultant revenue for socio-economic and cultural programmes; lastly, it supported the suggestion that a conference be convened on questions of development and disarmament. It went so far as to declare that Senegal, a member of the Socialist International Disarmament Advisory Council, would be prepared to facilitate the implementation of its recommendations.

It is obvious to our party that the Senegalese delegation's statement is demagoguery of the first water. One need not go far

for evidence. The "Socialist" Party has done nothing so far to inform national public opinion about the recommendations made at Lima, recommendations that quite evidently serve the Senegalese government's desire to maintain a good image in the eyes of world public opinion while pursuing a ruthless anti-national and anti-people policy. Although our party is aware of all this, it takes note of the statements made by the Senegalese "Socialists". We see our duty in doing our utmost to mobilise public opinion in our country to compel the demagogues to live up to their promises.

Although the questions of peace and disarmament clearly predominated at the Lima Congress, they were not the only theme attracting the attention of the Socialist International. This was the first time it held its congress in Latin America, which is experiencing economic, political, and social difficulties. This was reflected in the proceedings. The recent numerical growth of the Socialist International's membership with the admission of parties from developing nations likewise influenced the approach that was adopted at the congress to present-day international economic relations, some regional conflicts, and the problems of freedom and democracy.

It would be impossible, of course, to consider in any detail all the policy planks formulated by the Socialist International. I shall therefore confine myself to mentioning what in my view are the more significant trends.

At the congress Third World problems were examined in the context of the general crisis of the system of international eco-

conomic relations. This crisis, in the opinion of the Socialist International, has its origin in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods financial system in 1971-1973. This breakdown coincided with the end of the US economy's total hegemony in the postwar world and with the drastic diminution of the funds allocated by OECD⁴ states for development assistance, and the resultant growth of the role of private cash flows. The oil boom accelerated this trend, for it permitted Western bankers to make massive investments and pocket colossal profits. The profits recycled in the shape of loans to Third World nations helped the latter to survive and the Western economies to avert a depression.

In the short run these steps yielded some results and demonstrated, it is asserted in The Manifesto of Lima, that "a massive transfer of funds from North to South is a critical part of the common solution to the world economic crisis". However, in the form it was conceived in the 1970s the strategy of addressing the Third World's difficulties with loans laid the foundation for the debt crisis of the 1980s. This took place "primarily because international cash flows between North and South had become hostage to private banking priorities". The monetarist policy of the USA led not only to the worst recession that started in / ^{about 1975} but to a rise of interest rates. It thereby set off a reverse flow of funds from the South to the North.

The increase in arms sales to developing nations and the inefficient management of capital in some of these nations accentuated this trend. Conducted in this context, the IMF's "strength"

and "austerity" policy dramatically exacerbated the condition of many nations along the capitalist periphery: "the masses," it is stated in The Manifesto of Lima, "had to pay with their living standards for debts which had often been undertaken by anti-democratic regimes and had, in any case, been artificially and unfairly increased by the anti-inflation policies of Western conservatives".

In the view of the Socialist International, taking into account the interdependence of national and international problems, the settlement of this crisis can only be a global one. In other words, as in questions related to peace and disarmament, this settlement can only come from collective negotiations and the promotion of multilateral international cooperation on the basis of equality, justice, and mutual benefit.

The congress adopted an Action Programme, which, in view of new circumstances, is on the whole founded on the recommendations in two reports of the Brandt Commission (1980 and 1983) on international development. It would hardly be worth to dwell in detail on this document in this article. However, we feel that economists of fraternal parties will have to make a serious critical analysis of this programme, which, at least in general terms, has points in common with many of the demands of the champions of a new international economic order. Such a critical analysis would enable communist parties, notably in the Third World, to be better prepared for the debates that will most likely take place in the coming years.

In examining the present system of international economic relations the Socialist International uses categories that do not in all cases coincide with those used by us. For instance, the Communists always show the class essence of problems, preferring to call a spade a spade. That is why ^{we} do not speak of a "world economic crisis" generally when we are witnessing an exacerbation of a specific and tangible general crisis of capitalism (even if its consequences affect the whole world). Or, instead of speaking abstractly about "North-South contradictions" we clearly identify two radically different tendencies in the system of international economic relations. One of these reinforces the mechanism of exploiting Third World countries and characterises their relations with industrial capitalist powers; the other, stemming from mutually beneficial collaboration, defines the essence of the relations of these countries with the socialist world community.

Another point to be noted is that on such a crucial issue as debt the Socialist International preferred a compromise solution, which circumvented this problem and left it unanswered in the context that it was clearly spelled out by Fidel Castro: mathematically (and, hence, economically) the debt is not repayable.

However, while underlining this distinction, we should note that in their analysis of the reasons for the crisis the Communists and Social Democrats have drawn very close together: the way the capitalist economy functions; the policies pursued by the

USA and reactionary Western governments; the arms race, in which some irresponsible leaders of Third World countries are taking part instead of utilising their meagre national resources for the socio-economic and cultural development of their countries; the negative effect of the recipes proffered by the International Monetary Fund. They are also agreed that there should be collective negotiations for a serious examination of the present state of international economic relations.

We feel that it is vital, on the basis of this convergence of views, to continue the discussion and comparing attitudes in order to see to what extent it is possible to combine the efforts of the Communists, the Socialists, the Social Democrats, and the peoples of developing countries in the struggle to inaugurate a new international economic order and promote socio-economic progress. Thus, in our view, there is nothing to indicate that a minimum accommodation is unattainable in this context. This would open up further opportunities for enlarging the sphere of unity of action. Of course, this prospect implies that the Communists should themselves give more attention to Third World problems and have a more exact idea of the role that the processes taking place in the Third World could play in our common anti-imperialist struggle.

For instance, the problem of apartheid is today seriously preoccupying all democratic and progressive people in the world, especially the African revolutionaries. We therefore welcome the clear stand taken on this issue by the Lima Congress. It emphatically condemned not only the apartheid regime but also the

attempts to modify that regime instead of abolishing it. Moreover, criticism was levelled at the attitude adopted by the Western powers that are supporting the Pretoria racists directly or indirectly. The congress rejected the rhetoric justifying the refusal to apply effective economic sanctions and adopted the relevant recommendations for a boycott of South Africa to be brought to the attention of all the anti-racist forces in the world: a boycott on the unloading and loading of South African aircraft and ships at ports and airports; an appeal for deinvestment in South Africa; ^{and} various economic sanctions.

Our party, which attaches immense significance to the struggle against apartheid, clearly declares that it is prepared to consider any possibility for unity of action against the shameful regime with any Senegalese organisation or movement, including quarters close to the government. But we have to note with regret that on this issue as well the "Socialist" Party of Senegal prefers public relations exercises to concrete joint actions in support of the South African freedom fighters.

Let us sum up. On quite a few issues the Lima Congress adopted a positive stand to which the Communists cannot remain indifferent. However, some points indicate that the Socialist International has in no way modified its attitude to the communist parties of non-socialist countries. It continues to belittle the role and influence of these parties on the political scene of their respective countries in order to place them before the option of either gradually moving into the background and ultima-

tely disappearing or totally abandoning the revolutionary prospect and reducing the sense of their existence to an adjunct of the Social Democratic bandwagon.

It is well known that in any country a course towards the realisation of reformist alternatives, whose anti-labour orientation does not differ from outright capitalism, is incompatible with the class-defined, dynamic, and consistent policy of the Communist Party concerned. In this sense the Lima Congress was another exercise in misrepresenting the communist concept of freedom and democracy. People least qualified to teach us lessons in patriotism and devotion to the interests of our peoples went out of their way to depict the Communists as isolated politically, socially, and culturally, as "aliens" in their own countries. To what extent will the Socialist International act on these attitudes? We shall be able to answer this question after new principles (to replace the Socialist International's 1951 Frankfort Declaration) are formulated at the next congress.

But even today there should be no illusions. After the 27th Congress of the CPSU and the congresses of fraternal parties of some other socialist countries had determined a strategy, whose implementation will powerfully accelerate the development of existing socialism, our class adversaries are stepping up their subversive manoeuvres in an effort to confuse people because they feel that they are increasingly unable to influence the future. It is also natural that as the Socialist International draws closer to our attitudes on crucial issues, the more conser-

vative forces in it are intensifying their resistance and engaging in rearguard battles. We Communists should effectively rebuff them. We should raise still higher the militant banner of our unfading ideals of true democracy, tangible freedoms, genuine social justice, and peace. We should strengthen our unity, solidarity, and cooperation on the basis of the principles of creative Marxism-Leninism.

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI
TÜSTAV

¹ The 17th Congress was attended by nearly 700 delegates from 75 social democratic, socialist, and labour parties of Western Europe, Asia, Africa, and America.--Ed.

² The author attended the congress in the capacity of a journalist.--Ed.

³ The quotations used in this article are from documents circulated by the congress Press Centre: the report of the Socialist International's Disarmament Advisory Council, the report delivered by Willy Brandt, the Chairman of the Socialist International, and The Manifesto of Lima.--Ed.

⁴ The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development is an inter-governmental association of 24 capitalist countries. Its official objectives are to promote the social and economic development of member and non-member states and to work out ways for coordinating trade and aiding developing nations.--Ed.

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For discussion by the Editorial
Council

TWO MAIN TRENDS IN THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

An Analysis by the Institute of the
International Working-Class Movement,
USSR Academy of Sciences

1. This article opens a series of publications prepared by research establishments in various countries containing an analysis of the most important social trends at the junction of the 1970s and the 1980s, and scientific prognostications based on that analysis. This article has been prepared by the Institute of the International Working-Class Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

2. The closing decades of the 20th century constitute an exceptionally important boundary line in the development of human society. On the one hand, unprecedentedly favourable prospects for social progress have taken shape. The level to which the productive forces have risen make it possible to formulate and tackle in practice tasks in the provision everywhere of at least the necessary minimum of material and cultural conditions of life. Especially favourable opportunities have arisen for restructuring social relations for the benefit of the overwhelming majority of the working people. On the other hand, the ^{outline} contours of new and grave dangers of global scope have appeared. The danger of a disastrous disruption of the ecological equilibrium and the exhaustion of important raw material and energy resources has intensified.

Socially privileged groups and political trends representing their interests have sharply stepped up the resistance to social change. The self-seeking acts of monopoly capital, especially of the military-industrial complexes, whose influence on the capitalist countries' policy has been growing, have aggravated the real threat of mankind's slide into the maelstrom of a universal and devastating war which could mean mankind's suicide.

3. In this situation, especial importance attaches to the stand taken by the working class as the most massive, politically organised and vanguard social force, and the importance of its activity and contribution to positive solutions of the problems facing the whole world tends to grow. This contribution, for its part, depends on the degree of unity of action among the various trends in the working-class movement, notably, the Communists and Socialists, who are the two most important socio-political forces within it.

4. The Communist parties are ruling parties in the socialist community countries, the mainstay of the struggle against imperialism, and for social progress and international security. The Communist parties are a major social force in many capitalist countries of the world. They have influential groups in parliament, and hold important positions in the trade unions and other mass bodies, including social movements.

5. Socialist and Social Democratic parties head governments in some capitalist countries or participate in these governments. Elsewhere, they have an important role to play in their countries' domestic political life and act as an opposition force. On the whole, they have considerable potentialities

for exerting an influence on domestic and foreign policy.

6. Effective cooperation between Communists and Socialists could evidently be a crucial factor in ensuring peace and social progress, because it can substantially change the situation in the international arena and in the individual capitalist countries in favour of the world's working class.

7. Such cooperation is highly important in ensuring the interests of the working class and all the other working people in their resistance to the drive against their living standards, the attempts to "dismantle" their social and political gains, and the threat of another world war and the arms race. World developments confront Social Democrats with a turning-point ^{decision:} / are they to orient themselves upon cooperation with bourgeois political forces so as to preserve the capitalist system with its incurable sores, or are they to go over to real struggle for genuine and radical social transformations and a positive solution of global problems. The latter implied joint action with Communists for peace and social progress.

8. All of this attaches special importance to the intricate complex of problems, including the problem of contacts between the Socialist countries' Communist Parties and the Social Democratic parties operating under capitalism, relations between Communists and Social Democrats in the capitalist world, and joint action within the working-class movement in face of other political forces.

9. The Communists have put forward clear-cut proposals in the document they adopted at the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties. Aware of their responsibility to the working class, to the peoples, they have

once again most definitely come out for cooperation among democratic trends, and for a dialogue and joint action with Socialists. This call is also clearly sounded in the programme documents of the Communist parties of various countries.

10. Within Social Democracy there are also forces and whole parties which are already cooperating with Communists and have achieved some success. But among Social Democrats there are also many opponents of such cooperation. There are also objective obstacles in the way to it in the form of serious ideological differences between the revolutionary and reformist trends, different approaches to some political problems, residues of the past which have yet to be fully overcome, etc.

This makes a consideration of this complex of problems from the standpoint of the potentialities and prospects which have been brought out by the beginning of the 1980s all the more necessary.

I.

11. At various historical stages, the split within the ranks of the working class--and the struggle to overcome it--assumed various forms and had their own specific features arising from the conditions of time and place. That is why it is important to determine the peculiarity of the present circumstances, the actual situation in the early 1980s, which in some respects promote joint action by the working class, and in others, create obstacles to it.

12. Let us recall that the 1970s brought about a new and marked aggravation of all the contradictions of capitalism. The short-lived and flabby revival which followed upon the 1974-1975 crisis--comparable in scope and depth only with

the Great Depression of 1929-1933--a new industrial recession is in the offing. The sharpening of the economic situation in the capitalist countries has introduced a number of new elements into the conditions of the class struggle, and this has changed them in a way unfavourable for the working class. It has long since been established that the reduction in employment stemming from economic crises produces an excess of manpower supply over demand, creates growing pressure on its price, while hampering resistance to such pressure. It is true that in some circumstances the working class is capable of withstanding this trend. The chief of these is an international balance of social forces favourable for the working people, growing organisation of the proletarian ranks, and some peculiarities in the development of the productive forces under the scientific and technical revolution. There is, in particular, the growing interdependence of technological processes which enables trade unions to inflict great harm on the employers with less effort, by resorting to the present-day flexible tactics of strike struggle; there is the growing fission of the labour market under which excess supply of manpower in one area neighbours on sharp shortages of it in another, the special interest among employers in some categories of labour power, etc.

13. During the 1974/75 crisis, such circumstances enabled the working class in many capitalist countries (though not in all) to beat back the most extreme encroachments on its wages (it is true that the working people's real incomes were still depressed because of the reduction in the number of job-holders in the family, less overtime, and, accordingly,

less pay, and also a reduction in other fringe benefits). But the experience of the second half of the 1970s does not give any ground for the assumption that the positions won by the working class in the industrialised capitalist countries will make it possible, whatever the conditions, successfully to beat back the offensive by capital in the course of the economic upheavals expected for the early 1980s. This is borne out by the following.

14. Although the scale of the drive ^{against} the living standards of the working class will be determined by the scope and depth of the economic crisis, there are enough reasons to assume that the attempts by international capital to revenge itself for earlier reverses will have an influence on this scope. It is also evident that because the cyclical ^{crisis} ~~recession~~ is closely interwoven with the sharpening raw-material, energy and structural crises, the outlays for moving to the next phase of economic development will be much greater than they were in 1974/75. That is why capital will have even greater inducements to put pressure on the working class to force it to make sacrifices "for the common weal".

15. Another thing to bear in mind is that in anticipation of new class battles, international capital continued to bolster its positions throughout the second half of the 1970s. This was expressed, first, in the consolidation of the political influence of big capital in some developed capitalist countries through a partial shift to the right, and the ^{direct} takeover of the instruments of power by political forces most closely allied with monopoly capital (which reduced the

sensitivity of political institutions to pressure from below); second, in the especially intense and far from unsuccessful attempts to poison the international atmosphere, because tension in relations among states with different social systems, as the cold war period showed, provide an effective instrument for pressure on the working class in the interests of monopoly capital, notably under the pretext of the need for national unity in face of an "external threat"; and third, in the marked rise in the level of internalisation of capital, which has enhanced its ability to manoeuvre both within the framework of developed capitalism and at the expense of its periphery.

16. The buildup of the strength of the working class in the zone of developed capitalism in the second half of the 1970s was not so powerful as ^{despite} fully to neutralise the bolstering of the positions of the international bourgeoisie. In the conditions that have taken shape, the working class and its organisations will evidently have to mobilise all their potentialities in order to rebuff the strengthened enemy and not only to safeguard the old gains--notably living standards, and the whole spectrum of social and political gains--but also to score fresh successes ensuring the minimum that would accord with the present standards dictated by the scientific and technical revolution.

17. The possibilities for successfully resisting the monopoly-capital offensive and for going on to more vigorous action in the struggle for positions of power in the zone of developed capitalism are largely determined by the socio-psychological atmosphere in the area. When industry is on the upswing, especially when the upswing is relatively long,

broad public circles tend to imagine under the impact of bourgeois ideological influence, that the capitalist social system, having done away with its basic defects, is capable of ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of the economic mechanisms and, on that basis, of solving the acute social problems. Faith of this kind tends to penetrate into the ranks of the working class as well, so promoting the spread of social-reformist views.

18. Such a situation took shape, in particular, in the early postwar decades when, following the elimination of the immediate consequences of the Second World War, the capitalist cycle turned out to be slurred for various reasons. At that time, economic recessions were not as pronounced as they had been in the prewar period, which gave the ideologists of capitalism a basis for producing a "canonised image" of a modified capitalist society which allegedly differed fundamentally from the earlier capitalism of the 19th century.

19. The 1974/75 crisis dealt a heavy blow at this system of views, and dispelled among the mass social strata the incipient hope that this refurbished capitalist society could cope with the complexities of present-day development.

Accordingly, the rethinking by a sizable section of public opinion influenced by the apologia of capitalism of earlier ideological views was intensified.

20. A characteristic feature of this process is the ever more sceptical attitude to the existing social system which was extolled as an ideal one, and, in consequence, an interest in the alternative system, namely, socialism. At the same time, within the strata of the technocratically-oriented groups

of the traditional and service bourgeoisie and also among some middle strata, there was a further spread of hopes for "social engineering" designed to rationalise the social mechanisms in accordance with the requirements and potentialities of the scientific and technical revolution.

21. At the same time, the emergence of a critical attitude to present-day capitalism among its erstwhile unquestioning supporters, being superimposed on socio-psychological stereotypes worked out in the petty-bourgeois milieu, have frequently resulted in a primitive idealisation of the past and the spread of notions about it as some "lost paradise", with a rejection of progress in human society and the fruits of development of civilisation and culture, an attitude which goes hand in hand with sharp hostility for the working-class movement, notably the trade unions. This provides the soil on which not only traditionalist-conservative but also extreme right-wing ideological and political weeds tend to sprout.

II.

22. One could assume that the incipient recession with which capitalism is entering upon the 1980s will cause similar processes and intensify already existing trends. Their intensity will naturally be determined by a multiplicity of factors, above all, the strength of resistance to capital by the democratic public, notably, the organised working-class movement. Nevertheless, the strategy which the ruling class ^{the} its elite, /ruling circles, will choose is also of essential importance.

23. Under the general crisis of capitalism, the bourgeoisie has worked out two main strategic lines in its fight to maintain and consolidate its power. The first, designed for a relatively stable situation, entails large-scale social and political manoeuvring so as to induce the masses of the working people to accept the "rules of the game" as worked out in the bourgeois society. The form of power corresponding to this line consists of bourgeois parliamentary mechanisms, and the method of action, of reforms which do not affect the substance of social relations; and the instrument for their implementation--mass reformist parties of the Social Democratic or bourgeois persuasion.

24. The second line is kept in store for any extremely acute situations when the other mechanisms of power cannot cope. In that case, the task is to direct the tide of discontent against the parliamentary institutions and to force the mass of the population to reconcile itself with the bourgeois system of power. The form of power adequate to such a line is a dictatorial regime, the method of action--a combination of minor socio-economic concessions with savage suppression of any forms of social activity, above all, of the organised working-class movement, and the instruments of power--an influential right-radical, fascist political movement, or the armed forces (now and again, both).

25. After the Second World War, when the authoritarian fascist regimes suffered not only a crushing military but also ideological and political defeat, the ruling class in the main industrialised capitalist countries had to stake on parliamentary forms of government. The sharp aggravation

of crisis phenomena, especially pronounced in the 1970s, once again confronted the ruling bourgeoisie with the need to choose a strategy in the fight for power positions.

26. For a number of reasons the attempts to apply in practice the recommendations of the advocates of a "tough strategy" did not acquire any broad proportions in the developed capitalist countries. What is more, the mid-1970s were marked by the collapse of the last authoritarian fascist regimes on the European continent--in Portugal and Spain. Influential groups of the ruling class ultimately opted for finding a way out of the acute crisis situation in the mid-1970s by improving the instruments of indirect influence on the masses, while the extreme rightists and blatantly neo-fascist forces would continue to operate as a "fire-brigade" to be used in extreme conditions.

27. The current aggravation of the crisis phenomena in the capitalist economy has once again raised this whole complex of problems. What strategy will the leading groups of the bourgeoisie adopt in ^{their} efforts to preserve the pillars of its power which are now being subjected to fresh trials? Which of the two contending trends--consolidation of the left-wing forces' positions or shift to the right--will gain the upper hand in society's continued differentiation? Which political forces will head the contending social blocs? In which direction will the political system of contemporary capitalism be transformed, and with whose help?

28. In this context, there arises the highly acute question of the place the ruling classes now assign to the social-democratic movement.

29. In all the capitalist countries, the European capitalist countries at any rate, social democracy is a force which has up to now been an organic part of the mechanism of political power. With the existing division of functions, it usually ensures the modernisation of the system and its adaptation to the changing conditions, while the bourgeois centrist, right-centrist and right-wing political forces are assigned the role of stabiliser, which prevents modernisation from carrying the system to a point beyond the limits at which its existence is jeopardised. Departures from this division of functions do not alter the general uniformity, but merely accentuate it.

30. Subjectively, a majority of the ruling class regards social democracy with obvious or ill-concealed mistrust. This is based on many factors. Of considerable importance, for instance, is the bourgeoisie's traditional hostility for political forces which are left of centre, especially when these, like the Social Democrats, operate with the concept of "socialism". The installation of Social Democrats in power usually entails for the ruling class a policy of social concessions, while far from all its strata realise the need for them, and while their burden is not always evenly distributed. The bourgeoisie is also alarmed by the prompter social-democratic response to pressure from the working class and other contingents of wage-workers, something that is due to its concern for maintaining ties with its social basis. A constant source of fear is the possible shift to the left of the social-democratic ranks as the economic and socio-political situation sharpens and the social-democratic-led contingents of the working class are radicalised. Reminders of

such an eventuality comes from the existence of variously influential left-wing trends within the social-democratic ^{movement.}

31. In view of all this, the leading groups of the bourgeoisie usually prefer to have purely bourgeois political forces perform the main functions within the framework of the system. As soon as the acute need for turning to social democracy disappears, it is pushed away from the instruments of power into the political road-side.

32. But objectively, neither the modernisation of the political mechanism of contemporary capitalism, nor the improvement of the instruments of the bourgeoisie's socio-political power are now feasible without social democracy or in sharp confrontation with it. Here are some of the prime causes of this situation.

33. First, as has already been said, in most industrialised capitalist countries social democracy is now an influential political force enjoying stable support from masses of working people, including a sizable section of the working class. Any deliberate ignoring of the interests and political will of these sections of the population tends to narrow down the social basis of the political system, hampers the functioning of its institutions, and in some circumstances even tends to paralyse them. This also reduces the effectiveness of administrative decisions. Conversely, the involvement of social democracy in the adoption of such decisions or a temporary transfer to it of all the functions of political power tends to enlarge the mass basis of the political system of capitalism and gives it additional durability and flexibility. In these conditions, the transformations and innovations which have

become necessary can be put through more effectively, at a lower social and political cost for the capitalist class.

34. Second, the introduction of more or less important corrections into the existing order frequently runs into contradiction with the ideological principles of bourgeois political parties and the mass social groups supporting them. That is why such parties as a rule get down to such overdue transformations belatedly, hesitantly, inconsistently, etc. As for social democracy and its supporters, advocating the idea of social transformations through a gradual reform of the existing order, the achievement of changes, however insignificant, appears as a form in which ^{their} initially proposed goals are realised. Social Democrats tend to put through changes designed to cure ailing capitalism with greater resolution than their bourgeois partners and rivals, especially since in the process they manage additionally to enlarge their positions among the working masses seeking change.

35. Third, whenever the adaptation of the system to the changed conditions calls for additional sacrifices on the part of the population (and such cases are typical), it is the Social Democratic parties that turn out to be best adapted to inducing the masses to accept such sacrifices. These parties, reputedly champions of the working people's interests, can vindicate their calls by considerations of the common good, while similar appeals from patently bourgeois parties would inevitably bear the mark of the class egoism of the powers that be. Besides, one notion among the social-democratic-led masses is that the Social Democrats, directly sensing the requirements of the economically and socially deprived sections

of the population, are capable of getting the bourgeoisie to pay a larger compensation for any concessions than the bourgeois parties which are fettered in their moves by the stand of the various groups of the bourgeoisie.

36. All of this suggests that in the 1980s, social democracy will continue to play an important role in managing the affairs of present-day capitalism.

III.

37. What then are the assets with which the social-democratic movement itself enters upon the 1980s?

38. It entered upon the past decade full of radiant hopes. Its starting positions in the developed capitalist countries, notably in Western Europe, were more solid than ever before. The relatively long economic upswing, punctuated only with small fluctuations in growth rates, the expansion of consumption, determined, on the one hand, by the gains of the working class, and on the other, by the advances of the scientific and technical revolution, which created the prerequisites for the manufacture of relatively low-cost consumer goods, appeared to confirm the age-old social-democratic thesis that it was possible, step by step, through reforms, to purge capitalism of its most extreme defects and to convert it into a fundamentally different and better form of social organisation. This produced hopes that the social-democratic parties' popularity among the broad masses would grow.

39. The development of international relations has also given the Social Democrats additional opportunities. Among the political forces integrated into the superstructural fabric of capitalism, the social democratic parties were

the first to feel the winds of change and to derive the utmost advantages from them. Responding more immediately than the bourgeois parties to the population's increased need for real advance towards an improvement of the international atmosphere and consolidation of peace and security, social democracy began to lay much greater emphasis on this. Some acts were carried out for solving difficult external political problems which were poisoning the atmosphere in the world. Of course, this was made possible by the active peace policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. But the fact that this led to a marked relaxation of tension in relations between states with different social systems put on the Social-democratic parties the face of chief champion of a realistic foreign policy in the "Western world" and assured them of additional popularity in the mass social strata.

40. Another factor determined by external political development also operated in the same direction. Throughout the whole cold war period in the early postwar decades, ^{the} cold war line was mainly advocated by the bourgeois right-wing and right-centrist parties. They made extensive use of their influence, which sprang from the situation of sharp political and military confrontation with the socialist countries, not only to persecute the Communists, but also to put pressure on the Social Democrats from the right and to oust them from their old positions.

41. The discreditation of the cold war policy led to the discreditation of its most active upholders, especially those who did not manage to switch over in due time. For many Social Democratic parties this meant a marked weakening of

their rivals on the right.

42. The early 1970s seemed to bear out the social democratic optimism. In the leading capitalist countries, social-reformist parties either fortified their positions or won new ones. But subsequent development showed that the excessively optimistic assessment of their prospects had been groundless.

43. By the mid-1970s, a number of heavy blows were dealt at social democracy. And while they were not strong enough to undermine its positions, it had nevertheless almost everywhere to switch from the offensive to the defensive.

44. Among the causes behind this course of events the following was of the utmost importance. Having undertaken to manage the affairs of capitalism and acting in that role in practice in many countries, the social democratic parties tied in their fortunes with the state of that social systems' health. When it was tolerable, the Social Democrats stood ultimately to win. When the disease took a turn for the worse, they inevitably had to bear the responsibility. That is why when the 1974/75 crisis brought down a squall of calamities on the population in the capitalist countries, social democracy found itself in the position of scapegoat, especially in countries where it was in power.

45. The untenability of the old ^{lines of action} / and, accordingly, of the old theoretical postulates by means of which these acts were justified deepened the division within the reformist camp. The old rivalry ^{disseminable} between social-reformism and bourgeois-type reformism over who was to be the chief instruments in realising this policy flared up anew. The

avowedly conservative circles also stepped up their activity, for they regarded the discreditation of reformist postulates as a favourable opportunity for regaining their influence and positions of power. Hesitations in the bourgeois camp concerning the expediency of further using social democracy as a partner in running society led to the consolidation of factions hostile to any left-wing forces. One direct consequence of this was the active use against social democracy of modern instruments for ideologically brainwashing the masses, above all, the mass media, which are directly controlled by big capital.

46. At the same time, the Social Democrats themselves found it harder than ever before to keep broad masses of people following in the wake of their policy. On the one hand, there was greater competition from bourgeois reformism, which claimed recognition of its ability to provide the capitalist society with much more effective medication than the Social Democrats had done. On the other hand, in view of the obvious failure of the reformist strategy, which the Social Democrats had been using since the war, there was evidence of a marked reduction in mass confidence in the reformist prescriptions. This frequently went to benefit the political forces to the right of the Social Democrats, mostly the conservative parties which are traditionally hostile to any change, which deny the concept of progress and which seek their ideals in the past. Nevertheless, this process contains the possibility of a shift in the social basis of social reformism to the left, and consequently, of a further strengthening of the revolutionary wing in the

working-class movement.

47. The crisis of the traditional reformist notions about the substance of the capitalist system, the functions of the capitalist state, the ways of socialist transformations, etc., accelerated the differentiation within the ranks of the social democratic parties, which had already been in evidence at the previous stage. The crisis induced the left-wing forces within the social democratic movement, which had at one time been pushed into the background, to act much more vigorously. A number of alternative programmes was put forward to make social democratic policy more dynamic, and to bring it closer to the new realities of the early 1980s. The left-wing forces' influence on the shaping of the official policy of some Social democratic parties increased.

48. The need to specify the ideological and political positions of social democracy tended to stimulate a heightened interest in theoretical problems, and, accordingly, unusual activity in this sphere. Because in each country the ideological and political evolution of the reformist section of the working-class movement is substantially influenced by the specific arrangement of class, political forces, by the intensity of the class struggle, and the authority of the vanguard revolutionary party of the working class, this process tends to be uneven and contradictory. This, for its part, tends to widen the gap on a number of key issues not only between the individual social-reformist parties but also between the various factions within each of these.

49. The urge to find a way out of the economic, political and spiritual crisis which has hit the industrialised capitalist countries and which has also spread to social democracy to the extent to which it has been integrated with the capitalist system could be regarded as common to the current efforts to bring about a theoretical and programmatic renewal of the social-democratic movement. The quest for a way out, which is in addition stimulated by the shift to the left of mass social groups engaged in wage labour impels the Social Democrats to make a more critical (if not always consistent) analysis of the capitalist system and to give support, frequently only verbal support, it is true, for the demand for more resolute and effective reforms than those of the period of illusory hopes for an "affluent society". A section of Social Democrats is increasingly aware of the need for deep-going democratic reforms with a socialist perspective, while another section--the most influential for the time being--still seeks to correct the development of state-monopoly capitalism, insisting only on a growth of its efficiency.

50. In the second half of the 1970s, these trends were embodied in a great number of programmatic and political documents adopted both by individual Social Democratic parties and by the Socialist International. An analysis of the documents shows, however, that so far this evolution has not affected the basic ideological and political principles of social democracy as a reformist movement, which objectively helps to preserve the capitalist system. Nevertheless, the changes here present some additional opportunities for joint action in the working-class movement.

51. The revolutionary working-class movement is a resolute opponent of reformism both in theory and in practice. While maintaining its revolutionary positions, it has actively sought ways of effective cooperation of all the left-wing forces. This quest implies above all a definition of the objectives and goals of cooperation and, consequently, the establishment of its scale and limits, and the extent to which the tasks and interests of the various political forces are identical (or not). In defining their attitude to the social-democratic movement, the Communist parties draw a clear distinction between the concrete character of the individual trends, depending on the place they have in that movement, and also take into account ^{the} possible evolution of each trend as existing or potential joint programmes are realised.

52. Who stands at the helm of the bourgeois state--those who want tougher forms of force with respect to the working people or those who want a strategy of social and political manoeuvring--is far from being a matter of indifference to the revolutionary forces. Nor are they indifferent to the form in which the reformist policy is implemented and to the agents used to implement it. This consideration is highly important in defining their attitude to social democracy.

53. The bourgeoisie's use of overtly violent methods in exercising its power would mean for the working class the elimination of its political and social gains, and would convert it into a victim of arbitrary acts by the ruling elite. Meanwhile, socio-political . . . manoeuvring on the basis of bourgeois parliamentary institutions preserves the possibilities for carrying on a struggle for the working people's economic

and political interests. To the extent/^{to} which social democracy opposes attempts to undermine these institutions, and to limit the political influence of the working class and its organisations, the Social Democrats' activity can be regarded as positive and deserves support.

54. From the standpoint of the working class the accession to power of Social Democratic parties is preferable to that of bourgeois, to say nothing of the right-wing bourgeois parties, despite the fact that it does not affect the foundations of the capitalist system. First, in effecting changes which are dictated by the objective requirements of capitalist development, social democracy, as a rule, takes greater account of the interests of the bulk of the working people than the bourgeois political forces. Second, being more closely allied with the working section of the population and with the most massive organisations of wage-workers (trade unions, cooperatives, etc.), Social Democratic parties are forced to have their policies take greater account of the interests and views of the social grass roots. Third, with their left-wing ideology, the Social Democratic parties are relatively less inclined than bourgeois parties to resort to non-democratic measures at home and to launch adventurist acts abroad. Fourth, vanguard forces of the working class constantly reckon, in their attitude to social democracy, ^{with} the above-mentioned possibility of a shift to the left by the Social Democratic parties with the sharpening of the class struggle and radicalisation of the bulk of the working people, including the ^{existing} differentiation within social democracy ^{its} which reflects both the heterogeneity of / social basis and its two-fold position in the capitalist society.

55. What is equally important is that with the aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism, a real possibility for using the existing balance of social and political forces for transformation going beyond the framework of a mere modernisation of the existing social system has taken shape in a number of industrialised capitalist countries of Western Europe for the first time over the past three decades. This change evidently implies above all cooperation among the left-wing forces. At the same time, there are also a number of obstacles in the way of cooperation between the revolutionary and the reformist trends.

56. Cooperation is possible only if the parties concerned are sincerely prepared to engage in it. That is something that will not be found everywhere or at every level of the social-democratic movement. Some Social Democratic parties refuse to establish contacts with the Communist Parties of the socialist countries. Among those who maintain ties with them are parties who refuse to cooperate with Communists in their own country. Among Social Democrats, attitude to the Communists tends to vary depending not only on the country but also on the inner-party trends.

57. In these conditions, the problem of cooperation does not boil down to practical measures, to say nothing of the technical measures, but is an object of struggle, including struggle within social democracy.

58. Effective cooperation implies a sincere attitude to one's partner in the alliance, and an urge to achieve joint success, instead of benefit at the other's expense. This is all the more important because Communists and Social Democrats frequently

rely on a similar mass basis. Social Democrats, even when displaying a readiness for joint action, do not always abide by this principle. This will be seen, for instance, by the hopes of some of them--and their strategy corresponding to these hopes--that contacts between Social Democratic parties and political forces in the countries of existing socialism will erode its political system and bring about a change of policy. In this context, one could also recall the disloyalty of the French Socialists with respect to the PCP, their partner in the left-wing alliance, in 1977 and 1978.

59. A gap between word and deed has always been characteristic of social democracy. The positive potential of many of its programme propositions frequently remains untranslated into concrete political action, and remains a pious hope. From this it follows that in order to attain goals that have been proclaimed there is a need to start a mass movement giving policy the necessary impulses and acting as catalyst.

60. There is also a big gap between the stand taken by social democracy as a political movement and the behaviour of Social Democratic politicians who are in government. As a political movement, social democracy, being under the influence of the masses, is usually farther to the left than its representatives in government bodies, because the latter are additionally influenced by factors like considerations of coalition policy, an urge to reckon with contradictory interests, pressure from the administrative apparatus, personal ambitions and gain, etc.

61. The traditional fear of some Social Democratic parties of sharpening their relations with the political forces situated to their right, and also their proneness to give in to pressure from

the bourgeois press and their uncunsumounted anti-communism constitute a big obstacle to cooperation.

62. The practical approach to cooperation cannot but reckon with all these circumstances. At the same time, they do not constitute an insuperable barrier in the way of unity, if the objective need for it is sufficiently acute.

63. The basis for joint action by Communists and Social Democrats is broad. The primary goal, as we have said, is to consolidate world peace. The 1980s have brought a marked worsening of international situation. Communists and Social Democrats give largely different assessments to the causes. But there is no doubt in any one's mind that this dangerous trend is fraught with a threat to peace and security throughout the world, including Europe. In the existing conditions, the struggle to preserve and consolidate the detente, to back up the political detente with a military detente, to act against hegemonism, violations of concluded agreements, the introduction of a Wild-West atmosphere into international relations, and so on, becomes of especial importance. Here, there is a vital need both for new initiatives and fresh efforts.

64. Joint or parallel action by Communist and Social Democratic parties against the incipient shift to the right, which is expressed in the strengthening of the bourgeois political camp, and within its framework, of the most rightist, conservative forces, could become an important sphere of cooperation. The manifestations and pace of this shift differ from country to country. But the offensive by the rightist, reactionary forces is a fact. And the dangers arising from it are great, especially in view of the looming economic upheavals.

65. There is also a considerable identity of interests and purposes in the struggle for the everyday interests of the working class. There is a need to formulate joint anti-crisis programmes to improve the economic situation not at the expense of the working class and the other working people, but through an improvement of the social mechanisms of economic management and a curb on the ~~way~~ of the large monopolies, including the transnationals, elimination of the most odious social and political privileges, improvement of the material conditions for the working class and other wage-workers, enhancement of the so-called quality of life, including a democratic reform of education, public health, environmental protection, etc.

66. Full or even partial implementation of such programmes would provide additional opportunities for enhancing the influence of the left-wing forces on new sections of the working population.

67. It is much harder to define the sphere of cooperation between the revolutionary and Social Democratic parties in the transformation of the capitalist social system. Their differences in formulating the goals, and also the ways and methods for achieving ^{the goals} are very much greater than the identity of their views on individual, mainly particular, issues. This is especially evident in the industrialised capitalist countries of Western Europe, where politically no Social Democratic party, however left-wing, is yet prepared to cross the boundary separating the existing capitalist society ^{from} a system based on socialist principles. If a basis fit for joint action is to emerge in this area, there will evidently be a need at least for time

and a further evolution of the reformist trend in the working-class movement towards a more adequate reflection not only of the current but also of the ultimate goals of the working class.

68. Joint action by the working class is not someone's tactical slogan, but an objective requirement reflecting the in-depth processes which determine development in our day. Short-term fluctuations can accelerate or temporarily slow down the urge for unity, but they cannot do away with it altogether. Indeed, when and to what extent the various trends in the working-class movement, a crucial social and political factor, will succeed in uniting their forces is of truly vital importance.

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI
TÜSTAV

İŞÇİ SINIFI HAREKETİNDE İKİ TEMEL AKIM

Bugün sosyalist ve Sosyal demokrat partiler bazı kapitalist ülkelerde hükümette yer almakta, bazılarında ise ülke politik yaşamında önemli rol oynamakta ve muhalefet gücü olarak ortaya çıkmakta.

Komünist ve sosyalistlerin işbirliği barış ve sosyal ilerleme açısından önemli bir etmen. Gerek uluslararası alanda, gerekse tek tek kapitalist ülkelerdeki işçi sınıfının çıkarları doğrultusunda belli kazanımlar sağlayabilir. Örneğin, emekçi halkın yaşam koşullarının iyileştirilmesi, sosyal, politik kazanımların korunması, savaş tehlikesine ve silahlanma yarışına karşı ortak savaşım vb.

Dünyadaki gelişmeler sosyal demokrasiyi bir dönemecin eşiğine getiriyor: Ya burjuvazinin yanında yer alıp kapitalizmi korumak, ya da gerçek, köklü değişimler için savaşım ki bu yolda komünistlerle işbirliğine gireceklerdir.

Bugüne dek sosyal demokrat hareket içindeki bazı güçlerle ya da tüm partiyle komünistlerin işbirliği yolunda bazı başarılar kaydedildi. Ancak işbirliğine karşı güçlerin varlığının yanı sıra devrimci ve reformist akımlar arasındaki ideolojik farklılıklar, politik sorunlara farklı yanaşmaların, geçmişin kalıntılarının vb. doğurduğu nesnel engeller henüz kalkmış değil. Bu sorunu 80'li yılların getirdiği gelişmelerle yeniden gözden geçirmek gerekmekte.

I

1970'li yıllarda kapitalizmin tüm çelişkilerinin keskinleştiğini görüyoruz. 1974-75 bunalımını derinliği açısından ancak 1929 Büyük Bunalımıyla karşılaştırmak olası. Ekonomik durumun kötüleşmesi kapitalist ülkelerde sınıf savaşımına yeni koşullar getirdi, bu koşullar sınıf savaşımını olumsuz yönde etkiledi. Şöyle ki: a) İşgücü istemine oranla sununun fazla olması, ~~ve~~ sonuçta işgücünün fiyatına baskıyı artırdı. Gerçi ücret artışlarını sınırlandırma girişimine karşı pekçok kapitalist ülkede işçi sınıfı başarılı savaşım verdi. Uluslararası güç dengesinin de emekçilerden yana olması, işçi sınıfının örgütlük düzeyinin yüksekliği, BT'D'in üretici güçlerin gelişimine getirdiği bazı özellikler vb. işçi sınıfının sermayeye karşı belli kazanımlar elde etmesine

olanak tanındı. Ancak 1970'lerin ikinci yarısında kazanılan konumlardan 1980'lerde olası ekonomik ferahlama devresinde sermayenin saldırısını geri püskürtmek mümkün olabilecekti mi?

b) Kapitalizmin devresel çöküşlerinin enerji, hammadde ve yapısal bunalımlarla içiçe geçmesi sermayenin işçi sınıfını daha çok fedakarlık yapmaya zorlamasını getiriyor. Öte yandan 1970'lerin ikinci yarısında, bazı gelişmiş kapitalist ülkelerde tekelci sermaye ile çok sıkı bağları olan politik güçlerin yönetime geçmesiyle büyük sermayenin politik etkisi pekişti. Uluslararası atmosferi zehirleme yolunda yoğun, ancak başarısız sayılmayacak girişimler tekelci sermayenin çıkarları doğrultusunda, işçi sınıfı üzerinde baskı artırıcı rol oynadı. Tekelci sermaye büyük ölçüde "ulusal birlik gereksinimi", "dış tehlike" tezlerini kullandı. Sermayenin uluslararası özelliğinin artması, kendi çeperleri içinde ve çeperlerindeki manevra niteliğini artırdı.

70'li yılların ikinci yarısında, gelişmiş kapitalist ülkelerde işçi sınıfının güç birikimi uluslararası sermayeyi konumlarında nötrleştirecek ölçüde değildi. Bu koşullarda işçi sınıfı ve örgütleri tüm potansiyellerini kullanarak güçlenen düşmanı geri püskürtmek eski kazanımları korumanın yanısıra yeni başarılar da elde etmek zorunda.

c) Öte yandan gelişmiş kapitalist ülkelerde tekelci sermayeye karşı başarılı bir direniş bölgedeki sosyo-psikolojik ortama da bağlı. Ekonomi devresel ferahlama dönemine girdiğinde bu ülkelerde kamuoyu, burjuva ideologlarının etkisiyle kapitalizmin toplumsal sorunlarının çözülebileceğini düşleyebilir ve bu eğilim işçi sınıfı hareketine sızarak sosyal-reformist görüşlerin yayılmasını getirebilir. Özellikle teknik elemanlar ve bazı orta katmanlar arasında BTĐ'in gereksinimine ve potansiyeline uygun bir biçimde toplumsal işleyişi düzeltme amacıyla "Toplumsal mühendislik" adıyla bazı görüşler doğmakta.

Günümüzde kapitalist sisteme yöneltilen eleştirilerin sonucu burjuvazi tarafından küçük burjuva çevrelere dayatılmaya çalışan görüşlerden biri de geçmişin ilkel bir biçimde abartılması ve "kaybedilmiş cennet" kavramları, ilerlemeye karşı çıkma eğilimleri. Bu görüşler işçi sınıfı hareketine ve sendikalara karşı düşmanlıkta birleşiyor, sadece geleneksel tutucu değil, aynı zamanda aşırı sağ, ~~ve~~ ideolojik ve politik akımların gelişmesine taban hazırladı.

Kapitalizmin genel bunalımı koşullarında burjuvazi gücünü korumak ve pekiştirmek için iki stratejik yol izliyor. Göreceli olarak daha istikrarlı dönemlerinde toplumsal ve politik manevralarla kitleleri "oyunun kuralları"nı oynamaya zorluyor. Bu yöntemin güç biçimi ise burjuva parlamenter sistemi ve eylem biçimleri, toplumsal ilişkilerin özüne dokunmayan reformlar. Uygulama aracı olarak Sosyal Demokrat ~~part~~ reformist kitle partileri kullanılıyor. Olağanüstü zor durumlarda, burjuvazi parlamenter organlarla yetinmeyerek halkı burjuva kaç sistemiyle anlaştırmaya zorluyor. Burjuvazi bu yolu izlediğinde güç biçimi olarak diktatörlük rejimi, eylem yöntemi olarak bazı ufak ekonomik tavizlerle birlikte tüm toplumsal eylem biçimlerinin bastırılması, herşeyden önce örgütlü işçi sınıfı hareketine baskı ve güç aracı olarak sağ radikal, faşist politik hareket ya da orduyu kullanıyor.

11 Dünya Savaşından sonra faşizmin politik ve ideolojik yenilgisiyle gelişmiş kapitalist ülkeler egemen sınıfları parlamenter yönetim biçimini kabul etmek zorunda kaldılar. 1970'li yıllardaki bunalım egemen çevreleri yeni bir strateji bulmaya zorladı. 1970'lerin ortasında son faşist rejimlerin (İspanya, Portekiz) çökmesiyle gelişmiş kapitalist ülkelerde "kaba güç" yanlıları fazla destek bulamadı. Egemen çevreler, 1974-75 bunalımından çıkış yolu olarak kitleleri dolaylı etkileme araçlarını geliştirirken aşırı sağ ve neo-faşist güçler olağanüstü durumlarda "yangın söndürücü" işlevi görmekteydi.

Kısacası bunalımın derinleştiği koşullarda burjuvazi bu karmaşık sorunu çözmek zorunda. Gücünü korumak için bu sorunların üstesinden nasıl gelecek, sosyal demokrasiye nasıl yer verecek?

Tüm Avrupa kapitalist ülkelerinde sosyal demokrasi politik gücün organik bir bölümünü oluşturuyor. Genellikle sistemin değişen koşullara uygun bir biçimde modernleştirilmesinden yana. Halbuki orta ve ortanın sağındaki burjuvazi moderleşmeye karşı ve daha çok istikrarlı bir politika yanlısı.

Öte yandan egemen burjuvazinin büyük bir bölümü ortanın solundaki güçlere, özellikle sosyal demokrasi gibi "sosyalizm" kavramını kullanan tüm güçlere karşı geleneksel düşmanlık duyuyor. Sosyal demokrasinin ekonomik durum ağırlaştıkça, tabanının da etkisiyle sola kaymasından da korkuyor. Bu nedenle burjuvazi sosyal demokrasiye dönmeyi getiren zorunluluk ortadan kalkar kalkmaz onu politik alandan itmek istiyor. Ancak nesnel olarak ne kapitalizmin politik

yapısının modernleştirilmesi ne de burjuvazinin sosyo-politik gücünün pekiştirilmesi sosyal demokrasisiz veya sosyal demokrasiye kesin karşı çıkma ile mümkün olabilir.

Herşeyden önce sosyal demokrasi emekçilerin ve belli ölçüde işçi sınıfının da desteklediği önemli bir politik güç durumunda. Bu kesimlerin çıkarlarının gözardı edilmesi politik sistemin toplumsal tabanını daraltır, işlevlerini aksatabilir ve hatta falce uğratabilir. Oysa sosyal demokrasinin belli kararların alınmasına katılması, belli görevler alması kapitalizmin politik yapısının kitle tabanını genişletecek ve daha bir esneklik kazandıracaktır.

İkincisi, sosyal demokrasi değişiklik isteyen tabanının kaymaması için, zorunlu olarak kapitalizmi kurtarma uğraşına giriyor, ve bunda burjuvaziye oranla daha çok çaba harcıyor.

Üçüncüsü, eğer sistemi kurtarmak için belli değişiklikler gerekiyor ve emekçilerden daha fazla katkı isteniyorsa bunu kitleye en iyi benimsetecek olan sosyal demokrasidir.

Tüm bunlar 1980'li yıllarda sosyal demokrasinin önemli rol oynamaya devam edeceğini göstermekte.

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1980'li yıllara sosyal demokrasi nasıl bir durumda giriyor?

70'li yılların başında batı Avrupa kapitalist ülkelerinde ekonomik durum sosyal demokrasiyi haklı gösterecek biçimde gelişti. BTD sonucu tüketim mallarının daha ucuza üretimi, işçi sınıfının bazı kazanımları vb. sosyal demokrat tezlerim, yani kapitalizmin reformlarla düzeltilebileceği görüşlerini görünüşte kanıtlar biçimdeydi. Uluslararası durumdaki olumlu gelişmeleri ilk kavrayan sosyal demokrasi oldu. Barış ve güvenliğin korunması yönünde yaptığı propaganda ile de daha fazla sempati kazandı. Böylece pekçok ülkede sosyal demokrasi ya varolan konumlarını korudu ya da yeni konumlar elde etti.

Ancak 1974-75 bunalımıyla sosyal demokrasi saldırıdan savunmaya geçmek zorunda kaldı. Öte yandan reformizm içindeki ayrışım hızlandı. Sosyal reformizm ile burjuva reformizmi arasındaki eski çatışma tekrar alevlendi.

Bir yandan burjuva reformizminin kapitalizmi kurtarmada sosyal demokrasiden daha başarılı olacağını ileri sürmesi ve yarışı, öte yandan 11 Dünya Savaşından buyana sosyal reformizmin izlediği ideolojinin başarısızlığa uğraması kitlelerde reformist reçetelere inancı önemli ölçüde azalttı, sosyal demokrasinin sağındaki güçle-

rin çıkarına uygun bir durum yarattı. Ancak bu durum sosyal reformizmin tabanının sola kayması ve işçi sınıfı içindeki devrimci kanadın güçlenmesini de getirdi.

Geleneksel reformist görüşlerin bunalımı sosyal demokrat partilerdeki ayrışmayı hızlandırdı. Bu partilerdeki sol kanat güçler ön plana çıkmaya başladı, sosyal demokrasiyi daha bir dinamikleştirme ve gerçeklere yaklaştırma amacıyla yeni programlar önerildi.

Sosyal demokrasinin teori ve programını yenileme zorunluluğu tabanının sola kaymaya başlaması, sosyal demokrat partileri kapitalizme daha eleştirel gözle bakmaya zorladı, sözde de olsa daha köklü reformları desteklemeye başladılar. Sosyal demokrasinin bir bölümü daha derin sosyal açılımlı reformlar isterken, bir bölümü de hala devlet-tekelci kapitalizmini geliştirmeden yanaydı.

Devrimci işçi sınıfı hareketi her zaman teorik ve pratik olarak reformizme karşıdır. Devrimci konumlarını korurken bir yandan da tüm sol güçlerle eylem birliği yollarını arar. Bunda ise herşeyden önce, oluşturulması amaçlanan işbirliğinin hedef ve sınırlarının çizilmesi, değişik politik güçlerin ortak çıkarlarının saptanması gerekir. Sosyal demokrasiye karşı tavırda, komünist partileri her akımın tekbaşına somut özelliğini, hareketteki yerini, kendi içindeki olası gelişme potansiyelini dikkate alır.

Devrimci güçler "Burjuva devletinin dümeni kimin elinde", "kim emekçi halka daha sert baskı uygulamakta, ve kim toplumsal, politik manevra stratejisinden yana" gibi sorunlara kayıtsız kalmadıkları gibi reformist politikanın uygulanma biçimine ve uygulayan araçlara da kayıtsız kalmazlar. Bu ise sosyal demokrasiye karşı tavır belirlemede çok önemlidir.

Burjuvazinin gücünü koruyabilmek için sert yöntemlere başvurulması, işçi sınıfının sosyo-politik kazanımların yoketmesiyle işçi sınıfı burjuvazinin keyfi eylemlerinin kurbanı olabilir. Öte yandan burjuvazinin parlamenter organları sosyo-politik manevrelerle koruması işçi sınıfına ekonomik, politik hakları için savaşımda olanak tanır. Sosyal demokrasi bu organları zayıflatma girişimine, işçi sınıfı ve örgütlerinin politik etkisini kısıtlama girişimlerine karşı olduğu sürece olumlu sayılabilir ve sosyal demokrat eylemlere destek verilebilir.

Sosyal demokrat partiler belli özellikleriyle diğer burjuva partilerinden farklıdır. Şöyle ki:

- a) Diğer burjuva partilerine göre sosyal demokrat partiler emekçi kesimlerin daha büyük çoğunluğunun istemlerini yansıtır,
- b) Emekçi halk ve kitle örgütleriyle daha yakın bir işbirliği için-

dedir. (Sendika, kooperatif vb.) Bu nedenle tabanının çıkarlarını belli ölçüde yansıtmak zorundadır.

c) 'sol' ideolojileriyle, sosyal demokrat partiler diğer burjuva partilerine göre anti-demokratik uygulamalara daha az eğilimlidir.

d) Sosyal demokrasiye karşı tavırda işçi sınıfı hareketi, sınıf savaşının keskinleşmesiyle birlikte sosyal demokrasinin sola kayma olasılığını ve tabanının heterojen olması ve ikili konumu neneniyile sosyal demokrasi içinde olabilecek ayrışmaları gözönünde tutar.

Devrimci ve reformist akımlar arasındaki işbirliği herşeyden önce her iki partinin de bu işbirliğini ~~samimi~~ gerçekten istemesiyle gerçekleşebilir. Sosyal demokrat partilerin komünist partilere karşı tavrı ülkeden ülkeye farklılıklar gösterebilir. Etkin bir işbirliği karşılıklı samimi tavır ve birinden diğerinin yararlanması biçiminde değil, ortak başarı için savaşım ile gerçekleştirilebilir. Bazı sosyal demokrat partiler işbirliğinden yana olmalarına rağmen bu ilkeye uymamakta. (Fransız sosyal demokratlarının sadakatsizliği)

Sosyal demokrasinin bir özelliği de eylemleriyle sözleri arasındaki farklılıktır. Yönetimdeyken, bir politik güç halindeyken söz ve eylemleri farklıdır. Yönetimdeyken koalisyon sorunu, çekişkili çıkarlar, yönetim organlarının baskısı, kişisel istemler vb. nedenlerle daha sağ konumlara kayabilir. Ek olarak, bazı sosyal demokrat partiler sağ güçlerle ilişkilerini bozmaktan korkmakta ya da basının anti-komünist propagandası işbirliğine engel yaratmaktadır. Eylem birliğininintemeli:

- Temel hedef, özellikle 1980'lerde dünya barışının tehlikeye girmesine karşı barış savaşımı, askersel yumuşamanın politik yumuşamayla desteklenmesi için savaşım
- Komünist ve sosyal demokratların ülkede sağa kayışa karşı ortak eylemleri
- Güncel istemler için savaşım, ortak anti-bunalım programları, eğitim reformu, kamu sağlığı, çevre korunması vb. konularda ortak savaşım.
- † Komünist ve sosyal demokrat partilerin uzun erimli amaçları farklı olduğundan işbirliğinin alanını çizmek zor olabilir. Özellikle Avrupa sosyal demokrat partileri henüz sosyalist toplum hedefine yönelmiş ve bu na hazırlıklı değil.
- Sosyal demokrasiyle işbirliği taktik bir slogan değil, somut bir gereksinim. Bu yolda kısa dönemli yalpalamalar olabilir ancak gereksinimi ortadan kaldıramaz.

SOSYALIST INTERNASYONAL

SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL AND MILITARY DETENTE

Yu. Zhilin

What are the eighties likely to be? Will it be a period of yet another, still more dangerous, bout of the arms race or a way will be found to scale down military confrontation? No serious political trend in our times can avoid making its choice between these two ways. It is worth while looking from this standpoint at the position and action of social democracy, one of the influential forces of modern times. What choice will this political trend make?

It would seem that the fullest possible answer to this question ought to have been given by the Fifteenth Congress of the Socialist International which met in Madrid last November, with the action of social democracy in the area of international politics in the 1980s as the major point on its agenda. The Congress passed a number of positive decisions. However, there are different decisions applying to the same area, the decisions of NATO, an organisation which includes a number of countries with governments comprising social democrats. So, for all the obvious difference between these two organisations, it is quite logical to collate their decisions.

One cannot but accept the standard of reference suggested by the Socialist International Chairman, Willy Brandt, at the Congress: "When the point at issue is one of human survival, the Socialist International cannot limit itself to passing resolutions, however good they might be by themselves. What is required is the will to change the course of events..."

Let us collate this standard of reference to two problems. First, the attitude of social democracy to the decisions of the Brussels NATO ministerial meeting in December 1979 about the manufacture and deployment of new American nuclear missiles on the European continent. Second, the attitude to the "new nuclear strategy", launched by the US Administration last summer.

Many of those who took part in the debate at the Congress linked up the realisation of the Brussels decisions of NATO with the issue of ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty. For example, a spokesman for the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDPG),

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K.Voigt pointed out, in connection with the position taken up by the US President-elect still in the course of the election campaign with regard to SALT-2, that "a new situation is arising" and that it had to be examined because it meant turning upside down the condition under which some social democratic parties had agreed to the production and installation of new missiles in the territory of their countries. "If we cannot influence the position of the United States," he said, "we must make appropriate conclusions". The Secretary of the Socialist International's Working Group on Disarmament Problems W.Hacker, of the Socialist Party of Austria, declared: "We are opposed to the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe". A representative of the British Labour Party J.Little, speaking on behalf of the women's organisation of the Socialist International, said that the conference of that organisation, which had been held just before the Congress was due to open, saw the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe as a way to intensify the war danger. "We," she declared, "are opposed to their presence in the territory of Europe and we stand, in particular, for a revision of the decision concerning cruise missiles".

At a press conference, the Secretary General of the Socialist International, B.Carlsson pointed out one of the ideas, expressed in the course of the debate, notably, the proposal to fix a time-limit after which, in the absence of agreement between the US and the Soviet Union on nuclear arms limitation in Europe, "the Europeans must take their own initiative in this matter". Finally, the report by the Socialist International's Working Group on Disarmament Problems contained a rather essential passage stating that the object of discussions connected with SALT-2 was now more vital than ever: a turn towards an actual reduction and suspension of research, development and testing of new types of armaments.

Now, a few weeks after the Congress of the Socialist International, on December 8, 1980, the so-called NATO "Euro-group" met in the Belgian capital under the chairmanship of West German Defence Minister H.Apel, a SDPG member. The ministers attending it, one learned from its communique, reaffirmed their standpoint in the sense that modernisation of the long-range theatre forces (the description given in the North Atlantic bloc to medium-range missiles--Y.Zh.) was necessary to meet the NATO requirements in defence and deterrence and to create a base for serious negotiations on limiting LRT forces. It turns out that not only the NATO decisions but their implementation, too, is an indispensable pre-condition for negotiations!

Nor was that the end of it. The NATO Military Planning Committee met in session at ministerial level on December 9 and 10. Its concluding communique pointed out, in particular, that comprehensive national military programmes geared to fulfilling their tasks with regard to armed forces in 1981-

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1986 would ensure a substantial increase of the total deterrence and defence potential of the NATO alliance. The ministers stated that the Pershing-2 and ground-based cruise missile programmes were being carried out on schedule; that was an indication that the first missiles of this type will be in service by the end of 1983...

Unlike the Socialist International leaders, the NATO leadership believes that it is the arms buildup that is a prerequisite for the strengthening of peace in the 1980s, that this buildup covers new types of weapons, including the cruise missiles, and that the new situation that has taken shape round the SALT-2 Treaty and in connection with the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva has no practical effect on NATO's plans concerning the deployment of new American missiles in Europe.

As regards the countries on whose territory these missiles are to be sited, a France Presse report said that West Germany is shortly to name the sites where these missiles will be stationed at the end of 1983. The report also said that all the 108 Pershing-2 missiles were to be placed in West Germany.

France Presse also indicated that refusal to ratify the SALT-2 Treaty "may delay the deployment of cruise missiles in Belgium and the Netherlands" which made their answer conditional upon the "results of the American-Soviet talks."

As regards Italy, Arrigo Boldrini, member of the Italian Communist Party leadership and member of the Senate commission for defence, said in a newspaper interview that "Italy has already undertaken serious military commitments." He pointed out that "600 nuclear warheads are stationed" in the country at present. Nevertheless, the Italian government, which includes Socialists, has agreed with the NATO decision to deploy new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Italy. This agreement grants the Pentagon the right to decide when these weapons may be put to use and, therefore, the right to decide the destiny of the country.

The plans aimed at making Italy a vast launching site for American nuclear missiles lie on the conscience of the Socialist Party leaders. The latter demonstrate utter irresponsibility to their people and neglect the country's national interests. Addressing the Socialist International's Congress in Madrid, Bettino Craxi, secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, could not miss the opportunity to throw a stone at the defeated American President Jimmy Carter. He justly accused him of failing to "fill the gap between what he said and did." He might as well criticise some other Western leaders...

It would also be appropriate here to consider the position taken by the Norwegian Labour Party. Its leadership supported the decision on siting new American missiles in Western Europe.

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True, it reaffirmed Norway's decision that no foreign military bases and nuclear weapons would be deployed in the country in peacetime.

A new problem soon arose. The United States and Norway began bilateral negotiations on using depots in Norway for American heavy military hardware. The event caused many people to think that Norway was gradually giving up its policy of not allowing foreign military bases and nuclear weapons to be sited on its territory.

There was a strong public outcry in Norway against the conclusion of a relevant agreement, action committees were set up under the slogan "No to Deployment!", signatures on protest petitions were collected and over 120,000 signatures were handed to the government. Many local organisations of the Labour Party and various Social Democrat-dominated industry trade unions actively participated in this movement. The party's youth organisation also determinedly came out against deployment. But the leadership of the party, as well as the government, did not heed the opinion of rank-and-file members. After a stormy debate at all levels the line of the leadership of the party prevailed and the national board of the party voted 30 against 6 for the approval of the Norwegian-American agreement.

Let us now turn to the second problem--the attitude of the Socialist International to the "new US nuclear strategy". The speech by A. Kitson, a representative of the British Labour party, at the congress in Madrid is noteworthy in this respect. We do not approve the conception of a limited nuclear war, he declared and added that Directive No.59 is a threat to all the Europeans. The conception of a "limited" nuclear war was condemned in the resolution adopted by the congress but, mildly speaking, in a rather ambiguous form. Banking on a "limited nuclear war" is ascribed in the resolution not only to the USA, but also ... to the Soviet Union.

What is the position of the governing bodies of NATO on this problem?

In the communique of the NATO nuclear planning group, the session of which took place in November in Brussels, it is said that this directive reinforces the strategy of deterrence within the framework of NATO, increasing the flexibility of its forces. The defence ministers who attended the session also reaffirmed that American strategic policy in the context of NATO strategy remains the center of satisfactory deterrence against the threat created by the Soviet nuclear force.

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What the delegates to the Socialist International congress designated as something "terrible," the leading bodies of NATO with the participation of individual Social Democratic ministers in the very same days described as something "satisfactory"...

It would be oversimplifying, of course, to see a gap only between the more or less good resolutions of the Socialist International congress and the degree of the Social Democrats' will to carry them out. There is also an obvious difference of postures among the member parties of the Socialist International on a number of practical issues of military detente. Unity on these questions is also frequently absent inside the individual Social Democratic parties.

One cannot but see the new trends in the Socialist International as a whole. The evolution of the foreign-policy conceptions of international Social Democracy over the past decade is most evident. Its positive tendency--in favour of detente, disarmament, and establishment of cooperation of the capitalist countries with the socialist--cannot be discounted. It is precisely these shifts that create preconditions for broad contact and dialogue of the Communists, notably, with the Socialists and Social Democrats, "in the interests of the policy of detente and of finding ways to reduce armaments on our continent," as it is out in the Appeal of the Paris meeting of European Communist and Workers' Parties.

Not only rank-and-file members of the Social Democratic parties, but also many of their leaders are worried by the turn in US foreign policy, by its staking on militarism and the undermining of detente. However, despite protest voiced in their ranks, some of the Socialist International's influential parties are adjusting their stands to the US Administration's crude pressure. But is this time-serving action so fatally inevitable? We have before us a fresh example, namely, the statement of the latest annual British Labour Party conference that it favours the elimination of all nuclear bases, British or US, on British territory or in British territorial waters. The British Labour Party's stand is also recorded in the report of the Socialist International's working group on disarmament problems. One cannot but see that the attitude of the Belgian Socialist Party and the Labour Party of the Netherlands against the siting of new nuclear missiles in Western Europe facilitated the emergence of a mass public movement in those countries rejecting the schemes of stationing these new missiles on their territories.

Nevertheless, one should not pass over in silence the contradictoriness of Social Democracy's practical line of conduct. References to the fact that the decisions of the Socialist International are not binding in character for the parties affiliated with it and that, therefore, are not always

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fulfilled by them, can hardly clarify the situation. Perhaps, closer to the truth is the circumstance that it is hard to follow a consistent line, if in decisive matters and at decisive moments it is subordinated to views far removed from national interests. The point is not that someone wants to cause cracks in "Atlantic solidarity". It is not by chance that incantations about its priority over all other problems begin to be heard in connection with every new action under Washington's policy of anti-detente. What reveals itself at precisely such moments is the alignment with Washington of the leadership of individual, yet influential, Social-Democratic parties in the very essential practical matters on the solution of which depends whether a military detente will materialise or not.

There is no doubt that ambivalence in the positions of international Social Democracy greatly weakens the significance of the decisions of the Socialist International, even when their content meets to some or other degree the interests of military detente.

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TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARŞİVİ
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INFORMATION

THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

1. The Socialist International (SI) brings together most of the parties of the social-reformist section of the international working-class movement. By mid-1980, it had a membership of 42 parties from 38 countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, America, Australia and Oceania.¹ The social-reformist-type parties of Cyprus, Paraguay, and Venezuela, and also some organisations of emigres from socialist countries have voice in the SI. On it are also represented so-called fraternal organisations (the International Council of Social-Democratic Women, the International Union of Young Socialists) and some associated organisations (like the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community).

2. An absolute majority of SI members consists of Socialist and Social-Democratic parties of Western Europe. The biggest parties which are members of this organisation are the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, the Socialist Party of Austria, the Labour Party of Great Britain, and the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Sweden. The parties of Italy, Belgium, France, Spain, Norway and Portugal which

¹ Two independent parties are members of the SI from some countries: Italy, Japan, the United States, Iceland, and also Northern Ireland.

are members of the SI are also relatively large. The most massive parties from among the non-European countries are the Labourites of Canada, the Socialists of New Zealand and Jamaica. The membership of the parties within the SI comes to over 15 million, including so-called associated members of the Labour Party of Great Britain and the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Sweden.

Organisational Structure

3. The leaders of the West European Social-Democrats have the leading positions on the SI's governing bodies. Since 1976, Chairman of the SDPG Willy Brandt has been President of the SI. Among the 19 vice-presidents are the leaders of Socialist and Social-Democratic Parties of Austria (Bruno Kreisky), Sweden (Olof Palme), France (Francois Mitterand), Italy (Bettino Craxi), Spain (Felipe Gonzales), and Portugal (Mario Soares). The Swedish Social-Democrat B. Karlsson is the General Secretary of the SI.

4. In the 1970s, the Socialist International extended its activity in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.² Since the spring of 1979, there has been a regional organisation for countries of Asia and the Pacific with headquarters at Tokyo. It is also planned to set up a regional organisation for Latin American countries. Attempts to set up a confederation of African Socialist Parties are also being made with

² See, Khaled Bagdash. "The National-Liberation Movement and Social-Reformism", WMR, No. 8, 1979.

the direct participation of some SI leaders.

5. The highest organ of the Socialist International is a congress. According to the new statute adopted in 1976, congresses are called at least once in two years. Since the establishment of the SI (July 1951) there have been 14, the latest in Vancouver, Canada, in November 1978. The 15th Congress is to be held ^{in Madrid} in November of this year. In between the congresses, the SI's work is directed by a Bureau, on which all the member-parties and also the "fraternal organisations" are represented. Conferences of the leaders of the Social-Democratic parties--the SI Council--are held at least once a year. The latest such conference was held in Vienna at the beginning of last February.

Formation of the SI, Its Activity in
in the 1950s and 1960s

6. The Socialist International is the successor of the Socialist Workers' International which was set up in 1923 and which fell apart during the Second World War.

7. In 1947, right-wing Social-Democratic leaders set up a Committee of International Socialist Conferences at Antwerp. It was assigned the task of carrying on direct preparations for the establishment of a new organisational centre of international Social-Democracy. The first Constituent Congress of the Socialist International was held in Frankfurt-on-Main from late June to the beginning of July, 1951. It adopted an ideological and political platform: a declaration

entitled "The Goals and Tasks of Democratic Socialism".³ This document, formulated at the height of the cold war, contains crude attacks on the socialist countries, which allegedly pose a threat to peace, and on the Communist Parties, which are allegedly responsible for the split in the working-class movement. This anti-communist tenor continues to be the main political and ideological feature of the SI. Here is a characteristic statement by Egon Bahr, a prominent leader of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany: "From the standpoint of the interests of peace, the communist governments of Eastern Europe are our partners. From the standpoint of the interests of democracy, the Communists in the Federal Republic are our adversaries. From the standpoint of the interests of freedom, justice and solidarity, the Communists are ^{our} rivals on a world scale."⁴

8. The Declaration criticises the capitalist society but only very superficially and not in concrete terms. This criticism goes hand in hand with an apologia for important aspects of capitalist economics and institutions of bourgeois democracy. It proclaims the reformist slogan that capitalism can be "peacefully transformed" into socialism.

³ This declaration is still in force, as will be seen from the new Statute of the SI, which says, in part: "The Socialist International is an association of parties seeking to realise democratic socialism as formulated in the 1951 Frankfurt Declaration".

⁴ SPD, Internationale Politik, Sozialdemokratische Fachkoferenz, 9/14, April 1976. Hrg. Vorstand der SPD Bonn, o.g. Jahr, S.30.

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9. The foreign-policy section of the Declaration contains general calls for peace, universal disarmament and a collective-security system, but it does not give any in-depth analysis of the concrete causes behind the origination of international tension. In effect, it glosses over the aggressive substance of imperialism and the system of colonial domination. It deals in very abstract terms with the problems of internationalism and international solidarity, and what is most important, does not connect them with the working class as the vanguard of the peace forces.

10. On the whole, the 1951 Frankfurt Declaration is a programme for the Social-Democrats' close political cooperation with the bourgeoisie and is evidence of the pro-capitalist orientation of social-reformism.

11. The right-wing leaders had the decisive role to play not only in the formation of the SI, but also in laying down its political line. A resolution adopted by the Second (Milan) Congress of 1952 asserted that the Soviet Union was the source of international tensions, while the United States was the guarantor of world peace. The anti-Soviet and anti-Communist orientation of the SI's activity has been manifested throughout the whole of this period, now and again becoming bellicose (as in 1956, in connection with the counter-revolutionary putsch in Hungary and the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt, and in connection with the Czechoslovak events in 1968-1969).

12. But some positive elements have been in evidence since roughly the end of the 1950s. Thus, at the Fifth Congress (Vienna, 1957) there was support for some Soviet proposals on limiting the production and testing of nuclear weapons. *I don't know such a thing. We should check this formula (Kruschevski)* At the Sixth Congress (Hamburg, 1959), a positive attitude was expressed to the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe. The residue of the cold war naturally remained, for the SI leaders repeatedly demonstrated their support for the imperialist circles, which tried to deal with the USSR and its allies from a position of strength. But the peaceable mood of broad masses of people could no longer be ignored. This will be seen, in particular, from the removal of a number of odious pro-NATO theses from the statement "The World Today--a Socialist Perspective", which was adopted at the SI Conference in Oslo in June 1962. The subsequent development of realistic trends in the SI's policy led the 10th Congress (Stockholm, 1966) to declare the need for general and complete disarmament, to urge a limitation of the sale of weapons, and a ban on the use of cosmic space for military purposes.

The SI in the 1970s

13. The association of social-reformist parties has displayed a fairly high level of activity on such key issues in this period as the detente, the further aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism, and the growing complication of relations between the developed and developing countries.

14. The SI supported the Soviet initiative for the convocation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A number of prominent Social-Democrats, among them Brandt, Kreisky, Sorsa and Palme, made a constructive contribution to that historic forum and to the framing of the Final Act. The results of the Helsinki Conference were approved in the resolution on the political situation adopted at the SI's 13th Congress (Geneva, November 1976). The decisions of the 14th Congress pointed to the need of accelerating international negotiations on the banning of nuclear weapons tests, tightening up non-proliferation, effecting mutual-confidence measures, etc. It drew attention to the fact that the constant growth of military expenditures not only posed a growing threat to peace, but also diverted vast resources from the satisfaction of urgent economic and social needs.

15. The SI held a special conference on disarmament in Helsinki April 1978. It was also attended by guests from the USSR and the United States. The Soviet delegation was led by Boris Ponomarev, CC Political Bureau member and Secretary, CPSU. He told the Conference of the Soviet Union's initiatives aimed to ensure a military detente and on behalf of the CPSU invited the SI to continue cooperation in this field.

16. In the summer of 1978, a special SI working group on disarmament was instructed to contact the leaders of the USSR, the United States and international organisations, and to prepare a special report on this problem for the 15th Congress. In 1979, the working group went to the United States

and met with representatives of the United Nations and the non-aligned movement.

17. Special importance attached to the SI working group's visit to Moscow in late September and early October 1979. For the first time in the SI's history, its official representatives visited the USSR, met with the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state and with disarmament specialists. In the course of the visit, the working group had a conversation with Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. A joint statement for the press showed that the parties had unanimously recognised the need for urgently halting the arms race and the sale of weapons, establishing a system of international control over disarmament, and using for peaceful purposes the funds released as a result of the slow-down in the arms race. They expressed a common concern for achieving the earliest possible positive results in the Vienna talks, for the practical realisation of the SALT-2 and a start on SALT-3.

18. The promotion (not always consistent and frequently confined to declarations) of the process of detente did not, of course, signify any change in the SI leaders' political and ideological views. The cyclical crisis of the mid-1970s and the subsequent stagflation induced them to make a more thorough study than before of some socio-economic problems. Thus, a committee on the transnational corporations was set up under the SI's Bureau. It presented reports to the 13th

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and 14th Congresses with an overall analysis of the transnationals' operations and its recommendations. The reports criticised the plundering activity of the super concerns, but the recommendations did not go beyond suggestion for a "code of conduct" for the transnationals. The social-reformist conception of "class cooperation" ruled out any decisions on concrete measures aimed against the transnationals.

19. The SI leaders' approach to the problem of restructuring international economic relations involves a division of the world into "North" and "South". The former includes not only the capitalist but also industrialised socialist countries, an approach which puts on them the "responsibility" for the developing countries' socio-economic backwardness. It is well known, however, that their backwardness originated from imperialist colonial and neocolonial policy. Here, the SI's purpose is, in effect, to range the developing countries against world socialism, and this is in line with the overall urge of international Social-Democracy to keep the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America within the world capitalist system.

Socialists and Communists

20. The Communists, on the one hand, and the Socialists and Social-Democrats, on the other, continue to have fundamental ideological differences on a number of political problems. But the 1970s have also brought out some potentialities for a dialogue and cooperation between them in some capitalist countries both in the domestic and foreign-policy spheres.

To what extent are these potentialities being realised?

21. In April 1972, the SI leadership gave its parties the right independently to decide on the nature of their relations with other political forces, thereby lifting the ban on cooperation with the Communists, which had been in force since the cold war period (the Communists' stand on this issue is well known. While rejecting any policy or ideology which essentially amounts to subordinating the working class to the capitalist system, they want equitable cooperation with Socialist and Social-Democratic parties in the struggle for peace, democracy and social progress.)

22. However, since then no substantial changes have taken place in the relations between most SI parties and Communist parties. What is more, they have worsened in some countries in view of the anti-communist prejudices of the Socialists and Social-Democrats. But that does not, of course, eliminate the objective need for interaction and cooperation between the democratic forces in the interests of the working class and all the other working people.

23. The presentation in November 1976 to the SI leadership by a delegation of the SUPG of the documents of the Berlin Conference of Communist and Workers's Parties of Europe on Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress, was a step towards the establishment of international-level contacts between Communists and Socialists. Subsequently, as has been said, there was an exchange of views on disarmament. This aspect of relations between the two main trends in the

working-class movement is of especial importance now that the most aggressive forces of imperialism have openly taken the line of eroding the detente.

24. Unfortunately, the policy of the overwhelming majority of the SI parties in this field is to some extent inconsistent. This applies especially to the Socialist and Social-Democratic parties of the NATO countries. Their statements about their adherence to detente, for instance, run counter to their actual support of the decision, taken late last year, on the deployment of new US medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. There is also the SI leaders' inclination to assert that the United States and the USSR are equally to blame for the recent aggravation of international tension. That is nothing but an attempt to whitewash the US imperialist circles, whose adventurist acts have sharply worsened the situation in the world.

25. The Social-Democratic centre has considerable potentials for the struggle to improve the international political climate. Their fuller use would be of great importance and would really promote the extension of cooperation between nations on the basis of the policy of detente.

V. Shveitser

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General Problems of Theory :	Comrade _____
(Y. Panfilov) :	
Tr. D. Skvirsky/VCh/PN :	Please send your remarks to the
_____ :	Secretariat by April 17
Rolled off April 14 :	

WHOM DOES THE "STRATEGY OF REFORMS" SERVE?

Ernst Wimmer

CC Political Bureau member,
Communist Party of Austria

Hardly anybody will dispute the fact that reform and revolution are different, not only as concepts. However, it would not be enough to say that revolutionaries recognise this difference. They also recognise the need both for revolution and reform as the means of progress, and note their extremely intricate relationship, which is not given once and for all, and the mobility and changeability of the line dividing them. For reformism and petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, those eternally wrangling Siamese twins, a characteristic delusion is that this "dividing line" may be drawn in a way that one of the sides is seen as "purely negative" or disappears altogether as though it is possible for one of two poles to exist alone—in short, either a soft, almost imperceptible transition to the new society or a "total rupture", an "absolute negation of what exists", an "exclusively revolutionary settlement" of all issues under all circumstances. In either case one-sidedness is elevated into a theory and one-leggedness into a premise for advance. The former acknowledge only various ways of creeping, and the latter only jumps and leaps.

In fact, development proceeds dialectically and, as Lenin pointed out, the contrast between reform and revolution is "not something absolute, this line is not something dead, but alive and changing, and one must be able to define it in each particular case" (Coll. Works, Vol. 17, p. 116). The Kautskyan motto of either reformist policy or renunciation of reforms, he wrote, was a "bourgeois presentation of the question" (Coll. Works, Vol. 30, p. 260). This motto makes renunciation of the efforts to overthrow the bourgeois system as the price for reforms. Either revolution or the dead end of reformism--this is the view of the petty bourgeois who has lost his self-control, the petty bourgeois who thinks that "willpower can alone move mountains", that history is made by the "resolve of the elite", as though a few hotheads are enough to break any, even the strongest, wall.

What have reforms not only been. A means for changing the alignment of class forces and the conditions of struggle; steps to enhance the public role of the working people up to the creation of the preponderance of strength needed to defeat a heavily armed adversary. But they also brought about changes--frequently significant, that improved the lot of many people--which at the same time prevented bigger, more important changes. Reforms were a means of a temporary retreat and achieving a respite for mustering or regrouping forces. They have been a launching pad, a springboard towards revolution. But they could also be a barrier, a means facilitating

the temporary triumph of counter-revolution, or even the lid of the coffin into which reaction would like to cram progress.

Without the most circumspect consideration of many factors it is impossible to define the place of reforms in social development, to understand their "dual" nature.

With the emergence of the socialist world the possibility of enforcing reforms and the role played by them depends not only on the struggles of the people of a given country although, in the long run, the people concerned have the final say. Victorious revolutions may, for some time, induce capitalism and its partners to display an amazing "eagerness for reforms".¹ Consequently, it is not easy to adopt a correct

¹ Where the number of socio-political reforms are concerned Austria holds one of the leading places in the capitalist world. In terms of history, there are two "periods of reforms" in Austria: the first is from 1918, following the fall of the Hapsburg monarchy, to the early 1920s, when the masses were moving towards revolution. The second dates from 1945, following the defeat of Hitlerite fascism and the old state authority. The impulse making capitalism "eager for reforms" was, in the first case, the impact of the October Revolution, and in the second case the Soviet Army's defeat of fascism and some other factors. Capitalism's apologists concede that the concessions made by it in Austria would not have been so generous had there not been the "Red neighbour". In either case the reforms were thus a "by-product" of the revolutionary struggle, though in a somewhat different sense. A phase of freezing or curtailing social advances has now commenced.

attitude to reforms if only because in every case this has to be approached differently, in a changing situation.

Since the days when Lenin noted that "reformism versus socialist revolution... is the formula of the modern 'advanced', educated bourgeoisie" (Coll. Works, Vol. 17, p. 229) the forces of socialism have grown immeasurably stronger. But capitalism, too, has had to learn much in order to prolong its existence. On the one hand, if we take development as a whole, socialism's achievements and all the new victories of the revolution are compelling capitalism to have recourse to the "second method of rule": reformism, concessions, and handouts. On the other hand, these successes and the aggravation of capitalism's general crisis are visibly narrowing the opportunities for this method, again if we take development as a whole, because there are significant political distinctions between the capitalist countries. Thus, more than ever before, capitalism has to combine two basic forms of its rule, to modify them, although keeping the first in readiness, as a contingency, namely, renunciation of important reforms and the use of force up to undisguised terrorism.

Unquestionably, there is still a relatively broad objective basis for opportunism in the working-class movement. One can hardly find, at least in countries dominated by state-monopoly capitalism, a single major issue concerning the dimension, basic character, and content of reforms over which no struggle is waged between the three main forces. First,

this is the "modern bourgeoisie", which has long ceased to be united and is not in the least progressive in any highly industrialised capitalist country. Second, this is the reformist wing of the working-class movement, in which the growing contradictions of capitalism generate friction, disagreements, and even crises that lead to a split. Lastly, there is the revolutionary working-class movement, which, while fighting for reforms, is set on creating springboards, even if in many cases they are unstable and vulnerable, for a further advance towards socialism. It seeks to draw the reformism-influenced masses into the struggle for specific reforms, helping them to draw lessons from their own experience and see that this struggle is justifiable but that solely reforms cannot lead to fundamental improvements.

In view of the complexity of the confrontation on many fronts, the question we ask ourselves is whether there is truth in the widespread belief that reformism is a party, tendency or champion of the working-class movement contending that the new social system can be achieved exclusively by means of reforms? But this definition is in many ways inadequate for a characteristic of the reformist trends in Austria (reformist influence in Austria is the strongest in the capitalist world).

Prior to the First World War the Austrian Social-Democrats proclaimed themselves proponents not only of socialism as an aim but also of revolution as the indispensable way of achieving socialism. What then was the crux of reformism? Victor Adler and Otto Bauer had repeatedly said that the maximum reforms could only be achieved through adherence to the revolutionary aim. However, so far as the Social-Democratic leaders were concerned, this adherence never acquired a more "dangerous" form than the preaching of the "theory of the collapse" of capitalism and appeals for the "great day of reckoning". Priority, they said, belonged not to the subjective factor of revolution but to history, which, they claimed, would itself execute its sentence. This was entirely in harmony with the situation when the Social-Democratic leadership did not find bourgeois partners, despite the predisposition to form coalitions and blocs with them, when, as Otto Bauer put it, the "uniqueness of the state" "inhibits even the temptation for blocs and ministerialism".²

The appearance of state-monopoly capitalism was accompanied by the rise of a new variety of reformism, and since then the revolutionary movement has been fighting its innumerable manifestations. This state-monopoly reformism was most clearly defined as early as 1917 by Karl Renner. His main thesis was that the penetration of "statehood into the

² Otto Bauer, Der Kampf, 1917, p. 328.

cellular fabric" of the private economy preconditioned not only the appropriateness but also the need for cooperation with "the most progressive segment of capital". This segment is seen in monopoly capitalism in an entirely "Marxist spirit", for, it is argued, it represents the "highest development level of the productive forces". This thesis is coupled with the corresponding theory on the state, claiming that as a result of the reforms it puts into effect the state can "pass from hand to hand". It is alleged that the outcome of "social administration organised by the state" is that the "instrument outgrows its master", ultimately evolving into a "lever of socialism".³

In order to arrive at a correct assessment of the claims, made by some quarters lately, that they had developed an "entirely new strategy", it should be recalled that Renner had written in a "Marxist spirit" that "economic, social, and political trenches run across every institution of society". From this he concluded that instead of a sudden, sharp turn of the system or the fall of the bourgeoisie, there can only be a "gradual advance of the line of trenches".⁴

³ Austromarxismus, Texte, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, pp. 269, 281.

⁴ Ibid., p. 283.

In Austria, a few decades later, this theory was partially implemented in the form of "social collaboration", i.e., it evolved into institutionalised, constant, and "historical" collaboration of the Social-Democratic elite with the "most advanced segments of capital" or, in simpler terms, with big capital. Lately, when the opportunities for distribution have diminished for the working class and the constant redistribution of social wealth in favour of big capital has become more tangible and striking, tension and even conflict has erupted between state-monopoly reformism of the Social-Democratic school and the old, traditional reformism. Today, for the struggle for reforms it is by no means a matter of indifference whether preference is given to the maximalisation of profits, the stabilisation of the system and the "national interests of the economy", or the order of priorities is established differently, as the "old" reformists had urged, while the interests of the working people are taken into account only from the angle of stabilising the system.

The importance of this distinction is growing visibly today. But even this is not enough. In the Socialist Party of Austria there is growing resistance to the policy of reforming the system, to Social-Democratic managers and wheeler-dealers, who have taken over from the bourgeoisie not only the cult of profit but also bourgeois vices, and personify a negation of the traditional norms and values of the working-class movement. For example, a statement by a number of

opposition Austrian Socialists declares: "We cannot go along with reformism that believes fundamental changes can be achieved solely by moving from one reform to another, without a rupture with capitalist logic."⁵ However, in their conclusions there only are scattered embryos of an anti-monopoly strategy, and the illusions about "gradually bringing the functions of the state into harmony with the interests of the working people" are still very much alive.

For many of them it would be incomparably easier to go over to a consistently socialist stand if, in all its new guises, reformism were not constantly proclaimed the "new third way". From its own experience the Austrian working-class movement is coming round to the conclusion that when reformist currents objectively cannot align themselves or form coalitions with a segment of capital, when among the people there is unrest or a growing aspiration for fundamental changes, varieties of reformism that do not lend themselves to the usual definition inevitably spring up. To illustrate, let us reconstruct the instructive arguments presented by Otto Bauer, who was a leading theorist of the Second International. He held that by setting tasks that could only be achieved in a revolutionary situation the Communist confused the present with the future. Petty-bourgeois democrats, on the contrary, believe that the bourgeois republic will consummate historical development. They confuse the future with the present.

⁵ Rober Anstos, Verlag Jugend und Volk, 1980, p. 10.

In these arguments revolution is by no means either "written off" or reviled. Bauer claims to a supreme combination of soberness and realism in day-to-day politics with a historical understanding of the need for the "final battle". But he juggles: it is quite enough, he declares, to become a revolutionary when a revolutionary situation arises. Reforms are described as an "autonomous sphere", a "broad field of political education" unlinked to the forms of struggle that may prove vital for the accomplishment of a revolution. Bauer had himself once characterised this stand, partly as in self-criticism, as "temporising": reformist day-to-day politics, avoidance of decisive class battles, a wait-and-see tactic coupled to comforting references to an imminent "final battle". Like petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, this "temporising" divorces the present from the future, ignoring its potentialities.

The fact that in some West European countries a return is to be observed to some tenets of Austro-Marxism, notably to "wait-and-see", is evidence of the gravity of capitalism's crisis. But has there been a radical change in the correlation between reforms and revolution with the development of state-monopoly capitalism and new functions of the state, particularly in the economy? Can one identify, for instance, the "strategy of reforms", even if it is complemented with the "strategy of democratisation", with the struggle for socialism?

Now, as before (when Lenin wrote the words), it is important that "one should know how to combine the struggle for democracy and the struggle for the socialist revolution, subordinating the first to the second" (Coll. Works, Vol. 35, p. 267) and that it is necessary to subordinate "the struggle for reforms, as the part to the whole, to the revolutionary struggle for freedom and for socialism" (Coll. Works, Vol. 5, p. 406). The most diverse theories about the "radical reforms" allegedly taking place in the correlation between reforms and revolution are based, in the final analysis, on the illusion that the class character of the state—if it is at all recognised—can be neutralised by means of reforms, as though the enemy has no citadels and fortresses but only trenches that can be captured in trench warfare.

In order to ensure its continued operation state-monopoly capitalism has to have recourse again and again to reforms in order to defuse its own tensions. And since progressing socialisation of the productive forces has somewhat to be taken into account, the opportunity presents itself of passing many of these reforms off as "useful" for the entire economy. However, damage is inflicted more and more frequently on large segments of the population, whose interests come into conflict with the system in one way or another. The steep rise of discontent, protest, and self-aid-movements that are in most cases spontaneous and diverse in origin, social composition, content, and duration—is a very significant fact. Here revolutionaries are confronted with new tasks precisely because the "integrational mechanisms" of the state no longer function in the political system.

Many vices and contradictions at first seem to be isolated and are seen as problems of "individual spheres", of individual groups and strata. Hence the need to define one's attitude to every reform, from the most insignificant to the most important, and work out options, especially in cases where the proponents of the system try to prove that no options exist. Hence the need to couple reforms that make it possible to champion the material and cultural needs of the population effectively, and bring to light the causes of the unsatisfactory situation and in future ensure a further advance. Hence the need to use this sort of positive reforms to counter state-monopoly capitalism's reformist policy.

In drafting its new Programme, which is now being discussed, the Communist Party of Austria endeavoured to take its own and international experience into account. In the "Action Programme" section, in which medium and long-term demands are reduced to a "totality of reforms", it is stated: "Under pressure from the socialist nations and the changing balance of strength in the world basic human rights in the political, economic, and social fields were recorded in the various UN conventions as norms mandatory for capitalist countries as well. For us--in Austria as in other countries--the struggle to get them formalised constitutionally and ensure their actual implementation in all spheres coincides with the struggle for the old demands of the working-class movement. Where the realisation and the securing of these rights encounters barriers erected by

capitalist relations of property and power, those whom this affects should be made to realise that these barriers must be broken down."⁶ Thus, we regard social and democratic reforms as a major area of our struggle for Austria's socialist future.

This interpretation of reforms in no way spells out a "reformist strategy": it generates--within the framework of the strategy of struggle for socialism--the demands around which concrete unity of action and alliances are already partly taking shape or can take shape. The central issues, the draft says, is the "conquest of power by the working class". There is no "third way". The CPA sets the course initially towards the stage of anti-monopoly democracy that will be achieved as a result of an upheaval. This conclusion mirrors an important lesson drawn by the Party. In the past the revisionists had theorised about a "multiplicity of stages". For instance, they spoke of a stage of participation in management without the total abolition of "social collaboration". Unquestionably, every reform should now be balanced not only with the "ultimate aim" but also with the objectively possible stage leading to it, a stage characterised by a qualitative change of the relations of property and power. However, if every step--and, needless to say, there will be many--is at once proclaimed a stage. The perspective is lost, sight is lost of the central issue (the issue of power) and once can easily slide into reformism.

⁶ Programm der KPO (Entwurf), Beilage zur Volkstimme von 31.1.1981, p. 21.

Because economics, politics, and ideology are intertwining ever more closely, it is becoming necessary to enforce a "totality or series of reforms" in the economy. Of course, here the point of departure cannot be the striving to ease the conflicts of the capitalist system, to "sanitize" it better than is being done by bourgeois and Social-Democratic "darners". Attention should be given to the state's efforts to derive surplus value and redistribute it in favour of big capital, and also to resultant fact that the satisfaction of the people's various material and cultural needs lags behind the level of social production, behind what is already possible. The CPA's local, regional, and national economic concepts are in various forms aimed at exposing the mechanisms of redistribution in favour of capital. These mechanisms are counterposed by the demand for social redistribution and for the relevant funding. Of course, a "socialism of distribution" is fundamentally no socialism at all: it does not affect the relations of property and power. But if no use is made of the question of distribution for the purpose of explaining to the people that they are being exploited, done out of their share, and cheated it will hardly be possible to approach the sphere of power and profits near enough to intervene seriously in that sphere.

The nationalised sector of the economy, especially in Austria, where it is quite large, is an important factor in determining the role of reforms in the struggle against the state-monopoly system. As the draft CPA Programme declares,

nationalisation is the highest form of property under capitalism; it is "evidence of the inefficiency and untenability of the much-lauded 'private enterprise' in key areas".⁷ This is precisely why, along with the Social-Democratic governments, the conservative forces are opposed to an enlargement of the nationalised sector. Let us lay special stress on two aspects.

The first is that the preservation, extension, and functioning of the nationalised economy and to the funding of that sector are an object of active struggle by the working class. Actions against the state as an "amalgamated capitalist" can more easily evolve into a political movement and substantially contribute to the moulding of anti-monopolistic consciousness. Second, the nationalised industry can become a key position serving the people only if monopoly capital's managers and politicians are removed from the state apparatus and from the managerial agencies of the public sector of the economy. Experience shows that if anti-capitalism cannot assert itself again and again in the day-to-day struggle, it cannot sink roots in the minds of the people. More, if in the name of "making it easier to win support" anti-capitalism abandons the tested conclusions of scientific socialism it deprives the movement of its striking power.

More importance than ever is now being acquired by Lenin's repeated statements that socialism can win allies only if the revolutionary movement champions democratic demands in their most consistent and prospective form. Growing monopolisation is

⁷ Ibid.

accompanied by an increasingly more pronounced trend towards de-democratisation. And the more varied the forms of this de-democratisation, bureaucratisation, managerial arbitrariness, emasculation of the people's rights, and inhibition of their initiatives, the more diverse this struggle must become.

Right extremism and neofascism are growing more active in Austria. However, unlike the constitutions of most of the other bourgeois states a component part of the Austrian Constitution--the State Treaty--contains a clear-cut anti-fascist mandate: the banning of fascist organisations is not only the right but also the duty of the proponents of democracy. A paradoxical situation is now to be observed in Austria: the conservative forces and the Social-Democrats maintain that it is tolerable to treat neofascist organisations "democratically, in other words, that it is not obligatory to observe the Constitution. They say that fulfilment of the constitutional mandate, demanded by a growing number of Socialists, Christians, and Communists, is an "element of totalitarianism" and a violation of "pluralism". Of course, observance of constitutional norms can hardly be called a "reform". But it is extremely important to ensure their fulfilment in order to weaken reaction and anti-Communism and promote the democratic, anti-monopoly movement.

Another element in this context concerns "democracy in the sphere of labour." This is also a key problem of the revolutionary working-class movement in Austria. It emerged

when speaking of "participation in management" the leadership of the Association of Trade Union in fact became an executive agency of class collaboration with capital. Within the framework of this collaboration many production councils, the only representative agencies of blue- and white-collar workers elected by direct voting, turned from agencies of workers' control into ancillary agencies of the leaders of "collaboration" for control of the workers. As the central organ of the Socialist Party of Austria admits,⁸ many production councils are becoming "henchmen in dismissals", agreeing to the firing of factory and office workers for the sake of "objective necessity" and "order at enterprises".

More than half a century ago, Max Adler, a theorist of the left wing of "Austro-Marxism" doubted the justification of his party's drive for the "total democratisation of the economy" without radically changing the relations of power and property. He wrote that "without the proletarian, class-revolutionary basic orientation, all the institutions of economic democracy turn into their opposites; into craft-unionism, estate egoism, economic privileges and, lastly, a mercenary link to capitalist interests."⁹ These words are borne out by the practice of "social collaboration".

It is sometimes asked whether for tactical purposes it is possible to utilise and "reform" such a subtle system as

⁸ AZ, January 1, 1980.

⁹ Max Adler, Politische oder soziale Demokratie, 1926.

participation in management? Here the following is ignored. To enable "collaboration" to function at the highest level, decisions should in principle be taken behind the backs of those they concern, they should be taken in their name but against them. Thus the working people are denied elementary democratic rights: the right to direct elections of all leading trade union bodies, to vote in advance on strikes at enterprises. Sectoral trade unions are restricted or even dissolved; at enterprises democratic elections are obstructed or prohibited altogether.

"Participation in management without democracy in the localities," states the CPA draft Programme, "is the direct opposite of the working people's 'positions of power'. Under the guise of participation in management it makes 'representatives of the workers' dependent on capital'.¹⁰ This makes the struggle for democracy in the localities a central issue. It signifies a change in the character of the trade unions, their conversion into an instrument of struggle ensuring the possibility for genuine control. That this is the correct path is borne out by the actions against "social collaboration" by a growing number of non-Party people, Socialists, and Christians.

Because of the diversity of the . problems of the correlation between reforms and the revolutionary struggle even in one country taken separately, it would be meaningless to compose instructions of any sort. However, to get one's bearings

¹⁰ Programm der KPO (Entwurf), p. 8.

one need criteria. In this context we raise some questions. Do reforms facilitate or prevent organising the masses, democratic independence, the understanding by the masses of their own interests, and vital relationships? Do reforms improve the people's living conditions and create the opportunity for a sensible, more cultured life? Do they help to obtain strongpoints in the agencies, apparatus, and institutions of the government and the political system? Or do they help the adversary to expand his "system of fortifications", close breaches and eliminate weaknesses? Do they contribute to a better understanding of the community of interests, for instance, of the interests of the working class and the intermediate strata? Or do they help to set these interests on a collision course, encourage estate thinking, craft-unionism, and isolation? One of the perverse and most effective tricks of bourgeois and Social-Democratic reformists is to conceive reforms in a manner to engineer a split among the people. For instance, by steering towards a redistribution among them, to the benefit of some and the detriment of others, by diverting attention from redistribution affecting capital.

When capital and its partners find themselves in difficulties, they have recourse to a "policy of rolling back reforms": first sacrifices (on the part of the working people) and, when the worst has been passed, reforms. In each such case the question in Austria has been not only one of the profits of the capitalists but of using "distribution of responsibility" as a

cover to hit the working-class movement, weaken it, break its vigour for as long as possible.

An important criterion of the relationship between reforms and revolution is unquestionably the nearness to the struggle for power or for some power. However, at all stages of the development of social contradictions and the working-class movement all questions must be set in such a way as to lead, even if there are many mediating elements, to understanding the need for abolishing the state-monopoly system and to showing the class character of bourgeois democracy and the limits placed on it by monopoly-capital domination. This is the only way to turn temporary alliances into broader, more lasting and militant alliances, to avoid the danger of these alliances being again deserted by vacillating, irresolute people and also by those who have have partially won over to these alliances, notably members of the middle strata.

The concept of an "escalation of reforms", of reforms "gathering momentum" sometimes surfaces in debates. There is an element of both truth and importance in this concept. Let us recall the history of many revolutions: the growth and radicalisation of grievances became the key element activating the people, expanding the movement, and drawing into it those who had hitherto been standing on the sidelines. An accumulation of reforms is almost always an expression of a deep social crisis, of the hastening of a situation, creating possi-

bilities and demanding decisions, of situations that sometimes are, to use Lenin's words, "harbingers of revolution" (Collected Works, Vol. 15, p. 31). However, there is a negative side to the concept of an "escalation of reforms". It may lead to the misguided conclusion that reforms as such help to bring about qualitative changes in the system.

This conclusion underlies the concept of "reforms going beyond the framework of the system". Its proponents try to prove that capitalism can be defeated without storming the citadels of power. In was this that Bruno Kreisky meant when recently he said: "Socialism is not a state of things that may be gotten, for example, by the seizure of power. It is a long dialectical process." Of course, to negate any qualitative advance means to ignore dialectics. Whatever way this negation is formulated, it is also directed against revolution.

Nothing in actual history gives grounds for surmising that the "strategy of reforms", the "strategy of democratisation shifting from the political system to the economy" or any other of their combinations allows working out or replacing the strategy of the socialist revolution. Experience, including the lessons of the recent past, make it clear that the struggle for reforms, as the struggle for democracy, must be combined with and subordinated to the struggle for socialism. Herein lies the crux of the matter.

Information and Research
(G.Kobyakov)
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Comrade ...

3084. DEM.

Please send your remarks to **BARIS**
the secretariat by July 13.

COMMUNISTS, SOCIALISTS AND THE STRUGGLE
for PEACE

This is a brief review of the anti-war unity of the working class, the initiatives of the international communist movement and the stand taken by Social Democracy on this issue since the 1930s, when this unity first became important, to our day.

The review has been prepared by V. Shveitzer of the Institute of the International Working-Class Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the WMR Information Department.

The proletariat's international class solidarity is one of the chief principles of Marxist-Leninist strategy of the anti-war movement. The struggle to realise this principle runs right through the activity of the Communist Parties. In the 1930s, this struggle was intensified as the policy of the imperialist powers, especially of fascist Germany and Italy in Europe, and of militarist Japan in Asia posed an ever more tangible threat of another world war.

The first major act in defence of peace in that period was the Amsterdam Congress (end of August, 1932), which was attended by over 2,000 delegates from nearly 30 countries. It was called on the initiative of a group of well-known writers, scientists and public figures, and became a powerful manifestation of the international working class and the progressive intelligentsia. The overwhelming majority of its participants (1,855) were communist workers and social democrats,

despite the fact that the Socialist Workers' International (SWI) had prohibited its organisations from sending delegates to Amsterdam. Despite this stand of the SWI, the Congress provided an impetus in involving in the anti-war movement working people who were members of the reformist trade unions and social democratic parties, so inaugurating mass action in defence of peace.

In Europe, the growth of the war danger was primarily connected with the rise of fascism. That is why the struggle to prevent war and the anti-fascist struggle became, especially after Hitler's seizure of power in Germany, the most important two-fold task of the international working class and communist movement. In March 1933, the Comintern issued its appeal "To the Workers of All Countries!",¹ which emphasised the Communists' readiness to act together with the Social Democrats. This was followed by an address from the Communist Parties to the Social Democratic Parties and trade unions offering to set up a united anti-fascist front. However, this initiative did not meet with any positive response.

Nevertheless, the European Anti-Fascist Congress (Paris, June 1933) was attended, together with Communists and non-party people, and in defiance of the ban issued by the leadership of the SWI, by 335 members of social Democratic Parties and reformist trade unions. It adopted a declaration calling for the establishment of the united front against fascism and the danger of imperialist war.

¹ Pravda, March 6, 1933.

Social Democrats were also among the delegates at the World's Congress of Youth Against War and Fascism, also held in Paris (September 1933). Its manifesto emphasised: "If all the anti-fascist forces rallied together and acted in a united front, fascism would be destroyed where it is now in power, and where it is rearing its head."

By the mid-1930s, the working-class movement had accumulated some experience of united action against the threat of fascism, especially in France, Austria and Spain. A sizable section of international Social Democracy displayed a fairly clear understanding of the need for a united front. A congress of the French Socialist Party passed a resolution urging the leadership of the Socialist Workers' International to seek an agreement with the Comintern.² This meant broader opportunities for joint action by the working class, although on the whole Social Democracy continued to maintain its traditional anti-communist stand.

The strategic and tactical tasks of the revolutionary movement of the working class with the steadily growing threat to peace were central to the work of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which was held in July and August 1935. The new international conditions also called for a new approach to cooperation with Social Democracy. Its resolution stressed that "a united working-class front of struggle is the principal and most immediate task of the international working-class movement at the present stage." With this aim in view, the Comintern reaffirmed its readiness to enter into negotiations

² L'Internationale et la guerre. Paris, 1935, p. 9.

with the SWI and its sections. It called the Communist Parties to make the maximum efforts to involve in the struggle for peace all those who oppose war: the masses of workers, regardless of their political and party affiliation, pacifist-minded social strata, women, young people, and ethnic minorities.

In September 1935, as the danger of an attack by fascist Italy on Ethiopia became ever more imminent, the Executive Committee of the Comintern proposed to the SWI Secretariat that they should jointly discuss measures to prevent aggression and maintain peace. Its letter said: "Both Internationals must act in concert and through joint efforts restrain the hand of the fascist warmongers ... It is not yet too late to avert a monstrous catastrophe into which the fascist criminals are pushing mankind. Tomorrow it may be impossible to do so."

This call was reiterated in early October, after the invasion has taken place. At the same time, the Executive Committee of the Comintern issued an appeal "Down with War!" insisting on the earliest "establishment of joint action by all workers' organisations, all friends of peace in all countries to isolate and bridle the fascist instigators of war".

However, the SWI leadership rejected the Comintern's proposal. This negative stand by international Social Democracy made it impossible to unite the anti-fascist, democratic forces and mount an anti-war movement on a scale that could have a substantial effect on developments.

In most capitalist countries, the Communist Parties had to work alone in rousing the masses for the fight against fascism

and war, and this undoubtedly narrowed down its scale. Conversely, wherever the Communists and Socialists took united action, wherever the broad sections of the population were rallied on a democratic platform and a Popular Front set-up, reaction was confronted with powerful resistance from the progressive forces. On the whole, the Communist Parties acted as the most solid barrier in the way of the fascist warmongers. No wonder the November 1936 German-Japanese Act, which formalised the alliance of the aggressors in the drive for world domination, proclaimed as an official goal the cooperation of the two powers against the Comintern ("anti-Comintern pact"). Soon fascist Italy also acceded to the pact.

The SWI leadership's passive attitude to the issues of war and peace produced a situation in which the international working class remained divided in face of the growing aggressiveness of the fascist states. One of the most dramatic consequences of this was the defeat of Republican Spain in the struggle against internal fascist reaction and intervention by the fascist powers. The broad movement of solidarity with the Spanish people across the world was unable to turn the tide of the struggle in Spain in favour of the democratic forces in the absence of joint action by international working-class associations. Meanwhile, the SWI leadership repeatedly rejected relevant Comintern proposals.

From 1935 to 1939, the Comintern addressed the SWI on 10 (sic!) occasions, inviting it to joint action against fascism and war. The calls for the establishment of a united front

of Communists and Socialists sprang from a clear understanding of the vital imperative of mobilising all the forces of the international working class to beat back the aggressors and defend peace. There is no doubt that with the existence of such a front, developments in Europe--and throughout the world--in the 1930s would have been substantially different from those which history has recorded.

These lessons of the past are highly meaningful today. The international communist movement and the overwhelming majority of the Communist Parties have consistently followed the line of expanding the peace front in every possible way and uniting the anti-war forces within it. Here again a great deal depends on the stand of the international Social Democracy which has considerable political weight and the corresponding potentialities. What then is its stand, how is it expressed today?

The Socialist International (SI) is the successor of the Socialist Workers' International, which fell apart during the Second World War. The SI was set up at a constituent congress held in Frankfurt (FRG) in June and July 1951, and it now brings together 49 Socialist and Social Democratic Parties from 44 countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, America, Australia and Oceania.³

Many members of the SI have a prominent base in the political structure of their countries. At the end of 1980, they had one-party governments in Austria, Barbados, Grenada,

³ Socialist Affairs, No. 2/81, p. 88.

Denmark, Dominican Republic, Malta, Norway and Senegal; they headed government coalitions in Mauritius, FRG, and Finland; they were "junior partners" of coalitions in Belgium, Italy, San Marino and Switzerland. In France, chairman of the Socialist Party Francois Mitterrand was elected President of the country in April and May of this year. As a result of the June elections a left-wing government has been formed in the country led by the Socialist P. Mauroy, which for the first time in the last 34 years includes representatives of the French Communist Party. In some countries (Britain, Israel, Netherland and Sweden, among others) the positions of SI parties have for various reasons been weakened over the past few years.

The leaders of West European Social Democracy have leading posts on the SI's governing bodies. Since 1976, Chairman of the SDPG Willy Brandt has been President of the SI. Among the vice-presidents are prominent Social Democrats Bruno Kreisky (Austria), Olaf Palme (Sweden), B. Craxi (Italy), F. Gonzales (Spain), Mario Soares (Portugal) and K. Sorsa (Finland). The Swedish Social Democrat B. Karlsson is the SI General Secretary.⁴ West European Social Democratic and Socialist parties now make up the nucleus of the SI--almost one-half of its membership--although over the past few years the SI has managed to extend its activity to Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The declaration "Goals and Tasks of Democratic Socialism", adopted at its constituent congress continues to be the SI's ideological platform. The foreign-policy section of the document, which was formulated during the "cold war" period, contains calls for peace, general disarmament, and a collective security system. But it does not contain any in-depth analysis

⁴ Socialist Affairs, No. 1/79, p. 30.

of the causes of international tension and says virtually nothing about the aggressive substance of imperialism and the system of colonial domination.

Some positive aspects began to appear in the SI's foreign-policy activity from about the end of the 1950s. Its Fifth Congress (Vienna, 1957) supported some Soviet proposals on limiting the production and testing of nuclear weapons. Its Sixth Congress (Hamburg, 1959) took a positive attitude to the establishment of nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. The stratification of the "cold war" naturally remained: the Social Democratic leaders, in effect, continue to demonstrate their support for imperialist circles. But the peaceful mood of broad masses of people could no longer be ignored, as will be seen, in particular, from the removal of a number of odious pro-NATO theses from the declaration "Peace Today--The Socialist Perspective", which was adopted at an SI conference held in Oslo in June 1962.⁵ The subsequent development of realistic trends in the SI's policy led the 10th Congress (Stockholm, 1966) to declare the need for general and complete disarmament, and to call for curbs on the sale of weapons and a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes.

In the 1970s, the SI displayed a heightened attention to the international detente. It supported--even if not at once--the Soviet call for the convocation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A number of prominent Social Democratic leaders--Brandt, Kreisky, Sorsa and Palme--made a constructive contribution to that historic forum and the

⁵ Die Sozialistische International. Berlin, 1977, S. 127.

formulation of its Final Act. The Helsinki results were approved in a resolution on the political situation passed by the 13th Congress of the SI (Geneva, November 1976). The resolutions of the 14th Congress (Vancouver, November 1978) urged the need to press with international negotiations on the banning of nuclear weapons tests, on strengthening the nonproliferation regime, confidence-building measures, etc. They drew attention to the fact that the steady increase in military spending not only poses a growing threat to peace, but also diverts huge resources from the satisfaction of primary economic and social needs.

In April 1978, the SI held a special conference in Helsinki on disarmament. It was attended by guests from the USSR and the United States. The Soviet delegation was led by Boris Ponomarev, member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CPSU CC. At the Conference, he told of the Soviet Union's initiatives aimed to ensure a military detente, and on behalf of the CPSU invited the Socialist International to develop cooperation in this field.

In the summer of 1978, a special SI working group on disarmament was authorised to establish contact with the leadership of the USSR, the United States and international bodies, and to prepare a special report for the 15th Congress. In 1979, the working group visited the United States and met representatives of the United Nations and the nonaligned movement.

At the end of September and early October 1979, the working group paid^a visit to Moscow. Its official representatives

met with leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state and specialists on disarmament matters. They had a conversation with Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It followed from a joint press release that the parties unanimously recognised the need for an end to the arms race without delay, for a curb on the sale of weapons, for the establishment of a system of international control over disarmament, and the use for peaceful purposes of funds that would be released as a result of a slackening of the arms race. It expressed joint concern for attaining the earliest positive results at the Vienna talks, practical realisation of the SALT-2 and a start of negotiations of SALT-3.

Social Democratic foreign-policy conceptions were rather broadly expressed at the 15th Congress of the SI (Madrid, November 1980). The assessment of the present international situation given in the Brandt and Kreisky report and also in the final resolution of the Congress was not free of the inconsistency which is generally characteristic of the whole SI line. On the one hand, alarm was expressed over the worsening situation and the need was urged to improve it. On the other, the blame for the worsening of the international situation was placed on the "two super-powers". The Soviet Union was, in effect presented as a co-author of the "limited nuclear war" doctrine. The resolution remarked in positive terms on China's "new orientation towards the policy of a dialogue with other powers, although it is well known that the Peking leadership

is oriented above all towards contacts with political forces seeking to step up international tensions.

The propositions concerning a military detente appeared to be more consistent and positive. The final resolution said, among other things, that under the new US administration there could be even greater barriers to SALT-2 and emphasised the need for the ratification of the agreement and the earliest start of negotiations on SALT-3. The SI, it said, "believes that it is of exceptional importance to start preparations for a European conference on disarmament",⁶

The Congress approved the report of the SI working group on disarmament, containing, on the whole, a correct analysis of the problem. It was decided to acquaint the governments of the USSR and the United States, the United Nations and the nonaligned movement with the content of the report, and also to set up under the SI a special consultative group on problems of disarmament and disarmament controls to keep track of developments in this field and cooperate with various international organisations. On the whole, the 15th Congress showed that on the questions of war and peace the SI now takes a more constructive stand than in the past.

Practical Social Democratic action in defence of peace has also been invigorated. The group on disarmament problems set up in accordance with the Congress decisions was headed by K. Sorsa, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Finland. Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden U. Palme, another prominent SI leader, heads the nongovernmental

⁶ Socialist Affairs, No. 1/81, pp. 7, 21, 22; Arbeiter Zeitung, November 22, 1980.

international organisation "Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security". One of its sittings was held in Moscow in June of this year. The latest conference of SI party leaders, held in Amsterdam at the end of April this year, called for negotiations in the near future between the United States and the USSR on problems connected with medium-range missile weapons in Europe.

Social Democrats have displayed more understanding than in the past of the need of joint action with the Communists and all the other peace forces in defence of peace. One example is the international symposium on security, cooperation and human rights held in Madrid in February of this year. It was arranged by centres for socio-political studies of the Communist and Socialist parties of Spain, FRG, France, Greece, Holland, Britain and Italy. It clearly expressed the idea of standing up for the process of detente, and rebuffing the militaristic plans of the aggressive imperialist circles. The SI's May Day address contained a call on all men, regardless of their political convictions, to make a contribution to the efforts aimed at disarmament, the maintenance of peace, detente and international cooperation.

A number of meetings between representatives of Social Democratic parties of the capitalist countries, on the one hand, and the fraternal parties of the socialist countries, on the other, emphasised the insistent need for joint action by all democratic, peace-loving forces against the danger of war, for a relaxation of international tensions, for an end

to the arms race and for disarmament.

Much importance is attached to Leonid Brezhnev's meetings with Olaf Palme and Willy Brandt. In the course of his meeting with Brandt in June of this year, profound concern was expressed over the worsening of the international situation, especially the growth of the arms race, the existence of various hotbeds of armed conflict and the attendant increase in the danger of war. The conviction was expressed that in the present situation there is a need to do everything possible to continue the policy of detente, to extend it to the military field, and to preserve and strengthen peace.

The common view was expressed that the only reliable way of settling controversial international issues is serious negotiation based on a genuine concern to achieve positive results and a readiness of the parties to make their contribution in line with the principle of equality and equal security.

The facts of the recent period testify, therefore, to more vigorous anti-war effort by international Social Democracy. That is, unquestionably, a positive phenomenon. Social Democracy has highly substantial potentialities for improving the international political climate and averting the threat of thermonuclear war. Their realisation would be highly important for the future of peace and would be sincerely welcomed by the Communists.

National-Liberation
Movements in Latin
American Countries
(V. Davydov)

Tr. Yu. Sdobnikov/VCh

Rolled off December 12 1980

Comrade

253a

Please send your remarks to the
Secretariat by December 16

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, DOMINICAN STYLE

Narciso Isa Konde

General Secretary, Dominican CP

National reformist parties in some Latin American countries have declared their adoption of the social-democratic doctrine. It has also been accepted by political organisations which emerged on our continent a relatively short time ago, and which represent a broad spectrum of ideological trends, ranging from populist to socialist. Although they use the slogans of the West European Social-Democrats, notably those on the issue of war and peace, and disarmament, both groups remain an "original" phenomenon, which is highly distinct from traditional social-democracy, because they have to operate in different circumstances and have a different social basis. Below is an analysis of the experience of one such party in government.

The longer the Dominican Revolutionary Party (DRP)¹ remains in power, the more obvious it becomes that it has failed to justify the hopes pinned on it (and it is these hopes that brought it victory in the elections, in the first place), and to honour most of its own promises.

¹ The DRP, a self-proclaimed Social-Democratic party, won the 1978 general election. For details, see WMR, No. 12, 1978, pp. —Ed.

The clear urge on the part of the cabinet, headed by Antonio Guzman, to curb democratic rights (which were extended at the initial stage of the DRP's rule) the dependent character of its foreign policy, and the deepening of the economic and social crisis—all of this has cost the ruling party the confidence of the people.

Social conflicts are being exacerbated, and the working people's protest is growing. Ever more workers, peasants, marginalists,² students, intellectuals and members of other middle strata have been joining in the struggle for the satisfaction of their vital needs. Mass action has now and again assumed such proportions that it left whole cities paralysed.

The DRP promised that its government would ensure freedom for the activity of organisations, freedom of speech, demonstrations, movement and choice of domicile, and the right to work without discrimination for ideological or political motives, all of which are written into the 1963 Constitution.³ In practice, things turned out to be different. The Guzman Administration has prevented the Dominican Communist Party (DCP) and other progressive organisations from arranging mass social measures. The police have detained, without any grounds, leaders of our

² That part of the population which has no means of subsistence and has dropped out of the social fabric.--Ed.

³ It contained some progressive provisions and was adopted during the upswing in the democratic movement under the bourgeois-reformist government headed by Juan Bosch, then the leader of the DRP.--Ed.

Party and other left-wing and democratic associations. The authorities have been deporting Haitian emigres⁴ and imprisoning peasants who have ceased to believe the promises and have got down to taking over the lands of the latifundists. Strikes by urban transport drivers and the workers of the companies Falconbridge, Metaldom and Codal, and action by working people in Tamboril, Hatillo and Cotui districts were brutally put down. Meanwhile, the government has tolerated the illegal sackings of workers and employees in the private and state sectors.

There is every indication that the DRP leaders, who have close ties with US imperialism, are highly satisfied with the "limited democracy".

The present administration's economic policy is damaging to the country. Meanwhile, the economic outlook over the past few years has been favourable. The growing world prices of the basic Dominican exports (sugar, gold, ferro-nickel), the growing tax revenues, and the large foreign loans were not used at all to improve, in any way, the life of the working people or to overcome the difficulties in economic development. The Dominican economy and the condition of the mass of people continue to be in a parlous state.

⁴ Thousands of Haitians annually cross the Dominican border to escape the hunger and poverty to which they have been reduced at home, and persecution by the regime of Duvalier Jr.--Ed.

In 1979, inflation came to 26 per cent, with a tendency to increase in the recent period. In 1979, the Cross Domestic Product increased by only 2.3 per cent, while the 1980 indicator is estimated to be no more than 3.4 per cent.⁵

Over the past two years, the trade deficit has increased to \$550 million. According to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the deficit on current account⁶ has reached \$1 billion. In fiscal 1979, the country lost nearly \$100 million of its gold and currency reserves (in 1978, \$85 million). The 1980 data show a further worsening of the monetary and financial state of the country.

⁵ An indicator that could be regarded as satisfactory for an economically developed country, where population growth is slow. The situation is different in countries with a high rate of population growth, like the Dominican Republic. Reckoned per head, GDP growth turns out to be insignificant or even negative.--Ed.

⁶ Includes, apart from the trade balance, the balance of services, and unilateral transfers. Together with the capital and international payments balances, the balance on current account makes up the balance of payments (IMF method).--Ed.

The total foreign debt (together with the credit agreements concluded by the present government) has come to \$1.5 billion. In 1979-1980, of export earnings, \$40 went into the payment of interest or principal. Let us recall that the DRP undertook to cut the proportion down to 100 to 8.

The growing balance of payments deficit, the large external debt, and the agreements concluded with the IMF result in growing external pressure. Direct interference by the US-controlled IMF in the country's economic life cannot be ruled out.

Under pressure from rank-and-file members, among whom there is a pronounced anti-imperialist mood, the DRP leadership wrote into its electoral programme a plank on "control and regulation" of foreign investments as an immediate task. The programme said that foreign investors would "not be allowed into telephone and telegraph communications, radio, television, industries and enterprises of strategic importance for the national economy, the manufacture of military equipment and the communal services". It also promised to "review all the contracts concluded by the state with foreign companies on the use of national resources, above all deposits of ore, oil and other minerals".

But once in power, the DRP began to conduct an open-door policy, lifting all restrictions on operations by foreign capital and allowing the transfer of vast profits abroad (in 1979, \$80 million). The Guzman Administration is taking

its cue from the US corporations. Thus, when reviewing its contract with Alcoa, it succumbed to pressure from its representatives, and signed, on disadvantageous terms, an agreement with Vascoleonesa on the working of gold mines in Yujo. Even when the foreign companies which obtained a concession for the working of oil fields were in breach of their obligations, the authorities declared that they had no intention of reviewing the contracts on the use of national resources (for instance, with Falconbridge).

It is true that the government bought up the stock of the transnational Rosario Resource and Simplot, which were engaged in gold-mining in Pueblo Viejo. This measure appeared to cut across the whole line of conciliation, for it could provide a pretext for the establishment of state control over the whole of the mining industry. But the point is that the stock was bought on terms which were highly burdensome for the country. Within six years, these companies, whose initial investment came to \$6 million, repatriated \$53.3 million worth of profits, and obtained \$7 million from the floating of shares. The Dominican state paid these companies \$70 million. The situation is complicated by the fact that the present earnings of the nationalised enterprises do not go into the expansion of production but to cover the government's current spending.

And here is the pattern of budget appropriations: over a period of 23 months, the Guzman Administration spent a

total of nearly \$1.8 billion pesos,⁷ but no more than \$235 million went into the production sphere. Meanwhile, a large number of persons involved in the administration of the state have made fortunes at the expense of the Treasury (from high salaries, large bonuses, commission fees, etc.).

The condition of the state sector testifies to the government's incompetence and inaction. The functioning of the main enterprises has worsened, the pace of construction of the projects started under the previous government has markedly slowed down. Water and electricity charges have been increased. The country is forced to buy oil at ever higher prices, while the production of sugar (whose marketing could compensate for the import outlays) has been falling, despite the growth of world prices.

The DRP's electoral programme spoke of "a transformation of the country's agrarian structure, elimination of the latifundia and minifundia, and abolition of lease contracts and share-cropping". The Social Democrats also promised to distribute 5,000 allotments a year (3,000 under the previous administration). But within the DRP's two years, only 4,300 peasants have received land. The authorities have been increasingly attacking peasants who, with the support of the Communist Party, are engaged in the struggle for their right to land, to work and to normal living conditions.

⁷ According to the official exchange rate, 1 peso=\$1.—Ed.

Although the government did give assurances that agricultural production would get primary attention, the plans for the development of this sector are not being fulfilled. The shortfall in staple foods is now much larger than the planned deficit (6 million tons, in physical terms).

Nor has the activity of the Social-Democrat administration produced any positive changes in employment or in the distribution of incomes. Unemployment has even increased, to 24 per cent. The wealthiest part of the population--6 per cent--appropriates 43 per cent of the national income. The deprived sections--50 per cent--take 13 per cent. In view of the steady growth of consumer prices, the working people's purchasing power has markedly declined.

The authorities have done nothing at all to develop education and have not prevented the privatisation of the education system, a fact which has had a substantial effect on family budgets, because tuition fees in private schools are being constantly increased. Nothing has been done to prevent imperialist infiltration of the sphere of culture, or to protect its national character, as the government's programme promised. Plans for free pre-school and poly-technical education, and projects for the establishment for full-cycle schools in rural localities are not being implemented. The Minister of Education prefers to use repression, and many teachers have already lost their jobs.

The DRP started out by putting through some democratic changes in the army, but these were soon whittled down, because the officer corps was placed under rigid control by the US military advisers and the Pentagon. The Dominican Armed Forces are now in the grip of foreign tutelage.

The army is regarded as a fire brigade which responds to alarms whenever the social system is threatened. It is being induced to take an "apolitical" stand, although malicious anti-communism, toned down in the early months of the DRP's rule, is being revived in the barrack-rooms. The "apolitical" slogan is used by the command to prevent officers and men from identifying themselves with the people's aspirations and displaying concern for the protection of national sovereignty, the Constitution and the laws, which, let us recall, envisage a return to the country of its natural resources, now being plundered by foreign companies, an agrarian reform and assurance of civil rights and genuine economic independence.

For all its promises the government has done nothing to develop friendly relations and trade with the socialist community or the progressive states of Asia and Africa. The insignificant cultural, scientific and athletic contacts with Cuba have been frozen.

While DRP General Secretary Jose Francisco Pena Gomez and other leaders deliver brilliant speeches spiced with anti-imperialist catchwords at various international forums

the government has been pursuing a policy of completely subordinating the country's foreign policy to Washington. Thus, it did not send a team to the Moscow Olympic Games, and opposed the UN resolution on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. At the same time, the DRP government did not dare to break off relations with the Somoza dictatorship. It gave red-carpet treatment in Santo Domingo to the Foreign Minister of El Salvador's criminal junta. The regime has continued to abide by the secret treaties with the dictator Duvalier, and has persecuted Haitian emigres and brutally treated the farm hands arriving from Haiti to take in the sugar-cane crop.

The authorities have not only tolerated interference in the country's internal affairs by international financial outfits under the influence of US capital, but have also accepted so-called military-economic aid from the United States, which helps to build up the political and military positions of imperialism in our country. No wonder the Pentagon generals now pay inspection visits to Santo Domingo every three months.

However paradoxical this may sound, the foreign policy of the DRP, as a party, is not identical with its government's activity in the international arena. Pena Gomez is secretary of the Social International's Latin America Bureau. In our region, the Socialist International cooperates not only with the social-democratic movements, but also supports organisations which set themselves truly

revolutionary goals. This will be seen from the campaign of solidarity with the Sandinista National Liberation Front, the Coordination Organ of the Revolutionary Mass Organisations and the Revolutionary Democratic Front of El Salvador, with the Front of Democratic and Popular Unity in Bolivia, with the Zimbabwe African National Union, and other progressive associations in the developing countries.

Participation in these campaigns has naturally created authority for Pena Gomez, both abroad and at home. After all, most Dominicans sympathise with the fighters for the peoples' liberation. The fact that the foreign-policy activity of the DRP's General Secretary has positive aspects does not absolve him from responsibility for the acts of the government formed by his party, a government which seeks to maintain in our country a system of dependant capitalism in close alliance with the local oligarchy and US imperialism.

The Dominican Republic lies in a region of the continent which is in a state of revolutionary ferment. It is being swept by the vivifying winds of a fresh upswing in the liberation struggle in Central America and the Caribbean, an upswing marked by the victories of the Grenadan and Nicaraguan peoples, and the deepening of the revolutionary process in El Salvador.

The bitter experience of the twelve years under the Reformist Party,⁸ and the disenchantment with the social-democratic experiment that has sharpened the socio-economic crisis have bred mistrust of political projects, which, the masses have come to realise, serve the interests of imperialism and local capital. That is why the Communists' calls carry ever greater conviction. The people begin to regard our Party as the alternative to subordination to alien interests.

The facts show that the prerequisites are maturing for a take-over of power—in the foreseeable future—by truly revolutionary forces. The Communist Party is aware of the responsibility which the favourable historical moment imposes on it: the rise of the class struggle, the growth of the revolutionary consciousness of the masses and the spread of mass interest in socialism. The main task now is to strengthen our own ranks and to channel the joint action by the exploited masses into the class struggle.

No one in the Dominican Republic has considered the problem of the unity of the progressive forces as seriously as the Communists have done: on this score, we have formulated clear-cut programmatic propositions. The DCP has always stood for the cohesion of the anti-imperialist movement, and this must be admitted by the avowed anti-

⁸ See WMR, No. 5 for 1977, pp. —Ed.

Communists. We demonstrated our readiness to cooperate with the other progressive forces during the April 1965 uprising,⁹ and also in the subsequent period. Unity, but with a profound class content, was our invariable principle in the past, and it remains such today.

The question here is ultimately one of participants in a potential alliance and of the extent to which the prerequisites of the revolution have matured. There are Maoist groups in many organisations styling themselves leftist. These pursue a policy of alliance with the bourgeoisie, which is dependent on foreign imperialism, and slander the Soviet Union, the Cuban revolution and the whole socialist community. It goes without saying that we cannot join them. We believe that the defence of existing socialism is a matter of fundamental importance, which does not allow of any cooperation with the anti-socialist forces.

⁹ An uprising against the reactionary triumvirate installed by a military coup in 1963. The leaders of the uprising, in which the Communists took an active part, formed a government headed by Francisco Caamano, who declared his loyalty to the 1963 Constitution. In September 1965, the constitutionalist government was overthrown by the counter-revolutionary section of the army and the US Marines.—Ed.

The Dominican Liberation Party (DLP)¹⁰, headed by the former President Juan Bosch, is also classed as a left-wing party. He himself says that he is a Marxist but not a Leninist, while his party does not adhere either to Marxism or to Leninism. The Communists have been carrying on an ideological struggle against Bosch. He would like us to stop it for the purposes of reaching a tactical unity. But the question of an alliance with the DLP can be considered only if it clarifies, at long last, its goals and political positions. It is impossible to have any rapprochement on the leadership level in the present situation. Unity has to be forged from below, in daily struggle, in the unity of the workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, marginals, jobless, believers and atheists. Real cooperation must involve the mass basis of political and social organisation.

A general election is to be held in 1982. In preparing for it, we seek to unite the exploited masses. That is one of the Party's chief tasks. The electoral campaign requires our special attention, because through it runs the axis of political life.

In the long years of clandestine activity and in the short period of legal existence, the DCP has made a tangible contribution to the shaping of the nation's anti-imperialist consciousness, the political enlightenment of the masses, and the discussion of various economic and social problems.

¹⁰ Split off from the DRP in 1973.—Ed.

It initiated action by working people in town and country against every form of oppression. That is why many people in our country (even those who are remote from the Communists) understand that the Communist Party must have greater opportunities for carrying on the electoral struggle and for obtaining access to the legislative bodies.

Pursuing a line of using every form of revolutionary struggle (depending on the concrete circumstances), the DCP Central Committee has decided to resort to parliamentary methods once again. We shall fulfil the requirements of the law and the Central Electoral Commission, although that is not easy, for, among other things, one must present a list of 117,000 supporters.¹¹

A hard and unequal struggle lies ahead in the elections. The propaganda media and the material resources at the disposal of our rivals are many times greater than those of the DCP. But whatever the conditions of the electoral campaign, we must take part in this battle for influence on the masses. It is of great importance because it helps to win for the Communist Party new contingents of working people, and to secure support for its programme of social transformations.

¹¹ Before the 1978 election, the Communists collected 125,000 signatures, against the required quota of 111,000.--Ed.

The outcome of the parliamentary struggle will depend on how deeply the Communists' ideals penetrate into the midst of the people. If we have the support of a sizable part of the population, to say nothing of a majority, no one and nothing will be able to stop the advance towards socialism in our country.

It is up to the people to decide.

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA
TÜSTAV

National Liberation Movements
in Asia and Latin America

*The discussion will take place on
Thursday, December 3, at 9.30 a.m.
in the Editorial Council Hall
(Zasedačha)*

For discussion in the Commission
on Asia and Africa

Sémon Pathe Gueye

THE INDEPENDENCE AND LABOUR PARTY OF SENEGAL

A. Subject of discussion

Analysing the attempts at the Social Democratic infiltration of Africa; identifying the intentions of Social Democracy, its chances to succeed and maximum possibilities; detailing the ways to resist those attempts.

B. Notes for the discussion

Today there exists a threat of Africa "turning Social Democratic". Its objectives, deserving very serious consideration, are as follows: a) anti-socialism and anti-communism, concealed behind the smokescreen of ideological demagoguery about respecting the cultural identity and political independence of Africa's peoples and countries; b) reformist attempts at neutralising the radicalisation of the anti-imperialist movement in Africa. Both these objectives are aspects of a single plan: to consolidate imperialism's positions in Africa at the expense of certain concessions, inevitable amid the upsurge of the anti-imperialist sentiment. Varying according to specific social and political conditions in this or that country, the strategy aimed

at securing these objectives can take different forms and be implemented through different approaches. This determines the essential diversity of the processes we are analysing; moreover, this diversity is enhanced, on the one hand, by the heterogeneity of Social Democracy itself as an actual movement and, on the other hand, by the diversity of the African parties which are to provide the base for Social Democracy.

Social Democracy can count on winning support and even taking firm root in Africa in spite of the fact that the reformist solutions it offers are at best unable to meet the real interests of the peoples of Africa.

Nevertheless, the success of Social Democracy in Africa is not inevitable. There are many ways to prevent that. This can be greatly assisted by explaining Social Democratic objectives and exposing the myth of its ideological precepts. However, this effort should not be confined to ideological struggle alone.

C. The need for discussion

It may seem at first glance that there is no urgency to the discussion proposed. For a number of reasons it might appear that as far as urgency is concerned, the case of Social Democracy is a minor issue.

The reasons are as follows:

A. There are more dangerous hotbeds and areas of tensions in the world: the increasing aggressiveness of the US ruling quarters and the grave danger to universal peace (the manufacture of the neutron bomb, the decision on deploying the Pershing

missiles in Europe, the threat to Cuba and Nicaragua, the latent tensions in Southeast Asia, etc.).

B. On the international scene, Social Democracy itself does not operate as a monolithic ideological and political bloc deserving a global negative assessment. Some Social Democratic quarters proceed from reasonable positions; this makes it possible to arrive at similar opinions (the striving for peace, the approach to the question of a new international economic order, etc.).

The Social Democratic movement is encountering the following serious obstacles in Africa proper:

a) Its motley composition. Apart from anti-Sovietism and anti-communism, the common denominator for most of its parts, these parts differ considerably from one another; some genuinely progressive organisations vigorously oppose that trend.

b) The fact that such prominent leaders of the movement as Senghor and Bourguiba have been politically discredited: they have long been exposed as veritable agents of neocolonialism who have nothing to do with Social Democracy.

c) The great disparity between the objective interests of the popular masses in Africa (genuine liberation from imperialist domination, an alliance with the socialist countries) and the political platform of Social Democracy ("reformed neocolonialism, anti-Sovietism), with the full understanding that positions could converge and even coincide on certain specific questions (for example, the elimination of apartheid and the

last bastions of colonial rule is today a universal demand in Africa, and the Social Democratic platform also advocates it in order to further its infiltration and spread in Africa. The same applies to the struggle for the new international economic order).

All these reasons could appear as arguing against the need for discussing the issue of Social Democracy in Africa.

Nevertheless we consider the proposed discussion useful because the Social Democratic offensive does have a chance to succeed.

D. Conditions that may contribute to the Social Democratic offensive

The inter-African "Socialist" Centre. For the first time in African history, an openly anti-Soviet and anti-communist ideological and political bloc of countries and parties has emerged, commanding political, ideological and financial opportunities for conducting ideological sabotage, camouflaged by the striving for "socialism adapted to African realities", against the continent's revolutionary forces.

Certain distinctive features of the socio-political situation in Africa:

a) The working class is ideologically, politically and organisationally immature, small and has in most cases been lured into trade unions advocating class collaboration.

b) The Communist Parties are weak, although only they are capable of effectively fighting against the reformist Social Democratic illusions.

c) There exists a substantial latent social base for reformism, especially at the level of the educated urban petty bourgeoisie which, as a rule, wants change but is incapable by its very nature of elaborating a consistent concept of that change.

d) The ruling classes are leaning toward opportunism. Faced with the anti-imperialist sentiment becoming more radical, they could conclude a mercenary alliance with Social Democracy at the expense of minor liberal concessions--of course, if that does not threaten their survival.

e) Political entities not yet discredited in the eyes of the masses still exist in Africa (in Senegal and Tunisia). Social Democracy could shift its reliance onto them if its current allies are defeated.

The new factors that have emerged as a result of the transition of state power in France to the Socialist Party:

a) France has considerable colonial experience in Africa; therefore it is well acquainted with the people, customs and political sentiment.

b) France still exerts considerable cultural influence on the ruling political elite in the countries of French neocolonialism.

c) Socialist parties in Africa pursue an two-faced policy: they hide their actual anti-Soviet objectives behind the smokescreen of demagogic concern about implementing some of the most important aspirations of the peoples of Africa.

The financial factor invariably affecting African governments since almost all of them are bankrupt.

The aggravation of the crisis in conditions when the consistently revolutionary forces have no means for explaining to the popular masses the meaning of the genuine alternative; that plays into the hands of reformism.

Finally, the consequences of the ideological warfare launched by imperialism as far as their impact on the masses is concerned.

All the factors we have emphasised should be taken into account inasmuch as they can effectively contribute to the success of the Social Democratic offensive.

E. Conditions of effectively combating the Social Democratic offensive

The policy of the socialist countries who staunchly fight for peace and progress, their outstanding social, cultural and humanitarian achievements are for us the best way to refute anti-communist and anti-Soviet lies. The image of established socialism will be our most effective weapon. The more attractive this image, the more attractive socialism itself will be for the African popular masses and the smaller the chances of those peddling the rotten economic and political imperialist wares. Hence the need to publicise socialism's achievements as widely as possible.

The power of socialism is already evident in Africa thanks to the constantly increasing number of countries that have

embarked on the socialist-oriented path. Their advances will help change the alignment of forces between reformists and revolutionaries.

This calls for effective and consistent assistance to those countries, for material, political and ideological aid to them (a correct assessment of the stage they are at in the struggle, of the essence of their states and their historical tasks).

Enhancing the activities of the Communists by:

a) coordinating their action throughout Africa to jointly repel the offensive of the inter-African "Socialist" centre;

b) improving the efficiency of communist propaganda (an unremitting ideological struggle against reformism, anti-communism and anti-Sovietism in Africa, an in-depth theoretical analysis of specific processes under way in Africa for laying down a correct strategy and tactics, etc.)

c) strengthening the militant solidarity with the socialist community and other elements of the world revolutionary process.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONGRESS OF
SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL (1980)

Member Parties

ARGENTINA: Popular Socialist Party (Victor O. Garcia Costa, Nestor Martinez Eraso, Carlos Alberto Perez Funes, Carmen Moreno)

AUSTRALIA: Labor Party (Joan Taggart)

AUSTRIA: Socialist Party (Bruno Kreisky, Anna Demuth, Hertha Firnberg, Heinz Fischer, Leopold Gratz, Walter Hacker, Fritz Marsch, Leopold Wagner)

BELGIUM: BSP (Karel Van Miert, Oscar Debunne, Jos Van Eynde, Marc Galle, Gerrit Krevelt, Jos Vanelewyck)
PSP (Andre Cools, Ivon Brieffnot, Robert Denison, Irene Petry L Lucien Rodoux, Emy Spelkens, Phillipe Dutilleul)

CANADA: New Democratic Party (Edward Broadbent, David Lewis, Dennis MacDermott, Robin Sears, Muriel Smith, Johanna den Hertog, Ron Johnson, Terry Sargent)

COSTA RICA: National Liberation Party (Daniel Obuder, Rolando Araya, Roberto Mesen Vega)

CHILE: Radical Party (Anselmo Sule, Luis Alaya, Nora Maluenda,...)

DENMARK: The Social Democracy

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC : Dominican Revolutionary Party

EL SALVADOR: National Revolutionary Movement

FINLAND: Social Democratic Party

FRANCE : Socialist Party (F.Mitterrand, Jean-Piere Chevenement, Lionel Jospin, Jean-Piere Cot, Daniel Mayer, Veronique Neiertz Michel Rocard, Pierre Brana, Philippe Farine, Yves Lebas, Robert Pontillon)

FEDERAL GERMANY: Social Democratic Party of Germany (Hans-Juergen Wischnewsky, Hans-Eberhand Dingels, Horns Ehmke, Kauss Matthiesen, Christa Ranzio-Plath, Wolfgang Roth, Karsten Voigt)

GREAT BRITAIN: The Labor Party (Alex Kitson, Joyse Gould, Ron Haward, Joan Lester, Jenny Little, Ian Mikardo,)

ICELAND: Social Democratic Party

IRELAND: The Labor Party

ISRAEL : Labor Party

ITALY: Socialist Party
Social Democratic Party

JAMAICA: People's National Party

JAPAN : Democratic Socialist Party
Socialist Party

Republic of KOREA: United Socialist Party

LUXEMBURG : Socialist Workers' Party

MALTA : Labor Party

NETHERLANDS : Labor Party

NORWAY : Labor Party

PORTUGAL : Socialist Party (Mario Soares, Rui Mateus)

SAN MARINO: Unitary Socialist Party

SENEGAL : Socialist Party

SPAIN : Socialist Workers' Party

SWEDEN : Social Democratic Party

SWITZERLAND : Social Democratic Party

USA : Democratic Socialist Organising Committee
Social Democrats USA

Consultative Parties

CYPRUS : Edek Socialist Party (Takis Hadjidemetriou)

PARAGUAY : Febrerista Revolutionary Party

VENEZUELA : Democratic Action

Consultative Parties in exile

BULGARIA : Social Democratic Party (SUCEE)

ESTONIA : Socialist Party (SUCEE)

HUNGARY : Social Democratic Party (SUCEE)

LATVIA : Social Democratic Party (SUCEE)

LITHUANIA : Social Democratic Party (SUCEE)

POLAND : Socialist Party (SUCEE)

YUGOSLAVIA : Socialist Party (SUCEE)

Fraternal Organisations

IUSY, Socialist International Women,

Associated Organisations: CSPEC, IFM/SEI, Labour Zionist Movement,
Jewish Labour Bund, SUCEE

Observers from non member parties and organisations

COPPAL

ICFTU (Otto Kersten)

AFGHANISTAN : Social Democratic Party

ALGERIA : ~~CONFEDERATION~~ Front de liberation Nationale

ARGENTINA : Confederation Socialista, Partido Socialista Unificado,

BOLIVIA : Movimiento da la Izquierda Revolucionaria

Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda

BOTSWANA: Botswana Democratic Party

BRAZIL : Partido Democratico Trabalhista

CZECHOSLOVAKIA : Listy Group, Charter 77

CHILE :

EAST TIMOR :

ECUADOR :

EGYPT : National Demovratic Party

Progressive National Unionist Party

EL SALVADOR : Frente Democratico Revolucionario

ERITREA : Eritrean Liberation Front

ETIHOPIA : Me'isone

GAMBIA : People's Progressive Party

GRENADA : New Jewel Movement

GREECE : Party of Democratic Socialism

PASOK

GUATEMALA : Partido Socialista Democratico

Frente Democratico Contra la Represion

Frente Unido de la Revolution

GUYANA : Working People's Allience

HAITI MODELHN

HONDURAS : Movimiento Liberal de la Izquierda Democratica

INDIA :

ISRAEL : United Workers' Party

KOREA : Union of Overseas Koreans for Democracy and Unification

LEBANON : Parti Progresiste Socialiste

MEXICO : Partido Revolucionario Institucional

MOROCCO : Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires

NAMIBIA : SWAPO

NEPAL :

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES ARUBA: Movimiento Electoral di Pueblo

NICARAGUA : Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional

PANAMA: Partido Revolucionario Democratico

PERU : Partido Aprista Peruano

SOUTH AFRICA : African National Congress

Black Consciousness Movement

TANZANIA : CCM

TUNISIA : Mouvement d'Unite Populaire

UPPER VOLTA : Front Progressiste Voltaique

URUGUAY : Convergencia Democratica, Frente Amplio

USA : Socialist Party

WESTERN SAHARA : Frente POLISARIO

ZAMBIA : United National Independence Party

ZIMBABWE : ZANU (PF)

ZAPU :

Apologies from member organisations

DAP, Malaysia, Mauritius Labour Party, New Zealand Labour Party,
Northern Ireland SDLP, Republican People's Party Turkey.

Apologies from invited observers

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Charter 77, Republic of KOREA(...).....

TÜRKİYE SOSYAL TARİH ARAŞTIRMA VAKFI
TÜSTAV

22.8.80 The Times

WEST EUROPE

Leaders of socialist parties to seek more lasting cooperation

From Mario Modiano
Athens, Aug 21

The leaders of the socialist parties of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and a senior representative of the French socialists meeting in Corfu, have agreed to hold periodical meetings beginning next month to plan a more permanent form of cooperation among them.

The meeting, which lasted two days, was attended by Signor Bettino Craxi, Senhor Mario Soares, and Señor Felipe Gonzales, secretaries-general of the socialist parties of Italy, Portugal and Spain, and M Charles Hernu, representing the French socialist leader, M François Mitterand.

Their host was Mr Andreas Papandreu, leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok), the main opposition party in Greece.

In their closing statement tonight the five leaders expressed their concern about the problems of the right wing and extreme right in their respective countries as well as the persistence of terrorism in some of them.

They voiced concern about the conflict areas of the world, notably Afghanistan, the Mediterranean, Cyprus and the Middle East.

The leaders expressed regret over events in Poland. "We hope", they said, "that this situation will not lead to violence." They proclaimed their solidarity with the striking workers.

The socialist meeting discussed the situation in Latin America and condemned the Bolivian coup as well as the referendum planned by General Pinochet, the President of Chile, on September 11.

The communiqué spoke of the eagerness of the five parties to contribute to the success of the Madrid conference on security as well as the efforts for cooperation between the north and the south of Europe, especially the underprivileged areas. "The socialist movement is a nascent movement", they proclaimed, "therefore it cannot but grow".

The Corfu meeting evidently gave the five leaders a chance to exchange information rather than attempt to bridge their more striking disparities, especially on questions of defence.

It is a remarkable diversity for socialist parties living in the south European zone spanning the Bay of Biscay and the Aegean Sea. There is Greece's Pasok which wants to quit Nato and oust the American bases, in juxtaposition with the Spanish socialists who, as Señor Gonzales put it, are opposed to Spain's entry in Nato but favour the status quo on the American bases in Spain.

Then there are the Italians and the Portuguese socialists who, as their leaders said, favour their countries' membership in Nato so long as the Warsaw Pact exists. Finally the French Socialist Party is spared the embarrassment since France stands comfortably aloof of Nato's military wing.

Mr Papandreu admitted that these significant differences existed, especially on foreign affairs, but he felt that the parties agreed on the need for closer cooperation. "Each party, of course, is free to choose its own road to socialism", he added.

Social Reformism and the National-Liberation Movement

KHALED BAGDASH

General Secretary, CC Syrian Communist Party

THE national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has lately begun to receive heightened attention from West European Social-Democratic parties forming the backbone of the Socialist International and mostly representing the reformist trend in the international working-class movement.

It would be wrong to say that previously the Socialist International, reconstituted in 1951 (its predecessor between the two world wars was the Labour Socialist International), had entirely ignored the struggle for national liberation. In its first programme, the Frankfurt Declaration, and many subsequent documents it declared itself a champion of the oppressed peoples. But a curious evolution has taken place since then. Originally the statements of the international social-democratic movement were fairly radical and included the postulate that capitalism was unacceptable to the backward regions of the world (Milan Declaration, 1952). But as the liberation struggle, which culminated in the political break-up of the colonial system, gained momentum and its socio-economic aspects came to the fore the Social-Democrats' radicalism evaporated, giving way to far more moderate formulations without any hint of the "anti-capitalism" of the past.

This noteworthy metamorphosis must have been due to both historical factors and changes in the alignment of centres of influence within the Socialist International. Be that as it may, the slogans and objectives proclaimed today suggest reluctance to take an explicit stand on the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of liberated countries or on the development paths chosen by them. However, these slogans, which are as lavish as they are demagogical, serve as a means of winning mass support for the Social-Democrats and giving them more political leverage in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The Socialist International combines ever more moderate and less and less specific guidelines on the present liberation movement with persevering attempts to overcome the "Eurocentrism" of the movement and win solid positions on other continents.¹ This line was particularly evident at the two latest Socialist International congresses: the 13th (Geneva, November 1976) and the 14th, which met at Vancouver, Canada, two years later. This was seen in the agendas, the admission of parties of some developing countries to Socialist International membership (the Social-Democratic parties of the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Barbados, El Salvador, and India, the ruling Socialist Party of Senegal, and the People's Republican Party of Turkey), and a number of organisational measures.² We are thus witnessing an escalated Social-Democratic effort to win new spheres of influence.

This is happening at a time when the accentuation of the anti-imperialist character of the liberation movement is accompanied by a deepening of its social content. This trend is most noticeable in Africa and Asia. The past five years alone have seen revolutionary political changes in Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Benin, Laos, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Kampuchea. All these countries are set on effecting fundamental structural changes in the interest of the people. A socialist orientation has been adopted

by a sizable group of developing nations that are in the van of the struggle against imperialism and old and new forms of colonialism. Their very existence is giving the struggle an additional boost.

The dominant development trends in the one-time hinterland of world capitalism are alarming the imperialists. The process of history is going on at so fast a pace that the system of neocolonial exploitation of vast areas of the globe, a system based on their social and economic backwardness, is under a mounting threat from the liberation movement of their peoples. This explains imperialism's sustained attempts to reverse the course of events, as well as its full support for local reactionaries to the point of armed intervention, as in Zaire in the spring of 1978. It also accounts for Israel's policy of permanent aggression against Arab countries with the backing and abetment of US imperialism and world Zionism. It pursues two basic interconnected aims. One is to assist Israeli expansion and the imposition of US military, economic, and political influence on the region. The other is not only to prevent progressive Arab countries, primarily Syria, from pursuing and stepping up independent economic development and social progress but to make them more dependent than ever on the capitalist world market and the imperialist monopolies.

To achieve its political objectives, imperialism uses economic pressure, encourages the Peking leaders' hegemonist ambitions and acts of aggression, constantly brainwashes public opinion and leading political groups in developing countries, resorts to ideological subversion against the socialist orientation and to vicious anti-communist propaganda, defames life in the countries of existing socialism, and so forth. In short, it uses every imaginable means to ensure that Asian, African, and Latin American countries remain in the capitalist world system.

In view of the deadly conflict between the national-liberation movement and imperialism, the Social-Democrats' extra-European activity should obviously be estimated according to how the following questions are answered: Whose interests does this activity objectively meet? Is the Socialist International seriously concerned with the welfare of the peoples of developing countries, as its leaders claim, or is its intensified activity one of the means used by imperialism to deradicalise and "pacify" progressive forces? To answer these questions, it would be useful to begin by recalling the Social-Democrats' political role in Western Europe, where their positions are stronger than anywhere else.

This role has always consisted in preventing the working class from accomplishing its historic mission, which is to do away with the exploiting capitalist system and transform society on socialist lines. History has made it possible to test the reformist concepts of socialism in practice. And what is the result? The fact that the Social-Democrats have for years been in power in a number of West European countries (in coalition with bourgeois parties or on their own) has not altered the nature of these countries' economic basis. The rightist top leadership of the Social-Democrats has virtually renounced the socialist perspective and become an undisguised backer and executive agency of the monopoly bourgeoisie. Nor would it be an exaggeration to say that the bourgeoisie owes the preservation of the capitalist order in Western Europe largely if not entirely to social reformism.

To be sure, Social-Democratic leaders do say officially that their ideological positions are "incompatible" with bourgeois concepts. But this "incompatibility" is fictitious. Along with social reformist postulates which insist that the parliamentary road to socialism is indispensable, advocate "universal welfare", and consider that socialism and democracy are inseparable, there is something else that the bourgeoisie sees very well.

namely, "social partnership", or "class collaboration", renunciation of the principle of public property in the basic means of production, and the contention that the wealth produced by society can be "equitably" distributed given state control of enterprises and planning. Virtually recognising freedom of private capitalist property, and hence freedom (somewhat limited at best) for man to exploit man, the social reformists pretend that the change of economic basis needed for socialism boils down to social regulation of distribution. Yet this "regulation", which is illusory without public property in the basic means of production, does not imperil capitalism in the least, as the activity of the ruling Social-Democratic leadership itself has shown.

Having begun a vigorous thrust towards the developing countries, the leaders of the Socialist International try, of course, to introduce the main tenets of their ideology there, adapting them to local conditions where necessary. But what are the results of transplanting the principles of social reformism from their native, European capitalist soil to the social, economic, and political reality of developing countries?

I have said that the Social-Democrats' virtual denial of the necessity for public property in the basic means of production, whatever the reservations about "control" and "regulation", is tantamount to recognising freedom of private capitalist property and private capitalist enterprise. For our countries, this freedom is entirely negative today. Local private capital, which is rather weak and generally intent on making speedy and high speculative profit, is plainly unable to assure either the growth of the productive forces, or the optimisation of national economic structures. Without a powerful public sector, without the state playing an active role as employer, regulator, and organiser, production and the market in a country whose economy is lagging inevitably fall easy prey to the imperialist monopolies, with all the ensuing consequences.

In most of the developing countries it would, of course, be a mistake to raise insurmountable barriers to private capital; besides, this would be unrealistic, for it is vital to use every opportunity to foster independent economic growth. But these opportunities can be wisely used in the national interest only if the decisive economic positions are held by a state opposed to imperialism.

Another major principle of social reformism is "class collaboration", or "social partnership". The main criterion in regard to collaboration among definite classes in any situation is why, to what end and against whom they are collaborating. The main historical task of the peoples of the developing countries is to end their social and economic backwardness and their dependence on imperialism. In carrying out progressive changes in the national interest, the different classes can and must mobilise and act together against imperialism. But this conception has nothing in common with the Social-Democrats' idea of "conciliation" and "partnership" between antagonistic classes of capitalist society, primarily to the advantage of the big national and international monopoly bourgeoisie.

Transplanting "class collaboration" of the Social-Democratic type to Asia, Africa, and Latin America by no means eliminates its reactionary, anti-democratic essence. It must be admitted, however, that this approach occasionally surfaces even in the policy of the leadership of some socialist-oriented countries.

We Communists consider that since "social partnership" in the capitalist world serves chiefly the interests of monopoly capital, it can be nothing but a means of strengthening the exploiting classes' economic and political positions in the developing countries, to the detriment of the working people. At the level of relations between industrial capitalist countries and developing

nations, it means perpetuating the neocolonial exploitation of the latter, abandoning the struggle against imperialist monopoly, winding up the liberation fight, and fatalistically resigning oneself to the "destiny" ordained for our peoples in imperialist world centres.

We do not have to go far to find instances of this policy. In our own region the Sadat regime, which has repudiated all that was progressive in the Egyptian revolution in Nasser's day, represents a most instructive specimen of "social partnership" even though the Cairo leadership rarely uses the phrase. This policy virtually denies the priority of the public sector in the economy and encourages private capitalist enterprise, especially on the part of the compradore and other parasitical sections of the bourgeoisie, which take no part in industrial or agricultural production. Its consequences at national and international level alike are well known. Going one way, that is, against the working class, in the sphere of social relations is a logical result of the present Egyptian regime's economic policy, which implies the gradual erosion of the public sector, compensation (with interest) for the losses incurred by the Egyptian big bourgeoisie and feudal lords in the 1960s, the restoration and augmentation of their economic and political leverage, giving the "green light" not only to domestic private capital, especially the parasitical bourgeoisie, but to foreign monopolies and non-Egyptian Arab business, and so on. Equally logical was, therefore, Cairo's volteface from cooperation and interaction with the socialist community, primarily the Soviet Union, to a disgraceful alignment with US imperialism, from the struggle to eliminate the effects of the Israeli aggression to a capitulationist "peace" with the aggressor, betraying the national interests of the Egyptian people, the fraternal Arab people of Palestine and other Arab peoples.

Lastly, let us consider such a theme of the Socialist International's high-key propaganda campaign as democratic freedoms and human rights.

The Communists are determined and consistent supporters of democracy and have repeatedly proved their allegiance to its ideals by giving their blood and their very lives. We regard democracy as a most important condition for progress in any sphere of the life of developing countries, irrespective of the orientation chosen by them.

History has furnished sufficient proof that any measure curtailing the democratic rights of progressive forces, let alone repression against them, greatly injures the cause of national liberation and anti-imperialist unity. Everyone knows of the great difficulties encountered by these forces and of the extent to which social progress is hampered where openly despotic regimes or military-fascist dictatorships—generally allies or watchdogs of imperialism—have been established. What is particularly outrageous is the persecution of Communists where the leading circles follow an essentially anti-imperialist policy and even call themselves partisans of a progressive orientation, as in the case of some Arab countries. I wish to stress in this connection that solidarity with the heroic Iraqi Communist Party is now, as in the past, of paramount importance to us Arab Communists and our fellow-Communists the world over.

We do not forget that by extolling the ideas of "democratic socialism" and describing them as the only ones meeting the interests of mankind, the peoples of the developing countries included, the social reformists pursue mainly anti-communist objectives. In Europe Social-Democratic leaders, far from concealing this spearhead of their policy, actually advertise it.³ There is no doubt that in the developing countries, as elsewhere, one of the main objectives of the propaganda of "democratic socialism" is to "end" the growing influence of Marxism-Leninism. For the Social—Democratic leaders anything is

good that serves this purpose, and it is indicative that they throw the doors of the Socialist International wide open to the Turkish People's Republican Party, which is in power and obstinately refuses to legalise the Communist Party of Turkey.

Apparently realising that the character of the Socialist International postulates, which objectively hampers revolutionary processes, will not escape the attention of progressives in our countries, the Social-Democratic leaders widely use more "effective" methods that can, in their view, have the desired effect on Afro-Asian and Latin American opinion. First among these methods is talk about increasing aid to the developing countries, changing the nature of relations between them and the industrialised capitalist world, and the establishment of a "new economic world order".

A resolution of the 13th Socialist International Congress stated that the capitalist system had led to a tremendous discrepancy between development levels and created "anarchy and injustice" in the world economy. Hence the need for an "entirely new approach to international economic problems" and a "large-scale redistribution of wealth and income". At the 14th Socialist International Congress, the SI President Willy Brandt urged "demonstrating still more forcefully the common interests linking the developed and developing countries". He spoke of the determination to help "defeat hunger all over the world by the end of this century", "speed progress in relations between North and South, and reshape world economic relations in this way", and "examine properly the interconnection of armaments and development". The programmes of various Social-Democratic parties abound in similar appeals and declarations.

Economic relations between the developing nations and industrial capitalist states are really one of the most important problems of mankind. There is an unbridgeable gulf between them and it tends to widen. Many millions suffer from hunger and poverty. According to data released by the IBRD, the average per capita GNP in economically backward areas of the world (excepting the sparsely populated oil-producing countries of the Middle East) in 1976 was 2.4 per cent that of the group of industrial capitalist countries. To remove this discrepancy, the developing countries will require roughly 750 years if they are to advance at the same rate of economic growth as in the first half of the 1970s. Yet in recent years this rate has slackened further due to economic and monetary convulsions in the capitalist world.

Against this grim background, the SI's declarations sound very noble indeed. But even where the Social-Democrats are at the helm of state, monopoly capital always retains enough economic and political power to further solely its own interests, which are contrary to those of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Erhard Eppler, former West German Minister for Economic Cooperation (with developing countries), one of the SPD leaders, wrote as an informed man that "it would never occur to our private economy to make its investments dependent on the decisions of government agencies".⁴ Nor does this apply to Federal Germany alone.

The long-term programme of the British Labour Party published in 1976 contained many attractive provisions concerning the developing countries, those of Africa included. Did that alter the neocolonial nature of economic relations between Britain, which was governed by a Labour cabinet, and new African states? Not at all. According to press reports, 13 big British companies in 1977 "earned" £280 million in profits there, or more than what Britain's economic aid to all African countries amounted to in the same year. Similar examples could be given in regard to other West European countries, where social reformists are or were in power.

While the SI President states principles and tasks that are commendable in themselves, his fellow-Social-Democrat, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, pursues in relations with the developing countries a policy that draws no criticisms whatever from the West German monopolies and does not really differ from the corresponding policy of US imperialism.⁵ It is also revealing that SD participation in protracted negotiations on restructuring international economic relations (the so-called North-South dialogue) has not softened the ruling circles of the North (i.e., the capitalist West), which refuse to meet the South half-way.

The Social-Democrats do not mind anathematising the multinational corporation on occasion. The issue of these corporations was on the agenda of the 14th SI Congress. The Congress approved the report of a research team containing abundant evidence of the predatory, reactionary activities of these gigantic monopoly octopuses and drawing the conclusion that they must be curbed. However, no specific measures to this end were proposed, and all that the Congress did was to recommend setting up an "observation" body which, needless to say, cannot change anything.

In the light of these facts, neither the SI leaders' assurances of being sincere champions of reshaping international economic relations on the principles of justice and equality, nor their attempts to identify the very idea of a new economic world order with "democratic socialism" can be taken seriously, to say the least.

It is not only on the issue of international economic relations that the position of the SI and many of its member organisations is inconsistent and contradictory. The Social-Democrats have been equally inconsistent in regard to acute political problems of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

It is a fact that in the tensest periods of the national-liberation movement the SD parties of metropolitan states acted in the interest of the ruling classes of their countries. The British and French governments headed by member parties of the SI⁶ put down by force of arms the struggle for freedom that had broken out in the colonies. A shift from direct support to verbal condemnation of colonialism did not come until the late 1960s, when the SD leaders realised at long last that the process of disintegration of the colonial system was irreversible.

There are still major strongholds of colonialism and racism in southern Africa. One of the key tasks facing African countries is to eliminate them. The problems involved have held the attention of world opinion for years. They are also predominant in the activity of the international SD movement. After the 13th SI Congress, a delegation led by an SI Vice-President, former Swedish prime minister Olof Palme, went to southern Africa's "frontline states". The 14th SI Congress invited delegations of the MPLA-Party of Labour, FRELIMO, and SWAPO as observers.⁷ All this was accompanied by suitable gestures and declarations in support of the liberation movements.

How sincere are those declarations? The patriots of Zimbabwe and Namibia are compelled to wage an armed struggle for liberation. But it is precisely this fundamental form of struggle that the Social-Democrats fail to "appreciate". Even when the SD governments of Europe back up their anti-racist declarations with financial and material aid to the liberation movements and the "frontline states" of the region (as the Palme government did), they invariably make a reservation, saying that that aid may not be used by the patriots for combat action. Truly, they put "democracy" above everything else.

Very often there are no deeds to support words. The British Labour Party programme I have mentioned contained a number of measures whose

implementation would really have contributed to the struggle for the liberation of southern Africa. They included a ban on all new investments in South Africa by British companies, the withdrawal of all British banks from that country, an embargo on trade with the apartheid regime, aid to the Security Council in enforcing proper sanctions to compel South Africa to carry out the UN resolutions on Namibia, and settlement of the Rhodesian problem on the principle of "one man, one vote". But the activity of the Labour government pointed in the opposite direction on most of the above provisions.

The hypocrisy shown by the Socialist International on the Middle East question verges on alignment with US imperialism and international Zionism.

It is true that the time has gone when the majority of SD parties backed Israel without qualification and blamed the Arab countries for the conflict. The 13th SI Congress even declared for a settlement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, on the basis of the Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. However, two years later this position, which was in keeping with the realities in the region, was forgotten; the SI gave its approval to the separate deal made by Egypt and Israel at Camp David under the auspices of the United States, and called for continuing on the same course.

Indeed, many SI parties described the Washington treaty between Egypt and Israel as a victory for peace in the Middle East. Yet the treaty is intended to legalise the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories seized in 1967, and as for the virtual military alliance concluded by Begin, Sadat and Carter, it is directed against the Arab and African liberation movements, particularly against the Arab people of Palestine, their struggle for their legitimate rights, and their heroic resistance. All this has added to tension in our region and increased the danger of another armed conflict. An indication of this is the aggression against Lebanon, which Israel is carrying on with US approval. Its main purpose is to exert political pressure on Syria, which at the moment plays the leading role in building up the Arab solidarity needed to counter the intrigues of US imperialism, Zionism, and the Sadat regime in the Middle East.

It follows that the SD "friends" and "defenders" of the peoples upholding their national dignity have ended up for the nth time in the camp of imperialism and its allies. On this issue, the SD centre has unquestionably "adjusted" to the will of Zionist quarters, whose spokesman, ex-premier Itzhok Rabin of Israel, is a Vice-President of the SI.

SI documents admit that to settle the Middle East crisis "a just solution of the Palestine problem in its every aspect" is needed. But it is not clear what is meant by "just", and what the international SD movement thinks of the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for their national rights. However, some clarity may be derived from the fact that in spite of the SI policy of "seducing" developing countries and liberation movements, and in spite of international recognition of the PLO as the sole lawful spokesman of the Palestinian people, this organisation was not among those invited to the Vancouver congress.

In examining the extra-European activity of the SI, one must not forget that its inconsistency and contradictoriness are due in part to differences between various SD parties. These differences, in turn, are caused by non-coincidence of the approach to this or that problem, by the position of this or that party (by its being in opposition or in power), the fact that the given country is or is not a NATO member, and so on. Nevertheless, the nature of the general ideological premises of social reformism as well as of SD activity intended for the national liberation zone warrant the affirmation that both run counter to the vital interests of the masses in Asian, African, and Latin American countries and the needed further expansion of the anti-imperialist struggle. Ever more

readily, the social reformist parties of the SI assume the role of chief agent of the flexible, "sweetened" neocolonialist policy of imperialism. The progressive forces of the developing countries are equal to and are now drawing the appropriate conclusions.

¹Geographical Distribution of Socialist International Member Parties

	1952	1975	1976	1978
Europe	19	20	22	22
North America	3	2	2	3
Latin America	2	3	5	7
Asia	3	7	6	7
Africa	—	1	2	2
Australia and Oceania	—	1	2	2
	27	34	39	43

²Notably, the effort to form rather motley political alignments around parties close or affiliated to the Socialist International. The Socialist Party of Senegal and the Destour Socialist Party of Tunisia have taken steps to found a so-called *Interafricaine Socialiste*. M. Ba. "A Social-Democratic Model for Africa and Neocolonialism", in *WMR*, No. 3, 1978.

³"We have been fighting the Communists for fifty years... to us, they are still political opponents," says the European Programme which the Social-Democratic Party of Germany drew up in preparing for the elections to the European Parliament (*L'Humanité*, February 15, 1979).

⁴E. Eppler, *Wenig Zeit für die Dritte Welt*. Fourth edition (Stuttgart e.a.: Kohlhammer, 1971), p. 128.

⁵"Carter is in the lead and we are the runners-up," wrote *Wirtschaftswoche*, the West German business weekly (49/1978), spelling out as it were the formula being followed by the Schmidt government in this respect.

⁶In Algeria by the Guy Mollet government and in South Yemen by the government under Harold Wilson.

⁷MPLA, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola: FRELIMO, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique. The LMPA-Party of Labour and FRELIMO are in power and have proclaimed Marxism-Leninism their ideology. SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organisation) is leading the national liberation struggle in Namibia.

Raising Economic Efficiency: A Fundamental Task

ILIE VERDET

Member, Political Executive Committee of the CC RCP,
Prime Minister of the SRR

ON AUGUST 23, 1979 the Rumanian people will celebrate the 35th anniversary of the national armed anti-fascist and anti-imperialist rising, one of the most important events in their history. This rising was planned and accomplished mainly under the leadership of the Rumanian Communist Party. It organised the anti-fascist resistance movement, a struggle against nazi domination; for the liberation of Rumania from the fascist tyranny. Backed by a powerful upsurge in the people's anti-fascist resistance and taking advantage of the favourable conditions created by the victories of the Red Army and the anti-Hitlerite coalition as a whole, the RCP united all of the country's democratic, patriotic forces and mobilised them to fight, thereby guaranteeing the victory of the rising. As a result of the overthrow of the military-fascist dictatorship on August 23, 1944, Rumania withdrew from the war against the

8/1979

Social Reformism

Social Reformism and the National-Liberation Movement

KHALED BAGDASH

General Secretary, CC Syrian Communist Party

THE national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has lately begun to receive heightened attention from West European Social-Democratic parties forming the backbone of the Socialist International and mostly representing the reformist trend in the international working-class movement.

It would be wrong to say that previously the Socialist International, reconstituted in 1951 (its predecessor between the two world wars was the Labour Socialist International), had entirely ignored the struggle for national liberation. In its first programme, the Frankfurt Declaration, and many subsequent documents it declared itself a champion of the oppressed peoples. But a curious evolution has taken place since then. Originally the statements of the international social-democratic movement were fairly radical and included the postulate that capitalism was unacceptable to the backward regions of the world (Milan Declaration, 1952). But as the liberation struggle, which culminated in the political break-up of the colonial system, gained momentum and its socio-economic aspects came to the fore the Social-Democrats' radicalism evaporated, giving way to far more moderate formulations without any hint of the "anti-capitalism" of the past.

This noteworthy metamorphosis must have been due to both historical factors and changes in the alignment of centres of influence within the Socialist International. Be that as it may, the slogans and objectives proclaimed today suggest reluctance to take an explicit stand on the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of liberated countries or on the development paths chosen by them. However, these slogans, which are as lavish as they are demagogical, serve as a means of winning mass support for the Social-Democrats and giving them more political leverage in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The Socialist International combines ever more moderate and less and less specific guidelines on the present liberation movement with persevering attempts to overcome the "Eurocentrism" of the movement and win solid positions on other continents.¹ This line was particularly evident at the two latest Socialist International congresses: the 13th (Geneva, November 1976) and the 14th, which met at Vancouver, Canada, two years later. This was seen in the agendas, the admission of parties of some developing countries to Socialist International membership (the Social-Democratic parties of the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Barbados, El Salvador, and India, the ruling Socialist Party of Senegal, and the People's Republican Party of Turkey), and a number of organisational measures.² We are thus witnessing an escalated Social-Democratic effort to win new spheres of influence.

This is happening at a time when the accentuation of the anti-imperialist character of the liberation movement is accompanied by a deepening of its social content. This trend is most noticeable in Africa and Asia. The past five years alone have seen revolutionary political changes in Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Benin, Laos, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Kampuchea. All these countries are set on effecting fundamental structural changes in the interest of the people. A socialist orientation has been adopted

by a sizable group of developing nations that are in the van of the struggle against imperialism and old and new forms of colonialism. Their very existence is giving the struggle an additional boost.

The dominant development trends in the one-time hinterland of world capitalism are alarming the imperialists. The process of history is going on at so fast a pace that the system of neocolonial exploitation of vast areas of the globe, a system based on their social and economic backwardness, is under a mounting threat from the liberation movement of their peoples. This explains imperialism's sustained attempts to reverse the course of events, as well as its full support for local reactionaries to the point of armed intervention, as in Zaire in the spring of 1978. It also accounts for Israel's policy of permanent aggression against Arab countries with the backing and abetment of US imperialism and world Zionism. It pursues two basic interconnected aims. One is to assist Israeli expansion and the imposition of US military, economic, and political influence on the region. The other is not only to prevent progressive Arab countries, primarily Syria, from pursuing and stepping up independent economic development and social progress but to make them more dependent than ever on the capitalist world market and the imperialist monopolies.

To achieve its political objectives, imperialism uses economic pressure, encourages the Peking leaders' hegemonist ambitions and acts of aggression, constantly brainwashes public opinion and leading political groups in developing countries, resorts to ideological subversion against the socialist orientation and to vicious anti-communist propaganda, defames life in the countries of existing socialism, and so forth. In short, it uses every imaginable means to ensure that Asian, African, and Latin American countries remain in the capitalist world system.

In view of the deadly conflict between the national-liberation movement and imperialism, the Social-Democrats' extra-European activity should obviously be estimated according to how the following questions are answered: Whose interests does this activity objectively meet? Is the Socialist International seriously concerned with the welfare of the peoples of developing countries, as its leaders claim, or is its intensified activity one of the means used by imperialism to deradicalise and "pacify" progressive forces? To answer these questions, it would be useful to begin by recalling the Social-Democrats' political role in Western Europe, where their positions are stronger than anywhere else.

This role has always consisted in preventing the working class from accomplishing its historic mission, which is to do away with the exploiting capitalist system and transform society on socialist lines. History has made it possible to test the reformist concepts of socialism in practice. And what is the result? The fact that the Social-Democrats have for years been in power in a number of West European countries (in coalition with bourgeois parties or on their own) has not altered the nature of these countries' economic basis. The rightist top leadership of the Social-Democrats has virtually renounced the socialist perspective and become an undisguised backer and executive agency of the monopoly bourgeoisie. Nor would it be an exaggeration to say that the bourgeoisie owes the preservation of the capitalist order in Western Europe largely if not entirely to social reformism.

To be sure, Social-Democratic leaders do say officially that their ideological positions are "incompatible" with bourgeois concepts. But this "incompatibility" is fictitious. Along with social reformist postulates which insist that the parliamentary road to socialism is indispensable, advocate "universal welfare", and consider that socialism and democracy are inseparable, there is something else that the bourgeoisie sees very well,

namely, "social partnership", or "class collaboration", renunciation of the principle of public property in the basic means of production, and the contention that the wealth produced by society can be "equitably" distributed given state control of enterprises and planning. Virtually recognising freedom of private capitalist property, and hence freedom (somewhat limited at best) for man to exploit man, the social reformists pretend that the change of economic basis needed for socialism boils down to social regulation of distribution. Yet this "regulation", which is illusory without public property in the basic means of production, does not imperil capitalism in the least, as the activity of the ruling Social-Democratic leadership itself has shown.

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Against this grim background, the SI's declarations sound very noble indeed. But even where the Social-Democrats are at the helm of state, monopoly capital always retains enough economic and political power to further solely its own interests, which are contrary to those of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Erhard Eppler, former West German Minister for Economic Cooperation (with developing countries), one of the SPD leaders, wrote as an informed man that "it would never occur to our private economy to make its investments dependent on the decisions of government agencies".⁴ Nor does this apply to Federal Germany alone.

The long-term programme of the British Labour Party published in 1976 contained many attractive provisions concerning the developing countries, those of Africa included. Did that alter the neocolonial nature of economic relations between Britain, which was governed by a Labour cabinet, and new African states? Not at all. According to press reports, 13 big British companies in 1977 "earned" £280 million in profits there, or more than what Britain's economic aid to all African countries amounted to in the same year. Similar examples could be given in regard to other West European countries, where social reformists are or were in power.

While the SI President states principles and tasks that are commendable in themselves, his fellow-Social-Democrat, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, pursues in relations with the developing countries a policy that draws no criticisms whatever from the West German monopolies and does not really differ from the corresponding policy of US imperialism.⁵ It is also revealing that SD participation in protracted negotiations on restructuring international economic relations (the so-called North-South dialogue) has not softened the ruling circles of the North (i.e., the capitalist West), which refuse to meet the South half-way.

The Social-Democrats do not mind anathematising the multinational corporation on occasion. The issue of these corporations was on the agenda of the 14th SI Congress. The Congress approved the report of a research team containing abundant evidence of the predatory, reactionary activities of these gigantic monopoly octopuses and drawing the conclusion that they must be curbed. However, no specific measures to this end were proposed, and all that the Congress did was to recommend setting up an "observation" body which, needless to say, cannot change anything.

In the light of these facts, neither the SI leaders' assurances of being sincere champions of reshaping international economic relations on the principles of justice and equality, nor their attempts to identify the very idea of a new economic world order with "democratic socialism" can be taken seriously, to say the least.

It is not only on the issue of international economic relations that the position of the SI and many of its member organisations is inconsistent and contradictory. The Social-Democrats have been equally inconsistent in regard to acute political problems of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

It is a fact that in the tensest periods of the national-liberation movement the SD parties of metropolitan states acted in the interest of the ruling classes of their countries. The British and French governments headed by member parties of the SI⁶ put down by force of arms the struggle for freedom that had broken out in the colonies. A shift from direct support to verbal condemnation of colonialism did not come until the late 1960s, when the SD leaders realised at long last that the process of disintegration of the colonial system was irreversible.

There are still major strongholds of colonialism and racism in southern Africa. One of the key tasks facing African countries is to eliminate them. The problems involved have held the attention of world opinion for years. They are also predominant in the activity of the international SD movement. After the 13th SI Congress, a delegation led by an SI Vice-President, former Swedish prime minister Olof Palme, went to southern Africa's "frontline states". The 14th SI Congress invited delegations of the MPLA-Party of Labour, FRELIMO, and SWAPO as observers.⁷ All this was accompanied by suitable gestures and declarations in support of the liberation movements.

How sincere are those declarations? The patriots of Zimbabwe and Namibia are compelled to wage an armed struggle for liberation. But it is precisely this fundamental form of struggle that the Social-Democrats fail to "appreciate". Even when the SD governments of Europe back up their anti-racist declarations with financial and material aid to the liberation movements and the "frontline states" of the region (as the Palme government did), they invariably make a reservation, saying that that aid may not be used by the patriots for combat action. Truly, they put "democracy" above everything else.

Very often there are no deeds to support words. The British Labour Party programme I have mentioned contained a number of measures whose

implementation would really have contributed to the struggle for the liberation of southern Africa. They included a ban on all new investments in South Africa by British companies, the withdrawal of all British banks from that country, an embargo on trade with the apartheid regime, aid to the Security Council in enforcing proper sanctions to compel South Africa to carry out the UN resolutions on Namibia, and settlement of the Rhodesian problem on the principle of "one man, one vote". But the activity of the Labour government pointed in the opposite direction on most of the above provisions.

The hypocrisy shown by the Socialist International on the Middle East question verges on alignment with US imperialism and international Zionism.

It is true that the time has gone when the majority of SD parties backed Israel without qualification and blamed the Arab countries for the conflict. The 13th SI Congress even declared for a settlement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, on the basis of the Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. However, two years later this position, which was in keeping with the realities in the region, was forgotten; the SI gave its approval to the separate deal made by Egypt and Israel at Camp David under the auspices of the United States, and called for continuing on the same course.

Indeed, many SI parties described the Washington treaty between Egypt and Israel as a victory for peace in the Middle East. Yet the treaty is intended to legalise the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories seized in 1967, and as for the virtual military alliance concluded by Begin, Sadat and Carter, it is directed against the Arab and African liberation movements, particularly against the Arab people of Palestine, their struggle for their legitimate rights, and their heroic resistance. All this has added to tension in our region and increased the danger of another armed conflict. An indication of this is the aggression against Lebanon, which Israel is carrying on with US approval. Its main purpose is to exert political pressure on Syria, which at the moment plays the leading role in building up the Arab solidarity needed to counter the intrigues of US imperialism, Zionism, and the Sadat regime in the Middle East.

It follows that the SD "friends" and "defenders" of the peoples upholding their national dignity have ended up for the nth time in the camp of imperialism and its allies. On this issue, the SD centre has unquestionably "adjusted" to the will of Zionist quarters, whose spokesman, ex-premier Itzhok Rabin of Israel, is a Vice-President of the SI.

SI documents admit that to settle the Middle East crisis "a just solution of the Palestine problem in its every aspect" is needed. But it is not clear what is meant by "just", and what the international SD movement thinks of the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for their national rights. However, some clarity may be derived from the fact that in spite of the SI policy of "seducing" developing countries and liberation movements, and in spite of international recognition of the PLO as the sole lawful spokesman of the Palestinian people, this organisation was not among those invited to the Vancouver congress.

In examining the extra-European activity of the SI, one must not forget that its inconsistency and contradictoriness are due in part to differences between various SD parties. These differences, in turn, are caused by non-coincidence of the approach to this or that problem, by the position of this or that party (by its being in opposition or in power), the fact that the given country is or is not a NATO member, and so on. Nevertheless, the nature of the general ideological premises of social reformism as well as of SD activity intended for the national liberation zone warrant the affirmation that both run counter to the vital interests of the masses in Asian, African, and Latin American countries and the needed further expansion of the anti-imperialist struggle. Ever more

readily, the social reformist parties of the SI assume the role of chief agent of the flexible, "sweetened" neocolonialist policy of imperialism. The progressive forces of the developing countries are equal to and are now drawing the appropriate conclusions.

¹Geographical Distribution of Socialist International Member Parties

	1952	1975	1976	1978
Europe	19	20	22	22
North America	3	2	2	3
Latin America	2	3	5	7
Asia	3	7	6	7
Africa	—	1	2	2
Australia and Oceania	—	1	2	2
	27	34	39	43

²Notably, the effort to form rather motley political alignments around parties close or affiliated to the Socialist International. The Socialist Party of Senegal and the Destour Socialist Party of Tunisia have taken steps to found a so-called Interfricaine Socialiste. M. Ba, "A Social-Democratic Model for Africa and Neocolonialism", in *WMR*, No. 3, 1978.

³"We have been fighting the Communists for fifty years... to us, they are still political opponents," says the European Programme which the Social-Democratic Party of Germany drew up in preparing for the elections to the European Parliament (*L'Humanité*, February 15, 1979).

⁴E. Eppler, *Wenig Zeit für die Dritte Welt*. Fourth edition (Stuttgart e.a.: Kohlhammer, 1971), p.128.

⁵"Carter is in the lead and we are the runners-up," wrote *Wirtschaftswoche*, the West German business weekly (49/1978), spelling out as it were the formula being followed by the Schmidt government in this respect.

⁶In Algeria by the Guy Mollet government and in South Yemen by the government under Harold Wilson.

⁷MPLA, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola: FRELIMO, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique. The LMPA-Party of Labour and FRELIMO are in power and have proclaimed Marxism-Leninism their ideology. SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organisation) is leading the national liberation struggle in Namibia.

Raising Economic Efficiency: A Fundamental Task

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Prime Minister of the SRR

ON AUGUST 23, 1979 the Rumanian people will celebrate the 35th anniversary of the national armed anti-fascist and anti-imperialist rising, one of the most important events in their history. This rising was planned and accomplished mainly under the leadership of the Rumanian Communist Party. It organised the anti-fascist resistance movement, a struggle against nazi domination, for the liberation of Rumania from the fascist tyranny. Backed by a powerful upsurge in the people's anti-fascist resistance and taking advantage of the favourable conditions created by the victories of the Red Army and the anti-Hitlerite coalition as a whole, the RCP united all of the country's democratic, patriotic forces and mobilised them to fight, thereby guaranteeing the victory of the rising. As a result of the overthrow of the military-fascist dictatorship on August 23, 1944, Rumania withdrew from the war against the

10/1980

Reformism

¹The term for palace coups by Latin America.—Ed.

²*Partido Comunista de Bolivia. Por la victoria democratica y el ejercicio de la soberania nacional hacia un partido de masas. IV congreso nacional (Documentos principales).* La Paz, 1980, p.18.

³Leader of the bourgeois Historical Nationalist Revolutionary Movement.—Ed.

⁴*Partido Comunista de Bolivia. Documentos. Seleccion 1971-1979.* La Paz, 1979, p.142.

⁵*International Herald Tribune.* August 5, 1980.

⁶General Roberto Viaux Marambio's group attempted a coup to prevent Salvador Allende's assumption of the presidency. But the Chilean People foiled the conspirators' plans.—Ed.

⁷*Granma,* July 28, 1980.

Peculiarities of Contemporary Reformism

ALLAN BOOTH

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REFORMISM has dominated the organised labour movement of Britain for the past hundred years. It presents a major obstacle to a socialist transformation of society which can only result from a revolutionary process, in our country as elsewhere. To overcome reformist influence in the labour movement is a programmatic objective of the Communist Party of Great Britain the realisation of which is envisaged by *The British Road to Socialism*. Hence the attention which the British Communists devote to the investigation of this phenomenon on the analyses made by Marx, Engels, Lenin and British Marxists.

Reformism is a complex ideological and political formation today, as the case of Britain shows. Its manifestations in political practice depend on the concrete historical situation and change with the passage of time. But generally, reformism seeks social progress and radical changes in social institutions and relationships without resorting to a political revolution or, in some versions, even disturbing the existing social order. Reformism has a distinctive trend due to the nature of measures proposed for "introducing" a new order. Reformists believe that social reform is a connecting link between capitalism and socialism and makes it unnecessary to break with the capitalist system through a revolution.

Present-day British reformism is characterised primarily by the influence which it has had on the mass party of the working class, the Labour Party, its policies and its conceptions of struggle for the rights of labour.

The place and role of this party in British politics have always been dependent on a working-class vote and an historical alliance with trade unionism. However, the allegiance of Labour Party leaderships to bourgeois democratic structures, which is the strongest indication of reformist influence, left a decisive imprint on the public function of the party.

The objective of Labour Party policy is, in many of its leaders' view, to win a parliamentary majority. Thus they reduce the role of the party to that of an electoral machine; as for everything else they leave it in the hands of a small group, the Labour government.

The Labour Party puts emphasis on formal political processes—basically the marshalling of votes at elections as the means to a Labour majority. Accordingly, it regards less mediated forms of class struggle and power with distrust. At best, they are considered of no great significance to parliamentary

work; at worst, they are held to constitute a really undemocratic threat. An example of this can be seen with the Parliamentary Labour Party leadership's attitude to the Tory government. Callaghan and Healey try to discourage the development of a mass movement against the Tories. In practice they accept the Tory argument that action outside parliament is undemocratic, because the electors have given the government a "mandate". This would imply that the political system and parliament exist in a vacuum and that the relations of power in the capitalist state are independent of class struggle.

This integration with the bourgeois parliamentary system is a result of the corrupting influence of reformism on the political struggles of the working class and is a major characteristic of the labour movement noted by many analysts. As Ralph Miliband puts it, "Of political parties claiming socialism to be their aim, the Labour Party has always been one of the most dogmatic—not about socialism, but about the parliamentary system. Empirical and flexible about all else, its leaders have always made devotion to that system their fixed point of reference and the conditioning factor of their political behaviour . . . The leaders of the Labour Party have always rejected any kind of political action which fell, or which appeared to them to fall, outside the conventions of the parliamentary system. The Labour Party has not only been a parliamentary party, it has been a party deeply imbued by parliamentarianism."¹ One of the peculiarities of British reformism is that it defers every step towards real socialism to the bourgeois parliamentary system, reducing socialism itself from the outset to what the ruling class permits.

The ideological source and theoretical basis of such views are a belief in the neutrality or potential neutrality of the state, seen as an institution that can serve the interests of all the people and be used for the common good. In line with this belief Labour governments under reformist leaderships have subsumed primarily the class interests within the so-called "national interest". The political materialisation of their "socialist" aims has consisted in attempts to draw antagonistic classes into an active partnership with the state, supposed to be able to guarantee "equality of the interests of labour and capital".

The idea of a permanent alliance—for the national good—between labour, capital and the state is the key to reformist social policies. It is "a means, not of doing away with two extremes of capital and wage-labour, but of weakening their antagonism and transforming it into a harmony" (Karl Marx, *Eighteenth Brumaire*).

This policy is aimed at creating a national consensus, and at institutionalising the class struggle. According to reformist notions, capital would control its more extremist elements. The unions would discipline their shop-floor militants. Both antagonists could be won for the "centre" and induced to strike "the bargains". It should be clear, however, that in that case the state, while appearing to subsume into itself the best interests of everyone, would in fact be concerned with those of capital. No wonder such a policy has failed to win widespread acceptance among the workers. This is shown by the fact that in the 1979 general election millions of workers just didn't vote for the Labour Party.

Of course, not every action of a capitalist state is hostile to the interests of the working class. An argument to the contrary would deny the effectiveness of class struggle, the differences among various sections of the capitalist class and the development of the state and its apparatus. But in capitalist society the state serves the long-term, fundamental interests of the ruling class. This does not mean that the state is reducible to the ruling class. In fact its effectiveness as an instrument of class domination lies very much in that it has a certain degree of autonomy. It is a complex and contradictory structure necessitating class struggle both outside and within the state apparatus.

A further aspect of contemporary reformism is how it perceives the "process of change", a concept shared by the Labour Party. One of its key ideas is a particular form of social change—"equality", a demand for better conditions, for closing the gap between rich and poor. This concept is characterised by an ahistorical, non-class approach. It sees equality as a non-class value serving as a means of cohesion, and rejects inequality because of its divisiveness. Thus a frequent charge levelled at the Conservative Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, by James Callaghan, leader of the Labour Party, is that her government's policies "have divided the nation" and upset the consensus his party was trying to create.

"Class" cannot be said to be foreign to reformism. Indeed, reformists admit that class is a problem because it creates social conflicts and domination and also wastes resources. For them, class is inequality and its criteria are confined to income, or at best, occupation. They usually limit the economic criteria to the sphere of circulation.

Thus reformists regard "class" as a distribution term. It follows that under capitalism there can be more or less of it and so one can speak of "a more classless society". Class is said to be removable and, given cooperation and "good sense", its worst effects can allegedly be overcome.

The concept of class as something ephemeral, not absolutely necessary, capable of being eliminated and having no organic link with the functioning of the capitalist mode of production is upheld by every variety of reformism. But as class "divisions" recur on a massive scale (which shows that the concept is untenable), reformists stress the amazing persistence of national traits. To quote Crosland, an ideologue of British reformism, "British society—slow-moving, rigid and class-ridden—has proved much harder to change than was supposed."² The idea that class is rooted in the production relations of capitalist society is totally absent from reformist ideology.

Successive postwar Labour governments have tried a reformist strategy for social change. There has been no lack of illusions to the effect that the striking inequality prevailing in British society can be ended in this way. As far back as 1952, R.H. Tawney, an ideologue of British social democracy, wrote about "distinct advances towards the conversion of a class-ridden society into a community in fact as well as name".³ Subsequently spokesmen of both the Labour Party and the Tories repeatedly exaggerated the scope, social significance and effect of reformist measures carried out (each group doing it, needless to say, for its own political ends). More important, illusions about the possibility of achieving equality by reformist means was shared by a sizable majority of the working class. At the same time, they occasionally gave rise to apprehensions and outright fear among the capitalists.

Now that the "great social revolution" announced by the British reformists is marking its 35th anniversary, there is a sobering up in various quarters. Peregrine Worsthorne, a leading conservative journalist, makes a revealing comment. In an article following the Conservative election victory in 1979, he wrote: "Tory rhetoric in recent years has tended to suggest that socialism and egalitarianism had destroyed the old order beyond repair and that all the rich had been forced to flee . . . This is not quite the picture presented by the new Tory government which is encouragingly full of hereditary peers, self-made millionaires, wealthy landowners . . . What price the great social revolution that was meant to have got under way as far back as 1945? Nothing could better highlight the failure of British social democracy since the war to bring about a fundamental change in the structure of society. Much has changed. But the old ruling order is still very much alive and kicking."⁴

While putting the failure of reformism on record, Worsthorne is silent on the important thing, as are, by the way, all critics from the right. Reformist policy exalted to an official rank, far from bringing society nearer equality by a single step, undermining or at least shaking the economic and political domination of the capitalist class, has been a major factor, if not the greatest single factor, in preserving that domination. By offering the labour movement a false perspective and leading it on to the wrong path, reformism has saved capitalism in postwar Britain.

The results of reformist rule have been most disastrous to the British workers. The failure of reformist political practice is admitted by many, both in the Labour Party and among the workers. In fact, doubts about the effectiveness of reformist policy have never been as widespread as today. The reformists' sphere of action shrinks in periods of sharpening conflict between labour and capital, recession and increasing social polarisation, which is now greater than a mere ten years ago. In these circumstances many reformist conceptions that won currency in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s prove ineffective.

But while the present generation of workers knows through their own experience the bankruptcy of reformist policies, the political and ideological domination of reformism in the British labour movement is far from being broken. What complicates this task is, in particular, the fact that the immediate result of the failure of the reformist "strategy for change" is not a swing in parliament to the left but a swing to the right, from the Labour Party to the Tories. The right-wing Tory government is mounting attack after attack on working people and their organisations. In organising the masses to resist these attacks, Britain's Communists try to carry on their ideological work to win the working class to abandon reformist attitudes and policies for radical, revolutionary ones.

3

In the current struggle against reformism it is essential to take into account the national peculiarities and distinctive development of the labour movement. In many capitalist countries of continental Europe the rise of mass parties of the working class based on Marxist principles preceded the emergence of large-scale trade unionism. It is these parties that took the initiative in the formation and development of these mass movements, reflecting their ideology. Not so in Britain. The initiative to found the Labour Party—the first, and so far virtually the only, mass political party of the working class—was taken by the trade unions. To this day, the Labour Party is influenced largely by the trade unions, to which it is organically linked.

Marxism has therefore had a very limited impact on the Labour Party with regard to its theory, programme, structure and organisational form. While scientific political economy was developed largely on the basis of Marx's concrete study of British capitalism and of Engels' contribution to this specific study of conditions of the English working class, Marxist ideas never took root in this mass organisation of the working class and have always been alien to its leaders and the majority of its rank and file. Ever since the last quarter of the last century, Marxism has existed in our country as a minority trend in the labour movement.

This accounts for the specific phenomenon of British reformism. Unlike its continental counterparts, it did not need to put on a Marxist cloak to fight the revolutionary wing of the working class. It has not taken the form of the revision of Marx, which in many European countries has succeeded to disrupt from within the social democratic movement (committed to Marxism at one

time), bring about its ideological and political degeneration and split the working class. This largely explains the fact that the British workers in the main have traditionally been unfamiliar with Marxist language and terminology, to say nothing of Marxist ideas and principles. And yet, despite this different origin, reformism, in our country as well, is the main obstacle to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and performs the function of a bourgeois alternative to the ideology within the labour movement.

The ideological sources of reformism in Britain are a rather eclectic mixture of traditional trade unionist practices and ideological origins. But the dominant factor is still undoubtedly "economism", drawn from pragmatic experiences of the trade unions, which by the end of the last century had for more than five decades applied the principle of "no politics" in seeking improvements in the workers' condition.

"Economism" and pragmatism combined with a certain contempt for theory have very deep roots in the British labour movement. And this not only because of the class collaboration of the leadership, which from the foundation of the Labour Party until the present was dominated by the right wing. The struggles were many and often surpassed those in the rest of Western Europe but until recently were largely concentrated on bread-and-butter issues, with a minimum of politically and ideologically inspired struggles.

An important element in reformist ideology was a fairly strong religious trend derived from the religious radicalism of the Cromwellian revolution as well as from utopian socialism which was linked in Britain with parliamentary struggle as early as the seventeenth century and began during the Owenite movement of the first half of the nineteenth century to link up with workers' struggles.

It follows that to overcome reformism, it is indispensable, first of all, to inject Marxist ideology and politics into the mass labour movement; this involves struggle against revisionism, though to a lesser extent in Britain, where revisionism is very weak, than in many countries of the continent. Our paramount task is to expose class collaboration.

Britain's Communists maintain that the task of undermining reformist dominance in the labour movement must not be limited to theoretical criticism, ideological discussion and the political education of workers. We have said that reformism is embodied in the structure of the mass organisations of the labour movement formed under the influence of reformism. The Labour Party, and this as a consequence, traditionally reflects in their social function both ideologically and structurally its reformist parentage. Hence to accomplish this task, it is necessary to effect structural and functional changes in the labour movement itself. The prerequisites of the early steps in this direction are created by combining ideological work with class struggle in the workers' trade and political organisations, a struggle which the Communists and the Left as a whole are carrying on against the rightist leaderships of these organisations, and not without some success.

As regards the social functions of the trade unions, there are signs of certain changes beginning to express themselves due to the growing disillusionment of the masses with reformism and the conscious and consistent work of Communists and other militants. Today the British trade unions see their role in upholding the interests of the workers, who want higher wages and better working conditions, but they have started to recognise the need for action over a wide range of national political issues. This has become evident in their activity only fairly recently.

The attitude to extraparlimentary struggles is changing too. The trade unions are beginning to regard them as a necessary means of bringing about changes in

government policy. Last spring, for the first time in a hundred years, the British TUC called for a Day of Action against the government's overall domestic and foreign policy.

The response of the working class to the call was generally quite impressive. This was so despite the fact that the leadership of the BTUC General Council did not campaign actively and assumed a defensive posture when the government and the ruling class, sensing the danger to themselves in this new approach of the trade unions, unleashed an unprecedented campaign against the Day of Action. On the other hand, many workers who were influenced by reformist leaders did not respond to the call, which shows how much more needs to be done to weaken reformism in the minds of the British workers.

Changes are coming about in the Labour Party too. This is understandable, since the trade unions have a decisive say on the policies of the Labour Party as well as the composition of its Executive Committee. Last May, for the first time since it was founded, the Labour Party organised a national mass demonstration in London to express opposition to government and right-wing Labour policies and to the deployment of Cruise missiles in Europe. The demonstration drew 25,000 people. Callaghan stayed away. Another peace demonstration in the autumn organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is officially supported for the first time by the Labour Party.

The contradiction between the programmatic policy of the Labour Party and that of the Parliamentary Labour Party is growing. The objective of socialism has been resurrected in party documents. The primary issue now is how to realise the objective since the Parliamentary Labour Party ignores its party's programmatic policies and rejects its socialist objective as "outmoded". It is a measure of the leftward changes of the activists of the Labour Party that the recognition is now widespread amongst them that it is no longer enough to operate within the established party structure, to elect spokesmen of the Left to the Executive Committee, or to adopt left policies, although substantial progress has been made in this respect, or that reformist institutional structures and methods are suitable for achieving socialism.

That is why a central policy issue of the British labour movement is the need to democratise the Labour Party. The left forces are fighting to change the party's reformist structure, for the party and not solely the Parliamentary Labour Party to elect the leader, for the EC of the party and not the cabinet or shadow cabinet to draft the election manifesto and for the obligatory (automatic) reselection of Labour candidates before each election. The right wing is striving with might and main to frustrate these democratic changes, invoking tradition, encouraging right-wing trade union leaders to ignore and disregard the decisions taken by their rank-and-file delegations on these issues.

One of the biggest obstacles to effective struggle against reformism is still the size of the CPGB, which is itself the consequence of reformism in the labour movement. Thus to increase the size of the Party and the circulation of the *Morning Star* are crucial factors for ridding the working class of reformism. We believe this can be done. The influence of the CPGB, despite its small size, is considerable. The proof of this is the election of Communists to positions at all levels in the trade unions and the other mass organisations, the fact that the CPGB has pioneered a number of the programmatic demands now being made by the trade unions and the Labour Party, and the workers' response to the *Morning Star* 50th Anniversary £80,000 Fund Appeal, highlighted by the £5,000 contribution of the Transport and General Workers' Union (the largest trade union—2 million strong—in Western Europe) and £3,000 by the National Union of Public Employees with a membership of over half a million. Nor were

they intimidated by the mass media attack on them for this support to a Communist newspaper.

But financial and moral support, important as they are, are no substitute for a large Communist Party that could effectively fight reformism in the land of its birth, where it is more deeply rooted than in perhaps any other country of the capitalist world.

¹Ralph Miliband, *Parliamentary Socialism*. 1972, p.13.

²Anthony Crosland, *Socialism Now and Other Essays*. 1974, p.44.

³R.H. Tawney, *Equality*, 1952, p.26, Epilogue.

⁴*Sunday Telegraph*, May 27, 1979.

Our Country's Destiny is in Our Own Hands

IOS POR

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This interview was given in Phnompenh by Ios Por to WMR correspondent Vsevolod Rybakov. Part of the interview, related to the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime, was used for the article "The Ravages of Dogma" in our August 1980 issue.

You fought the US aggressors and their Lon Nol puppets as a member of the Khmer Rouge. The name is now often used to mean the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Kchieu Samphan gang. But there was a time when they had the support of many decent people, true patriots, and revolutionaries. Why?

The events of March-April 1970¹ found me in Kampot on a propaganda mission. I immediately joined in the struggle against the US-Saigon aggression and the Lon Nol regime. At the time many people believed in Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Kchieu Samphan. They camouflaged themselves skilfully, posing as patriots and saying nothing of their Maoist sympathies. We had no suspicion that we were dealing with traitors.

But after they consolidated their authority in the liberated regions in 1971, the Pol Pot gang began butchering revolutionary cadres and intellectuals, picking mainly people who had studied in Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries. Various specious explanations were given for the disappearance of people—transfer to other regions, to new jobs, and so on. All this made many people ponder, suspect the sincerity of the aims pursued by Pol Pot and his sycophants. In 1974 we were told that Vietnam was our enemy. This finally opened the eyes of those who had for years fought shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese comrades for the common cause.

Meanwhile, the Pol Pot thugs began a methodical extermination of those who had studied, worked or fought together with their Vietnamese friends. I was arrested on April 3, 1974 but in the night, before they could execute me, I fled with bound hands. Since then I have dedicated myself to fighting the Pol Pot clique, which had usurped power and betrayed the revolutionary liberation movement. On January 7, 1979 I entered Phnompenh together with units of the

Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS), and fraternal Vietnamese troops. I held the post of Director of the United Front's Political School, and at the Second KUFNS Congress in September-October 1979 I was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee. The main thing now is to organise the building of a new life.

The Pol Pot gang was in power for almost four years and in that time it inflicted colossal damage on Kampuchea. But I have also seen green fields, busy markets, and people in new clothes, and I heard laughter. Would you say a few words about what has been achieved by the new government during the period of a little over a year since it came to power on January 7, 1979?

After our second liberation we began the nation's rehabilitation from scratch. The people who survived now suffered from starvation, from a shortage of practically everything—clothes, housing, food utensils, medicines. Possibly, what has been achieved under the leadership of the People's Revolutionary Council may seem to be modest, but these achievements must be assessed against the background of what the criminal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan regime left behind it.

To put it briefly, our main achievement is that our people are no longer dying of starvation or slave labour; the nation's security has been ensured; surviving families have been reunited, and the bulk of the population have returned to their native villages or towns; people have become masters of their life, society, and destiny; a system of people's power from top to bottom has been set up; the education and health systems have been restored; factories are being opened. I'll give you some facts and figures.

The last Pol Pot sanctuaries on Kampuchean territory were destroyed in 1979. At least 45,000 Pol Pot troops were wiped out in these operations. The remnants fled across the frontier to Thailand. The struggle has steeled and strengthened the revolutionary armed forces. Military units are being enlarged, the first regular division was formed recently, and there are local military units and self-defence groups.

At the Second Congress of the KUFNS the Central Committee was enlarged from 12 to 35 members. This has made it a more representative body. Front committees are functioning in almost all the provinces. We now have trade unions, youth, women's, and journalists' associations, an Afro-Asian Solidarity and a Peace committee, and associations of friendship with Vietnam, Laos, and the Soviet Union.

New ministries have been formed under the People's Revolutionary Council. There are people's revolutionary councils in all provinces, and local organs of revolutionary power have been set up at the level of districts, cantons, and villages.

The peasants who have returned to their native villages with the assistance of the revolutionary authorities have been given seeds and farm implements, and—this is of the utmost importance—household and kitchen utensils, which were forbidden and destroyed by the Pol Pot gang. In 1979 nearly one million hectares of land were sown to rice and other crops. Fishing has been restored with nets (which were likewise destroyed by the Pol Pot gang) provided by fraternal Vietnam. The peasants are uniting in mutual assistance groups—there are some 50,000 of these groups in rice production alone.

Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries, and also some international organisations supplied us with hundreds of thousands of tons of food, which was distributed among the people. The threat of starvation—a legacy of the Pol Pot regime—has been averted.

We have restored the Pochentong international airport, the Phnompenh river

education and work, and guaranteed opportunities for the future. In democratic movements against *Berufsverbote* and neo-nazism, for an end to the arms race and for steadfast progress in detente, Communists and Social Democrats join forces with other democrats.

It is these real movements and pressure from below that compel the SPD leadership to reconsider its own position (as on *Berufsverbote*, the demand for a 35-hour week, the banning of lockouts, and the creation of an adequate number of openings for the training of young people). But the concessions that it has made are still verbal; it does not put them into practice. Dissatisfaction is growing among the Social Democrats and trade unionists with the vacillation shown by leading SPD politicians, who hold government posts and are not prepared to recognise decisions of party bodies as binding on them.

Success in the fight of the working class for its rights can only be guaranteed, now as in the past, through concerted action by the workers themselves and the full application of the unions' fighting power. Since the efforts of the SPD leadership to shackle Communist-Social Democratic unity of action and the Communist-baiting carried on by the ruling class and its media cannot prevent cooperation on common issues, that emerge time and again, it is obvious that life itself, the grim reality of everyday capitalism, imperatively makes working-class unity of action the order of the day.

How very seriously the German Communist Party is working for greater unity of action between Communists and Social Democrats is seen in the Party's activity in the trade unions, factories, universities, and working-class neighbourhoods. More explicitly than before, the GCP states in the programme adopted in October 1978 that what it seeks is not merely unity of action "from below", as the Social Democratic leaders often assert, but "a trustful, comradely attitude to the members, supporters, and organisations of the SPD"; that prompted by the interests of the working class, it declares "for cooperation with the SPD"¹³ and seeks not only "cooperation with the Social Democrats in the current struggle for a turn towards democratic and social progress", but also cooperation in the future struggle against monopoly power, for anti-monopoly democracy, for the socialist transformation of the Federal Republic".¹⁴

The GCP supports whatever serves the interests of the working class. It bears in mind the great significance of joint struggle by the Communist and Social Democrats to preserve the working people's social and democratic rights, which are in jeopardy, bring about social and democratic reforms, and curb monopoly power. What the GCP says in its programme about intending to use the slightest agreement as the starting point of joint action for common interests"¹⁵ and laying "no claim to leadership in alliances"¹⁶ is not, as many Social Democrats have seen for themselves, a mere declaration but everyday Communist practice.

The GCP is aware of the difficulties attending its effort to bring about working-class unity of action and trustful cooperation between Communists and Social Democrats. It seeks dialogue and discussion with the SPD comrades, putting what they have in common above what divides them.

At the same time, however, our Party sees it as its class duty to criticise the monopoly-oriented line of the SPD leadership and SPD-led Federal government—a line detrimental to the working class. We cannot renounce principled criticism of reformism, which can show no way out of the capitalist crisis.

The new programme adopted by the Mannheim congress of our Party provided the working class with a dependable guide in the struggle for its present and future interests. It is an answer to the new problems posed by

developments in the world and hence in the Federal Republic. In reply to the inability of capitalism and the political forces representing it to cope with the challenge of scientific and technological progress and the problems of unemployment, environmental protection, education, and training, our Party's programme calls for a turn towards democratic and social progress.

We consider it important to defend democratic and social gains together with the working class and other progressive forces and to ensure continuing detente. We see it as an important task to build up the working people's rights in the course of the class struggle, press back monopoly power, and significantly alter the balance of political forces in favour of the working people. The success of the struggle for social progress will depend in decisive measure on strengthening the GCP and promoting unity of action of the Communists, Social Democrats and Christians as well as non-party working people.

Our Party maintains that the class struggle is the best teacher and confirms time and again that it is not reformism but the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin creatively applied in national conditions that pave the way to a society in which the working class and its allies will win freedom, a society free from the evils of capitalism.

¹SPD—Jahrbuch 1968/69, p.434.

²Das Erste Jahr der Regierung Brandt-Scheel, Bonn, 1970, p.105.

³Neue Gesellschaft, August, 1975, p.612.

⁴Rehie Jugend, Heft, p.25.

⁵Vorwärts-Beilage, January 16, 1975, p.3.

⁶Ökonomisch-politischer Orientierungsrahmen für die Jahre 1975-1985, Bonn, 1975, p.23.

⁷Ibid., p.41.

⁸See the article "West German Multinationals" in this issue.

⁹Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, April 2, 1978.

¹⁰Vorwärts, May 18, 1978.

¹¹Vorwärts, May 4, 1978.

¹²Vorwärts, March 9, 1978.

¹³Programme der Deutschen Kommunistischen Partei, Düsseldorf, 1978, p.73.

¹⁴Ibid., p.74.

¹⁵Programm der DKP, p.74.

¹⁶Ibid., p.81.

Alternative to the Oligarchy

PEDRO ORTEGA DIAZ

CC Political Bureau member, CP Venezuela

WMR has received a letter from Mohammed Salim of Baghdad, who asks what is the CP Venezuela's attitude to the COPEI Party, which won the latest election. An answer will be found in the following article by Pedro Ortega Diaz, a leader of the CP Venezuela.

THE political power of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie appears to be strong, but it is incapable of solving the economic problems facing the country or of satisfying the people's numerous needs. That is its organic weakness. Closely tied to the multinational monopolies (and dependent on them), "our" bourgeoisie, consisting of large economic groups, owns the bulk of the

8/1979

Social Dem.

solidarity with all socialist countries, whose role and action in a strongly divided world, with imperialism still strong, are particularly important. Socialism can only be built in solidarity with all working-class forces and the national liberation movement throughout the world.

Wherever possible, Belgium's Communists try to promote the dialogue and joint action with Christian workers. One of the key aspects of the Party's political practice is to persuade Christian workers that the search for unity of the Communists, Socialists and Christians is also a struggle for a just and humane society.

¹In 1968 and 1969, the Christian Social Party (CSP) virtually split into two parties, the Walloon wing retaining the name of CSP and the Flemish wing renaming itself the Christian People's Party (CPP).

²Jean Blume, *Door democratie naar socialisme*, p.21.

³*Cahiers marxistes*, No. 35, May 1977, p.3.

Viewpoints

Reform Policy in Crisis

KURT SCHAET
Economist (FRG)

LIKE all other political forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Social Democrats ask themselves how they should react to the new problems being created by the deepening crisis of capitalism. There are many of these problems. What conclusion should the Social Democrats draw from the fact, for instance, that even during the short lived revival of the capitalist economy the unemployment rate remained high? How should they deal with the fact that monopoly capital increasingly abuses scientific and technological progress to "rationalise" away jobs and downgrade skilled workers? What should they do about the younger generation's dwindling professional opportunities and chances for the future? How should they react to the strategy of the ruling circles of big capital, which take advantage of the crisis to clip the social and democratic rights won by the working class, put the burden of the crisis on the working people, and shift the axis of political life still further to the right?

It goes without saying that in view of the Social Democrats' strong influence among the West German working class and trade unions and of the positions they held in the Federal government and some state governments, their answers to these questions are very important to the struggle waged by the working people and their allies for their rights and to the future development of the Federal Republic.

Speaking generally, the deepening capitalist crisis and its consequences have had a two-fold effect on the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD): first, they have dispersed the concept of reform evolved by the SPD in the sixties and early seventies, and second, they have accelerated the differentiation in the

Continuing our discussion of problems of the capitalist crisis: see *WMR*, Nos. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 1978; No. 2, 1979.

SPD itself. To give an idea of the extent of the gulf between hopes and illusions pinned on reform and grim reality, as well as of its consequences, it may be useful to recall once again the premises and content of the reform policy pursued by the Social Democrats until not so long ago.

When, in 1969, the SPD entered the Federal government as the leading party, its top politicians took an optimistic view of the future social development of the Federal Republic. Some even spoke of "entry into the golden age of social democracy". The government programme adopted by the SPD in 1969 said: "Our successes and our political experience enable us to effect the far-reaching reforms needed for the renewal of the Federal Republic."¹ It was on this optimistic note that Willy Brandt made his first government declaration as Federal Chancellor. "We are not at the end of our democracy," he said, "but are only just starting on it."²

In the past, the SPD stated that the key provision of its reform policy was to impart a social and material content to the "basic assets" of "democratic socialism" postulated by it—freedom, justice, and solidarity. The Social Democrats described the envisaged reforms as a means of winning prestige for these basic assets in the FRG's social reality.³ Needless to say, the reforms were not intended to go beyond the bounds of capitalist society.

In the early seventies, the Social Democratic concept of reform was formulated as a programme called at first the "Long-Term Programme for 1973-1985". It set the task of specifying and quantifying the "basic assets" of "democratic socialism". It indicated in precise terms and with regard to the various social and democratic spheres how the working people's material condition should be improved, what reforms should be tackled year after year and how much should be spent on them. The programme proceeded from the fundamental reformist assumption that the development of capitalism can be made harmonious and crisis-free, and, secondly, that the capitalist economy can be managed and controlled when the instruments of state-monopoly capitalism have been developed.

Objections to the thesis of crisis-free capitalist development that came from the SPD's own ranks were answered by the party leadership as follows: "The theory of capitalist crises as set out so far may have some historical justification if applied to earlier development periods. As for modern industrial society, this theory does not hold water. It is a fact that there are instruments which can be used for developing an up-to-date and largely crisis-proof national economy The Social Democrats have proved that where they are in charge they devise and use such instruments."⁴

In 1977, however, or a few years after the SPD had announced the beginning of the "golden age of social democracy", inexorable realities forced Erhard Eppler, a leading Social Democrat, to make a pessimistic statement at the SPD congress. ". . . None of us knows," he said, "what society will be like in the eighties."

This swing from an optimistic to a basically pessimistic mood was a reflection of the worsened state of capitalism in the Federal Republic. The fundamental reformist assumption of crisis-free capitalist development turned out to be as wrong as the assumption that with the development of state-monopoly instruments the SPD would discover a means of managing capitalism without incurring crises. Yet it was precisely on these two assumptions that the SPD draft programme raised, as has been said, the hope that the gross social product would show a real annual increase of 4.5 to 5 per cent. That, the SPD declared, would assure the material prerequisites of carrying out reform measures.

The economic crisis which broke out in 1973/74 brought the Social-Democratic concept of reform down like a house of cards. This confronted the

SPD with the question: Should it reconsider its fundamental views and its attitude to existing capitalist society and shed reformist illusions or go on chaining its destiny to a society stumbling from crisis to crisis and unable to offer the working class a perspective, a secure future?

The SPD leadership and adherents of the trend dominant in the party answered these questions by explicitly reaffirming their favourable attitude to capitalist society. Faced with insistent questions from many working people, as well as from members and supporters of social democracy, about the causes of the crisis and ways of overcoming it, top SPD politicians tried to prevent the askers from drawing correct class conclusions. In discussions on the causes of the crisis they argued that the capitalist crisis was not an outgrowth of the socio-economic system. They affirmed that no dependable long-range forecasts of economic growth could be made in view of "drastic changes in world politics and on the world market".⁵

Moreover, the final wording of the SPD programme for 1975-85, which was approved at the Mannheim Congress in 1975, described the crisis as "unconnected with the system" (*systemneutral*). "Highly developed industrial societies, whatever the economic and social order they belong to, have so far been afflicted with crises."⁶

These arguments of the SPD leadership were designed to present its policy, directed against the working people's interests, as the only one practicable in the situation imposed by the realities of the capitalist crisis. At the same time, they were expected to make it more difficult for the working class to realise that reformism had proved incapable of offering a solution to the pressing problems of our time while the successful if not problem-free development of the countries of the socialist community had demonstrated the vitality of socialism. It is really a grave challenge to the SPD and social democracy generally that what world developments bear out is not social reformism but the revolutionary teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

The programme reaffirmed the party's favourable attitude to the principles of the capitalist system. "Private economic use of the means of production and market competition are largely inevitable," it says.⁷ In line with this fundamental proposition, the SPD did not take a stand against the strategy of big capital. However, its leadership cannot give in to every demand of big capital if it wants to retain its influence over labour and its leverage in the trade unions, and this compels it to manoeuvre.

In 1974, the SPD-led Federal government began to gradually renounce the further implementation of a number of reforms. Numerous measures were adopted that worsened the working people's social and material condition, for instance, in health services and pensions. In June 1978, for instance, the government passed a pension adjustment law retracting an increase in pensions totalling about 40,000 million marks that had already been decreed by law for 1979-81. Bound by monopoly interests, the SPD-led government cut unemployment relief and robbed itself of the possibility of searching for effective remedies against unemployment. Furthermore, the government has been increasing subsidies and various other benefits for the monopolies, which use this aid for their expansion abroad.⁸

Contrary to the intention to "venture into greater democracy" announced in 1969, the SPD has played a decisive part in the adoption and implementation of the policy of *Berufsverbote* against Communists, left Social Democrats, and other consistent democrats. It curbs many democratic rights and freedoms on the pretext of "combating terrorism". It has played a part in the revival of anti-communism, through which the ruling circles of big capital divide the

working class, distract its attention from the crisis of the capitalist system, and resist the growth of the workers' class consciousness.

The question arises: How do the SPD leaders try to bring their policy of curtailing social and democratic rights into line with their continuing claim to being a reform party?

First of all, they are at pains to conceal the real causes of the deep and protracted crisis of capitalism. A further device used by them is to describe the earlier concept of reform as outworn and wrong and to argue that their current policy takes account of reality. There is also the fact that, to quote SPD Chairman Brandt, the party's "capacity for thinking and patient discussion" had not sufficed to create "a realistic programme".⁹ As for the masses, the SPD would like to influence them by claiming that the Federal Republic has under its SPD-led government coped with the crisis better than any other industrial capitalist state. Public opinion is even made to understand that a "German model" of an industrialised capitalist state has come into being. This is expected to give West Germany's working people a sense of pride tinged with nationalism as co-builders of a "model" suitable for other capitalist countries.

SPD leaders back up their appeal to the trade unions for a restraint on wages with the same arguments as the employers' unions. They affirm that the "excessive" wage increases has led to a rise in production costs, thus impairing the competitiveness of the West German economy in the world market. This, in turn, will cause a reduction in the number of jobs, they allege. The facts show, however, that the monopolies do not use the funds and benefits granted by the state as a means of preserving or creating jobs but use the greater part of these resources to "rationalise" away jobs.

One of the main lines on which leading Social Democrats of the Federal Republic seek ideological justification is to lend the "basic assets" of "democratic socialism" a new, different content. This is seen above all in the report of the committee on basic assets set up by the SPD Board. The report, published in the autumn of 1977, is an attempt by leading Social Democrats to ponder from an essentially reformist standpoint on the new problems that have arisen in capitalist society. In an effort to remove the contradiction between the policy of worsening the working people's social and material condition and the proclaimed "basic assets" of "democratic socialism", they give these "assets" a more abstract character, and view them in isolation from the concrete tasks of the struggle to curb the power of monopolies, the struggle against exploitation. Worthy of note as an indication of this tendency is an article by Hans Koschnik, Vice-Chairman of the SPD. Koschnik wants to create the impression that "by far most Social Democrats are willing to give the preservation of human dignity preference in the society of tomorrow over greater growth and a higher standard of material well-being".¹⁰

Further the SPD leaders call for a "more equitable redistribution" among the working people of that part of the social product that goes to them. In other words, they appeal to skilled workers to renounce part of their wages in favour of their less skilled fellow-workers, and thereby compensate for the deterioration of the condition of one segment by an improvement of the condition of another. Experience has shown that appeals of this kind are a disguise for the strategy of taking the struggle for the redistribution of the gross social product to the working class itself, instead of carrying on this struggle between the working class and the monopolies.

There are Social Democrats who share the Communists' view that the miscarriage of the SPD concept of reform is due to that party's policy, to its close links with the capitalist system, and the reluctance of its dominant forces to resist the power of monopoly capital. Their opinion was expressed by Detlov

Hensche, board member of the union of printing and paper industry workers. His investigations of the causes of the failure of the SPD reform policy brought him to the conclusion that the party increasingly commits itself as manager of the employers' interests. Hensche urged the SPD to resist capitalist blackmail. "What can be brought about in the matter of reform as well as in the economic field," he wrote, "depends very largely on support from society, and hence on the balance of social forces."¹¹

But the SPD leadership turns a deaf ear to these warnings from its own ranks. Nor does it lend an ear to those in the party and the trade unions who demand an end to the arms race and insist on using the resultant released funds for social reforms. This would be very important, for the fast-rising cost of armaments (which has doubled under SPD-led governments) is another major factor of the failure of the party's reform policy. It is realised more and more that the arms race, for its part, reduces the scope of necessary reforms in the interest of labour and that, moreover, it threatens to torpedo disarmament and complicates the joint struggle of the Communists and Social Democrats to press forward detente and safeguard peace in Europe and the world.

The deepening crisis of capitalism and its pernicious impact on the working people's condition give rise in the trade unions and part of the SPD to new schools of thought different from the one desired by the party's leaders. Of particular importance are the discussions now going on in the trade unions. The debate in the unions found reflection, for instance, at the May 1978 Congress of the German Federation of Trade Unions, at which delegates from seven million organised workers, office employees, and junior officials discussed ways of combating unemployment, protecting themselves from the effects of capitalist scientific and technological progress, and safeguarding the social and democratic rights won by them. The delegates analysed the strategy of the monopolies and their political spokesmen to make the working class pay for the capitalist crisis. They had to decide how the unions should respond to that strategy. The congress was still under the fresh impression of strong controversies over wage rates in the printing, paper, and metal industries. Memories were still vivid of the fact that the companies had replied with massive lockouts to the struggle of the printers' and metalworkers' unions for job security and wage rises and against professional downgrading.

A tendency toward a more explicit class attitude and greater militancy, that is also typical of many Social Democratic trade unionists, surfaced at the congress. Nor should it be forgotten that a number of union leaders were reluctant, considering the SPD's leading role in the Federal government, to use the unions' entire fighting power to uphold the interests of labour.

In contrast with the SPD leadership's allegation that the crisis is unconnected with the system, the congress pointed to "the crisis-like character of the Federal Republic's economic system, geared exclusively to profit and based on competition, and to its increasing proneness to crisis", and state: "It is evident that the interests of labour and capital are incompatible, that contradictions between interests are growing and that the economic system of the Federal Republic provides fewer and fewer guarantees of job security, an adequate standard of living, better working and living conditions, and so on." The congress confirmed the need to turn key capitalist industries and enterprises dominating the market into public property under democratic control.

The congress made a fundamental statement running counter to the pro-capitalist policy of the SPD leadership. "Without changing the balance of economic and hence social forces in favour of wage labour," it said, "no secure future can be achieved for the factory workers, office employees, officials, and students." It did not confine itself to such basic estimations but drew up a whole

programme intended to combat unemployment effectively and preserve the working people's social and democratic rights.

The SPD debate on how the capitalist crisis should be assessed and what conclusion should be drawn from the intensification of class conflicts and new problems goes deep. It is interesting to note, however, that a representative poll held among the membership revealed that not more than half of them adhere to a "socialist" position—whatever they may mean by that—and that one-fourth of the membership say they are "anti-socialist" . . . ¹²

The debate in the SPD is going on against the background of the greatly whittled influence of the Young Socialists, once the strongest left-wing force in the SPD. The influx of young people critical of the system into the SPD has stopped abruptly due to the anti-reform policy of the SPD-led Federal government.


In 1978, worsened relations between the party leadership and anti-capitalist-minded young people expressed themselves in the expulsion of the chairmen of two major Social Democratic youth organisations: Klaus Uwe Benneter, Chairman of Young Socialists, and Mechthild Jansen, Chairman of the Socialist Union of University Students. The SPD leadership accused the expelled above all of having cooperated with the Communists in democratic movements (such as those against *Berufsverbote* and for an end to the arms race).

Through these expulsions the SPD leadership hinted that while it allowed a certain scope for debate in the party over fundamental social issues, those who accepted the Marxist theory of state-monopoly capitalism and who deduced from their experience the necessity for unity of action of the working class and for cooperation between the Communists and Social Democrats, and, moreover, engaged, in such cooperation must reckon with the possibility of disciplinary action, including expulsion.

However, the SPD leadership cannot bring the growing class awareness of the membership under control. There was a minor sensation when, late in 1978, Hans Ulrich Lose, the Social Democratic mayor of Hamburg, who had belonged to the right wing, said in an interview that his own experience as mayor had confirmed the correctness of certain aspects of the Marxist analysis of state-monopoly capitalism, and that he had learned by experience that the state was a repair shop of capitalism.

True, the leftists in the SPD encounter rather considerable difficulties in trying to evolve a theoretical concept opposed to the classical function of reformism as a doctor at the bedside of capitalism. Their theoretical predicament or weakness also manifests itself in falling back on ideas of the father of revisionism, Eduard Bernstein, that may suit only those who are not interested in alternatives to monopoly power. But the companies' unscrupulous shifting of the burden of the crisis onto the working people, the massive abolition of jobs, and arbitrary massive lockouts gradually bring it home to workers and trade unionists belonging to the SPD and experiencing direct pressure from monopoly capital that there is an unbridgeable gulf between labour and capital and that the working class and their organisations must counter the monopolies' brutal bid for power by fighting.

In the course of recent major actions, workers and other employees from among the Social Democrats, Communists, Christians and non-party people have shown their resolve to fight in unity in the trade unions and the factories for job security, a 35-hour week and higher pay, against professional downgrading and in defence of social and democratic rights. Young Communists and Social Democrats have made common cause in important youth actions against unemployment among young people, for the right to



DYNAMICS OF GROWTH

Every January, the U.S.S.R. Central Statistical Board releases figures on plan fulfilment in the previous year. This year's report for the third year of the tenth five-year plan showed that the 1978 targets for overall growth of production had been reached and the social programme carried out. National income rose by 4 per cent.

The industries producing capital and consumers' goods developed faster than envisaged by the plan. The output of capital goods went up by 5 per cent and that of consumers' goods, by 4 per cent. Compared with 1977, industrial production grew by 4.8 per cent, as against the planned 4.5 per cent. In 1978 the Soviet Union produced 1,202,000 million kwh of electricity, 572 million tons of oil (gas condensate included), 724 million tons of coal, and 151 million tons of steel.

An all-time record grain harvest of 235 million tons was gathered, with total agricultural output increasing by 4 per cent. The diagram below gives an idea of the progress

achieved in this important branch of the economy over three years of the current five-year plan period.

The Soviet government is searching for a radical solution of the food problem and to meet the growing needs of industry in agricultural raw materials. In a situation where population and demand are rapidly growing while the land area remains the same this is not easy to achieve. The emphasis is therefore being laid on accelerated and intensive development of agriculture. Big capital investments are being made in this branch and the industries servicing it are being expanded.

Commenting on the Soviet tenth five-year plan, John Kenneth Galbraith, a prominent U.S. economist, wrote: "It was not difficult to design an economy that supplies a minority of the people with a high living standard... Nor is it difficult to supply a majority of the people with a satisfactory living standard. The problem arises when everyone must be assured... I take this to be

the central problem with which the planning authorities of the Soviet Union are contending. It is also increasingly a problem in the capitalist countries."

In 1978, as in the previous two years, living and cultural standards rose again. Per capita real incomes grew by 3 per cent and retail trade by 3.9 per cent. The scale of housing construction is impressive: 216 million square metres of housing were built in 1976 and 1977, and another 109 million in 1978. Nearly 33 million people have moved into new flats in the current five-year-plan period.

Summing up what has been achieved, Soviet people are aware that a good many problems still exist. The targets for the output of a number of staple products were not reached last year, among them coal, ferrous metals, mineral fertilizers, synthetic resins and plastics, tyres, freight rail cars, timber, pulp and fabrics. Shortcomings in the work of transport are not being eliminated fast enough. The volume of uncompleted construction has increased. Not all consumer goods meet the customers' requirements. There is not enough furniture, large

issues, these are a rehash of old ideas with the stake on Big Business, the very same ideas with which they lost elections or were unable to lead Britain out of an economic impasse. The main ideological orientations of the Tories in a country with a strong trade union movement do not look inspiring. Besides, a rather sharp struggle is going on within the Conservative Party, especially in its upper echelons. This can be seen from the divergence of views between Margaret Thatcher and former Tory leader and Prime Minister Edward Heath on how to cope with Britain's economic difficulties. The relations between the two have been aggravated to such an extent that the Evening Standard likened them to a "cold war."

The pre-election struggle and the increased rivalry between the parties and within them are having their effect on Britain's conduct of its foreign affairs. The government seems to be inhibited in its actions. In a sense, everything is being held in abeyance, in anticipation of the decisive say of the electorate.

On the other hand, a feature of such situations is that the positions and views of different forces on various issues, international issues included, are revealed more frankly than at other times. There is growing concern in Britain over the haste with which some military and political circles and businessmen are trying to use the "Chinese factor" for their own ends, anti-Soviet too, being clearly unwilling to look

a little farther ahead. Now and then diehard anti-communism and anti-Sovietism erupt to the surface of political life, the protagonists of which try to outdo one another in this field.

The situation in Britain is strained to the utmost. The government is preoccupied with the problem of how to retain power, the Conservatives, with trying to bring the present government down, and the trade unions, with upholding their positions. Britain has latterly been shaken by mass strikes. The strikers demand pay rises considerably higher than the 5 per cent limit set by the government. The working people are definitely opposed to the government's attempts to make them shoulder the burden of economic difficulties.

THERE ARE NO "GOOD EMPERORS"

Gaunt, weary people are making their way along China's roads. They come from different parts of the country and are all bound for one destination—Peking. Among them are peasants whose patience has been exhausted by tyrannical officials, workers listed as security risks, and young people who had been exiled from cities to rural areas. They all hope to draw attention to their plight and obtain protection against those responsible for it.

After reaching the capital, they stage meetings and demonstrations, and some manage to break through to the Zhongnanhai, the former imperial palace and now the residence of the Peking top leaders, to leave petitions at the massive gold and red lacquer gates.

All this is reminiscent of the China of long ago. For it used to be traditional, after the death of an emperor and the customary amnesty announced to mark the ascension of a new "Son of Heaven," for the downtrodden and humiliated to appeal to the "good emperor" over the heads of the local mandarins. They were given reassuring promises. The "Son of Heaven" would punish a few of the extortioners

and when this happened the word spread throughout the country and gave rise to talk beyond the bounds of the Celestial Empire about the beginning of a period of "enlightened rule."

Is this a matter only of the distant past? Not altogether. After the death of Mao Tse-tung some of the victims of the countless repressive campaigns were rehabilitated and supporters of the Gang of Four who had discredited themselves were removed from power. The vague promises of "improvement of well-being," "democracy" and "civil rights" that were handed out engendered, judging by everything, new hope among some of the people and gave rise to the present petition movement. At first the authorities decided to open the floodgates to some extent and to refrain from strong action against demonstrators, even though the security service and plainclothes agents kept a watchful eye on them. The movement, however, spilled over the limits permitted by the authorities. On January 14 hundreds of peasants marched past the Zhongnanhai, shouting "we have starved long enough," "end the oppression," and "we want democracy and human

rights." Another big demonstration took place a week later, on January 21. "We are denied conditions of life fit for human beings," demonstrators who had come from the provinces told foreign journalists. "China still has a feudal imperial system in this age of computers," a leaflet that found its way into the hands of foreigners read. At the same time newsmen from the pro-Peking Hongkong Tungshiang conducted in Peking the first public opinion poll ever taken in the People's Republic of China. To the question, "Are the rights proclaimed in the Constitution safeguarded in China?" 76 per cent of the polled replied with a categorical "No."

The Peking "supporters of democracy" realized that far too much information about the real state of affairs in the country might leak out if the sluice gates were left open and on January 24 the Peking correspondent of the British Daily Telegraph reported that the "Peking authorities have ordered a crackdown on human rights groups." According to him, the authors of "unplanned" wall posters had been ordered to be detained.

Thus the myth about the "democratization" of China concocted by the Peking rulers and some Western journalists is crumbling and the Chinese people can once again see for themselves that there are no "good emperors."

Y. DIMOV

food, were twice the average of January 1974 when Labour came to power. The increase was particularly high in the case of butter, cheese, milk, tea and bread, but electricity and gas charges shot up too. Rail fares are 170 per cent higher than four years ago. Rent has jumped more than 20 per cent in the past year.

The prospects are anything but bright. The firm Phillips and Drew predicts, for instance, that the rate of inflation, down to 8 per cent a year at one time, may soar again in the near future, while retail prices, including those of prime necessities, will go up by about 12 per cent this year. The gross national product is expected to increase only by one per cent.

The experts' predictions about a slowdown of economic growth are coming true. One explanation is that the North Sea oil revenue is spent not on industrial needs but on imports. As a result, British industry becomes less competitive.

* * *

Difficult as the situation is, one at times hears optimistic statements to the effect that British political life is skilfully enough ordered so that the ship can almost automatically be righted whenever its position becomes too precarious. What remedies are offered?

Prime Minister James Callaghan believes the economic situation can be improved if wage increases are limited to 5 per cent. But since the rate of inflation is higher this can only bring the living standards down.

The leaders of the big trade unions reject the 5 per cent ceiling and the government's interference in the relations between trade unions and employers. TUC General

MAJOR POSTWAR STRIKES

September 1945 — longshoremen

March 1957 — metalworkers

June 1959 — printers

January 1971 — postal workers

January 1972 — miners

February 1974 — miners

January 1979 — lorry drivers

As a result of these strikes (excluding the last) 31 million workdays were lost.



The road haulage and tanker drivers' strike paralyzed many branches of Britain's economy. The striking drivers were joined by railwaymen and other workers. Roads along which up to 90 per cent of all freight is carried in Britain were picketed.

AP-TASS photo

Secretary Len Murray has said the trade unions want free, collective bargaining. In his opinion, what the government proposes will not solve the inflation problem and it is the growth of prices, not wages, that should be curbed.

Tory leader Margaret Thatcher propounds capitalist ideas in their "pure form," so to speak. She advocates free collective bargaining, denationalization in industry, and a free hand for private capital. The Tory programme makes certain overtures to the trade unions, at the same time advocating unbridled capitalist rivalry. No few other projects have been advanced as well. None of them, however, gives those who are concerned about Britain's future any grounds for optimism. In the meantime, the political struggle within the parties and on a nationwide scale is sharpening.

The democratic forces offer their own alternative. Gordon McLennan, General Secretary of the Communist Party, formulated the Communist stand as follows: an end to wage curbs, a shorter working week, and more budget allocations for social needs.

As the general election approaches, the debate on economic issues is growing sharper. The election should be held not later than October this year. However, it may be

appointed earlier. There are, it is believed here, more than enough reasons for such a decision.

* * *

In fact, the Labourites and the Tories have already started the election campaign, followed by the Liberals and sundry small parties. Public opinion polls and forecasts by observers give no substantial advantage either to Labour or the Conservatives. However, public opinion is fluid, and polls and forecasts are valid only for the day on which they are made. A great deal depends on the tactics of parties at the later stages of the election campaign and on the support of possible allies, above all the Liberals.

Labour have proved unable to lessen the social and economic difficulties of the broad masses.

Though they make a point of stressing everything that seems to suggest that the economic situation is improving, the facts are the main criterion. The most disturbing fact is that under a Labour government unemployment has risen almost by one million, to the record figure for Britain of 1.5 million. For various reasons Labour have lost their majority in Parliament, and their "semi-coalition" with the Liberals has broken up. They are in bitter conflict with trade unions, their main support, on the issue of pay rises. Thus, there are no few breaches in the Labour position.

The position of the Tories, who behave with demonstrative aggressiveness, is not so simple either. Their present tactic is to attack Labour for the existing difficulties and turn public discontent to their advantage. As for their concrete proposals on social and economic

VLADIMIR LARIN



The Houses of Parliament, an ornate structure of late Gothic architecture, is like some huge ship laid up in the quiet waters of the Thames. But perhaps the comparison is not quite apt. The crew of this ship has to battle through severe political storms. The House of Commons meets from Monday to Friday, except when Parliament goes into recess, and the public galleries are usually packed with people who come to watch the M.P.s perform and to hear Ministers, the Prime Minister included, answer their questions at question time.

Not infrequently, when it comes to a vote, party discipline finds visible expression. A Member of Parliament, absent from the House at the time of a division, interrupts his lunch in the restaurant, his chat with a foreign diplomat at a reception or some more pleasant occupation and hurries to Westminster to register his vote for his party. Sometimes this saves the day for the party. Secretary of State for Education and Science Shirley Williams interrupted her visit to China last July and flew to London for the voting. After that she returned to Peking to continue the

contacts which now hold the attention of certain quarters in both countries. Newspapers calculated that her vote cost the taxpayers an additional £1,500. Parliamentary life gives much food for thought.

* * *

After the summer recess, the political season last year began more stormily than usual.

Every autumn the Trades Union Congress and the Labour, Conservative and Liberal parties hold their annual conferences, usually at small holiday resorts, Parliament reopens. In the House of Lords the Queen delivers her speech from the throne. Written by the Prime Minister, it sets forth the government's programme for the period ahead. Political life gets into its stride, in its traditional well-established groove.

Everything proceeded as usual last year too, except for one unforeseen circumstance. It was expected long before the summer recess that Prime Minister James Callaghan would appoint an early general election at a time opportune for Labour. But events took a different turn. Mr Callaghan knew, *Le Monde* commented, that the strategist never appears where his opponent awaits him.

Much to the disappointment of some political analysts and the an-

ger of his opponents, the Prime Minister told the nation that there would be no early election. Political passions were now let loose. The flood of recriminations and explanations that followed the Prime Minister's statement afforded a clearer insight into some features of British political development. A rather tense situation has emerged. "The problems remain, no matter what speeches are made," *Newsweek* observed in this connection.

The nationwide debate centres on economic issues, mainly unemployment, wages and living standards. The point is that Britain, like other Western countries, is beset more and more by economic, social and political contradictions. Though the government manages at times to retard this downhill slide, the economic situation remains complicated. The present period in the West's industrial development, Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey has admitted, is the most difficult since the 1930s.

It was pointed out at the 77th annual Labour Party Conference that real wages and salaries had dropped sharply since 1974, when pay restraints were introduced by the government. Taxes eat up about a third of the wages. At the same time the profits of big companies have reached a record high.

In September 1978 the retail prices of prime necessities, above all

tarian distribution of wealth and the amenities of life, the strengthening and development of the institutions through which the participation of the working classes in decision-making processes is effected."

Despite the vagueness of this formulation, we nevertheless must be grateful to the author for it: it at least shows out of what components and in what manner he proposes to build socialism in Italy.

"Leninism," Craxi writes, "is founded on the conviction that human nature was spoiled by the emergence of private property, which eroded the primitive community and started the class struggle." The leader of Italy's Socialists does not agree with this evaluation of the role of private property and appears to forget that the Socialists will have to achieve their ideal in the conditions of class struggle. But how, one is bound to ask, can socialism be achieved except through class struggle?

There is some suggestion on this score in the formulation by Craxi given above—primarily the references to "reformist enlightenment" and the "strengthening and development of the institutions through which the participation of the working classes in decision-making processes is effected." We shall not dismiss these two things a priori. They do have their place in the struggle waged by the working class and the other sections of the working people. As can be seen from the history of the Italian working-class movement, the Communists and Socialists of that country have achieved a good deal through joint struggle both in heightening the class consciousness of the proletariat and in the political education of the masses. Something has been accomplished also as regards exerting a certain influence on decision-making on a national scale and the participation of the working masses in local government, primarily in the "Red" regions of the country.

Statistics show that about 60 per cent of the total population of Italy now live in the regions and provinces where the local administrations are controlled by the Communists and Socialists. Drawing on the support of the masses and employing all the means at their disposal, including administrative levers, the Left forces have done

much in the regions and provinces under their administration to secure the masses more opportunities to wage successful struggles and better economic, social and cultural conditions of life. But does this mean that the character of the bourgeois state in which the Italian people live has changed? Obviously not. Under all circumstances the question of power remains the central issue in the socialist revolution. The choice is between the power of the working class in alliance with all other sections of the working people and the power of the bourgeoisie. There is no other alternative.

...

Let us turn to Craxi's "egalitarian distribution of wealth and the amenities of life" and his "economic pluralism" with a multiplicity of competing power centres.

He evidently believes that the process of strengthening the positions of the Left forces, the strengthening and development of the institutions through which the working classes participate in decision-making processes, will be smooth and painless from beginning to end. It is useless to look in the ISP leader's discourses for an answer to the question as to what action the workers' party would take if the classes and groups whose interests are infringed in the process of the decentralization of wealth and power decided to have recourse to extra-parliamentary means of pressure. Is he perhaps assuming in advance that capitulation is inevitable? There is reason to believe that he does, considering that the ISP was the only party that proposed conceding the demands of the kidnappers of Aldo Moro.

Perhaps when he talks about "economic pluralism" Craxi has in mind the economic "freedom" in some capitalist countries where the Social Democrats are in government. But it is a well-known fact that this "freedom" merely serves to bolster up the capitalist system under cover of Social Democratic labels.

Lenin, to whom the Socialist leader is so allergic, rightly wrote: "The transition from capitalism to communism takes an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch is over, the exploiters inevitably

cherish the hope of restoration, and this hope turns into attempts at restoration." The question of which will win—socialism or capitalism—is the crucial issue of the transition period.

Neither giving a free hand to the private capitalist sector in the economy of the transition period nor economic pluralism in the absence of a guiding political force can ensure the triumph of socialist principles in the economy and hence the realization of Craxi's ideal "egalitarian distribution of wealth and the amenities of life." Evidently all that remains is to pin one's hopes on some "free play of political forces," concessions, or simply on the magnanimity of the propertied classes.

That this is indeed so is evident from the direction in which its leaders have been impelling the Italian Socialist Party in recent years. It is a course towards ever greater adaptation to the capitalist system, a course of competing with the Socialists' natural ally, the Communists, a course aimed at expanding the traditional base of the party to take in large sections of the petty and middle bourgeoisie. Expounding the idea of economic, political, philosophical, religious and every other kind of pluralism and urging other political forces and primarily the Communists to renounce the idea of the revolutionary abolition of capitalism, the leadership of the Italian Socialist Party is increasingly revealing its inability to break away from the toils of class collaboration and reformism and to take the road of genuine struggle for socialism.

We do not propose to give Craxi advice as to how socialism can be attained. Moreover, we have different views on socialism. In the final analysis time will tell who is right.

The edifice of socialism built in our country according to Lenin's precepts is a solid edifice that has stood for more than sixty years now. We are proud of it, proud of the fact that it was not shaken either by foreign intervention or the Nazi invasion. As for others, let them go on building their own way. But let them not make so much noise about it. For along will come a high wind and the straw house of pluralism with its enlightenment and reformism will be swept away without trace.

proclaimed that the October Revolution was a failure and Leninism was dead. Yet reality testifies to the contrary. In the 61 years since the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia the new system has triumphed in many countries. The advent of socialism in the world has brought about tremendous changes in all areas of the life of society, the sphere of social consciousness included. The protagonists of the capitalist order are finding it increasingly difficult to discount the achievements and advantages of existing socialism.

* * *

"The debate on Leninism," Amrogio Donini, member of the Central Control Commission of the Italian Communist Party, said recently, "is going on not only in Italy or only among the Communist parties of the Western countries, but inside the socialist world as well. It is a vital discussion inasmuch as its object is to bring out that which is of permanent value not only at the stage when the working class enters the administration of the state, but also at the succeeding crucial period of transition to socialism. However, the polemic becomes anti-historical, biased and disorienting when it is directed at destroying the points of contact that exist in the theory and practice of Leninism between the Soviet experience and the international communist and working-class movement."

This was borne out by another discussion on Leninism which took place recently in Italy in connection with the successes scored latterly by the Italian Communists. It will be recalled that at the last parliamentary elections they carried 34.4 per cent of the total vote, almost catching up with the principal ruling party, the Christian Democrats. This enabled them to enter, along with other political parties, the parliamentary majority on which Italy's one-party government rested until recently.

The prospect of the further strengthening of the positions of the Left forces are relished by far from all in Italy and beyond its bounds. The fact that the Communists are increasingly moving closer to the sphere of political leadership of the country is a thorn in the side for both the conservative groups

among the Communist Party's allies in the parliamentary coalition and the undisguised transatlantic anti-communists. Hence the present vicious anti-communist campaign.

The Right-wing Christian Democratic leaders' drive to have the results of the last parliamentary election disregarded, and the U.S. State Department's caution against admitting the Italian Communists into the government are aspects of this campaign. Latterly a new element has been added to it—a massive offensive against the Communist Party on the part of the leadership of the Socialist Party, which would seem to be the natural ally of the Communists in the struggle for the democratic reorganization of Italian society. This offensive began in the middle of last year when Claudio Signorile, assistant political secretary of the ISP, declared that in his opinion the biggest obstacle to the entry of the Communist Party into government was its Leninist ideology. This was tantamount to a hint that if they gave up their ideological heritage the road into government would be open for the Communists.

This brazen attempt at blackmail was given a fitting rebuff by Italian Communist Party General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer. It was legitimate, he said, to ask all those who made such proposals to the Italian Communists whether they know who Lenin was and what Leninism is. "I very much doubt that they do," he said. "At any rate, I believe that the lesson is still fully valid which Lenin gave us when he elaborated a truly revolutionary theory, overcoming the 'orthodoxy' of the reformist theories of evolution, stressing the subjective factor of independent action by the Party, and coming out against such vices of Social Democracy as positivism, vulgar materialism and passive waiting for the coming of the Messiah."

This vigorous riposte, the Italian weekly L'Espresso observed, elicited an immediate reaction, especially from the Socialists, who at once split into the supporters of the line pursued by the present leading group in the ISP headed by its political secretary Bettino Craxi and its opponents. The majority of the latter were the supporters of former ISP political secretary Francesco De Martino. One of them, the economist Paolo Leon, wrote in a

letter to the editor of L'Avanti: "The polemic against the ICP is based on the classical arguments of the conservative reaction; the insistence on renunciation of Leninism is an instance of sectarianism that has nothing in common either with politics or with ideology."

In this heated atmosphere there appeared a lengthy article by Craxi in which he set out to outline the position of the ISP, one of the oldest Socialist parties of Europe, in regard to Lenin's teaching and the practical experience gained in the building of socialism. However, he was evidently inspired not so much by the history of the Socialist Party and its best traditions as by the hope to continue to share the government pie with the bourgeoisie. This is precisely the spirit of the conclusions he draws from his theorizing.

"If we wish to proceed to socialist pluralism," he writes, "we should move in the direction opposite to that indicated by Leninism." He could hardly have put it in plainer terms!

Bent on discrediting Lenin's teaching at all costs, the Socialist leader borrows from the stock-in-trade of the opponents of socialism the crudest fabrications about the "rigid collectivist postulates" and the "authoritarianism" of the Soviet socialist system. This is another attempt to smear socialism, the most humane and most democratic social system that has ever existed.

Of course there is nothing new in this. It is a repetition of the dogmas of the Second International which Lenin exposed in his time. Nor is there any secret about the object of the exercise: to try once again to question the need for socialist revolution and the establishment of working-class power, the historical mission of which is the abolition of the old, exploitative system and the socialist transformation of society.

In "demolishing" Leninism, Craxi realizes that as a Socialist he has to contrapose some positive ideal to real socialism. What is this "ideal"? "The democratic version of socialism," Craxi says, "is based on an ethical-political idea traditional to reformist enlightenment which consists of the following: socialization of the values of a liberal society, decentralization of power, equali-

ngs them little comfort. "I'm tired," whose daughter was killed, told 't sit in a courtroom and look at any more."

me the National Guard chiefs are whitewash themselves. Sylvester Del General of the Guard in 1970, for in- here is no apology. We expressed et just as you would express con- family of someone who died."

one hand the authorities appeared d their guilt. On the other hand it o one is to blame. Evidently the s prepared as before to counter dis- oners.


V. ALEXANDROV

please those in the CIA who had a hand in the coup in Chile. These quarters prefer to have the Argentinian Rightists in the sad- dle, especially those who are yearning to copy the Chilean model.

The Argentinian Denuncia writes that Di Stefano's job will be to penetrate "opposition organizations, gather information about their political orientation, plans and potential." And, of course, to keep in touch with the Right. With Washington's blessing.

A. BARYSHEV

"ARC OF INSTABILITY"



Imperialist think tanks have in recent years produced all manner of "axes" and "arcs" as expedients to be used to establish U.S. control over the socio-political processes of change in various parts of the world. Although the Iranian events have once again demonstrated the futility of such efforts, creative genius appears to be inexhaustible. The latest of such inventions is Zbigniew Brzezinski's "arc of instability." With its aid the learned professor is trying to harness to American policy the most diverse Middle East and Indian Ocean states. To keep them in line the "Soviet threat" bogey is trotted out.

But the realities of life defy the U.S. oracles and continue evolving according to their own objective laws.

Chart from U.S. News and World Report

WHERE TO FIND SUPPORTERS

Otto Habsburg is small beer as politicians go. But loquacious. The scion of the Austro-Hungarian royal family keeps himself in the limelight by making "sensational pronouncements" ranging from anti-communist sallies and calls for European unity in face of the "Soviet threat" to eulogies of reactionary regimes. As a token of appreciation of his zeal, his West German conservative friends propose to include him in the Christian Social Union list of candidates for the European Parliament.

Recently Otto Habsburg made a trip to China in

search of additional supporters. And his expectations were not disappointed. "I don't remember a single person making any mention of 'world revolution' in my presence," he said later. "Instead talk constantly turned to Königsberg. I was repeatedly told that under no circumstances should we reconcile ourselves to the loss of the German eastern territories."

It is not surprising that the West German neo-nazi National-Zeitung eagerly picked up the latest Habsburg pronouncements.

R. KARIN



DIE DEUTSCHE
LUFTWAFFE



the nazi Reich is being cultivated in West Germany by both mass media and some book publishers. Books about Hitler, other Third Reich leaders and periodicals eulogizing the ed by the SS and the fascist Luftwaffe are featured in many bookshop displays.

Photo from the Daily World (U.S.A.)

IN THE TOILS OF CLASS CONCILIATION AND REFORMISM

GENRIKH SMIRNOV

In the dense fog of the anti-Soviet, anti-socialist and, in the final analysis, anti-communist campaign now under way in the West, the various sallies of our ill-wishers would be indistinguishable from one another were it not for one thing—the fact that while attacks against the Soviet Union, existing socialism and the Communist parties coming from avowed anti-communists and organizations not infrequently financed by imperialist intelligence and propaganda agencies surprise no one, those coming from quarters that profess to subscribe to the ideals, if not of communism, then at least of democracy and socialism are harder to understand. Nevertheless, it is essential to have a clear idea of their motives, however distasteful it may be to examine them. Especially when it is a matter of the stand taken by the leaders of a party with which we had correct and often amicable relations over a considerable period of time.

* * *

I am referring to the Italian Socialist Party. In the course of its long and in many respects contradictory history the ISP has taken various attitudes to the October Revolution, Leninism, and the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. In the early years, for instance, it actively supported the Hands Off Soviet Russia movement, and in 1919 declared for affiliation with the Communist International. In the period of the revolutionary crisis in Italy following World War I, however, it was unable to see the way to the victory of the socialist revolution in its country. In the mid-thirties it concluded with the Communists a pact of united action in the struggle against fascism, and beginning with 1941 co-operated with them in the Resistance. After World War II it continued to draw

closer to the Communists and worked together with them for progressive, democratic reforms in Italy. Then it began gradually to shift to the Right, scrapping its pact with the Communist Party and entering the bourgeois Centre-Left government coalition. However, the Socialists' participation in government demonstrated that no democratic reforms were possible without the support of the masses, and beginning with the late sixties the ISP embarked on diverse manoeuvres to broaden its social base, first, in the period when it was led by Francesco De Martino, seeking co-operation with the Communists and other Left forces and then, after the entry into the leadership of Bettino Craxi, swinging towards open anti-communism and anti-Sovietism.

Indicative of this swing to the Right was the international conference "Marxism, Leninism, Socialism" held under the sponsorship of the Italian Socialists in late November last year in Rome. The very composition of the participants—it was attended, besides members of a number of respectable political parties, by Trotskyites, renegades from the Italian Communist Party, and so-called dissidents from Czechoslovakia, Poland and some other socialist countries—left no doubt as to the dubious ends pursued by the organizers.

In conformity with scenario drawn up by the sponsors of the conference, many of the speakers harped on the "crisis" allegedly gripping Marxism-Leninism, contending not only that Lenin's teachings are "inapplicable" to the developed countries of the West, but that they have become "obsolete" in general. The British Right-wing Labourite Maggee seized the opportunity for a full-dress apology of capitalism as a system with historical merits to its credit and allegedly capable of guaranteeing

both industrial development and civil liberties.

The atmosphere of unconcealed hostility towards the U.S.S.R. and the Leninist experience in building socialism embarrassed even some of those who are not advocates of revolutionary changes in the world. To counter the attacks made against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries, the Labourite Ken Coates, for instance, entered into sharp polemics with those who called for a "break" with the socialist countries. He pointed out in particular that the prime task of all supporters of socialism and freedom was to seek broader international unity and to overcome previous divisions.

The Communist Fabio Mussi stressed the need for a more restrained and considered approach to mutual criticism, pointed to the inaccuracy of the appraisals of Leninism given at the conference and called for a less biased view of the traditions of the various countries and parties. "The influence the Soviet model has had on the history of the world and its future should not be forgotten," he said. "This model should not be criticized without thought to the qualitatively new moments it has introduced in current history."

In its report on the conference, the Italian Communist L'Unità had some caustic comment to make on the sponsors' attempts to "brand and bury" Leninism, to sit in judgement of real, existing socialism, and to offer something in the nature of an "alternative socialism." As Giovanni Bozzo did in his speech, L'Unità rightly asked: "How is it that Leninism, despite all the 'negative' features ascribed to it by the conference, is continuing to register such lasting historical successes?"

Bourgeois ideologues and their hangers-on have time and again



Harrier aircraft

From Der Spiegel (West Germany)

planes in China and intends to do this with the help of British specialists. Preliminary estimates say the deal is worth about £1,000 million. The contract is to be signed next February, during Secretary of State for Industry Eric Varley's visit to Peking.

The delay with the conclusion of the contract is attributed by local observers to the British government's desire to make the sale of Harrier planes contingent on China's purchase of other goods. Britain is experiencing serious economic difficulties and London is trying to get Peking to buy equipment

and consumer goods for which there is no demand in the world markets. According to the draft trade and economic agreement, which it is planned to sign simultaneously with the Harrier contract, Anglo-Chinese trade is to increase almost fourfold by 1985.

Seeking somehow to justify the plans to sell modern arms to China, British officials affirm that Harrier planes are designed for defence. The Economist very rightly dismisses this as "a lot of pious nonsense" which, it says, will attend further sales of arms to China. Military specialists say the Harrier is one of the most up-to-date warplanes not only in Britain, but in the West in general. Moreover, it should be added, the Harrier is capable of carrying nuclear weapons. London knows perfectly well that Peking intends to station these planes in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet frontier. "The Harrier is the ideal machine for patrolling the Sino-Soviet border," writes the Guardian.

Sober-minded Britons who cherish peace are anxiously following this dangerous flirtation with Peking. Labour M.P. Frank Allaun said in the House of Commons that the sale of arms to China would complicate Anglo-Soviet relations and have a deleterious effect on the policy of détente. When

some Tories tried to interrupt him, Mr Allaun said: "Opposition M.P.s think that is of no importance; it is to me and my children and the human race."

Despite the temptation to play the "Chinese card" and profit by dubious deals, many in Britain see that Peking's policy presents a danger not only to the Soviet Union, but to the whole world, including its present partners in the West. The economic gain in the long run is also doubtful. "The more closely it [China] is involved with Western economies, the more the West has to lose from a repetition of the type of convulsions that marked the Cultural Revolution," the Financial Times writes.

Speaking in the Commons, Labour M. P. James Lamond asked Prime Minister Callaghan how the deal tallies with the government's proclaimed desire to restrict arms trade.

The Prime Minister evaded the question, though he admitted the political character of arms deliveries to China. This being so, London should seriously ponder the political consequences of the planned deal.

V. PAYLOV
Our Own Correspondent

London

capitalist integration is powerless to solve economic problems, not to speak of dealing with crisis phenomena. Although the Common Market has to a certain extent stimulated the development of economic and especially trade ties between its members, it has engendered new economic, financial and social difficulties. Entire branches of industry in all the EEC countries are in the grip of crisis. This applies particularly to the metallurgical and textile industries and shipbuilding.

For the working people integration has spelled more unemployment, which in the nine EEC countries taken together has now reached the record figure of nearly six million. Especially widespread is unemployment in France and Italy, each of which has more than 1.5 million jobless. Runaway inflation has sent prices soaring, in some countries at a rate of 10 per cent and more annually. The "social harmonization" of the Common Market promised by its leaders has amounted to nothing but a drive to even up working conditions and wages at the

lowest level. The ruling quarters of the EEC countries and the transnational monopolies dominating the community are exerting increasing pressure on the workers and their trade unions and parties in an effort to divide the working class and to weaken the influence of the Communists and other democratic forces.

In view of this, the projected expansion of the Common Market is evoking growing opposition on the part of the working class, the farmers and other sections of the population. They are striving to counter the monopoly offensive by unity of action and heightened class solidarity. In the past few days the democratic forces in all the Common Market countries have sponsored a mass protest march of the unemployed, which is to culminate in Brussels in early December, when an EEC summit meeting is to be held there. The metalworkers of many EEC countries have held a mass demonstration in support of their demands and against mass lay-offs in Thionville, the centre of the Lor-

raine iron and steel area. The workers see in the plans to expand the Common Market a threat to their interests.

Practically in all the Common Market countries the projected enlargement of the Community has sparked off a sharp debate between political parties. Besides the ruling quarters, the Social Democratic parties are for further integration and the admission of new members into the EEC. The West German Social Democrats and the French and Belgian Socialists have long supported economic and political integration. And although the Social Democrats declare for the "democratization" of the Common Market, their practical actions, especially in the countries where they are in power, show that they are faithful servants of the monopolies and have no intention of restricting their privileges.

The most resolute opponents of integration under the aegis of the monopolies are the Communists. The Communist parties regard the Common Market as an economic reality,

but are opposed to its enlargement since this would damage the interests of the national economy and the working people of their countries. There are, however, some differences between the positions of West European Communist parties on this question. Those of Italy and Spain, for instance, owing to the specific situation in these countries, take a favourable view of the plans to expand the Common Market. At the same time they are opposed to monopoly domination of the EEC and uphold the interests of the working people.

Opinions are no less sharply divided as regards the elections to the European Assembly scheduled for June 1979. The most diverse political circles in Western Europe are increasingly concerned over the intention of certain quarters linked with NATO to give the Assembly supranational powers. At present, in conformity with the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the EEC Assembly is a purely consultative body consisting of the representatives of the parliaments of the member countries, with the big ones having an equal number of representatives. In accordance with the decisions of the December 1974 EEC summit, the members of the Assembly are to be elected for the first time by a direct ballot in all countries. The advocates of a supranational Assembly no doubt will try to make use of these elections to increase the powers of that body and to turn it into an instrument for interfering in the internal affairs of the member countries. That there is such an intention is clearly evident from the public pronouncements of many political leaders: West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Chairman of the West German Social Democratic Party Willy Brandt, Luxemburg Prime Minister Gaston Thorn, Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Simonet, and others. In France broader powers for the Assembly are advocated by some leaders of the ruling coalition (Fourcade, Lecanuet, and others). Similar views were expressed also at the recent meeting of Socialist and Social Democratic parties in Lille.

This cannot but alarm those political forces which stand for the strengthening of the national independence of their countries and the ending of the division of Europe into diametrically opposed blocs.

Particularly critical has been the reaction in France. Resolute protest has been voiced by the French Communists, who have launched a vigorous campaign against the Atlanticist plans of integration and subordination of France to a new West European bloc that would be dominated by West Germany backed by the United States and NATO. French democrats point out that broadening the powers of the Assembly, in which representatives of the NATO countries constitute the majority, would inevitably restrict France's sovereignty and heighten NATO pressure on its foreign and military policies.

The Gaullists too are disquieted. The recent congress of the Alliance for the Republic, while supporting the government's European policy, demanded guarantees against any broadening of the Assembly's powers. French official quarters have had to make some reassuring pronouncements on this score. Spokesmen of the Palais de l'Elysée have expressed "surprise" at statements made by some West German leaders on this question. The democratic press, however, points out that many of the present leaders of the French ruling parties in their time advocated, and some still advocate, far-reaching integration, all the way to the establishment of supranational bodies.

Financial issues, in particular, the problem of the European Monetary System, the idea of which was advanced by West Germany and France, remain a bone of contention in the EEC. Designed to stabilize the financial situation in the Common Market, the EMS scheme has merely given rise to new differences between the member countries. The recent meeting of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Prime Minister James Callaghan revealed that Britain has no intention of joining the system on the conditions offered, but wants in exchange substantial alterations in the EEC agricultural policy. Callaghan urged the creation of a broader currency zone which would take in the U.S. dollar.

The present crisis has seriously shaken the Common Market and its entire mechanism. The attempts of the ruling quarters to overcome the current economic and social difficulties through continued integration are coming to nothing.

V. GURYEV

The Congress of the Socialist International

Posters depicting a red rose in a clenched fist were prominently displayed in the hall of one of the largest hotels in Vancouver, Canada, where the Socialist International held its 14th congress from November 3 to 5.

The rose as the symbol of harmony and perfection was apparently chosen as the emblem in order to stress the "harmonizing" and "peace-making" function of Social Democracy.

Unfortunately present-day world reality with its challenging problems, deep contradictions and sharp confrontations between the forces of progress and reaction has left no room for illusions of universal harmony. For fresh proof of this one has but to turn to the documents of the Vancouver congress.

The general theme of the congress was formulated as follows: "Peace and Development." The idea was to study and "clarify" the connection between the problems of peace, détente and disarmament, on the one hand, and the prospects of social progress, especially in developing countries, on the other.

Work for Peace

Two years ago, immediately after his election as President of the Socialist International, Willy Brandt, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, proclaimed an "offensive for a secure peace" as the primary task of Social Democracy. Since then the international situation has become considerably more complicated. The West has made a number of moves designed to slow down or even reverse the process of détente and to escalate the arms race.

How does Social Democracy react to this situation?

In his policy speech at the Vancouver congress, Willy Brandt voiced concern over "alarming setbacks" in the process of détente. He unequivocally censured the "policy of provocation" as being fraught with a return to "the period

IN FACE OF COMPLEX PROBLEMS

From Our Special Correspondent
ALEXANDER WEBER

of dangerous confrontations" and criticized the abuse of the human rights issue for propaganda purposes. The Social Democrats, Willy Brandt said, "will not be misled into degrading the debate about human rights into a drum which can be beaten for quite different purposes." The Socialist International President stressed the historic significance of the Helsinki Conference, recalling that its Final Act calls for respect of the sovereign rights of states and for non-interference in their internal affairs.

The Vancouver congress backed this realistic stand, thereby confirming that Social Democrats appreciate the significance of the requisites needed to maintain the momentum of détente. There appears to be also appreciation of the fact that the progress of détente depends on effective measures to halt the arms race. Willy Brandt called for an early conclusion and ratification of the SALT-II agreement to be immediately followed by negotiations on a third SALT treaty. Special attention, he pointed out, should also be given to the talks in Vienna, where "unnecessarily long delays" arise though there is "a fair chance" for a successful completion.

Mr Brandt also spoke of the need to include in the negotiations the new types of weapons now in the development stage. As if to dissociate his party from the U.S. President's decision to go ahead with the production of the main elements of the neutron bomb, Willy Brandt noted that "the political decision on qualitatively new weapons is not automatically bound to result in their production."

The Western press, evidently not without reason, saw in these remarks a more or less veiled criticism of some aspects of U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, foreign observers noted, Willy Brandt virtually held "the two nuclear world powers" equally responsible for the continuing arms race and for the fact that only "limited success" has so

far been achieved in the talks between them. Such a position is difficult to understand. It runs counter to widely known facts, including those mentioned in general terms by Willy Brandt.

What, one may ask, is the Social Democratic movement doing to contribute towards the solution of the disarmament problem? What are its intentions in this respect?

Last spring the Social Democrats displayed an important and useful initiative by holding in Helsinki a conference on disarmament to which Soviet and U.S. representatives were invited. In his report to the Vancouver congress, the Socialist International Secretary-General, Bernt Carlsson, drew attention to the proposals made by the Soviet representative at the Helsinki conference. These proposals, he said, range from the invitation of a high-level Socialist International delegation to Moscow to proposals for setting up the machinery for permanent joint actions by Communist and Social Democratic parties on disarmament questions. Bernt Carlsson described these proposals as "controversial" from the Social Democratic point of view. However, he said they should be discussed in a serious way. "The time is past when such proposals could be treated just by silence," he declared.

For his part, Willy Brandt mentioned as evidence of the Social Democratic efforts towards strengthening détente the "direct contacts" established by some affiliated parties of the Socialist International with "politically responsible forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." Referring to the obstacles that prevent the Socialist International as such from becoming "a suitable partner for negotiations," Willy Brandt declared at the same time that a study group on disarmament, set up within the Socialist International and led by Finnish Premier and Social Democratic Party Chairman Kalevi Sorsa, had been entrusted with the task of establishing the necessary contacts, with the Soviet Union as well.

Kalevi Sorsa delivered a report on disarmament, one of the main items on the agenda. Informing the congress of the tasks of his group and of the international meetings planned by it, he mentioned a message sent him by Leonid Brezhnev in reply to his letter shortly before the Vancouver congress. The Finnish Social Democratic leader said he had been pleased to receive a favourable answer from President Brezhnev concerning the possibility of a meeting and an exchange of opinions between the Soviet leadership and the study group on disarmament.

At the same time it should be said that the fight to end the arms race was not discussed by the Vancouver congress on the plane and to the extent required by the situation. This revealed the shortcoming recently noted in connection with the Helsinki conference by Reimund Seidelman, a leader of the International Union of Socialist Youth, namely, underestimation of the need to overcome the scepticism and distrust sown by the opponents of détente, to give a rebuff to those who spread such sentiments, and to mobilize public opinion in support of agreements on arms limitation and reduction.

Unfortunately, the Vancouver congress did not have as its task the drawing up of a concrete Social Democratic action programme in this field. This task still remains on the order of the day, as does another serious problem: to what extent the directives of individual parties and the Socialist International as a whole will be carried out by Social Democratic governments. This, incidentally, was noted by Bernt Carlsson in his report to the congress. Sometimes, he complained, "a river of words is emptied into a desert of inaction."

It is necessary, delegates stressed, to work for peace. Characterizing the Socialist International's tasks in this field, Willy Brandt said the Social Democrats had a great deal of work to do. Needless to say, the

important thing is to see that these words are backed by practical deeds.

The Socialist International and the Developing Nations

The Vancouver congress clearly demonstrated the Social Democrats' desire to overcome its inherent "Eurocentrism" and become a "world" movement enjoying support not only in Western Europe, in the industrial capitalist countries, but also in Latin America, Asia and Africa.

The reasons are obvious. This desire is evidently motivated by the economic and political interests of the West in general and the party and political interests of Social Democracy in particular. At any rate, this circumstance determined the salient feature of the Vancouver congress, moreover on two counts.

First, the organizers of the congress went out of their way to invite as many representatives of developing countries as possible, including representatives from a number of liberation movements. More than 50 political parties, organizations and movements in Latin America and Africa had been invited to send their observers to Vancouver and about 30 responded to the invitation. The congress was addressed by fighters against imperialism, racism, military dictatorships and fascist regimes. Among them were representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa, the South West Africa People's Organization of Namibia, the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, the United National Independence Party of Zambia, the Sandinist National Liberation Front of Nicaragua, and Chilean democrats.

Second, the agenda of the congress revealed a desire to impart a "universal" character to the Socialist International, to "internationalize the International." It included such questions as the economic situation in the capitalist world (the "world economy," according to the official formulation), a new international economic order, the transnational corporations, and the situation in southern Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific. Special emphasis was laid on the relationship between the industrial and the developing nations, or the "North-South problem," as Social Democratic leaders prefer to term it. Most of the time allotted for

discussion was devoted to the latter subject.

That the problems above are topical and complex is beyond doubt, and careful analysis will evidently show much that was rational and useful in what was said at the Vancouver congress during the discussion of these issues. At the same time, however, there was a tendentious desire to present Social Democracy as the sole proponent and champion of a restructuring of international economic relations on a more just and equal basis and to pass off the very concept of a "new international economic order" as the embodiment of "democratic socialism."

One cannot, of course, agree with this. To use this problem for the purpose of ideological speculation is to complicate, not facilitate, its solution.

What the peoples want is not disquisitions on the theme of "solidarity" and "justice," not declarations and promises, and not abstract appeals to renounce "national egoism," but practical steps to bridge the gulf between the industrial and developing countries, a gulf that continues to widen. The talks between the leading capitalist states and the developing countries on the question of restructuring international economic relations have not yet produced tangible results due to the West's reluctance to make concessions. This circumstance was stressed by delegates from newly-free states who insisted that the West European Social Democrats take a more effective stand on this question.

The basically correct idea running through many speeches was that restructuring of international economic relations is impossible without structural changes in both the developed and the developing countries. The capitalist system as a whole was criticized in more or less sharp terms. The causes of unemployment and inflation, said Michael Harrington of the United States, lie in the capitalist structure, and in the international monopolies being able to dictate prices. The plight of the youth in the conditions of the present crisis of capitalism was described by a representative of the International Union of Socialist Youth. "The younger generation," he said, "is losing faith in society. We can no longer tolerate youth unemployment. It is time to take action."

However, invectives against capitalism were, as a rule, accompanied by rather moderate proposals of a reformist character. It was in this spirit that the question of the transnational corporations was discussed. The congress approved the report of a study group on the multinationals, led by Oscar Debunne, a Belgian Socialist, which outlined Social Democratic policy on this question. Vast economic, political and social power was concentrated in the hands of the international monopolies, Oscar Debunne said in presenting the report. If the present trend of their growth remained, the entire life of society would eventually be determined by their interests alone. Concrete facts were cited in the discussion showing that the transnational corporations were co-operating with racist and other anti-popular regimes and had been involved in the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. It was also shown that the military industrial corporations engage in "illegal and criminal practices" and speed up the arms race.

What conclusions did the Social Democrats draw from these facts? The study group advocated the creation of some "countervailing force" to oppose the transnational corporations through the adoption of "behaviour codes" and other legislative restrictions, government intervention in the economy, trade union actions, etc. However, its recommendations were confined to the wish that the transnational companies should be placed under control and their power restricted and that they should be made to "serve the common interest." The transnational corporations, the report warned, would undoubtedly resist any measures aimed at restricting their power and influence. The study group evidently did not have much faith in the effectiveness of its proposals.

In Search of a Common Strategy

The attempts to extend the sphere of Social Democratic influence by including in it parties and movements objectively impelled to fight Western monopoly and imperialist domination are bound to exacerbate the apparent and latent contradictions within the Social Democratic ranks. Social Democratic leaders are faced with the need to work out some common strategy as a basis for rallying heterogeneous political

forces and for co-ordinating their widely divergent interests and aspirations.

As a matter of fact this was precisely the aim pursued by the organizers of the Vancouver congress in devoting so much time to the discussion of a "new international economic order" and other aspects of the relationship between industrial and developing countries. The basic elements of a broader and "updated" political strategy for Social Democracy have so far been only outlined, but they are already discernible. The emphasis above all is on the inter-relationship between the maintenance of peace and social progress.

The Social Democrats are unquestionably right in stressing this inter-relationship. It has also been repeatedly emphasized by the Communists, as, for instance, in the document of the Berlin (1976) Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties. There are important points of contact in the Communist and Social Democratic approach, especially as regards the ending of the arms race and reduction of armaments and military spending as prerequisites for social progress and, particularly, for overcoming the economic backwardness of developing countries.

But there are also differences. "Détente cannot be divorced from development," the congress resolution says. This is so indeed. Yet détente concerns interstate relations, while Social Democrats, as the resolution shows, would like to interpret it more loosely, as a principle for settling any conflicts, including conflicts "within nations."

One can understand the concern felt by Social Democratic leaders when they come out against the kindling of "sterile conflicts": the dimensions of economic and social problems in the world are such as to make it imperative for all countries to concentrate all their efforts and resources on their positive solution. But the just struggle of peoples for social and national liberation is not a "sterile conflict." The determination to continue this struggle was, incidentally, expressed at the congress by representatives of African and Latin American liberation movements. In these circumstances the Social Democrats, too, were constrained to denounce colonialism and exploitation, apartheid and racism, and express solidarity with the popular struggle in South

Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chile, Nicaragua and Puerto Rico.

The duality of this stand is indicative of the difficulties encountered by Social Democrats in attempting to frame a common strategy according with their present plans and objectives.

The same duality also characterized the Social Democratic approach to the human rights question, which figured on the congress agenda as an element of the Social Democratic strategy.

On the one hand, the congress discussed defence of human rights in the capitalist world, including social and economic rights and the maintenance and stability of society in the conditions in increasing political terror in a number of Western countries (terrorism was the subject of a special discussion within this theme). As the congress resolution noted, "the right to life, the right to work, the right to housing and the right to literacy—everyone of these is today called into question in different parts of the world."

Many speakers pointed to the constant violation of social and civil rights in the capitalist world, the capitalist West included. The human rights issue was directly linked with the search of ways towards détente, peace and social progress, and this should be noted as a positive factor. Willy Brandt referred to this link by saying that "the pursuit of a constructive peace and development policy is the best way to help people all over the world to secure their rights." The congress resolution also stresses that the human rights issue should not be used to derive political benefit.

On the other hand, some Social Democrats in the discussion of this theme paid tribute to a different kind of "strategy," that employed by Right-wing, reactionary propaganda. Some speeches contained invectives against the social and political system of socialist countries. On the final day of its work the congress was addressed by political ghosts dwelling in the backyard of the Socialist International—émigrés from East European countries and the Soviet Baltic republics. It was, indeed, a strange spectacle which could not be explained only by the desire, with due regard for North American public sentiment, somehow to "offset" the anti-imperialist speeches

delivered by delegates and observers from a number of Latin American states.

A number of delegates used the congress rostrum for attacks on the ideology and policy of the communist movement. For instance, Bettino Craxi, Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, tried to cast aspersions on the revolutionary way of transition from capitalism to socialism. More, he practically made the continuation of détente contingent on changes of a Social Democratic nature in the political system of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. His countryman, Mauro Ferri of the Social Democratic Party, went so far as to insinuate that the Communist Party policy had created the conditions for increased terror in Italy. Mario Soares, former Premier of Portugal, again prattled about the danger of a "communist dictatorship" that had existed in his country. According to the perverted logic of the French Socialist Lionel Gaspin, the Western intervention in Africa was prompted by the aid rendered by socialist countries to newly-free African states. The "communist menace"—such, it turns out, is the "reason" for this intervention. That is how the actual state of affairs is misrepresented and the true reasons and motives of imperialist policy are glossed over.

Anti-communism still persists in Social Democratic quarters and makes itself constantly felt. It is clear that the tendency of some Social Democratic leaders to yield to the pressure of reactionary forces and concede to anti-communist sentiments merely increases the internal contradictory nature and duality of Social Democratic policy as a whole.

The 14th Congress of the Socialist International reflected the multiform processes at work within the Social Democratic movement and the wide gamut of interests and aspirations of the different parties involved. The contribution of Social Democracy to a solution of mankind's formidable problems largely depends on whether it will be able to preserve, develop and realize those aspects of its present policy that are consonant with the real interests of the struggle for a stable peace and social progress.

UPHOLDING A JUST CAUSE

Palestine is the cornerstone of the entire Middle East settlement, U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim said on the eve of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People which the U.N. General Assembly instituted at its 32nd session and which was marked for the first time on November 29.

This event once again showed how closely linked the Palestinian issue is with the overall situation in the Middle East and with the movement to strengthen world peace and international security. The attitude to the struggle of the Palestinian patriots and to their legitimate national rights reveals the true nature of the line taken by different countries and political quarters on the Middle East problem.

It is not surprising that all peace-lovers throughout the world join with the Palestinians in categorically rejecting the separate deals that Egypt and Israel are concluding under U.S. aegis, especially the so-called "autonomy" devised for the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip. Ibrahim Souss, the PLO representative in France, likened this "autonomy" to what the racists offer Africans in the bantustans of South Africa.

Developments this year have shown that despite all the manoeuvres engaged in by Israel and its patrons, effective international solidarity with the Palestinian people's just struggle has gained considerable momentum. Thus, the International Conference of Solidarity with the African and Arab Peoples, held in Addis Ababa in September, voiced unanimous support for the stalwart patriots of Palestine. Of particular importance was the Baghdad Arab summit which reaffirmed, among other things, that the PLO is the sole lawful

representative of the Palestinian people.

The leaders of the Palestinian movement invariably underscore the significance of stronger ties with the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries. The Palestinians have acclaimed the Warsaw Treaty Declaration which explicitly states that a comprehensive political Middle East settlement must also ensure the Palestinian Arab people their inalienable right to self-determination and the establishment of their own homeland. The statement in which the leaders of the Communist and Workers' parties and governments of the six socialist countries denounced the policy of separate Israeli-Egyptian deals under U.S. aegis has evoked broad response among the Palestinians and all Arab peoples.

The international backing given the Palestinians in their struggle for their rights is an earnest of the ultimate triumph of their just cause.

Y. TYUNKOV

DAMNING DISCLOSURE

Flint is the nickname of a Black African who from 1972 had been with Rhodesia's Selous-scouts, a commando force serving the racist Smith regime. This man, who recently fled to neighbouring Mozambique, told a group of democratic lawyers from the U.S.A., Belgium and Britain that the slaying of British missionaries in Elim last summer had been the handiwork of a Selous-scout force commanded by two mercenaries—Dowson-Gunston and a certain "Pete" from South Africa.

Flint divulged that the Rhodesian authorities had learned that the Elim missionaries were helping Zimbabwe Patriotic Front fighters. He said that a Selous-scout force of thirty men, masquerading as guerrillas, surrounded the mission at daybreak on June 13,


burst into the houses and slaughtered all 13 adults and children there after torturing them for several hours.

The Rhodesian authorities ascribed the slaying to guerrillas to discredit Zimbabwe freedom fighters, a lie that was readily snatched up by Western propaganda media.

The Elim massacre is far from the only provocation the Rhodesian racists have staged in their "counter-insurgency" drive. Selous-scout bandits kill off peaceful inhabitants, including whites, suspected of sympathy for the guerrillas and raze entire villages. However, this cannot stop the mounting movement for liberation. No wonder even Smith's trusty Selous-scouts are deserting.

P. SERGEYEV

U.S. MID-TERM ELECTION RESULTS



Parties	Senators	Representatives	Governors
Democratic	58	276	32
Republican	41	159	18
Independent	1	0	0

AFRICAN AMBITIONS OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

VICTOR SIDENKO

On December 29 the leaders of eleven African political parties met for a one-day conference in Dakar, the capital of Senegal. Besides the Socialist Party of Senegal, the participants were the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt, the Sudanese Socialist Union, the People's Progressive Party of Gambia, the Moroccan Istiqlal Party and Socialist Union of Popular Forces, the Mauritian Labour and Social Democratic parties, the Mauritanian People's Party, the Destour Socialist Party of Tunisia, and the United National Independence Party of Zambia. All these parties had been invited to attend as guests the 9th Congress of the Senegalese Socialist Party held on the eve of the conference, as had been the Socialist Parties of Portugal and France (the latter also represented the Socialist International) and the African Party for Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. The last-mentioned, however, refused to take part in the conference.

According to the official communiqué, the discussions at the eleven-party meeting centred on the establishment of a Confederation of African Socialist Parties, or, as the press has termed the projected organization, an "African Socialist International."

The idea of such an association is not a new one. It was hatched quite some time ago by the leadership of the Socialist International, whose involvement in the Dakar meeting is nobody's secret. For one thing, the chief organizer of the meeting was General Secretary of the Socialist Party of Senegal and the country's President Léopold Sédar Senghor, who also happens to be a vice-chairman of the Socialist International.

The Background

The Socialist International began to evince interest in African developments as far back as the early

sixties. Its 7th Congress held in 1961 was the first to be attended by representatives of African countries. And the year before the International had sent a fact-finding mission to Africa. The authors of the document "Three Views on Africa," compiled by the British Labourites, the French Socialists and the West German Social Democrats to sum up the trip, contended that "democratic socialism" was applicable to the African situation and that Africa and Western Europe shared the same "democratic values." At the same time they went out of their way to argue that the experience of the socialist countries was unacceptable and even counter-indicated for Africa. Instead they set forth what they called an "African path of development" which actually was nothing but a camouflaged variant of neo-colonialist "partnership."

This programme, based as it was on superficial knowledge of the social and political realities and requirements of the embattled continent, resulted in no appreciable shift in African political thinking towards Social Democratic ideology. And no wonder. For the ideology and policy of Social Democracy, being rooted in some privileged sections of the European working class, did not lend themselves to "transplantation" to African countries fighting for their national sovereignty and independent development, indeed, were diametrically opposed to their interests. The doctrine of "democratic socialism" proved just as alien for Africa as for other parts of the Third World. Progressive Africans acquainted with the situation in Europe were well aware of the fact that the Social Democratic parties of Western Europe that propounded this "democratic socialism" had done nothing in practical terms to combat capitalist exploitation in their own countries—not even when they were in government.

Some of the more sober-minded

Socialist leaders themselves had to admit that social reformist models held no attraction for awakening Africa. For instance, the Danish Social Democrat K. B. Anderson, speaking at the 12th Congress of the Socialist International in 1972, said that the Third World peoples, including the Africans, regarded the Socialist International's programme as one of collaboration with neo-colonialist forces. The Belgian Socialist P. Bouvier put it equally plainly in the article "Socialism Face to Face with the Third World" published in 1974. The African countries, he noted, rejected the Socialists' proposals both as regards the type of society they advocated and as regards their development strategy.

Inner Weakness

True, here and there the Social Democrats succeeded in imposing on Africans reformist doctrines and policies. However, the practice of "democratic socialism" only tightened the squeeze of neo-colonialist oppression, strengthened the positions of the transnational corporations, and tended to perpetuate social and economic backwardness. Madagascar is a case in point. The Malagasy Social Democrats, who were in power for more than ten years, followed the line of the Socialist International and in effect became an instrument of neo-colonialism. In the end, however, they proved politically bankrupt and were swept away by the revolutionary movement. Their rule, regrettably, dearly cost the Malagasy people.

The setbacks suffered by Social-Democrat-type politicians stood out particularly glaringly against the background of the impressive successes of the revolutionary democratic forces in those African countries which have been guiding themselves by the principles of scientific socialism and have drawn on the experience of socialist countries. Their achievements have given added impetus to the spread of scientific socialism in present-day Africa—a fact evidenced by the growth of the number of parties that have declared their adherence to scientific socialism (the Congolese Party of Labour, MPLA—Party of Labour in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique, etc.) and of states that

ver, wanted more than that and insisted that he be given a "degree" of legislative power in addition to his executive functions. But it appears that even that was not enough; he wanted absolute personal control over the country and factual elimination of the junta's influence. Towards the close of 1976 he conducted a referendum of his own among the generals to establish who was for him and who against. The Italian L'Espresso commented that "information from reliable sources suggests that the air force and navy, with the exception of one admiral, unanimously voted against Pinochet. The carabinieri ... were 60 per cent for and 40 per cent against."

And the journal added that "there was a good deal of opposition" in Pinochet's own branch of the armed services.

And so, with growing isolation in the military leadership, Pinochet resorted to intimidation against his colleagues. The secret police is coming to enjoy more authority than the armed forces.

Of course, it would be wrong to exaggerate this bickering within the junta and among its close supporters. It can hardly be taken as proof of the existence, as some in the West maintain, of both hawks and doves within the junta. Nevertheless, these backstage developments reflect the concern felt within the army, navy, air force and police. Many in the officer corps, the mainstay of the regime, are in a state of turmoil.

In discussing these developments, Luis Corvalan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Chile, said in an interview with Unita in March 1977: "We are carefully watching developments within the armed forces from the standpoint of overthrowing Pinochet. All the more so if the process goes beyond a simple change of personalities or façade, or some minor reform in which the people have no part... Our aim is a democratic government representative of all the anti-fascist forces. And, better still, a government joined by the genuinely patriotic elements of the armed forces prepared to fight on the side of the people."

Pinochet wanted to prevent such a development by his bogus referendum. But has he not miscalculated, disclosing the deep cracks behind the façade of his regime?

A. BARYSHEV

CROOKED MIRROR

In its last issue for 1977 the Hamburg weekly Der Spiegel offered its readers such a plateful of anti-Soviet concoctions as might well make even Springer's propaganda kitchen grow green with envy. As a matter of fact, in the one issue three dishes were served up at once.

Dish one: the Soviet Union has begun to treat Bonn shabbily, playing "hide-and-seek" with it.

Dish two: in its jubilee year, 1977, the U.S.S.R. found itself in total isolation in the international arena.

Dish three: anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union has been carried to such lengths that even "nazi propaganda is being drawn on."

How the stomachs of Der Spiegel readers have reacted to all this we do not know. But the stench given off by this fare is clearly compounded of the reek of "true Aryanism" and the musty smell of the Goebbelsian big lie.

Der Spiegel has chosen to go in for conjectures, one more absurd than the other, about the postponement to a later date of Leonid Brezhnev's projected visit to Bonn. It blithely ignores facts that are plain to any unbiased and not totally uninformed observer. For instance, that in 1977 the Soviet Union was preoccupied with matters associated with the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution and the drafting and adoption of the new Soviet Constitution. Or that there can be all kinds of objective reasons for putting off visits. For instance, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt went to Warsaw later than he had originally planned, because of the aggravation of the internal political situation in West Germany as a result of the wave of terrorism it experienced at the time. But reasons obvious to any soberminded person

apparently are beyond the grasp of the editors of Der Spiegel.

Der Spiegel qualifies all complications in the international arena and all the zigzags in the policy of one or another country as "setbacks" for Soviet foreign policy. According to it, the Soviet Union is "in the dock" at the Belgrade meeting of participants in the all-European Conference. In the Middle East it has been "left in the sidelines," as if involvement in separate deals could bring political credit to anyone. And in South America "Soviet expansion [where has the CIA been?—V.K.] hardly has a chance of succeeding."

Why all this nonsense? The reason, we are told, is that all these "setbacks" for Soviet foreign policy have to be paid for by Bonn, which has become a "convenient scapegoat" for the Kremlin!

The Soviet Union has not given the slightest cause for anyone to doubt the consistency and sincerity of its friendly attitude towards the Federal Republic. This is well known to Bonn, which, as Chancellor Schmidt said, seeks to build its relations with the U.S.S.R. with an eye to the 21st century—on the solid, long-term foundation of détente and the good-neighbourship already achieved. West German government leaders are now speaking of the new impetus that the coming Soviet-West German summit meeting could give to relations between our countries. There are good grounds for such expectations.

The same issue of Der Spiegel contains also articles on whisky and "male fantasies." Printing them side by side has something of a symbolic significance, considering the irrepressible anti-Soviet fantasy of the weekly's writers and editors.

V. KUZNETSOV

DUET FOR BRASS

The NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, the U.S. General Alexander Haig, began the year with a speech in Bonn that can only be described as a paean to the neutron bomb. Its deployment, the General said, would give political leaders greater freedom to make use of their nuclear strike power. And the use of the neutron bomb in wartime would ensure greater military suc-

cess.

The U.S. General's neutron refrain was caught up by his West German colleague and newly appointed deputy, Gerhard Schmückle. "The quantitative and qualitative build-up of military strength in the East far exceeds its defence needs," he declared. A touching unanimity indeed.

G. VIKTOROV

have launched out on progressive paths of development.

Ever wider sections of society in some African countries are coming to see by their own experience that the policy pursued for years by the leaders of West European Social Democracy in effect runs counter to the interests of the national liberation movement. At the most difficult, crucial periods of development the Social Democratic leaders virtually sided with the imperialist colonialist forces. This was the case at the time of the Suez crisis, during the struggle against colonialism in Algeria and in Indo-China, and when the people of Angola repulsed the intervention mounted by the South African racists and their accomplices. Needless to say, the hostility of the Social Democrats towards the liberation movement could not win them popularity.

The growing political isolation of European Social Democracy in Africa is also due to the anti-communism of a certain section of its leadership. The anti-communist postulates of these quarters run counter to the sentiment of broad sections of progressive African opinion. Speaking of this sentiment, a leader of the Congolese Party of Labour observed:

"Anti-communism plays into the hands of imperialism, which, in order to perpetuate its domination and ruthless exploitation, is seeking to undermine, discredit and crush by all possible means the social system which points to the peoples the way to liberation. The African peoples are not anti-communists, they have no stake in anti-communism. On the contrary, they are grateful to the socialist camp which opened before them the widest vistas of freedom. Anti-communism can only cause damage to the African peoples."

It is not given to the Socialist International with its tactics of service to neo-colonialism to "spill over" from Europe to gain a foothold of any permanence in the countries of the Third World, the African countries included. According to data collected by the Polish researcher Professor I. W. Golebiowski, Social Democratic parties belonging to the Socialist International are to be found only in fifteen of the countries of Asia, Oceania, Africa and Latin America, and in most cases they represent no serious political force. Only two of them are in

Africa—the Socialist Party of Senegal and the Labour Party of Mauritius, if the totally bankrupt and virtually nonexistent Malagasy Socialist Party is discounted.

Setback in Tunis

Seeking to improve this state of affairs, leading circles in the Socialist International have in recent years notably stepped up their activity in Africa and begun to pay more attention to its problems. The resolutions of recent congresses of the International have put forward some slogans with an appeal for the Africans, such as condemnation of the racist regimes in southern Africa and calls for more economic aid to the continent's countries. Besides, more emphasis has begun to be placed on popularization of theses appealing to the nationalist sentiment of certain sections of the African public, such as the theory of the "equal responsibility" of the capitalist West and the socialist countries for Africa's cultural and economic lag, the "rich North and poor South" concept, and the like.

Needless to say, this does not signify that there has been any revision of the previous position of Western Social Democracy, nor can it compensate for the lack on the part of the Socialist International leaders of a clear-cut, tried and tested platform of socio-economic measures aimed at ensuring the national regeneration of the African countries and laying the groundwork for reforms that would pave the way to socialism.

In embarking on this policy of building bridges to Africa, the Socialist leaders were least of all concerned with ways and means of securing the liberation of African countries from neo-colonialist exploitation and dependence. Their objectives are remote indeed from the interests of the African peoples. In brief, these objectives are the following:

- heightening the international prestige of Social Democracy by extending its influence in Africa;

- isolation of the revolutionary democratic forces that reject the opportunist views and policies of Social Democracy;

- discrediting scientific socialism and contraposing to it the concepts of bourgeois and Social Democratic reformism;

- securing the ideological hinter-

land for the neo-colonialist offensive on Africa;

- the creation of a permanent organization of African political parties through which the Socialist International could influence political and social developments in the continent and strengthen its own foothold there.

With these aims in view a conference of African political parties was held in Tunis in July 1975 to examine "planned development and African roads to socialism." There is abundant evidence that the leaders of the Socialist International counted on the Tunis forum yielding them substantial political dividends. But these expectations were not fated to materialize and the results of the Tunis meeting were skimpy indeed. True, a declaration was adopted by consensus, but the vague and contradictory document did not go beyond the bounds of the traditional Social Democratic reform programmes, with some neo-colonialist postulates thrown in, such as the thesis of "Euro-Arab-African co-operation." The most important aim—the establishment of a "bureau for liaison with the Socialist International"—was not achieved. Most of the participants rejected the idea outright. And this meant the failure of the main purpose for which the Socialist International and the vehicles of its influence in Africa came to Tunis.*

The Ship That Was Not Launched

Notwithstanding the Tunis setback, the leaders of the Socialist International did not give up the idea of uniting the Socialist parties of Africa and setting up a permanent body to maintain contact between them and their European counterparts and the International. Having recovered from the fiasco, they proceeded with new vigour to give effect to these plans. A coordinating committee consisting of the representatives of the ruling parties of five African countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal) was set up and instructed to draw up a charter for a Confederation of African Socialist Parties and to prepare for the Dakar meeting which was to examine the document. An analysis of the charter

*For a more detailed background picture see article "Africa and the Socialist International" by Veniamin Midtsev in New Times, No. 38, 1975.

reveals that most of the planks on which it is projected to build this organization are a repetition of traditional Social Democratic programmes and is of a purely declarative nature. It by-passes the question of how democracy and socialism are to be achieved in African countries and makes no mention of the need to free them from imperialist dependence and neo-colonialist exploitation. According to the draft of the charter, the Confederation could establish relations with other international organizations pursuing the same aims, including the Socialist International. As regards its organizational structure, it is patterned after the Socialist International, as could be seen from Senghor's statement at the Dakar conference. The leading bodies would be the general conference, bureau and executive secretariat. The initial press commentaries on the Dakar meeting create the impression that it was convened to endorse the draft charter and to announce the establishment of the Confederation. The communiqué on the meeting, however, describes it merely as a "consultative" gathering, and indicates that there is much in the drafts of the documents that still has to be finalized, for which purpose a special commission was set up. Among other things, the participants pointed to the "absence of an African emphasis in the charter and in the concepts of democracy and socialism." Judging by everything, there was also disagreement as regards the nature of the relations between the Socialist International and the projected Confederation, and a number of other problems. The final decision on the convocation of the founding congress of the Confederation was put off until the next conference, which is to meet in Cairo. In other words, the ship of the "African Socialist International" still remains on the stocks.

But for all that, African progressive opinion is closely following the continuing manoeuvres of its architects and urges keeping a watchful eye on the attempts to implant opportunist social reformist trends in Africa. For it is precisely with the help of these trends that the neo-colonialists are hoping to be able to mislead the continent's peoples and to impede their final liberation.

FRANCE

Under the Roofs of Paris

VLADIMIR KELIN

Some people love Paris, others curse it, some yearn for it and others flee from it. And each is right in his own way.

"There is as much variety in a walk through the streets of Paris as in any exhibition," the Russian author Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin wrote. "A Moveable Feast" was how the young Ernest Hemingway spoke of the Paris he loved. People the world over dream of Paris, it is a city that excites imagination more than Rome or New York, said one French journalist. As for the Parisians themselves, they would like to leave their city for good or at least for the weekend. Pierre Viansson-Ponté, the well-informed *Le Monde* columnist, affirms that there are very many people in Paris who dream of a life in the provinces and many people in the provinces who dread the prospect of having to live in Paris.

The Paris Kaleidoscope

The beauty of the capital of France is generally recognized, today as hundreds of years ago. The Eiffel Tower, the Arc de Triomphe, the Cathedral of Notre Dame, the Champs-Élysées and the Grands Boulevards with their innumerable cinemas, restaurants and smart, expensive stores attract polyglot crowds of tourists like a magnet. The Latin Quarter is in its usual state of perpetual motion. The picturesque little square near Saint-Séverin Church, between the Saint-Michel Boulevard and the Seine, has been closed to motor traffic and given over to pedestrians. The tiny shops, cafés and bistros there are literally piled one atop the other. The secrets of the French cuisine are not hidden behind thick walls—there is nothing between the kitchens and the street but plate glass. And if one

adds the appetizing aroma that seeps from all cracks, it will not be hard to see that a passer-by is not only a witness of but also a party to the gastronomic ritual, even if he is only strolling along the pavement.

The different epochs have left labyrinths of narrow little streets of shabby houses with wooden shutters and garrets, and wide thoroughfares like the Saint-Michel, Saint-Germain, Strasbourg and Sébastopol boulevards. Speaking of the ground plan for the city's main thoroughfares drawn up by Baron Haussman, the prefect of the Seine Department who was in charge of the reconstruction of Paris during the Second Empire, the great Le Corbusier said that it was as if he had fired cannon balls right through the centuries-old maze of Paris streets. Here is the opulent Avenue Foch, where some flats are beyond the reach even of people with large bank accounts and where oil operators from the Persian Gulf emirates reserve whole storeys and houses just in case they happen to visit Paris. Here too are districts where immigrant workers live. Reports appearing in the press from time to time about the appallingly crowded living conditions there shock the respectable reader. But tabloids and illustrated magazines quickly offset the impression with some soulful article describing, for instance, how that wonder-boy of French show business Johnny Halliday spends his time on the secluded island in the ocean whither he retires to recover from another of his regular quarrels with singer Sylvie Vartan.

The Lido, the city's No. 1 cabaret, has moved to new, bigger premises in the Champs-Élysées. This is the cabaret, say illustrated magazines, where you can see the world's "most beautiful" women—chiefly Scandinavian, some British and West German, but very few French—who are better at show-

REFORMIST VIEW OF OUR TIME

ment. Far-reaching ideas on this score were advanced in Leonid Brezhnev's Berlin speech of October 6, 1979. Incidentally, Kreisky was one of the first to qualify this speech as a token of good will helping to build confidence between East and West. Indicative too is it that in the present aggravated international situation Kreisky numbers among those Social Democratic leaders who are urging the continued pursuance of a policy of détente in Europe and are opposed to a return to the cold war.

Kreisky examines from a positive angle problems of East-West economic co-operation, which he considers to be an important aspect of the Helsinki understandings. He criticizes—true, indirectly—the notorious U.S. Senate amendment imposing restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union. The Western countries, Kreisky says, have a stake in economic co-operation with the socialist countries inasmuch as they lack sufficient raw material resources of their own. He advocates the establishment of an integrated power system in Europe, in particular through co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

One of the chapters of the book is devoted to an analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The prominence given to the situation in this explosive area is explained by the fact that the author is in charge of Middle East affairs in the Socialist International. Much of what he has to say about the dangerous situation in the region and its causes is realistic enough. For one thing, he condemns the policy pursued by imperialism in the Middle East in the fifties and sixties, and, in particular, the Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression of 1956. Justified too is his polemics with Zionism, which he equates with racism. Also valid is his thesis that the tension in the Middle East can be dispelled by due respect for the rights of all the countries and peoples of the area, including the right of the Palestinians to their own statehood.

A good part of the book is devoted to an analysis of the social and political problems of capitalism today. The author lauds the Austrian system of "social partnership." Thanks to this form of class collaboration, Kreisky avers, the Austrian workers have achieved more in the social and material respects than the working people of other West European countries have won through strike action.

The fact is, however, that this "social partnership" has to a great extent facilitated the conversion of

Austria into a preserve for the multinational monopolies. Seeking to justify the policy of "class peace," Kreisky praises "ideal examples" of co-operation between the Austrian government and the employers, and the encouragement of the latter by means of tax exemptions and credits.

It is noteworthy that Kreisky tries to defend this policy not only by expatiating on its practical expediency but also by references to Marxism. According to him, "social partnership as such does not contradict the teaching of Karl Marx." The very fact that a top Social Democratic leader invokes Marx and his teaching, which Social Democracy at one time declared "obsolete," is symptomatic. It testifies to the recognition by the Social Democrats of the correctness of a number of theses advanced by Marx. As a matter of fact, "The Time We Live In" contains a good many compliments to Marx. Kreisky stresses that "Marx's great historical service consists in the fact that he posed before the working-class movement its basic political goal—the building of socialism." But at the same time Kreisky seeks to persuade the reader that Marxist theories are incompatible with the practice of real socialism. No less categorically does he insist that the economy cannot be run along the lines envisaged by Marx and that some of the present-day economic processes allegedly cannot be explained by Marxian methods.

Kreisky's logic is understandable, for class-oriented, Marxist analysis can in no way be fitted into the Procrustean bed of social reformism. In this connection this statement by the author is noteworthy: "One cannot demand that those who join our movement ... swear allegiance to Marx and unconditionally accept a world outlook and theories based on the legacy of Marx."

Concretely what road does Kreisky recommend for the working-class movement? His book contains no few high-flown phrases about "democratic socialism." But what exactly is meant by this remains unclear. Incidentally, from the standpoint of a vice-president of the Socialist International, there is no real need for a concrete definition inasmuch as "each interprets the substance of democratic socialism in his own way." The vagueness of formulations is of course not surprising. For both the Swedish Social Democrats, who governed their country for more than forty years without sharing power, and their Austrian opposite numbers, who have headed

the government for nearly ten years, have not only failed to bring their countries closer to socialism, but have not given effect to many of the prime social objectives proclaimed by the ideologues of "democratic socialism."

To divert attention from this, Kreisky tries to discredit existing socialism. His book is full of anti-communist stereotypes borrowed from the stock-in-trade of bourgeois propaganda. Here you have the alleged anti-humane substance of existing socialism and the "failure" of planned economy, as well as sallies against what is called the "expansionist policy" pursued by the countries of the socialist community in relation to the developing countries.

In an effort to bolster up his anti-communist theses the author repeatedly invokes the recent past. But at the same time he passes over in silence such a cardinal development in world history as the defeat of fascism by the Soviet Army, thousands of whose fighting men found their last resting place also in Austria. Nor does Kreisky make any mention of the fact that it was the Communists who were in the front ranks of the fighters against fascist dictatorship. This too is hardly surprising, for the author rejects the possibility of co-operation between the Communists and the Social Democrats on a platform common to the entire working-class movement. Between the lines of the book one can actually detect hopes for a split in the ranks of the Communists, for the rejection by some of them of the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. Fully in accord with the author's anti-communist concepts is also the idea of adapting the Final Act of the all-European Conference to political actions that can hardly be described as anything but interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries. Whether the author wished it or not, many of the anti-communist theses in the book amount not so much to an ideological struggle against Marxism-Leninism as to variants of the "psychological warfare" waged against the socialist countries by the opponents of détente.

"The Time We Live In" reflects the positions of many social reformist leaders. While advocating détente and improvement of East-West relations, they wittingly or unwittingly often uphold the ideological principles of the proponents of a "tough policy" towards existing socialism. Though taking into consideration some of the workers' most pressing demands, social reformism regrettably has not renounced doctrines that serve the basic interests of the monopoly quarters for whom working-class unity is anathema.

V. SHVEITSER

DARING ESCAPE

In the early hours of a January day an alarm was raised in Pretoria Local Prison. Three anti-apartheid fighters had broken out of this maximum-security jail, leaving life-like dummies in their cells.

The daring escape threw the South African authorities into confusion for nothing of the kind had happened in that jail since 1963. A high-ranking official of the Prison Department said that escape from the heavily guarded wing for political prisoners was extremely difficult. All sections of Pretoria Local Prison are separated from one another by numerous steel doors and grilles, with each warder having keys from two doors only.

Nevertheless, three South African white patriots—Alexander Moumbaris, 41, Stephen Lee, 28, and Timothy Jenkin, 31—managed to get through all the obstacles and escape from prison. With the help of comrades they slipped past numerous police posts and made their way into Zambia.

At a press conference organized in Lusaka by the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) the three fugitives, sitting among their friends, told the story of their participation in the movement against the apartheid regime.

Alex Moumbaris, a journalist and the eldest of the three, had taken part for many years in the liberation struggle. In July 1972 he and his wife Marie were arrested on the South Africa-Botswana border under the racist "Terrorism Act." The couple were accused of helping ANC members, of crossing the South African border into Botswana and Swaziland and back, and were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Alex was to serve 12 years in jail. Marie was released after four months because she was expecting a baby. Besides, she is a French citizen, and her release was demanded by the French authorities. She is now living in Paris with her son Boris, taking part in all campaigns for an end to the apartheid regime and for freedom for all political prisoners in South Africa.

Alex Moumbaris said the escape of the three prisoners was a big



Alexander Moumbaris and ANC President Oliver Tambo at a press conference in Lusaka.

Photo by author

victory for all concerned. He would not go into details so as not to endanger the friends who helped the three to break out of prison and reach free Zambia. Alex only revealed that the "underground machinery of the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and the people's army, Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), all of which we are part, played an essential role in getting us to where we are now."

Stephen Lee and Tim Jenkin studied at the social science department of Capetown University. Lee said the racist authorities regarded all students of this university as Communists, adding they were not mistaken as regards Tim Jenkin and himself. Both realized, he said, that the ANC alone was capable of leading the people to the establishment in South Africa of a state based on justice, without racial oppression, prisons and executions. They also saw that there was only one way to victory—active struggle against the apartheid regime.

Tim Jenkin said that he had met Stephen at the university in 1971 and they had both studied political science. However, they soon became disappointed with the lectures and set out to study Marxism, which gave the answers to many of the questions that interested them. On graduating from the university in 1974, Stephen Lee and Tim Jenkin continued their self-education. They established contacts with comrades from the ANC and began to receive the literature they needed. Their political education was helped by

the mounting strike and anti-racist movement in South Africa.

They were arrested on March 7, 1978, for preparing and distributing ANC pamphlets and leaflets, and were sentenced to 12 years.

Lee noted that, as distinct from inmates of the prisons for coloured South Africans, the white inmates in the political wing of their prison were not subjected to physical torture. The wardens tried to break them psychologically.

Lee said they began to plan their escape from the very first days in jail. It was not easy, Jenkin added, for they had to get through the numerous steel doors, evade many guards with watchdogs. He said that opposition to the apartheid policy was growing stronger every day even among a fairly wide section of the white population in South Africa. This applied first of all to young people who refuse to serve in the racist army and to suppress the South African Blacks, he said. Many young people emigrate, others stay in order to fight. Though the Botha government had carried out a number of superficial reforms, the racist nature of the regime had not changed. Therefore more and more South Africans, both white and coloured, were joining the ANC, which heads the liberation struggle.

Asked what the courageous three were planning to do now, Alex Moumbaris said they were looking forward to rejoining their families soop and were eager to get back into the struggle for the liberation of South Africa from oppression in any form. They would go where the Party would send them because they were at liberty while many of their comrades were still behind bars.

Moumbaris said that he and his comrades added their voices to those of progressives the world over in demanding the immediate release of all political prisoners in South Africa. The fascist authorities of that country were planning to commit a new bloody crime—to execute James Mange. Stephen Lee, Tim Jenkin and Alex Moumbaris said they would not rest until this noted freedom fighter and the other political prisoners were freed. They would continue their struggle.

S. PETUKHOV
Our Own Correspondent

Lusaka

Inasmuch as the Social Democrats occupy a prominent place in the political system of capitalism and the stand taken by the parties affiliated with the Socialist International influences international developments, writings by leading figures in the social reformist wing of the labour movement understandably command attention. One such work is Bruno Kreisky's "The Time We Live In."*

The author is an influential Western political leader, a Vice-President of the Socialist International, leader of the Austrian Socialist Party, and Chancellor of the Austrian Republic.

"The Time We Live In" focuses particular attention on international problems. Advocating the strengthening of détente, the author regards as the main objective the achievement of tangible results in the matter of disarmament and reduction of the danger of nuclear war. In his opinion the development of the détente process depends to a large extent on the building of confidence between East and West. It is indicative that Kreisky, like other prominent Social Democrats, does not question the sincerity of the Soviet Union's desire for military détente. The West, he says, should not give any cause for distrust; what is needed is initiatives that would help to strengthen confidence.

These realistic views coincide by and large with the stand of the Socialist International which is seeking to define its place in the process of scaling down military tension, a stand that found expression, in particular, in the establishment of a special Study Group on Disarmament, which established contact with the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States as well as a number of non-governmental organizations. In late September and early October last year the Study Group, headed by Finnish Social Democratic leader Kalevi Sorsa, visited Moscow, where it met with Leonid Brezhnev.

The contribution made by international Social Democracy to the achievement of military détente could be weightier than it is if the approach to this problem on the part of some of its leaders did not suffer from obvious inconsistencies. This applies also to the author of the book under review. For instance, he transparently hints, without bothering to adduce any proof, that the Soviet Union is not merely seeking military equilibrium, but allegedly is not averse to gaining a preponderance of strength. Yet, as everyone knows, the Soviet Union has put forward a great many initiatives aimed at securing a transition to military détente and actual disarma-

* Bruno Kreisky. Die Zeit in der wir leben. Betrachtungen zur internationalen Politik. Verlag Fritz Molden, Wien-München-Zürich-Innsbruck.